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WAR-TIME PRODUCTIVITY IN ITALY.

SIGLA: *A. e R.* = *Atene e Roma*. *Ann. Pisa* = *Annali della R. Scuola normale superiore di Pisa*. *Ath.* = *Athenaeum* (Pavia). *B. C.* = *Bullettino della Commissione archeologica del Governatorato di Roma e Bullettino del Museo dell' Impero Romano*. *Cap.* = *Capitolium*. *N. S.* = *Notizie degli Scavi*. *P. Ac.* = *Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia*. *Mem.* = *Memorie*. *Rendic.* = *Rendiconti*. *Riv. Ist. Archeol.* = *Rivista del R. Istituto d' Archeologia e Storia dell' Arte*. *Riv. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filologia*. *St. Ital.* = *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica*.

NOTES. The following results have resulted in certain changes in nomenclature

The time has come for an effort on the part of men of good will to remove the barriers which have arisen between various countries, first owing to military contingencies and then through difficulties of communication. The present survey endeavors to report on the more important classical publications which have appeared in Italy from 1940 to July 1946; it does not cover the activities of the several foreign institutions established in Rome which print in their own respective countries; nor will it repeat matter which has already been presented in *A. J. A.*, LXV (1941), pp. 451-75; in compensation, mention will be made of several undertakings which have not yet gone to press.

Opus adgredior opimum casibus!—Few serial publications in Italy have survived this prolonged *quinquennium*. *Riv. Fil.* completed vol. LXIX = XIX (1941). *N. S.* stopped with the end of II (of the new series) (1941), though a few subsequent articles appeared as preprints. *B. C.* was able to resume printing in 1945 with a thin installment entitled "LXXI 1943-5, fascicoli I-III." *Le Arti*, the successor to the *Bullettino d' Arte* of the Ministry, stopped with III (1941). Colleagues in Pavia have succeeded in maintaining *Athenaeum*, but on a reduced

scale; likewise the Florentines have kept *Studi Etruschi* alive, including XVI (1942) and one or more subsequent volumes which have not yet reached the libraries in Rome. But only the Pontifical Academy of Archaeology, in its position of extra-territoriality, has continued its normal procedure with *Rendiconti*, *Memorie*, and *Monumenti*. Among fellow-workers whose names will be missed in future publications are Mrs. Strong, Buonamici, Calza, Ducati, and Mengarelli. The labors of most archaeological administrators have gone into first the protection and then the reconditioning and reinstallation of the remains of antiquity: *si monumentum requiris, circumspice!*

On the other hand,—*non tamen adeo . . . sterile saeculum*—, the cult of the classics has not been forgotten in this land; and there are not lacking indications of the revival of these activities, brave attempts in the face of almost insurmountable obstacles. *Nunc demum redit animus*. A kindly welcome is assured for *Antiquitas, rivista trimestrale di antichità classica diretta da Riccardo Avallone* (Salerno, Via Indipendenza 92; Anno I, n. 1 was dated Jan.-March 1946); *La parola del passato, rivista di studi classici* (Naples, Gaetano Macchiaroli Editore); and *Arti figurative, rivista d' arte antica e moderna* (Rome, Danesi, Via Margutta 61; I, 1-2 bears the date June 1945).

The present survey makes no claim to completeness: it will have served its purpose if it guides to the wealth of material in these publications. E. g., it is possible to cite only a few of the longer articles in *Riv. Fil.*, New Series, XVIII-XIX (1940-1) and *St. Ital.*, XVII (1940): numerous brief but valuable studies will reward the enterprise of those who eventually find access to the journals themselves.

HISTORY

The veteran Gaetano De Sanctis has brought out the third edition of his *Storia dei Greci dalle origini alla fine del secolo V* (Florence, "La Nuova Italia," 1942: 2 vols., pp. 585, 580). He has also published *Pericle* (Biblioteca Storica Principato XI: Milan-Messina, Ed. Principato, 1944, 293 pp.). He blames the parasitic tendency of the Athenian democracy—the taint of misappropriated funds—, which Pericles himself had held in check, for the failure of Athens in her aspiration—in what appeared to be her mission—to become not only in the world of ideals the

school of Hellas but in the realm of reality the center of the nation.

Mario Segre treats of documents of Hellenistic history (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVII [1940-41], pp. 21-38); he also considers that a Ptolemaic papyrus is related to the *elogia* of the *imagines maiorum* of the Romans (*ibid.*, XIX [1942-3], pp. 269-80).

Heinz Haffter discusses political thought in ancient Rome (*St. Ital.*, XVII [1940], pp. 97-121); Clemente Merlo, the populations of ancient Italy at the time of the Roman conquest, with emphasis upon phonetic variations (*Antiquitas*, I [1946], pp. 5-10); Denis van Berchem treats of the "clients" of the Roman plebs (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1941-2], pp. 183-90). Angelo Segré discusses the juridical status of the *peregrini* in the Roman army (*ibid.*, XVII [1940-1], pp. 167-82). Aurelio Bernardi considers the relations between Rome and Capua in the second half of the fourth century B. C. (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 86-103; XXI [1943], pp. 21-31).

M. Licinius Crassus is treated by Albino Garzetti (*Ath.*, XIX [1941], pp. 3-37; XX [1942], pp. 12-40; XXII-XXIII [1944-5], pp. 1-61); C. Herennius Capito of Teate, procurator of Livia, of Tiberius, and of Gaius, by Plinio Fraccaro, who reproduces an inscription of Teate which had been previously known only through a local school annual (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 136-44); M. Arrecinus Clemens (Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 68), by Alfredo Passerini, republishing an inscription of Pesaro (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 145-63); the monument at Rimini to Q. Oвий Fregellanus is treated by Attilio Degrassi (*Ath.*, XIX [1941], pp. 133-40). Menophilus, Legate of Moesia Inferior under Gordian III is discussed by G. M. Bersanetti (*Ath.*, XIX [1941], pp. 144-8).

The "soprannomi imperiali variabili" of the *auxilia* of the Roman army form the subject of a study by G. M. Bersanetti (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 105-35); three rescripts concerning municipal law are discussed by Achille Vogliano (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 1-10); the chief magistrates of Milan in the imperial period, by Alfredo Passerini (*Ath.*, XXII-XXIII [1944-5], pp. 98-103). Francesca Bozza deals with provincial property, using Gaius, II, 7 (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 66-85; XXI [1943], pp. 13-20); Luigi Pareti asks, "How many were the Belgae at the time of Caesar?" (*Ath.*, XXII-XXIII [1944-5], pp. 63-71).

RELIGION

Momolina Marconi discusses Μέλισσα, a Cretan goddess (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 164-78); Francesco Sbordone, the Italic cycle of Hercules (*Ath.*, XIX [1941], pp. 72-96, 149-180, to be continued).

LINGUISTICS

M. Lenchantin has *Meletemata metrica*, regarding the *Lex Meinekiana*—which he finds “not applicable” to the odes of Horace—, and concerning also Horace’s technique in his Aeolic verses in relation to modulated declamation (*Ath.*, XXII-XXIII [1944-5], pp. 72-97). Alessandro Ronconi treats of *imperfectum pro praesenti* (*ibid.*, XXI [1943], pp. 1-12). Vittore Pisani interprets Umbr. FRITE as = Lat. *ritu* (*ibid.*, XIX [1941], pp. 38-43). He also discusses the value of τέλσον and ἔλκα (*ibid.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 3-10).

LITERATURE

We begin with the Greek lyrists. Nicola Terzaghi treats of the first “Strasbourg Epode” and the hate of Hipponax (*St. Ital.*, XVII [1940], pp. 217-35). The “Epodes of Strasbourg” are again treated by Umberto Galli (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 255-67). The background of Sappho and Alcaeus—the history of Lesbos in the sixth century B. C.—forms the theme of Santo Mazzarino’s long study (*Ath.*, XXI [1943], pp. 38-78). Sappho and hence Catullus are treated by Carlo Gallavotti (*A. e R.*, XI [1943], pp. 3-17); Sappho, fr. 5(4)-6(5) Diehl, by Quintino Cataudella (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 199-201). The Lesbian poetess engages the attention likewise of Bruno Lavagnini (*Ann. Pisa*, XI [1942], pp. 8-19); Giovanni Nencioni (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 41-61); and Achille Vogliano (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 114-18). The latter writes also on Erinna (*Ath.*, XXI [1943], pp. 32-7). Francesco Sbordone writes of “Partenii pindarici e dafneforie tebane” (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 26-50).

Turning to Athenian literature:

Graziella Fiori Sole discusses the figure of Zeus in the *Suppl.* of Aeschylus (*A. e R.*, XI [1943], pp. 45-56); Aristide Colonna has a study “*De codice quodam Sophoclis antiquissimo*”: Vat. gr. 2291 is considered a direct copy of a MS of the X-XI

centuries, with notable variations from the Sophoclean tradition as hitherto observed (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 270-80); he also treats of the text-tradition of Herodotus (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 11-25). Luigia Achillea Stella presents a second installment of her study of Euripides the Lyrist (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 3-96). Carlo Mazzantini discusses the immortality of the human soul in the Platonic philosophy (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 244-60); while Vogliano devotes his attention to Epicurus (*Ath.*, XIX [1941], pp. 141-3; XX [1942], pp. 119-20); Carlo Diano also has some notes on Epicurus (*Ann. Pisa*, XIII [1943], pp. 111-23). Quintino Cataudella deals with Celsus and Epicureanism (*Ann. Pisa*, XII [1943], pp. 1-2) and—coming down to Christian writers—disposes of the tradition of John Chrysostom's "imitation" of Aristophanes (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 236-43). Still among the philosophers, Alcmaeon's ideas as to the soul, life, and death are treated by Maria Cardini Timpanaro (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 213-24); and the Epicurean doctrine of the *clinamen*—of interest to Lucretian scholars—by Ettore Bignone (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 159-98). Returning to belles lettres, the late Bruno Serboni discusses Greeks and barbarians in the orations of Demosthenes (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 117-32); and Carlo Gallavotti uses the papyri for the iambics of Callimachus (*Antiquitas*, I [1946], pp. 11-22).

On the Latin side, Bignone has brought out the first two volumes of his *Storia di Letteratura Latina* (Florence, Sansoni); and Riccardo Avallone suggests "new lines" for such evaluation (*Antiq.*, I [1946], pp. 23-48). There is a study of satire and poetry by Nicola Terzaghi (*Ann. Pisa*, XII [1943], pp. 99-110), and one on *Exitus illustrium virorum* by Alessandro Ronconi (*St. Ital.*, XVII [1940], pp. 3-32). Leo Gestri presents Plautine studies (*St. Ital.*, XVII [1940], pp. 181-214, 237-60). The artistic originality of the *Hecyra* of Terence is discussed by Maria Rosa Posani (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 225-46); the Attic *epikleros* in the Roman *Palliata*, by Ugo Enrico Paoli (*A. e R.*, XI [1943], pp. 19-29).

Coming to Cicero, the testimony of Aulus Gellius, X, 3, 12, as to the effectiveness of the stupendous passage in *Verr.*, Act. Sec., V, 162, *Caedebatur virgis in medio foro Messanae*, etc., has received confirmation from an unexpected source: for re-

newed scrutiny of a peculiarly offensive Pompeian graffito (Diehl, 617) reveals that it is a ribald parody of the noble, Ciceronian phrases (Van Buren, *P. Ac. Rendic.*, XIX [1942-3], pp. 195-6). The late Walter Ferrari discusses Cicero and Aratus (*St. Ital.*, XVII [1940], pp. 77-95).

This is the 2,000th anniversary of the death of Catullus: *Antiquitas*, I (1946), p. 107, contains an appeal for collaboration in a commemorative volume of "*Catulliana*." I have endeavored to restore the text of Catullus, 6, 12 and Martial, *Spect.*, 28, 11 (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XIX [1942-3], pp. 183-91). Alessandro Ronconi treats of attitudes and forms in Catullian parody (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 141-58); Luigi Alfonsi, Propertius I, 15, 15-16 (*St. Ital.*, XVII [1940], pp. 123-35); *Ille ego qui quondam* . . . and Propertius II, 34 interest G. Funaioli (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 97-109); the Virgil of the *Georgics* and Lucan are treated by Ettore Paratore (*Ann. Pisa*, XII [1943], pp. 40-69); the epic fragment of Pedo by Quintino Cataudella (*A. e R.*, XI [1943], pp. 31-44). The remains of Maecenas (such as they are) have been published and elucidated by Avallone (Salerno, the author as publisher).

The Younger Pliny's account of his villa at Laurentum (*Ep.*, II, 17) forms the basis for a fresh attempt at graphic reconstruction, based on the assumption that the author's terms are precisely used, refer to a real villa, and can be interpreted in the light of archaeological remains (Van Buren, *P. Ac. Rendic.*, XX [1943-4], pp. 165-92). G. Bezzola had the fortune to discover, in a private library, a sheet from a parchment codex of the X-XI centuries: Statius, *Theb.*, XI, 307-500 with scholia of "Lactantius Placidus" (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 51-3). Enrica Malcovati treats of the text of Florus (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 261-9). The gap between two cultural areas appears bridged by Emanuele Rapisarda, in his discussion of Epicureanism in the first Latin Christian writers (*Antiquitas*, I [1946], pp. 49-54).

ART

Italy still cultivates a regard for the artistic achievements of the ancients. Silvio Ferri suggests a reconstruction of the ideas of the Greeks as to their art (*A. e R.*, VIII [1940], pp. 247-53); he also treats of "the canon" (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, VII [1940],

pp. 117-52) and of the artistic judgments of the Elder Pliny (*Ann. Pisa*, XI [1942], pp. 69-116). Guglielmo De Angelis d'Ossat discusses the origin of the triglyph (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1942], pp. 117-33). Catia Caprino publishes a Late Geometric Attic hydria at the Villa Giulia (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVII [1941], pp. 155-65). Umberto Zanotti-Bianco treats of the "Olive-tree" pediment on the Athenian Acropolis (*ibid.*, XIX [1944], pp. 371-87). Giovanni Becatti adds to his already considerable achievements a "critical revision" of the problems of Panathenaic amphorae and the archaistic style (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVII [1941], pp. 85-95). The "Pothos of Scopas" is treated by Becatti (*Le Arti*, III [1940-1], pp. 401-12); Zeus Aigiochos, by Paolo Enrico Arias (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, IX [1942], pp. 98-102); "Diana Venatrix" by P. Claudio Sestieri (*ibid.*, VIII [1940-1], pp. 107-28); Psyche-Andromeda (in the Naples museum), by Goffredo Bendinelli (*ibid.*, IX [1942], pp. 77-86); Rhodian sculpture, by Luciano Laurenzi (*ibid.*, VIII [1940-1], pp. 25-44); Attic sculpture of the Hellenistic period, by Becatti (*ibid.*, VII [1940], pp. 7-116). Luigi Bernabò Brea adds to the material for Tarentine reliefs in soft stone which was assembled by Klumbach in his *Tarentiner Grabkunst* (*Le Arti*, II [1939-40], pp. 61-6). From Tuscania in Etruria, Maria Santangelo publishes a bronze showing an Etruscan interpretation of a Greek Athena (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, IX [1942], pp. 68-76). A long-familiar Hellenistic hooded female head among the Farnese marbles in the Naples museum is studied by Olga Elia, who, on the basis of coin portraits, assigns it to an undetermined school of Asia Minor under Pergamene influence, of about the middle of the second century B. C. (*Le Arti*, II [1940-1], pp. 223-7); she also treats of a "testa isiaca" and Hellenistic-Roman portraits from Pompeii (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, VIII [1940-1], pp. 89-106).

A replica of a Lysippean statue discovered at Cassino is published by Gianfilippo Carettoni (*P. Ac. Mem.*, VI, iii [1941], pp. 53-66). The crater from Lentini with a scene of comedy is presented by Elena Zevi Fiorentini (*ibid.*, ii, pp. 39-52). The school of Aphrodisias in Caria is treated by Maria Squarciapino (*Studi e mat. d. Mus. dell' Imp. Rom.*, III [1943]). The reliefs of the amphitheater of Capua are published by Gennaro Pesce (*ibid.*, II [1941]).

Goffredo Bendinelli attempts to assign certain familiar paintings from Herculaneum to the myth of Iphigenia (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVII [1941], pp. 143-53). The "Capitolia" in the Roman Empire are assembled by Michelangelo Cagiano de Azevedo (*P. Ac. Mem.*, V, i [1941]). A neglected theme, the pedimental decoration of the imperial period in Africa and other provinces, is treated by Maria Squarciapino (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1942], pp. 209-30). And an official report on developments in the pontifical museums and galleries contains valuable information, especially as to technical methods of restoration (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1942], pp. 231-99).

Roman portraits hold their own in interest. Becatti presents the "new contribution of Ostia" to this repertory (*Le Arti*, II [1939-40], pp. 3-11); Maurizio Borda studies a Galba in the Borghese museum (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, IX [1942], pp. 87-97); and Becatti treats of the Antonines (*Le Arti*, II [1939-40], pp. 340-6).

A new sarcophagus with a pastoral scene is published by Arias (*Le Arti*, II [1939-40], pp. 24-6).

Paola Zancani Montuoro presents a fictile tablet from Epizephyrian Locri with a scene of cult (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, VII [1940], pp. 205-24); Raffaele Umberto Inglieri, a polychrome pyxis with the Birth of Aphrodite, from Numana, in the Ancona museum (*ibid.*, VIII [1940-1], pp. 45-61). Attic r.-f. vases in the museum at Pegli (Genoa) form the subject of a report by Luigi Bernabò Brea (*Le Arti*, III [1940-1], pp. 180-6); an Etruscan fictile crater in private possession in Rome is published by Riccardo Zandrino (*Le Arti*, III [1940-1], pp. 371-3). A remarkable—but apparently quite genuine—group of Hellenistic portraits from Centuripe—*tondi* in terra-cotta painted in tempera upon a surface of plaster—are treated enthusiastically by Biagio Pace (*ibid.*, III [1940-1], pp. 4-8).

Another Hellenistic mosaic showing the cat and birds was found on the Via Ardeatina near Rome, and has been published by Arias (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, VIII [1940], pp. 16-24). And there is a presentation of the fine mosaics from Imola and Ozzano dell' Emilia: the latter include a polychrome treatment of garland and masks, quite in the Hellenistic manner (*Le Arti*, II [1939-40], pp. 58-9).

The most recent installment of *Monumenti della Pittura Antica scoperti in Italia* (Rome, La Libreria dello Stato) is Sezione III, Roma, fasc. V: *Le Pitture del Colombario di Villa Pamphili, descr. da Goffredo Bendinelli* (1941). The series *Opere d'Arte* published by the R. Istituto di Archeologia e Storia d'Arte reached vol. XIII in 1942; Michelangelo Cagiano de Azevedo publishing a sarcophagus at Villa Medici in Rome.

The epoch-making innovations, a century ago, of Padre Giuseppe Marchi are commemorated by Romano Fausti (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XIX [1944], pp. 105-79).

But the most considerable individual contribution of recent years to the repertory and interpretation of Roman art is the volume by Filippo Magi, with foreword by Bartolomeo Nogara: *I rilievi flavi del Palazzo della Cancelleria* (*Monumenti Vaticani di Archeologia e d'Arte pubblicati a cura della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia*, Vol. VIII: Rome, Bardi, 1945: large quarto, pp. xx + 180, pls. 24 + 4). Seven large marble slabs were found in this corner of the ancient Campus Martius; six of these are now in the Vatican, the seventh is in the possession of the Commune of Rome; they are sculptured in relief and were clearly intended for a single monument adorned with two friezes. Three of them unite to form one frieze, one slab of which, probably, is lacking to the left. Of the other four slabs preserved, three unite to form the greater part of the second frieze, including its termination to the right; while the seventh slab gives the termination, to the left, of that representation but lacks the juncture with its neighboring slab. They represent Domitian's return from the wars, and belong stylistically not far from the reliefs on the arch of Titus, a monument which is shown by its inscription to have been erected in memory of that prince after his death and deification, and will probably have to be assigned to the early years of the principate of Trajan; but the reliefs from the Cancelleria appear to represent a less developed style than is found on the arch of Titus, and the determining of the exact dates of the two structures will involve a very precise weighing of the evidence. In any case, the further study of Flavian and early Trajanic art should start with the material, and the observations, presented in Dr. Magi's splendid volume.

NUMISMATICS

Signorina Cesano, who began her publishing career as Lorenzina Cesano, then for a while adopted the style of Secondina L., then S. L., signs herself now S. Lorenzina Cesano. This should add variety and interest to the labors of the library cataloguers. She has well maintained her standing as the foremost, almost the only, contemporary representative of Italian science in the field of ancient numismatics, with the following notable articles:

"Il Medagliere del Museo Archeologico di Siracusa" (R. Istituto Italiano di Numismatica, *Studi di Numismatica*, I [1940], 62 pp., 9 pls.: here and in many other instances an offprint is given its own page-numbering which replaces that in the original publication and complicates the task of those citing it). A systematic survey of the contents of this unique collection, with special reference to hoards, find-spots, and their evidence as to the ancient circulation of the respective currencies and issues. Sicilian coins circulated only within the island itself. The Roman period here was one of numismatic stagnation.

"La monetazione delle città adriatiche dei Senones e del Piceno nell' età Pre-Romana" (Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria per le Marche, *Atti e Memorie*, ser. V, vol. V [1942], 31 pp., 4 pls.). A fundamental treatment of this obscure and difficult corner of the numismatic field, with its orientations fluctuating between Greek, Etruscan, and Roman systems and tendencies.

"I fasti della Repubblica Romana sulla moneta di Roma" (*Studi, ibid.*, pp. 105-262). An admirable survey, accompanied by enlarged photographs of the representations of scenes from legend and history, which would well repay the labor of translation and publication in English.

"Stipe monetale del IV-II secolo av. Cr." (Rome) and "Ripostiglio monetale romano del principio del III secolo av. Cr." (Ardea) (*N. S.*, ser. VII, vol. III [1942]).

"Una nuova 'Restitutio' aurea di Traiano" (*Boll. d. Circolo Numismatico Napoletano* [July-Dec. 1939], 17 pp., 2 pls.). Starting with an unpublished piece bequeathed by Dr. Carlo Piancastelli to the Commune of Forlì, which restores an aureus of Sextus Pompey, Rev. 2 heads of Pompeius Magnus and Gnaeus

Pompey confronted between lituus and tripod, the authoress reviews the whole double series of Trajanic "restitutions."

"Un nuovo medaglione aureo di Teodosio I e la figura di Constantinopolis" (*Studi*, I, 16 pp.): Rev. GLORIA ROMANORVM: Roma seated.

"Un medaglione aureo di Libio Severo e l'ultima moneta di Roma Imperiale" (*ibid.*, 18 pp.). The largest and heaviest gold medallion known from the Late Empire: to be added to those treated by Jocelyn M. C. Toynbee, *Roman Medallions* (Amer. Num. Soc., *Num. Studies*, V, 1944). In the Mazzini collection, Turin. Rev. PIETAS AVG. NOSTRI: Roma, standing, presents the Republic, turreted and kneeling, to the Emperor, who is standing and crowned by Victoria. Diam. mm. 52; weight, 1/6 of a pound of gold.

EPIGRAPHY

Before *Epigraphica* suspended publication with the end of vol. II (1940), it had rendered valuable service in its chosen field, both in presenting fresh material and in according fresh treatment to what was already available. Its well-organized bibliographical notices were admirable. Only a few among the outstanding articles can be listed here:

I (1938-9), pp. 99-118: Pietro Romanelli, "Tre iscrizioni tripolitane di interesse storico." Pp. 119-41: Colini, "Le iscrizioni del Santuario Dolicheno scoperto sull' Aventino." Pp. 331-8: Herbert Nesselhauf, "Publicum portorii Illyrici utriusque et ripae Thraciae."

II (1940), pp. 171-8: Matteo Della Corte, "Virgilio nell' epigrafia pompeiana." Pp. 201-213: Guido Calza, "Nuovi frammenti di Fasti Ostiensi" (these, and those already published, will be included in Degrassi's forthcoming volume). Pp. 314-36: Olga Pergreffi, "Ricerche epigrafiche sui liberti" (to be continued).

Under the editorship of Giuseppe Cardinali (Presidente del R. Istituto per la Storia Antica, Via Milano 76, Rome), an effort is being made to resuscitate the *Dizionario Epigrafico* of De Ruggiero: the energies of the younger generation are being recruited for the purpose.

The next installment of *Inscriptiones Italiae*—fasc. i of Vol. XIII—is to be Attilio Degrassi's eagerly awaited presentation

of the *Fasti Consulares*: this is now in the press, and—as I am informed—will form a thick volume in itself, with some 100 pages of reproductions and 600 pages of text.

In 1943 appeared Vol. I, Roma, of *Monumenta Epigraphica Christiana saeculo XIII antiquiora quae in Italiae finibus adhuc exstant—edita curante Angelo Silvagni (in Civitate Vaticana: Pontif. Inst. Archaeol. Chr.)*.

My supplement to Dessau's *I. L. S.* is intended to bring that indispensable repertory "up-to-date," for practical purposes, by listing illustrations of the inscriptions, and citing recent treatment of them, and also by presenting a choice of the more significant inscriptions which have come to light since Dessau's day. For the present, this "Mentor Epigraphicus" exists in MS form at the American Academy in Rome, where it is available for consultation either in person or through correspondence.

Margherita Guarducci treats of the Greek inscriptions of Venice (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, IX [1942], pp. 7-53), and the oath of the Itanii in an unpublished inscription in the museum of Candia (*ibid.*, VIII [1940-1], pp. 7-15), also, of "The Inscription of Nazareth" relative to violation of sepulture, the discussion of which appears endless (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1942], pp. 85-98).

Fraccaro publishes early inscriptions from the Via Valeria (*Ath.*, XIX [1941], pp. 44-58) and, from Vicenza, the tombstone of a *vitor* (basket-maker) showing the tools of his craft (*Ath.*, XVIII [1940], pp. 54-61, 183-4). Alfredo Passerini treats of the tablet of Brigetio (discovered in 1930) and the military diplomas (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 121-6). Vittore Pisani publishes a key bearing an Oscan inscription (*Ath.*, XX [1942], pp. 108-13).

Two recently discovered inscriptions appear to bring us somewhat closer to personages of literary distinction: one at Sorrento, *Corneliae Cratiae / M. Corneli Frontonis*—(*Epigraphica*, II [1940], pp. 214-16); and one in Rome, [*L.*] *Iulio L. f. Ani(ensi tribu) / Graecino, / tr. pl., pr., / M. Iulius L. f. Ani. / Graecinus / quaestor f(ecit)* (*B. C.*, LXVIII [1940], p. 178): all indications suggest that the latter is the tombstone of the father of the Agricola who in turn became the father-in-law of Tacitus (*Tacitus, Agr.*, 4, 1); Agricola's own father-in-law, Domitius

Decidius (inferred from *Agr.* 6), had already been attested by a stone which was formerly seen and copied in Rome (*I. L. S.*, 966).

ETRUSCAN STUDIES

Studi Etruschi, XIV-XVI (1940-42) defy excerpption (the more recent volume or volumes have not reached the excerpctor); the repertory is almost endless; but some of the outstanding articles are: XIV (1940), pp. 43-87: B. M. Felletti Maj, on the necropolis of Spina and the ceramics of the Upper Adriatic. XV (1941), pp. 27-71: E. Galli, *Hereklu* (dealing with a bronze statuette found near Iesi). Pp. 109-26: G. Patroni, on Vetulonia, Pompeii, and history: he compares the lay-outs of the two places, recognizes a nucleus of an Etruscan population in the sixth region of Pompeii, and an Etruscan period in its town-plan. XVI (1942), pp. 9-87: A. Talocchini, on the armor of Vetulonia and Populonia. Pp. 89-195: F. W. von Bissing, on colored glass alabastra.

A small sheet of lead with an Etruscan inscription of good period has been found at Chiusi; Comm. Nogara's account of it before the Pontifical Academy may be expected to appear in the next volume of *Rendiconti*. It runs to a number of lines, apparently of magical content.

EARLY CHRISTIAN

Early Christian studies are still energetically prosecuted in Rome, their birthplace and natural home. A sumptuous volume by Carlo Cecchelli (*Monumenti cristiano-eretici di Roma*: Rome, Palombi [1944], quarto, pp. 274, pls. 16 + 48) is devoted to the Hypogaeum of the Aurelii (Viale Manzoni) and a number of hypogaea on the various highways leading out from the city; it covers also some heretical centers within the walls; and it treats of various sects such as Arians, Manichaeans, Montanists, and Nestorians.

Paolino Mingazzino likewise treats of the sepulchre of the Aurelii (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XIX [1944], pp. 355-69); Adriano Prandi discusses "mensa martyrum" (*ibid.*, XIX [1944], pp. 345-53); Margherita Guarducci, the feet of "*Quo Vadis*" (*ibid.*, XIX [1944], pp. 305-44: where figs. 13-14 reproduce two of Passeri's old forgeries or falsifications of plastic lamps); Prandi

has an article on Santa Costanza (*ibid.*, XIX [1944], pp. 281-304).

The *Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana*, XVII-XVIII (1940-1) contains studies on catacombs in Rome and Syracuse, the Baptistery at Nocera Superiore, unpublished fragments of sarcophagi, and both pagan and Christian inscriptions in Sicily; also a tribute to the late Pater G. P. Kirsch with a bibliography of his work.

THE BARBARIANS

In *P. Ac. Mem.*, VI, i (1941), Edoardo Galli presents fresh barbaric materials from Central Italy: Chiusi and the vicinity of Ancona; the Lombard culture.

THE CITY OF ROME

Scholars already familiar with Giuseppe Lugli's four volumes, *I Monumenti antichi di Roma e suburbio*, will recognize the new, greatly enlarged edition of Vol. I, dealing with the "Archaeological Zone," i.e. the center of the ancient city, as an indispensable component in their topographical apparatus; it incorporates much of its author's own studies of recent years. He also devotes a detailed article to the topographical and juridical value of the "Insula" (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1942], pp. 191-208).

Two characteristic quarters of the city have been accorded monographic treatment: the Quirinal, by Maria Santangelo (*P. Ac. Mem.*, V, ii [1941]), and the Caelian, by Antonio Maria Colini (*P. Ac. Mem.*, VII [1944]). The second of these monographs, both in bulk and in content, constitutes one of the most substantial contributions of the period to the interpretation of ancient Rome.

The engineering problem of the water-supply of the Capitoline Hill is involved with the geological question as to a "saddle" between Quirinal and Capitoline: hydraulic engineering is conditioned by terrain. That some form of inverted siphon was used—pressure rather than normal flow—is implied in the use of the term *fistulae* in the literary sources (Van Buren, *P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1942], pp. 65-70). But geological considerations which are shortly to be presented in an article by Gioacchino De Angelis d'Ossat render probable the existence, down to an Early Imperial date, of at least a vestigial low-level saddle

connecting the hills in question, of which the engineers would have availed themselves for their purpose, very likely supporting their siphon upon arches which followed the low ridge across the depression between the two hills. The absence, however, of references to such a ridge in the authors suggests that it possessed even less consequence than the saddle between the Palatine and the outskirts of the Esquiline, across which ran the Sacra Via.

Colini reports on discoveries near the temple of Apollo Sosianus (*Capitolium*, XVI [1941], pp. 385-93); Guglielmo Cironi, on the *Horti Caesaris* and the neighboring temple of Fortuna (*ibid.*, XVI [1941], pp. 287-94).

The "arch" of the Argentarii has been fully published and discussed by Massimo Pallottino (*I Monumenti Romani a cura del R. Istituto di Studi Romani*, 2: *L' Arco degli Argentari*; Rome, Danesi, 1946. Large quarto, 146 pp., 16 pls.). The volume covers history and bibliography; dedicatory inscription; architecture; figurative adornment; with a topographical appendix. Both "arch" and monograph are important for the topography of the Forum Boarium and its neighborhood, and for the official propaganda, political and religious, of the Severi. (Unless some obscure reference has escaped us, Pallottino was unacquainted with the study by D. E. L. Haynes and P. E. D. Hirst, *Porta Argentariorum* (*Suppl. Paper of the Brit. Sch. at Rome*: London, Macmillan, 1939, 43 pp., 7 pls.: reviewed by Arnaldo Momigliano, *J. R. S.*, XXX [1940], pp. 213-15.)

Antonio Maria Colini had already published, in 1941, a small octavo volume, *Lo stadio di Domiziano*, in the series *Monumenti di Roma*, serie B, 1 (Rome, Governatorato di Roma). His large, richly illustrated publication has now appeared: *Stadium Domitiani*, with technical reconstructions by Italo Gismondi, being Vol. I of the series *I Monumenti Romani* (Rome, R. Istituto di Studi Romani, 1943: 110 pp. with 62 + 8 figs. in text, 25 + 2 pls.). The Barock Piazza Navona preserves the outline of the ancient race-course. Of the fifty or so stadia known from antiquity, this is the only one situated in the western part of the Empire; for the so-called "stadium" on the Palatine seems to have been in reality a sumptuous garden-court. In the West, the populace preferred the more exciting diversions of the amphitheater and the circus. In length, the

Roman structure is surpassed, it appears, only by the one at Laodicea ad Lycum, which has two hemicycles; in seating capacity, by those at Ephesus, Athens, and Olympia. Its proximity to the great Neronian baths finds parallels in certain Eastern cities, where, however, the function of the baths is assumed by gymnasia.

TOPOGRAPHY AND MONUMENTS OF ITALY

The innumerable sorties of the Allied Aviation have yielded hundreds of thousands of air-photographs of all parts of this country. These have been deposited in distribution among several of the institutions in Rome, and should prove an inexhaustible mine of documentation, especially for earthworks, roads, and *centuriatio*.

The useful series of small illustrated guides, *Itinerari dei Musei e Monumenti d' Italia*, produced by the *Direzione Generale delle Arti* of the *Ministero della Educazione Nazionale* (Rome, La Libreria dello Stato), was able to make some progress in the early years under review: Velleia, Tarquinia, and Cervetri are now represented with the other sites. And the "collana" of small volumes on municipalities and colonies edited by Giglioli and Minto for the Istituto di Studi Romani already includes in its first series Spoletium, Ferentium, Tibur, and Casinum, and in its second series Sestinum and Tarquinii. The two volumes of *N.S.* which appeared in the first years present much fresh material from all parts of Italy, as appears below.

Beginning at the North-West corner of the land: At Aosta, a start was made with an ambitious project for isolating the theater and the Roman walls near Porta Pretoria; and numerous graves were found outside Porta Decumana, showing three types of burial: "a cappuccina," "in muratura," and a third type varying from the second in its covering of one or more stone slabs. Chronologically the burials fall into two groups, both late, and together with the edifice which was erected among them they testify to the establishment of Christianity in this region (*N.S.*, 1941, pp. 1-19).

The clearing of one of the town gates of Susa and its adjacent structures has progressed (*N.S.*, *ibid.*, pp. 20-8); and the excavation and partial restoration of the amphitheater at Serravalle Scrivia (Libarna) have been completed (*ibid.*, pp. 29-32).

At Trivulzio (Prov. of Pavia), the finding of a small hoard of four necklaces and three rings is a welcome contribution to knowledge of the jeweller's craft in that region in the fifth century of our era (*ibid.*, pp. 303-10).

Considerable progress is reported in the recovery of the ancient street-system—the town-plan—of Bergamo (*ibid.*, pp. 311-18).

At Reggio Emilia, a mediaeval structure proved to consist largely of re-used architectural members and inscribed stones of the Roman period; at another point, well-preserved mosaic pavements were found, while further information has been acquired as to the course of the Via Aemilia and other elements in the street-system (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 255-301, 304-11). Forlimpopolo has yielded more mosaics of interest, the refuse-dump of a pottery specialising in ordinary wine-jars, and a less fragmentary reading of the important inscription *C. I. L.*, XI, 571 (*ibid.*, pp. 3-18).

The Gallo-Roman period in the Po Valley is evidenced in a necropolis which has come to light at Arquà Petrarca (*ibid.*, pp. 145-63); while at Este the Augustan Bimillennium was celebrated by an extensive programme of excavation which threw much light upon the—hitherto somewhat neglected—Roman period of that city (*N. S.*, 1941, pp. 37-69). At Cesena, too, Roman mosaics were uncovered (*ibid.*, pp. 71-6).

The indigenous culture of the region appears in the bronzes preserved in the museum of Belluno (*ibid.*, pp. 33-7).

We now consider Etruria (for *Studi Etruschi*, see above).

There is now a monograph on Pisae by Luisa Banti (*P. Ac. Mem.*, VI, iv [1943]). Populonia has yielded another chamber tomb of the archaic period, as well as sporadic finds of some interest (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 375-94); Pitigliano, a chamber tomb with some remarkable local wares (*ibid.*, pp. 19-29). Otricoli, to which I had devoted a short article in *R.-E.*, has now engaged the attention of Carlo Pietrangeli, who has published *Otriculum* (Rome, 1942), *Scavi e scoperte di antichità nella Roma di Pio VI* (Rome, 1942), and "Lo scavo pontificio di Otricoli" (*P. Ac. Rendic.*, XIX [1944], pp. 47-104). The discovery of a large villa of the republican period at Anguillara Sabazia is a helpful addition to knowledge of the building methods of that period (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 398-419). The temple, with its plastic revetments, and the other finds, on the citadel of Veii, have been

published by Enrico Stefani (preprinted from *Mon. Ant.*, XL [1944], pp. 173-290); and Massimo Pallottino tells of the recent discoveries at the sanctuary "of the Apollo" at the same city (*Le Arti*, II [1939-40], pp. 17-24). Both the Etruscan and the Roman periods are represented in reports from Civitavecchia and vicinity (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 183-98; 1941, pp. 344-69).

In Umbria, Fossato di Vico has contributed to the repertory of the late republican monuments of the countryside an archaic Latin inscription, and a villa the decorators of which made use of the lozenge or rhomb motive not only for a pavement but for a painted wall in the same room: a second instance of this combination, to be quoted as a parallel to the room in the "Casa dei Grifi" on the Palatine (Van Buren, *P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVI [1940], pp. 57-61; *N. S.*, 1940, pp. 171-9).

At Ostia, the well-known *Horrea Epagathiana et Epaphroditiana* and the *horrea* adjacent on their north have now been adequately published (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 32-50); the Christian basilica has been restudied (Calza, *P. Ac. Rendic.*, XVIII [1941-2], pp. 135-48), and the Museum has been reconstituted as practically a new creation (Becatti, *Arti Figurative*, I [1945], pp. 29-39); a Severan portrait head is published by Raissa de Chirico (now Calza) (*ibid.*, pp. 69-72).

The topography of Antium has been fully treated by Lugli (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, VII [1940], pp. 153-88).

Maiuri's exploration of the subsoil of the forum at Pompeii has produced results of fundamental importance for the earlier history of that community (*N. S.*, 1941, pp. 371-404). Giuseppe Spano's readable volume, *La Campania Felice nelle età più remote, Pompei dalle origini alla fase ellenistica* (Naples, Giannini, 1941), will evoke pleasant memories among those who have enjoyed the author's enthusiastic and learned exposition on the spot; it is, however, an extremely personal interpretation. The 98 illustrations are serviceable; the bibliographical notes, while by their state bearing mute witness to the difficult conditions in which the volume was produced, abound in suggestive indications which could not readily be found assembled elsewhere. The production has clearly been a labor of love. But specialists will be well advised to devote closer attention to Spano's closely-packed article, "Il 'Pompeianum' di M. Tullio Cicerone e lo 'Stabianum' di M. Mario" (*Antiquitas*, I [1946],

pp. 55-88), which makes out a case for assigning Cicero's villa to the territory lying on the side of Pompeii towards Stabiae.

My own most recent Pompeian study has not yet appeared in print. But a brief statement of its essential features may serve to relieve fellow-workers who have been facing the same difficulties. It seems impossible to reconcile the currently-accepted dating of certain of the painted notices with (1) the appearance of the walls when freshly excavated, (2) the effects to be expected from exposure to the elements through a series of years, before the catastrophe, and (3) the damage caused by the earthquake of the year 62 (this date is to be preferred to 63). Doubts on this score are corroborated by various considerations: e. g. the famous notice of "house to let" of Gn. Alleius Nigidius Maius (*C. I. L.*, IV, 138) is intelligible only if it belongs to the last months of the city's life; and the activities of the *dealbator* Aemilius Celer certainly appear to form a compact group. In reality, the received chronology was vitiated at its source by a false conception of the background of *C. I. L.*, IV, 3884 of D. Lucretius Satrius Valens: there the title *flamen Neronis Caesaris Aug. fli perpetuus* serves to date *inter annos p. Chr. 50 et 54* not the inscription itself and the games which it announces, but merely the assumption of the flamine in question by a personage who was free to continue to avail himself of the title for as long a period thereafter as he might choose; and it does not appear that the memory of Nero was so unpopular among the Pompeians as to deter anyone from using the title even down to the final catastrophe.

We are compelled to assign the great mass of notices of both electoral propaganda and games to the last years of the colony. And this leads to the identification of the *opus tabularum* of Diehl², 981 (*N. S.*, 1914, pp. 106-7) with the restored stage-backing of the great theater, and the *ara* the dedication of which is mentioned in *C. I. L.*, IV, 1180, add. pp. 462, 790, Diehl 245, and which is to be restored as referring to the Flavians, with the well-known marble-faced altar which stands in front of the temple of Vespasian.

The new, greatly augmented edition of Matteo Della Corte's *Casa e Abitanti* is approaching completion; also, and even more important, his supplement to *C. I. L.*, IV. And the late Vittorio Spinazzola's monumental publication of his epoch-

making discoveries on the Strada dell' Abbondanza is ready for the press; the care of this unique material has fallen to Salvatore Aurigemma.

Evidence for the pre-Roman culture of Campania is furnished by some tombs at Telesse: the local ware imitates Greek forms but accords them a characteristic treatment of decoration in relief; and this in the Late Hellenistic period and contemporarily with the quite different fabrics of Cales and Teanum (*N. S.*, 1941, pp. 77-84).

Magna Graecia next demands attention. Locri yields a spring dedicated to Pan and the Nymphs, with many clay ex-votos (*Le Arti*, III [1940-1], pp. 177-80). At Metaponto, the votive deposits of the temple called *Tavole Palatine*, and the tombs, have yielded abundant ceramic material, mostly of the later period (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 51-122). The finds at Taranto have proved even richer and more varied (*ibid.*, pp. 314-54, 426-505): they defy recapitulation here. The neighboring Francavilla Fontana maintains its interest as a find-spot, in particular, of "Gnazia ware," which perhaps was produced there (*N. S.*, 1941, pp. 112-19).

Passing over to Sicily: Lentini continues to exhibit Greek graves, but their contents testify to the impoverishment of the local population during the period of Syracusan domination (*N. S.*, 1941, pp. 120-9). The prosperous rival, however, can boast many minor finds, chiefly of structures, few of them imposing in themselves, but all combining to fill in the picture of this great city (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 199-226). Two columns of the Artemision on Ortygia have been reinforced (*Riv. Ist. Archeol.*, IX [1942], pp. 54-67). The primitive, prehistoric populations of the western part of the island are represented by some burials near Palermo (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 132-43).

The indigenous culture of Sardinia is attested by finds at Siddi (*N. S.*, 1941, pp. 130-63), Siniscola (*ibid.*, pp. 164-71), and other sites (*N. S.*, 1940, pp. 234-54).

The close of the year 1946 should witness the issuing of the first annual volume of the bulletin of the newly-constituted International Association for Classical Archaeology: this publication will deserve a place in all classical libraries.

A. W. VAN BUREN.

THE ORIGINAL FORM OF NAEVIUS' *BELLUM PUNICUM*.

From statements of Suetonius and Santra, it is known that Cn. Naevius wrote his *Bellum Punicum* in the form of a single unbroken narrative which was later divided into seven books by C. Octavius Lampadio, probably in the second half of the second century B. C.¹ That this edition of Lampadio was used either directly or indirectly by some of the later writers who refer to the *Bellum Punicum* is indicated by their identification of specific books as the sources of their quotations and references.² Consequently scholars who have compiled and edited the fragments, since the revival of learning, have distributed them among seven separate books³ and there can be no quarrel with this arrangement.

¹ Suetonius, *De Grammaticis*, 2; Santra *ap.* Nonius, *s. v. septem-fariam*, I, p. 250 Lindsay; cf. Buecheler, *Rh. Mus.*, XL (1885), p. 148. That Lampadio was influenced by Crates of Mallos in undertaking this division is not unlikely (cf. Hendrickson, *A. J. P.*, XIX [1898], p. 286), but the words of Suetonius (*ibid.*) do not permit the certainty with which the matter is treated by Birt (*Das antike Buchwesen*, p. 481) and Hillscher (*Jahrb. f. d. class. Phil.*, Suppl. XVIII [1892], p. 359).

² Of the 61 fragments cited by Morel (*Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum*, pp. 17 ff.) which can be attributed to the *Bellum Punicum*, 24 are assigned to specific books by the ancient sources. The authors who cite entirely or chiefly by Lampadio's edition are Charisius, Macrobius, Nonius, and the authors of the commentaries on Virgil which pass under the names of Probus and Servius Danielis. Priscian cites with and without book number which indicates the use of both ancient editions. Verrius Flaccus (as the source of Festus) and Varro seem to have used Naevius' original edition exclusively. For a detailed discussion, see L. Strzelecki, *De Naeviano Belli Punici Carmine Quaestiones Selectae* (Polska Akademia Umiejetności, Rozprawy Wydziału Filologicznego, T. LXV, 2 [Krakow, 1935]), pp. 1-5.

³ They are so distributed in the following editions: Ernst Spangenberg, *Quinti Ennii Annalium Libb. XVIII Fragmenta. Accedunt Cn. Naevii Librorum De Bello Punico Fragmenta Collecta*, etc. (Leipzig, 1825); Ernst Klussmann, *Cn. Naevii Poetae Romani Vitam Descripsit*, etc. (Jena, 1843); Johannes Vahlen, *Cn. Naevi De Bello Punico Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1854); Emil Baehrens, *Fragmenta Poetarum Romanorum*

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The method, however, which has been followed in assigning specific fragments to specific books has long needed to be challenged. From 1595, when Merula first expressed an opinion regarding the contents of the first books of the *Bellum Punicum*,⁴ until the near present, certain fragments have been assigned to certain books in flagrant violation of the testimony of the ancient authors by whom they are preserved. These dislocations have not only affected our views regarding the continuity which Naevius observed in describing the first Punic War. They have also created the prevailing concept of the place within the opening books occupied by the legendary material which Naevius also treated and the relation of that material to the historical account of the war.

The manner in which this occurred deserves to be noted. First of all, certain fragments were arbitrarily dislocated in order to fit them into a preconceived notion of the original order of contents of the poem. This can be clearly seen in the early reconstructions of Spangenberg⁵ and Klussmann⁶ which influenced Vahlen's arrangement⁷ in which those fragments alone which seem to pertain to legendary events are assigned to the first two books. Subsequently, as this notion of the order of contents was passed on unaltered in its essentials from scholar to scholar, it acquired an independent authority and began to enjoy the respect due to an established fact. It then either caused the precarious base on which it rested to be ignored or was adduced as a reason for accepting the dislocations which made its existence possible. So great is the power of repetition.

Now the traditional reconstruction—for so we shall call it henceforth for convenience—of the *Bellum Punicum* is reproduced in recent works of scholarship substantially as follows:

Naevius began his epic with the Fall of Troy and the wan- (Teubner, 1886); and Willy Morel, *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum* (Teubner, 1927). In this article, fragments of Naevius will be given the numbers which they have in Morel's edition unless otherwise stated.

⁴ Paul Merula, *Q. Enni, Poetae cum Primis Censendi, Annalium Libb. XIII quae apud Varios Auctores Supersunt Fragmenta Collecta*, etc. (Leyden, 1595). Merula's observations on the *Bellum Punicum* begin on p. 49 of his commentary and are made chiefly to illustrate the text of Ennius. Nevertheless, it is there for the first time, so far as I can ascertain, that we find the germ of a reconstruction of contents.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 188. ⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 29 f., 216 f. ⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 9-14.

derings of Aeneas. These events together with the founding of Rome and, possibly that of Carthage occupied the first two books. The main theme of the poem, the first Punic War, began with Book III and continued through Book VII, that is, to the end of the poem.⁸ Roman history between the founding of Rome and the first Punic War was not included.⁹

The reason for this arrangement, however, was not easily explained. The omission of events between the founding of the city and the first Punic War did not allow the material of the first two books to be interpreted as the opening part of an annalistic account of Roman history in verse similar in plan and purpose to the *Annales* of Ennius. Since Dido and Anna appeared in the *Bellum Punicum* (frg. 6) and the main theme of the poem was a war between Rome and Carthage, many scholars found it reasonable to assume, especially in the light of Virgil, that Dido and Aeneas were made responsible in some way for the enmity between the states which they had founded¹⁰—an enmity which flared into open warfare in 264 B. C. Those

⁸ This reconstruction appears in Schanz-Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, I⁴ (1927), p. 53; Cichorius, *Röm. Studien* (1922), p. 25; Fränkel, *R.-E.*, Suppl. VI (1935), col. 638; Enk, *Handboek der Latijnse Letterkunde*, II, I (1937), p. 73. Leo (*Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, p. 81), who is also inclined to accept it, suggests, nevertheless, that the historical account may have begun early in Book II, a suggestion that is condemned by Fränkel (*loc. cit.*). In the literary histories of Klotz, Ussani, and Wight Duff, the prevailing view is stated as an established fact which needs no further discussion.

⁹ Lucian Mueller alone, so far as I know, attempts to prove by detailed arguments that Naevius treated the entire history of Rome down to the first Punic War (*Q. Ennii Carminum Reliquae* [1884], pp. XX-XXXII). His conclusions are repeated without discussion of evidence by Marchesi (*Storia della letteratura latina*, p. 46) while Terzaghi (*Storia della letteratura latina*, p. 53) implies their adoption. Plessis (*La poésie latine*, p. 13) is noncommittal. But the evidence against Mueller's conclusions is overwhelming; cf. Strzelecki, *op. cit.*, p. 6, note 2; Leo, *op. cit.*, p. 82, and Fränkel, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰ Whether Naevius brought Dido and Aeneas together and if so, how fully his account is reflected in Book IV of Virgil's *Aeneid*, has been debated for over a century; see the exhaustive lists of proponents and opponents in A. S. Pease, *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quartus*, pp. 18-19, notes 120 and 121. Strzelecki (*op. cit.*, pp. 12-24) is now to be added to the list of proponents.

who declined to accept this theory were compelled to assume another link between the legendary and historical parts of the poem. As stated by Leo, whom Fränkel cites in this connection, "Also war es nur die Entstehung Roms um deren willen Naevius die Einleitung vorausgeschickt hat."¹¹

This, then, is the traditional reconstruction. But it has been finally challenged by Ladislaus Strzelecki, who published his monograph, *De Naeviano Belli Punici Carmine Quaestiones Selectae*, in 1935.¹² Part of this work is of capital importance since it contains a new concept of the original form of the first three books of the *Bellum Punicum* based on a new arrangement of the fragments. The approach is new, to be sure, only in so far as it breaks with the traditional method of reassigning certain fragments arbitrarily. In principle it is hardly radical since it consists in following the evidence of the manuscripts.¹³ Without anticipating the general plan which Naevius might or should have followed in composing his epic, Strzelecki advocates placing the fragments where they are said to belong by the ancient authors in whose works they are preserved and not where they have to be placed to support the traditional reconstruction of contents.

Unfortunately, Strzelecki's monograph does not appear to have received the consideration which it deserved before the Second World War¹⁴ and no one, to my knowledge, has yet made

¹¹ Leo, *op. cit.*, p. 82; Fränkel, *loc. cit.*, col. 638.

¹² See note 2 above.

¹³ Strzelecki, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-11; 36-38.

¹⁴ The only critical review known to me which attempts to do justice to Strzelecki's treatment of the order of contents is that of Haffter (*Deut. Lit. Zeit.*, LVIII [1937], pp. 659-663). Haffter does not accept Strzelecki's proposed rearrangement of the fragments explicitly, but sees no obstacle to its acceptance. Of the writers of short notices who do not discuss the details, Amatucci (*Boll. Fil. Class.*, XLII [1936-37], p. 133) accepts the rearrangement as logical and soundly based on existing evidence; Ernout (*Rev. Phil.*, XI [1937], p. 182) and Constans (*Rev. Ét. Anc.*, XXXVIII [1936], p. 241) are noncommittal; the reviewers for the *Rivista di Filologia* (XV [1937], p. 431) and the *Bulletin Budé* (suppl. crit., VIII [1936], p. 113) do not touch upon the rearrangement; Skutsch (*C. R.*, L [1936], p. 149) devotes thirteen lines to it and concludes flatly that it fails. I have been unable to find any mention of Strzelecki's work in American learned journals.

full use of its conclusions.¹⁵ Part of this neglect, at least, is probably due to the author's greater interest in tracing reflections of the *Bellum Punicum* in Virgil's *Aeneid* than in working out his reconstruction in more than a cursory manner. I wish to give Strzelecki full credit for his accomplishment which is the work of a pioneer. But I believe that it can be stated in all fairness that he is content to show us in a few bold strokes the way which we must travel in the future, but does not concern himself with many details of the departure or accompany us for any distance on the way.

My purpose, therefore, in writing this article is to follow the way indicated by Strzelecki as far as it will take us in regard to the original form of the entire poem. The fragments which the traditional reconstruction has displaced are the foundation stones of any reconstruction and their position in the work as a whole must be tested far more rigorously than Strzelecki cared to test them. This can be done only by examining them separately in the light of the textual tradition. Next, when the evidence for their position has been established, their contents must be analyzed for what they can tell us about the order and contents of the first three books of the poem. Finally, when this step has been completed, we shall be in a position to investigate the order and form of the remaining four books in the light of our new conclusions.

If the technical investigation which has been proposed succeeds in creating a new concept of the poem's original form, it will have created a new problem simultaneously. Many of the fragments which have not been displaced or have been assigned by conjecture will have to be rearranged and a new and detailed reconstruction of the entire contents, especially of the legendary part, will have to be undertaken. Such a reconstruction must lead eventually to questions regarding the genesis of the poem: What did Naeivius know of the Trojan Legend? How did he select and transform material already at hand? What did he add which was peculiarly his own creation? Why did he choose

¹⁵ Klotz, who accepts the rearrangement, used it only in connection with a single point; cf. *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXVII (1938), p. 190, and p. 36 below.

a particular form in preference to others? In time these questions must be answered, in so far as the evidence permits.

For the present, however, the task must be the laying of a firm foundation for future investigation along the lines just indicated. For only after it has been laid and its flaws detected can further work be carried out with profit. It therefore seemed advisable to conduct an investigation which attempted no more than to furnish a new conception of the original form of the poem as a whole and to develop its implications and consequences in other studies.

As has been indicated above, the evidence of a seven book edition of the *Bellum Punicum* and the fact that certain fragments are attributed to specific books in our sources make any reconstruction of the poem depend on the relative order of the fragments and notices. The following fragments are assigned expressly to the first three books:

Nos. 5, 13, 19, 21, and 32 to Book I

Nos. 22, 23, 29, and 30 to Book II

Nos. 3 and 24 to Book III

Yet, of these fragments, Nos. 3, 24, and 32 have been assigned arbitrarily to other books by modern scholars. Let us now see to what extent such displacements can be justified.

Fragment 32 which has been reassigned to Book III (Vahlen, Baehrens, Morel) reads as follows in Morel's edition (p. 23):

	Manius Valerius
consul partem exerciti	in expeditionem
ducit	

The verses are preserved by Charisius (p. 163 Barwick; p. 128 Keil) with the notice: *Gn. Naevius Belli Punici* I. In the *Codex Neapolitanus* from which this passage in other sources is ultimately derived, the *praenomen* of Valerius is given in abbreviation as *M*. Hence Barwick and Keil read *Marcus*. But since the only Valerii who were consuls during the first Punic War are known to have borne the praenomina *Manius* and *Lucius*, we must accept the emendation, as old as Merula's edition, of *M'* for *M* and identify the consul of the passage with

Manius Valerius Maximus, consul in 263 B. C. who conducted military operations in Sicily in the course of the same year.¹⁶

Emending the number of the book, however, from I to II with Spangenberg and Klussmann or from I to III with later scholars is quite a different matter. Baehrens and Cichorius alone, so far as I have been able to ascertain, have sought paleographic grounds for assuming a corruption in the text.¹⁷ They found them in the fact that the *praenomen* of the consul in abbreviation follows directly upon the number of the book. Hence confusion between an original III and the M' of *Manius* is assumed. But this common assumption did not lead to common results. For Baehrens suggests that the manuscript I M represents an original IIII followed by *Valerius*, while Cichorius conjectures an original III M'.

Yet, the facts of the matter are these. The *Neapolitanus* and all its derivatives, that is, the sum total of existing evidence, give the reading I according to Keil and Barwick, who made thorough studies of them. This is the only firm evidence which we have. Behind it we cannot go except in conjecture and such conjecture must be properly justified. Its only justification in this instance is the assumption which has become powerful by repetition but is actually devoid of any supporting evidence that Naevius did not begin the *Bellum Punicum* with the war which gave it its title but with the fall of Troy. Hence this fragment which refers to the Punic War had to be assigned to Book II or III or even IV according to the opinions of the several editors regarding the place in the poem where the legendary account ended and the historical account began. Paleography was then called upon by a few to furnish questionable support for a desired emendation. The rest simply made the emendation without the slightest regard for the textual tradition.

¹⁶ Consulship and *praenomen* of Manius are expressly attested by the *Fasti Consulares*, C. I. L., I², I, p. 22; *Fasti Triumphales*, *ibid.*, p. 46; Polybius, I, 16; cf. Pliny, *H. N.*, VII, 214, and *Ineditum Vaticanum*, 4 (Drachmann, *Diodors röm. Annalen*, p. 69). Morel (*ad loc.*) assigns Valerius' consulship incorrectly to the year 262, an error which he apparently took from Cichorius to whom he refers in his notes; cf. *Römische Studien*, p. 27.

¹⁷ Cichorius, *loc. cit.*; Baehrens, *F. P. R.*, *ap. crit.* on frg. 35, p. 48.

Fragment 24, which has been reassigned to Book II (Vahlen, Baehrens, Morel), reads as follows in Morel's edition (p. 21):

Manusque susum ad caelum	sustulit suas rex
Amulius divis<que>	gratulabatur

The verses are preserved by Nonius under *gratulari*: *gratias agere* (p. 165 Mueller, p. 167 Lindsay) with the notice: *Naevius Belli Punici* III. The emendations *manusque* for *isque* (Merula) and *rex* for *res* (Stephanus) are also accepted by Mueller and Leo.¹⁸ Lindsay retains the manuscript readings. In the second line, the emendation *Amulius* for *Amullus* has been accepted by all editors since Bentinus. Given the part played by Amulius in the legend of Rome's foundation, it is reasonably certain. The manuscript *gratulabatur divis* (retained by Lindsay) has been rearranged in various ways to accord with the several editors' opinions of what a Saturnian verse should be. Morel, as indicated by his reference *ad loc.*, adopted Leo's version, which is as satisfactory as any other.

But there is no reason to emend the number of the book from which the passage was taken except to make it support the traditional reconstruction. Since Naevius was believed to have begun his account of the first Punic War with Book III, there could be no place in Book III for the mention of an event which was so clearly connected with the legendary history of Rome. Hence, editors reassigned the fragment to Book II in spite of the fact that all manuscripts give Book III as its source.

The last of the dislocated fragments is Number 3, which has been reassigned to Book I (Vahlen, Baehrens, Morel). In Morel's edition (p. 17) it reads as follows:

Postquam avem aspexit	in templo Anchisa,
sacra in mensa penatium	ordine ponuntur;
immolabat auream	victimam pulchram.

The fragment is preserved by Probus (*ad Verg. Ecl.*, 6, 31 [p. 336 Hagen; p. 14 Keil]) with the notice: *Naevius Belli Punici libro tertio sic* (the *Monacensis* gives: 3 libro). The *Anchises* of the *Vaticanus* was emended to *Anchisa* by Keil,

¹⁸ *Der Saturnische Vers* (Abh. Gött., VIII [1905]), 5, p. 33, note 4; p. 52, note 5.

an emendation later adopted by Hagen and Leo.¹⁹ The rest of the text is based on a uniform manuscript tradition. Furthermore, it is confirmed from *templo* to *ponuntur* by Cynthius Cenetensis,²⁰ a scholar of the fifteenth century who in composing a commentary on Virgil's *Aeneid* appears to have used the now lost Bobbio manuscript of Probus which was the archetype of all existing manuscripts and of the *editio princeps*.²¹ But for our present purpose, the words with which Cynthius introduces his citation are of greater importance. They read, as reproduced by Mai: *Et Naevius belli punici lib. . III .*

Thus, the original position of the fragment is well attested by the sum total of our evidence. But this evidence has been consistently ignored in favor of the traditional reconstruction. Obviously a fragment which mentions Anchises could not find an appropriate place in a book (III) which was believed to have begun with the opening events of the first Punic War. On the other hand, its contents could be interpreted conveniently as a sacrifice undertaken by Anchises in connection with the fall of Troy or the setting forth of the Trojans to seek a new home. Hence reassignment of the fragment from Book III to Book I.

These, then, are the fragments of the *Bellum Punicum* which have been dislocated by scholars in order to give them new positions in the contents of the poem as a whole. The analysis of the sources in which they are preserved has shown that the dislocations, so far as the manuscript tradition is concerned, are thoroughly unjustified. We shall therefore follow the order of the fragments attested by the sources in examining what the fragments have to tell about the original form and contents of the poem. In a way, this will be a second testing of the sources in regard to the fragments' position. For if intolerable diffi-

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 44, note 1.

²⁰ Mai, *Class. Auct.*, VII, p. 386.

²¹ On Cynthius' use of Probus, see Keil's edition of Probus' *Commentary*, pp. VIII-IX. The descent of all existing manuscripts and the *editio princeps* from the lost *Bobbiensis* is maintained by Keil (*op. cit.*, pp. V-IX), Hagen (Thilo-Hagen edition of Servius, III, 2, p. VIII), and F. M. Wheelock (*Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.*, XLIV [1933], pp. 247 ff.). Wheelock, however, who adduces new material, argues for a less direct descent than was assumed by his predecessors. See his stemma on p. 248 where X¹ represents the *Bobbiensis*.

culties are placed in the way of understanding the contents by returning the fragments to where they are said to belong, we shall have to suspect again that the sources are in error.

In establishing the text of fragment 32 above, we also established a firm date for the historical event to which it refers. This was the year 263 B. C. when Manius Valerius Maximus was consul and conducted military operations in Sicily.²² After Valerius and his consular colleague had raised the siege of Messina, which was being besieged by a Carthaginian and a Greek army, the latter under the command of Hiero, Valerius pursued Hiero to Syracuse. There he forced him to come to terms which included an alliance with the Romans.²³

De Sanctis suggests that our Naevian fragment refers to Valerius' first invasion of Syracusan territory, an event in which he sees the beginning of Roman imperialism.²⁴ Cichorius does little more in his commentary than restate what Naevius tells us except that he assumes that the military operation in question was a sally into the interior which took place during the siege of Messina.²⁵ Since the Latin phrase *expeditionem ducere* means no more than to lead out troops on a military operation,²⁶ we know for certain only that Naevius is referring to a march, sally, or campaign undertaken by Valerius.

Little as this fragment may add to our historical knowledge of the first Punic War, it is of capital importance for our under-

²² See note 16 above.

²³ I am here following De Sanctis' interpretation of the sources (*Storia dei Romani*, III, 1, pp. 114 ff.) as best explaining why a triumph was accorded to Valerius alone of the two consuls (cf. *C. I. L.*, I², 1, p. 46). Frank (*C. A. H.*, p. 675), apparently accepting the statement of Diodorus (XXIII, 4), has both consuls pursue Hiero. But even if it was a joint pursuit, the *Ineditum Vaticanum* (4) mentions Valerius alone as making the treaty with Hiero; cf. De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 116, note 37.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

²⁶ *Expediit* in the general sense of a military operation is well attested by Sallust (*Jug.*, 37; 103; *Hist.*, frg. 98, 6 Maurenbrecher), Caesar (*B. G.*, V, 10), Hirtius (*B. G.*, VIII, 6 and 8), and Cicero (*Div.*, I, 33, 72; II, 30, 65). The precise nature of the operation is sometimes added *expressis verbis* or can be inferred from the context. That the meaning of *expeditio* in the military terminology of the Empire is generally "campaign" (a military operation of some magnitude) can be ascertained from a glance at Dessau's *Index* (*I. L. S.*, III, p. 509).

standing of the original form of Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*. Both its position in Book I and its reference to an event of the year 263 B. C. indicate beyond reasonable doubt that Naevius did not begin his poem with the fall of Troy and the legend of Aeneas, but with the historical subject which gave the poem its name. Moreover, Naevius' method of handling the events of the war in chronological order, as attested by the fragments of the last four books, allows us to assume that the part of the war which preceded the military operation mentioned in the fragment was also described in the same Book I and preceded the fragment in the order of the text. It would be absurd to assume that Naevius could have omitted the crossing into Sicily and the military operations of 264. It is unlikely that he would not have touched, at least, upon the war's immediate causes.²⁷ These causes and events must have furnished the contents of the opening part of the poem.

On the other hand, it is certain that episodes from the fall of Troy and the legend of Aeneas were also included in Book I.²⁸ This legendary material continued to be treated in Book II and, as we shall demonstrate below, in Book III. Since Naevius used the same chronological method of ordering his legendary material as he used in describing historical events, we have no grounds to assume any interruption of the legendary account by historical digressions of which no traces have survived. On the contrary, all the evidence points to a continuous presentation of the Trojan legend from the fall of Troy to the founding of Rome on the soil of Latium.

The point has now been reached where we must ask whether the order of contents or the contents themselves, as we have just analyzed them, present difficulties such as to compel us to question the correctness of the source which assigned the basis of our reconstruction, Fragment 32, to Book I. By following the evidence so far we have reached the conclusion that the legendary part of the poem was inserted within the body of the main

²⁷ Frg. 31 appears to refer to the formal declaration of war by the Romans; cf. Cichorius, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 f.

²⁸ Fragments 5, 13, and 17, dealing with the fall of Troy and the wanderings of Aeneas, are all assigned specifically to Book I in our sources.

narrative, that is, the account of the first Punic War. In other words, we have a story within a story, the former relating events which precede in time the events contained in the latter. If such a device did not occur elsewhere in ancient literature, we might be entitled to doubt the evidence which produced it. But, indeed, the opposite is the truth, for we have a precedent of the greatest authority: Odysseus' account of his wanderings contained in Books IX-XII of the *Odyssey*. The differences in purpose and treatment in the inserted narratives of Homer and Naevius are obvious. They can best be analyzed in connection with the purely literary problems which, as I have said above, do not lie within the scope of this article. Here, I shall simply emphasize that Homer set the example for the formal device and that it had already been made known to the Latin reader through the version of Livius Andronicus. It could have struck but very few literate persons of the period as something entirely new.

If, then, we have no right to displace Fragment 32 because it has created something unprecedented in a literary form, we must now attempt to estimate how far down Naevius carried his account of the first Punic War in Book I before beginning his account of the legendary material.

As we have seen, Fragment 32 refers to an event of the year 263. Two fragments (33 and 34) which are not assigned to any book in our sources, have been referred to the siege of Agrigentum in 262 by Cichorius with some probability.²⁹ Even without them we would have to assume that Naevius described this important event. The question is where? Was it before or after the insertion of the legendary material?

Fortunately three lines of the *Bellum Punicum* (frg. 19) preserved by Priscian (I, p. 198 Hertz) and assigned expressly to Book I furnish the means of approach. They read as follows:

Inerant signa expressa	quomodo Titani
bicorporos Gigantes	magnique Atlantes
Runcus ac Purpureus	fili Terras

It is obvious that this passage was originally part of a description of a monument or object which either was itself figured or

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 28 ff.

contained statues. Consequently, since the time of Spangenberg many identifications have been proposed.³⁰ About them it can only be said that they are not convincing because of the manner in which they are made. A monument or work of art which Naevius mentioned or might well have mentioned in the course of his poem is taken as the object of identification. Then, without further evidence, it is assumed that the figures which are expressly mentioned by Naevius in Fragment 19 were contained in the object in question.

There is, however, an identification which is an exception to the rule and recommends itself as resting on a reasonably firm foundation. In 1935, Hermann Fränkel called attention to the passage in the *De Architectura* in which Vitruvius describes the architectural figures which the Greeks called ἀτλαντές, the Romans *telemones*.³¹ The function of these male figures was to support *mutuli* or *coronae*, or to put it more generally, they served as male counterparts, architecturally speaking, of female Caryatids. Fränkel then pointed out that the oldest and most famous monument known to us which contained *magni Atlantes* was the temple of Zeus at Agrigentum in Sicily; further, that a description of this temple has been preserved by Diodorus;³² finally, that mentioned therein were sculptured representations of a gigantomachy and the fall of Troy. Hence the fragment of Naevius in question would belong to a description of the temple of Zeus at Agrigentum.

This was all pure gain. But confidence in the traditional reconstruction of contents prevented Fränkel apparently from following his valuable discovery to its logical conclusion. Although he was aware of the part played by Agrigentum in the first Punic War and although he could assume reasonably that Naevius himself had seen the temple in the course of his campaigns, nevertheless he connected Naevius' description of the temple with a hypothetical visit of Aeneas to Agrigentum. In other words, he assumed a retrojection of the historical temple

³⁰ Spangenberg, *op. cit.* (see note 3 above), p. 196: figureheads or figures on Roman warships; Baehrens, *F. P. R.*, p. 46: temple at Cumae; Waser, *R.-E.*, Suppl. III, col. 701: shield.

³¹ Fränkel, *Hermes*, LXX (1935), pp. 59 ff.; Vitruvius, VI, 7, 6.

³² XIII, 82.

known to Naevius into the legendary past, because the fragment describing the temple belonged in Book I and that book was considered by all to have dealt exclusively with legendary events.

If we turn now to the remains of the temple of Zeus at Agrigento, we find ample evidence for the existence of the *Atlantes* although archaeologists cannot agree on the position which they occupied in the structure of the temple.³³ Of the Giants and Titans mentioned by Naevius in the same passage we have no certain remains.³⁴ But the express statement of Diodorus that a Gigantomachy stood in the east part of the temple³⁵ and the evidence of the *Atlantes* compel us to agree with Fränkel that Naevius' Giants and Titans are to be identified with the figures which stood in the Gigantomachy. The mention of Titans does not militate against the identification. In classical antiquity, Giants and Titans were often confused or brought together in a single group,³⁶ and, whereas Diodorus

³³ On the temple in general, the following important studies have appeared since the work of Koldewey and Puchstein (*Die Griechischen Tempel in Unteritalien und Sicilien*, pp. 153 ff.); Pace, *Mon. Ant.*, XXVIII (1922), pp. 174 ff., and Marconi, *Agrigento* (1929), pp. 57 ff. There is also a brief description in Robertson, *Greek and Roman Architecture* (2nd ed., 1943), pp. 122 ff. On the *Atlantes* the most thorough study is that of Marconi (*Bollettino d'Arte*, VI [1927], pp. 33-45), restated briefly in his *Agrigento*, pp. 168-170. Earlier hypotheses regarding the position of these figures in the structure of the temple are summarized by Pace, *loc. cit.*, pp. 185 ff. The hypothesis of Koldewey and Puchstein (*op. cit.*, pp. 160 ff.) that the *Atlantes* were situated in the intercolumniations on the outside of the temple to provide additional support for the architrave has been strengthened by Marconi's investigations.

³⁴ It is possible, though far from certain, that a fragment of sculpture depicting a lion's tail comes from the Gigantomachy. Otherwise, the sculptural remains are too few and fragmentary to be identified.

³⁵ The pertinent lines of Diodorus are as follows (XIII, 82, 4): τῶν δὲ στοῶν τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ὕψος ἐξαισιον ἔχουσῶν, ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸς ἑω μέρει τὴν γιγαντομαχίαν ἐποιήσαντο γλυφαῖς καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει διαφερούσαις, ἐν δὲ τῷ πρὸς δυσμὰς τὴν ἄλυσιν τῆς Τροίας, ἐν ᾗ τῶν ἡρώων ἕκαστον ἰδεῖν ἔστιν οἰκείως τῆς περιστάσεως δεδημιουργημένον.

³⁶ On the confusion of Giants and Titans in ancient authors, see Maximilian Meyer, *Die Giganten und Titanen in der antiken Sage und Kunst*, pp. 144 f., especially note 211; cf. pp. 1 ff. Additions to Meyer's evidence have been made by Wüst, *R.-Z.*, VI (A), col. 1503.

was giving a generic indication, Naevius was describing the several kinds of figures.

We may therefore conclude that Naevius described the siege and fall of Agrigentum in Book I before beginning his account of the fall of Troy in the same book. Furthermore, as we shall see below (pp. 43 ff.), the historical events which are described directly after the legendary material make it unlikely that Naevius could have carried his historical account in Book I much beyond the end of the year 262. To these considerations, we must add the following reasons for concluding that the last historical event described by Naevius in Book I was in fact the fall of Agrigentum.

The first reason is that the fall of Agrigentum was an appropriate point at which to abandon the historical for the legendary, to turn from Rome's present to Rome's past. This event meant more to the Romans than the completion of a tedious and difficult military operation. As Polybius tells us,³⁷ it was then that the Romans became aware of their power and began to entertain hopes of driving the Carthaginians out of Sicily. No longer were they content to have saved the Mamertines and to enjoy the profits which they had already reaped from the war. They now perceived the advantages of a total victory and set their minds on it. The hesitant step of 264 had become a determined march toward the acquisition of an empire.

From the vantage point of time Polybius saw this clearly. But I do not believe that we would be expecting too much of the Latin poet who had himself fought in that war³⁸ if we assumed that he too, when he came to write his poem, recognized the same turning point as Polybius. If the past was to be considered, here was the appropriate place to begin, the place whose fall had determined the deadly struggle which was destined to endure for the next hundred years.

The second reason is that the Temple of Zeus at Agrigentum furnished material which the poet could use to effect a transition between actual events and the legendary past. It has already been noted that the counterpart of the Gigantomachy in the east part of the temple described by Naevius was a representation of the fall of Troy. That the latter might be connected with

³⁷ I, 20.

³⁸ Naevius, frg. 2.

Naevius' account of the legendary material occurred to Alfred Klotz, who having accepted Strzelecki's new arrangement of the fragments, attempted to find an historical event which would lead naturally to the legendary insertion.³⁹ Having failed in his attempt, he added the following suggestion, apparently an afterthought since it appears in the form of a K(orrecktur N(ote) to his completed article: "Oder sollte die Erzählung von Aeneas vielleicht mit dem Giebelschmuck des Zeustempels zusammenhängen und an die Eroberung dieser Stadt angeschlossen sein, die doch einen Wendepunkt des Krieges bezeichnete?"

The "Giebelschmuck" to which he refers is obviously the sculptured representation of the fall of Troy which according to Diodorus was in the west part of the temple.⁴⁰ But that it, or the Gigantomachy, which was its counterpart on the east, stood in a pediment is pure assumption. Neither the language of Diodorus nor archaeological remains permit more than hypotheses with regard to their places in the structure of the temple.⁴¹ Comparisons may be made with other temples of the same century⁴² which had sculptured representations of the same two subjects, but they will produce little profit. Scholars agree substantially that the fall of Troy assigned by Pausanias to a place above the columns of the second temple of Hera in the

³⁹ *Rh. Mus.*, LXXXVII (1938), pp. 190-192.

⁴⁰ See note 35 above.

⁴¹ Jahn (*Annali*, XXXV [1863], p. 245, note 1) and Pace (*loc. cit.*, pp. 244 ff.), who do not believe that the temple had pediments, distribute the two groups over metopes. Koldewey and Puchstein (*op. cit.*, p. 164) and Marconi (*Agrigento*, pp. 171 f.) assign them to pediments. But the fact remains that neither Diodorus nor the remains permit certain attribution.

⁴² The temple of Zeus at Agrigento had not been completed by 409 B. C. (Diodorus, XIII, 82, 2), although it is clear from the same passage that it already then contained the Gigantomachy and the fall of Troy. Pace conjectures reasonably that the temple was begun shortly after the battle of Himera in 480 B. C. when the Agrigentines set their prisoners to work quarrying marble from which to build their greatest temples (*loc. cit.*, pp. 178 f.; cf. Diodorus, XI, 25). On stylistic grounds, Marconi assigns the *Atlantes* to the decade 480-470 B. C. and the fragments of sculpture to 450-440 (*Agrigento*, p. 66). If Marconi is correct, these sculptures are not far removed in time from those with which they are now compared.

Argive Heraeum occupied the west pediment.⁴³ On the other hand, the Gigantomachy mentioned in the same passage is assigned to metopes.⁴⁴ On the Parthenon, scenes from a Gigantomachy and from the fall of Troy occupied metopes.⁴⁵ So far as I know, the fall of Troy is not represented elsewhere in a pediment, on a series of metopes, or on a frieze.⁴⁶ But the numerous Gigantomachies which can be added to those just mentioned appear in all three positions.⁴⁷ In view of this comparable material, it is safe to assume only that the Gigantomachy and Fall of Troy of the temple of Zeus at Agrigento were represented on pediments or on metopes.

Yet wherever they were, it is certain that they could be seen clearly. Diodorus states (XIII, 82, 4) that the Gigantomachy was depicted γλυφαῖς καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ κάλλει διαφερούσας. As to the heroes portrayed in the Fall, ἕκαστον ἰδεῖν ἔστιν οἰκείως τῆς περιστάσεως δεδημοιουργημένον. Since the phrase οἰκείως τῆς περιστάσεως has been interpreted loosely as referring to the form and garments of the figures,⁴⁸ it will not be irrelevant to our subject to analyze its meaning more carefully.

To begin with οἰκείως, it is an adverb derived from an adjective

⁴³ Pausanias, II, 17, 3. On the temple in general, see Waldstein, *The Argive Heraeum*, pp. 117 ff. On the position of the sculptured groups, the following are in substantial agreement: Jahn, *loc. cit.* (see note 41 above); Curtius, *Peloponnesus*, II, p. 570; Heydemann, *Iliupersis*, pp. 8 f.; Frazer, *Pausanias*, III, p. 182; Waldstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 ff.

⁴⁴ See references cited in the preceding note.

⁴⁵ The latest and most detailed study of these metopes is that of Praschniker in which appropriate reference is made to earlier discussions (*Parthenonstudien* [Wien, 1928]). For the east metopes (Gigantomachy), see pp. 186 ff.; for the north metopes (Fall of Troy), see pp. 87 ff. We shall return to the north metopes in more detail below.

⁴⁶ In speaking of the Fall in this connection, I mean those events alone which are part of the capture of the city. Such scenes from the Trojan War as are represented on the west pediment of the Temple of Aphaia at Aegina or on the east frieze of the Treasury of the Siphnians at Delphi do not concern us here.

⁴⁷ The evidence has been collected by Waser, *R.-E.*, Suppl. III, cols. 670 ff.

⁴⁸ Pace translates (*loc. cit.*, p. 186): "in cui ciascun eroe può ravvisarsi dalla forma e vestimento caratteristico"; Mueller (in the Didot edition, I, p. 522): "ubi heroum unumquemque videre est ad habitus sui formam elaborate fabricatam."

which governs both the genitive and the dative case. When the adverb governs a noun in the genitive, it means simply "in a manner appropriate to" the meaning of the noun which it governs. In another passage of Diodorus (XVI, 38, 6) Phayllus meets his end *ἐπιπόνως καὶ τῆς ἀσεβείας οἰκείως*, that is "painfully and in a manner appropriate to his impiety." Again Polybius (XV, 10, 1) has Scipio address his forces before Zama *βραχέως μὲν, οἰκείως δὲ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως* that is, "briefly but in a manner appropriate to the occasion." The statues, then, of the several heroes in Diodorus' group could be seen fashioned in a manner appropriate to the *περίστασις*. In the context, this *περίστασις* can mean but one thing: the event, vicissitudes, or circumstances in which they were portrayed. And as Diodorus has just told us, this was the fall of Troy.

We may therefore conceive of a group of figures, each of which had been given the attitude and attributes of the part which had been assigned to it in the scene as a whole. Fortunately, we have a strong parallel to support this concept. Four of the metopes on the north side of the Parthenon are sufficiently well preserved not only to place their subject matter beyond doubt but also to provide a fair idea of the way in which it was presented. Metopes XXIV and XXV represent Menelaus' first meeting with Helen after the fall of Troy; XXVII and XXVIII the flight of Aeneas, Anchises, Ascanius, and probably Creusa from the fallen city.⁴⁹ I refer the reader to the descriptions given by competent archaeologists for the details. Here, I would only state that the episodes are executed dramatically, that the gestures of the figures befit the persons whom they

⁴⁹ Michaelis first recognized that metopes XXIV and XXV represented the episode of Menelaus and Helen (*Der Parthenon*, p. 139). His view, which was generally accepted, has been confirmed most recently by Praschniker's careful reexamination of the metopes themselves and his comparative study of the same episode as represented on vases (*op. cit.*, pp. 98 ff.). The identification of the Aeneas episode (XXVII and XXVIII) is the work of Praschniker (*op. cit.*, pp. 107 ff.) and is accepted by Studniczka (*Neue Jahrb.*, V [1929], p. 645). Here we need not discuss other metopes of the north side, the interpretation of which is uncertain in regard to their place in the Fall, or the still unsettled question whether all the metopes of this side were devoted to the Trojan legend.

represent in the situations where they find themselves, that material attributes such as armor, garments, and statues are appropriately provided, and that all in all ἡρώων ἕκαστον ἰδεῖν ἔστιν οἰκέως τῆς περιστάσεως δεδημιουργημένον.

To return now to Naevius, it was such a dramatic representation of the fall of Troy which he must have seen on the temple of Zeus at Agrigentum. It has already been noted that he described its counterpart, the Gigantomachy, in some detail. We can well ask ourselves if he would have done so if it had not belonged to a building which in another part offered him material suitable to his literary purpose. Naevius, after all, was not writing a description of the monuments of Sicily. But more important is this: the earliest fragments of the *Bellum Punicum* which refer to the Trojan legend, one of which is expressly assigned to Book I, describe Aeneas, Anchises, their wives, and their followers escaping from Troy.⁵⁰ We do not know to what extent the poet may or may not have described preceding events, but the fragments which we have represent a motif which we found on the Parthenon metopes and can reasonably assume to have been included in the group at Agrigentum.

We have then an event which was a turning point not only in the first Punic War but in Roman history as a whole. At such a moment before the next irrevocable step was taken, it would have been appropriate to pause for consideration of the contestants and their antecedents. In regard to the Romans, the ultimate causes of Rome's existence, the fall of Troy and the departure of Aeneas, were there to see, the first certainly, the second very probably, on the most important temple of the city where the historical event took place. In the present condition of our evidence, I believe that we are justified in assuming that Naevius used the fall of Troy represented on the temple of Zeus at Agrigentum as a point of departure for his legendary account.

From this point on—and we are, I would recall, within Book I—the *Bellum Punicum* was devoted to legend. That this legendary part extended at least as far as the founding of Rome is indicated by Naevius' identification of Romulus, the founder of Rome, as the grandson of Aeneas by a daughter (frg. 25) and

⁵⁰ Frgs. 4 and 5. The latter is assigned to Book I by Servius Danielis on *Aeneid*, II, 797 (II, p. 506 Rand).

his mention of the Palatine (frg. 27). In the traditional reconstruction, the founding of Rome is assigned to Book II on the grounds that Naevius began his account of the first Punic War at the beginning of Book III. But here again what we have learned from our examination of Fragments 3, 24, and 32 in relation to their proper position in the poem will lead us to a different conclusion.

First of all, we have seen that Naevius began his account of the first Punic War not at the beginning of Book III but at the beginning of Book I. In the second place, it has been demonstrated that Fragments 3 and 24 are assigned to Book III in our sources and have been dislocated in direct violation of the evidence in order to make them fit into the traditional reconstruction. Let us now see what their contents teach us regarding the place where Naevius ended his legendary account to return to the first Punic War.

Fragment 24 mentions King Amulius. In the account of Livy⁵¹ and Dionysius of Halicarnassus⁵² he appears together with his brother Numitor as the last of the long line of Alban Kings, whose literary existence can be traced as far back as the History of Fabius Pictor.⁵³ In the same authors it is also Amulius who orders Romulus and Remus, the sons of his brother Numitor's daughter, Ilia or Rea Silvia, to be drowned.⁵⁴

Since Naevius made Romulus the grandson of Aeneas,⁵⁵ there was no place in his account for the line of Alban Kings who fill in the period of time between the fall of Troy as dated by the Greeks and the founding of Rome as dated by the Romans. As noted already by others, Naevius ignored Roman chronology in composing the legendary part of his poem and drew on one or several versions of the founding of Rome which were earlier than that of Fabius.⁵⁶

On the other hand, although the Amulius of Naevius could not have occupied the same position among the Alban Kings

⁵¹ I, 3, 10.

⁵² I, 71, 4.

⁵³ Frg. 5a, *H. R. R.*, Peter; cf. Leuze, *Die röm. Jahrzahlung*, pp. 86 ff.

⁵⁴ Livy I, 4, 3; Dionysius, I, 79, 4 = Fabius, frg. 5b.

⁵⁵ Frg. 25.

⁵⁶ Cf. Leo, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, pp. 83 f.; Mesk, *Wien. Stud.*, XXXVI (1914), p. 22.

which he occupied in the works of Fabius and later historians, there are unmistakable indications that his part was played in Latium and that it was connected with the legend of Romulus. First of all, Amulius is called *rex* in the fragment from the *Bellum Punicum* (24), while he appears in the *praetexta Lupus*, also by Naevius, as *rex Albanus*.⁵⁷ The title of the play alone would suggest that it dealt with the story of Romulus and Remus, and Leo's correct interpretation of a passage of Donatus has placed the matter beyond reasonable doubt.⁵⁸ We may reason, then, that Naevius would not have been likely to use two different versions of the same events, one in his play and the other in his epic. Differences in treatment and detail we must of course assume, but not to the extent of changing the basic rôles and relations of the principal characters.⁵⁹

In the second place, we have the testimony of Ennius. He, too, made Romulus the grandson of Aeneas by a daughter and Amulius a king of Alba.⁶⁰ In these elements of the legend, there is complete correspondence with Naevius and if Ennius was not following him directly, he at least was drawing upon a common source. Whether we may assume with Mesk that Ennius continued to follow this common source in handling other parts of the legend⁶¹ is uncertain and need not concern us here. For our purpose we have learned that the Amulius of Fragment 24 of the *Bellum Punicum* was king of Alba and as such played a part in the events in Latium after the arrival of the Trojans which led to the founding of Rome. And since Fragment 24 belonged to Book III, part of Book III, at least, contained a part of the legendary account.

We now come to the last of the dislocated fragments, Fragment 3. In it, Anchises is performing a sacrifice. The ritual is Roman (*auspicia, templum, penates*),⁶² but this does not allow us to assume anything about the place where the sacrifice was

⁵⁷ Frg. 1, *T. R. F.*³, p. 322 Ribbeck.

⁵⁸ Donatus on Terence, *Ad.* 537. Leo's views (*op. cit.*, p. 90, note 1) have been accepted by Fränkel (*R.-E.*, Suppl. VI, col. 627).

⁵⁹ Cf. Mesk, *loc. cit.*, pp. 28 f.

⁶⁰ See the *testimonia* collected by Vahlen on Ennius, *Ann.*, frgs. 28 and 30.

⁶¹ Mesk, *loc. cit.*, p. 29.

⁶² Cf. Weinstock, *R.-E.*, XIX, col. 420.

performed. Naevius might well have used a Roman ritual in describing a sacrifice performed by Anchises in Troy. But the fact that the fragment in question belongs to Book III and the knowledge which we now have that legendary events in Latium were described in that book make it very likely that the sacrifice took place in Latium.

Hence, Naevius would have brought Anchises to Latium. This is contrary to the Virgilian account and, apart from the influence exercised by the traditional reconstruction, this discrepancy has played no small part in moving scholars to reassign the fragment to Book I. But if we dismiss Virgil from our minds for the moment, there is no good reason to believe against the evidence that Naevius could not have brought Anchises to Italy with Aeneas.

In the first place, Anchises' presence in Latium is not peculiar to Naevius' account. Cato brought Anchises to Latium in his *Origines*⁶³ and his death there is mentioned expressly by Strabo.⁶⁴ Dionysius, we may assume, had this version in mind, when he reports that there were authors who said that the tomb of Aeneas in Latium was built originally for Anchises by Aeneas.⁶⁵

In the second place, so far as our evidence permits us to judge, there was no fixed tradition about Anchises, at the time when Naevius was writing the *Bellum Punicum*, which would prevent him from being brought to Latium. Naevius knew from Greek authors that Anchises had escaped the destruction of Troy and so he portrayed him.⁶⁶ If the ἀπόπλους Αἰνῆου represented on the Tabula Iliaca faithfully reflects an incident from the Ἰλίου Πέποις of Stesichorus—and this is far from certain⁶⁷—, Naevius may have known of Anchises' departure for the West with Aeneas. From that point on, the poet was free to do what he wished with the character of Anchises. What could be more natural, then, than to have him accompany his son to the end of his voyage, especially if the prophetic books which Venus had given to Anchises⁶⁸ could be used to advantage in Latium?

⁶³ Frg. 9, Peter.

⁶⁵ I, 64, 5.

⁶⁴ V, 3, 2, p. 229.

⁶⁶ Frgs. 4 and 5.

⁶⁷ Cf. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 103 ff. For a description of this scene, see Mancuso, *Memorie Acad. Lincei*, XIV (1911), p. 719.

⁶⁸ Naevius, frg. 13a.

Where, then, did Naevius return to his account of the first Punic War? We have no fragments dealing with the War assigned to Book III in our sources. Fragment 39 which describes a Roman raid on Malta is assigned to Book IV in our source. It is the earliest event in Book IV which we can identify with complete certainty and it took place in 258 or 257, more probably in the latter year.⁶⁹ Fragment 36, however, which is also assigned to Book IV, has been identified by Cichorius as referring to an event of 260. It reads:

virum praetor advenit auspicat auspicium
prosperum.

Cichorius points out that only three occasions are attested on which a praetor commanded an army outside of Rome during the first Punic War: in 260, 248, and 242 B. C.⁷⁰ Inasmuch as the last two dates would be too late for Book IV, he chooses the event of the year 260 when the *praetor urbanus* was sent out from Rome to take over the command of Scipio who had been captured by the enemy.

The reasoning is sound and the conclusion attractive. But before we come to a final conclusion regarding the place where Naevius resumed his account of the first Punic War, we must see if the evidence furnished by subsequent fragments can help us.

There are no fragments assigned to Book V in our sources. As to Book VI, Fragment 45 is assigned to that book by Nonius. It has been identified by Cichorius with great probability as referring to the arrogant attitude toward his troops of P. Claudius Pulcher, consul in 249.⁷¹ Fragment 48, also assigned to Book VI by Nonius, mentions the seventeenth year of the war. Although the event to which it refers must remain a matter of conjecture, the date of the event is certain: 248-247. In Fragment 50, assigned to Book VII, the terms of the peace which brought the war to an end in 241 are mentioned.⁷²

⁶⁹ Cichorius, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁷¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁷² That Fragments 49 and 50 do not belong together in context, although they both derive from the same passage of Nonius, was first observed by Buecheler (*Kleine Schriften*, I, pp. 387 f.). The division is accepted by Lindsay in his edition of Nonius (pp. 760-761) and Morel has

This evidence has been carefully selected in order to furnish the firmest possible foundation for a concept of the order and contents of the later books. Only such fragments as were assigned to specific books in their sources were considered and among these, only those were discussed which could be referred to datable historical events either with complete certainty or great probability. In several cases attractive and reasonable identifications made by Cichorius were discarded as falling short of the established criteria. A conspectus will assist analysis.

<i>Fragment</i>	<i>Book</i>	<i>Date of Event</i>	<i>Quality</i>
36	IV	260	Very Probable
39	IV	258 or 257	Certain
45	VI	249	Very Probable
48	VI	248-247	Certain
50	VII	241	Certain

We have here four Books (IV-VII) covering a period of nineteen years. It is certain that events of 258 or 257, 248 or 247, and 241 were mentioned in books IV, VI, and VII respectively. It is probable that events of 260 and 249 were mentioned in Books IV and VI. Thus, the order of the probable fragments fits in nicely with that of the certain fragments. The conclusion is obvious: in Lampadio's seven book edition, the last four books seem to have been divided so that each book contained the events of about five years of the war. We cannot assume that the divisions were absolutely even, since the number and importance of the events to be described varied from year to year. Also Lampadio, as shown by his inclusion of historical and legendary material in Book I, was dividing by quantity⁷³ rather than contents. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates a reasonably uniform proportion between the various books and the periods which they covered.

given the fragment the numbers cited above. Cichorius (*op. cit.*, pp. 50 ff.) has shown that Fragment 49 probably refers to an event of 248 and belonged to Book VI. This does not affect Nonius' statement that the lines composing Fragment 50 came from Book VII.

⁷³ On the basis of the average length of seven books of the *Iliad*, Leo estimates that the *Bellum Punicum* contained between 4000 and 5000 verses (*op. cit.*, p. 81), Birt about 7000 verses (*Buchwesen*, p. 462). Both these estimates are reasonable, but the evidence allows them to be no more than conjectures.

Returning now to the place where Naevius abandoned his legendary account to resume that of the first Punic War, we may reason as follows. If Fragment 36 of Book IV is correctly identified as referring to the year 260—and I think it is—the legendary part of the poem must have run at least as far as the end or the beginning of the end of Book III. For there was only a single year of the war to be treated, 261, between the fall of Agrigentum at the end of 262⁷⁴ where the legendary part began within Book I and the arrival of the *praetor urbanus* in 260 in Book IV. We cannot assume, of course, that Lampadio made the end of the legendary account coincide with the end of Book III, for, as we have seen above, he did not work in this way. In view of this, he may have included the events of 261 at the end of Book III, or even extended the end of the legendary account into Book IV. But it could not have gone far into Book IV since this book had to contain certainly the historical events from 261 to 258 or 257 and probably those down to 256 or 255.

On the other hand, if we discard the evidence of Fragment 36 as uncertain, we still must distribute the events of 261 to 258 or 257 between Books III and IV. In this case the reasonable assumption is again that Book IV contained approximately the events of 260 to 255 and that consequently the legendary part ended somewhere in the vicinity of the end of Book III.

The conclusions which have been attained in the course of this study may now be summarized: Naevius began his *Bellum Punicum* with an account of the opening years of the first Punic War. He carried this account down to the fall of Agrigentum in 262 B. C. where he abandoned the historical narrative in order to begin an account of Rome's origins from the fall of Troy and the setting forth of Aeneas. The fall of Troy represented in the sculptures of the temple of Zeus at Agrigentum afforded him a means of transition. The legendary account was extended without interruption to the founding of Rome. At this point, Naevius returned to the first Punic War with the historical events of the year 261. The rest of the poem was devoted to a chronological account of the war down to its end.

⁷⁴ In December according to De Sanctis (*op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 211) on the basis of Polybius, I, 18, 6, and I, 19, 5.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE MINTS UNDER THE JULIO-CLAUDIAN EMPERORS.¹

The last quarter of a century has seen great progress in the knowledge and use of the Roman imperial coinage as fundamental evidence for Roman history. This is due primarily to the superb stream of British Museum Catalogues poured forth by Mr. Mattingly, who has re-taught the lesson, long forgotten in Roman numismatics, that the only key to proper analysis is proper classification, especially when the material to be classified exists in overwhelming volume. As a result, students of the Roman Empire are increasingly aware of the value of a large body of material from which evidence can be drawn without the uncertainty or self-consciousness which too often attends the worker in an unrecognized field. Nevertheless, it may still be true that the imperial coinage is used in an undiscerning manner. This mass of significant evidence, so welcome in itself, may very easily be accepted uncritically and at its face value. The mere fact that the standard catalogues have reduced to order a peculiarly complex and voluminous material is, in itself, enough to suggest that further effort is unnecessary. In addition, the habits engendered in the use and study of inscriptions are perhaps partly responsible for uncritical handling of coin-evidence. Face-value is a simple and prominent factor in inscriptions, the majority of which are documentary in a pure sense—statements, whether public or private, official or unofficial, recording specific achievements or specific actions in a more or less specific manner. The accuracy of such statements must, of course, be tested: chronology and nomenclature must be checked, together with all the diverse details bearing upon private life or public service and administration. But no question arises, in general, of good faith or ulterior motive: nearly all Roman inscriptions—save for such obviously exceptional

¹ In its original form this paper was read at a joint meeting of the Oxford Philological Society and of the Classical Association (Oxford Branch). In its present form it owes much to the criticisms and suggestions of Professor Momigliano.

examples as the *Res Gestae*, written for a purpose by the head of the State—were specifications possessing full documentary value at the time of publication. Coinage is very different. It was neither simple nor, in the same sense, personal; it was virtually the monopoly of the imperial government; it was a medium of mass-information; it might, and did, urge the belief of what was true; it might also depreciate the truth, or commend what was either partially true or false, or express mere hope, however distant this might lie from the field of possible achievement. It purported to possess a full documentary value at the time of publication; but in fact, like the *Res Gestae*, it could not make that claim with truth, though ultimately its documentary value (again like that of the *Res Gestae*) has attained a degree far higher and far more illuminating than anything which could be claimed for it originally.

This essential difference of character between the epigraphic and numismatic evidence for the Roman Empire will be generally conceded; but it will be asked, in the light of this distinction, from what standpoint correct criticism can most properly be brought to bear upon any seemingly relevant numismatic evidence. If we have, in the past, too often committed the double sin of accepting the evidence of coinage uncritically while also admitting the need for criticism, if we have reacted to the Roman imperial coinage somewhat as the imperial government may have expected its subjects to react, then plainly the selection of such a standpoint is a matter of first importance. And we must begin by obtaining a clear idea of the system upon which the mints were conducted.

Of their purely technical and mechanical side something is already known. A series of inscriptions from statues dedicated in A.D. 115 to Apollo, Fortuna, Hercules, and Victoria, has thrown considerable light upon this aspect of the imperial mint.² At the head of the technical staff stood an imperial freedman, Felix by name. He bore the military title *optio*, from which it may be seen that the authority which he exerted over the em-

² *C. I. L.*, VI, 42, 43, 44, 791; cf. 8454-6, 8461, 8464. The essential details of these inscriptions will be found in *B. M. Cat. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. lviii, where the question of the organization of the mints is discussed; see also *B. M. Cat. Rom. Emp.*, III, pp. xvi f.; IV, pp. xvii f.

ployees of the imperial mint—these four dedications alone specify upwards of 90 names, two-thirds freedmen and the rest slaves—was perhaps semi-military in character. His subordinates included the *officinatores* (many in number, whose functions were probably, as Mr. Mattingly has suggested,³ those of casting and trimming the blanks and sinking the dies), the *signatores* (who perhaps cut the legends on the dies and affixed a secret mark), the *suppostores* (who held the blanks steady between the dies in the act of striking), and the *malliatores* (who performed the actual striking), in addition to the *conductores flaturae argent[ariae]*, who must have been engaged in ensuring a supply of bar-silver.⁴ The responsibility of Felix was thus wide. But it went further still; for he was *exactor*—technical controller, doubtless with reference to purity of metal—for gold, silver, and for *aes* as well.⁵ With appropriate modifications, the system prevailing in Trajan's principate may be referred back to an earlier period also, for the imperial mint, whether situated at Lyons (as up to Gaius' principate) or at Rome, was under the direct control of the *princeps* through his personal servants.⁶

The technical organization of the senatorial mint presents greater difficulties, because of the lack of comparable information; but even here the main outlines can be distinguished. Control of the mechanical processes lay with senatorial delegates, the *III viri aere argento auro flando feriundo*. During the Republican period their powers over the metropolitan mint or mints appear to have been supreme; they were, as their title declares, responsible for coinage in all three metals, and they decided what types the coins should bear. Under Augustus this triumviral college was shorn of much of its dignity;⁷ though the *tresviri monetales* continued, down to the third century, to claim by their

³ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. lviii f., as against E. Babelon, *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines* I(1) (Paris, 1901), cols. 863 f.

⁴ Babelon, *op. cit.*, col. 865.

⁵ Mommsen (*C. I. L.*, VI, 44, *ad loc.*) emphasized the importance of this fact.

⁶ Trajan's imperial mint was under the supervision of an imperial procurator (*C. I. L.*, VI, 1607; cf. 1625 a, b); but this is not to say that such a post had existed much (if any) earlier.

⁷ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. lvii.

title a connection with coinage in all three metals, they must henceforth have been almost certainly restricted to *aes*. Even here their importance was much diminished, as is shown by the fact that Augustus incorporated the mint-triumvirate in the *vigintiviratus*, that collection of junior posts of which one must be held by all aspirants to a senatorial career. Their responsibilities cannot, therefore, have been wide. The increasingly close relationship which may be postulated between the imperial and senatorial mints (seen primarily in Gaius' removal of the former to Rome, and strengthened in Nero's principate⁸) makes it likely that the imperial freedman who controlled the technical side of the imperial mint exercised a closer and closer supervision over that of the senatorial mint as well. It will be remembered that Felix, under Trajan, was "exactor auri, argenti, et aeris."

But this will not get us far; minor officials such as these can scarcely have exerted any influence upon the mints except in purely technical matters. What of the major officials, who bore a general responsibility for the mints in a larger sense? Here again we are on fairly certain ground. The senatorial mint must have fallen within the competence of the officials of the State Treasury, the *aerarium Saturni*. Tacitus specifies the many changes in the status of these officials under the Julio-Claudian *principes*, making it quite clear that the tendency throughout was towards a greater imperial control over the *aerarium*.⁹ Nero's personally selected *praefecti aerarii* would not unnaturally pay some deference to the imperial Finance Secretary, the *procurator a rationibus*, who would thus exercise control over the senatorial mint—indirectly, perhaps, but as surely as he had open control over the imperial mint or mints. Statius has suggested, in vivid form, the immense range of Claudius Etruscus' duties in that post in the Flavian epoch. Not only did he supervise the production of metal from its natural sources; it was his eye too that watched

quod domini celsis niteat laquearibus aurum,
quae divum in vultus igni formanda liquescat
massa, quid Ausoniae scriptum crepet igne Monetae.¹⁰

⁸ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. lix.

⁹ *Ann.*, XIII, 29.

¹⁰ *Silvae*, III, 3, 103-5.

And just as the Finance Secretary controlled, with greater or less directness, the central mints of Rome, so also he must have controlled decentralized mints in the provinces, by means of subordinate procurators.¹¹

On the technical side, therefore, the main lines of organization are fairly clear. For the imperial coinage supreme authority, under the *princeps*, rests in the Finance Secretary; from him it descends to an imperial *libertus*, charged with the direct supervision of the workmen. For the senatorial coinage the officials of the *aerarium* bear theoretical responsibility (though, as we have seen, they must inevitably have been influenced by the imperial Finance Secretary); they in turn delegate their duties to the *IIIviri a.a.a.f.f.* (themselves increasingly influenced by the permanent—and professional—imperial *libertus*), by whom the workmen are controlled and supervised.

At this point an approach can be made to the main question, "the personality" of the mints. None of the officials so far mentioned seems likely to have dictated the choice of coin-types; all of them are concerned, so far as can be seen, with the economic or mechanical questions arising in the process of coinage. And yet, if we wish to dissociate ourselves from the recipient of Julio-Claudian coinage who either swallowed whole its rich variety of suggestion and inspired comment or brushed its message aside in a spirit of bored and cynical indifference, we must ask who *was* responsible for the choice of types. It is only by discovering definite signs of personality inherent in that choice that we can undertake secure and profitable criticism of numismatic evidence. The task is difficult and delicate; and yet the coinage itself, when properly considered, supplies a broad

¹¹ This is not the place to discuss the post held by C. Iulius Quadratus Bassus as ἐπιμελη[τήν] ? χρυσοῦ ἀργύρου χαράγματος. W. Weber (*Berl. Sitzb.*, Ph.-Hist. Kl., 1932, pp. 57 ff., especially pp. 78 f.) reads μονήρη], making Bassus a *curator* of Domitian's reorganized imperial mint. A. von Premerstein (*Sitzb. Bay. Akad.*, Ph.-Hist. Abt., 1934, pp. 3 ff., especially pp. 24 f.) reading χαλκο]ῦ, would appear to be preferable: Bassus' post would be, on this reading, the normal *IIIvir a.a.a.f.f.*, badly translated into Greek. But the reading is too doubtful to allow the inscription to bear much weight of theory; and in any case the problem is one that falls after the period with which we are here concerned.

base for hypothesis. Moreover the Julio-Claudian period shows the Roman coinage in its adolescent, and therefore most significantly changing, state.

Augustus found, ready to hand, many precedents (already firmly established in the final years of the Republic) for coin-types of appeal and persuasion.¹² No previous *imperator*, however, had controlled anything like the wide variety of mints which worked for Augustus—Ephesus and probably Pergamum in the East,¹³ Emerita together with two other unnamed mints in Spain, and, last and greatest of all, Lyons. The eastern mints, which must have begun to operate almost immediately after Actium and which continued certainly until *ca.* 19 B. C., supplied coinage for an area long associated with senatorial tradition and only lately within the administration of Antony. Choice of types was thus a matter for shrewd discretion, for, though the past could not be forgotten overnight, no advantage was to be gained by irritating the wounds of civil war as a result of imprudent commemoration or rejoicing. Not that the issue was evaded; the general theme of the eastern mints from *ca.* 31 to 27 B. C.¹⁴ was Victory, open and unambiguous. But Victory, even when dwelling in Octavian, has climbed above the personal plane to the universal.¹⁵ Her tone was mild; Egypt was “capta,”¹⁶ and Asia “recepta”¹⁷—a distinction which suggests that the true victory was felt to lie in Rome’s triumphant self-vindication. Victory, moreover, was accompanied by Peace.¹⁸ It was only in the east, for example, that the equation of Peace and Political Freedom was emphasized, in the remarkably winning and conciliatory issue which styled Octavian (in 28

¹² *B. M. U. Rom. Rep.*, *passim*.

¹³ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. cxviii ff.

¹⁴ The eastern types struck after the formal establishment of the principate are less significant, falling into line with new issues produced elsewhere.

¹⁵ It is not possible, owing to the limits of space, to give even the barest conspectus of the various emissions discussed in this paper. Individual references will be given to the most important; for the rest, the reader will naturally turn to *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.* for the material upon which our argument, section by section, is based.

¹⁶ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 106, nos. 650 ff.

¹⁷ *Id.*, p. 105, nos. 647 ff.

¹⁸ *Id.*, p. 99, nos. 605 ff.

B. C.) "Libertatis populi Romani vindex."¹⁹ A place was found also for Venus, founder of the Julian *gens*, and for Neptune, in whose element Actium had been fought and won.²⁰ Throughout this series the sentiment was truly Roman—as Roman and as metropolitan as the very symbolism employed in the actual design of the types.

A strong contrast is provided by Emerita—a new *colonia*, in newly provincialized territory, intended primarily for the reception of veterans paid off from the legions engaged in Augustus' campaigns in north-west Spain. Though it was, as a *colonia*, a self-governing community, it was doubtless also the centre from which Augustus' *propraetor* administered Lusitania as a whole; and its mint, as the coins themselves make perfectly clear, was directly controlled by that *propraetor*.²¹ The coins, nearly all of which bear the *propraetor's* name and official title, were predominantly military in character; their types—shield, spear, sword; helmet, dagger, axe; the battlements of Emerita; trophy²²—appeared in a rigid sequence, stern and unimaginative, with little to suggest inspired comment or subtle thought.

Elsewhere in Spain a different outlook prevailed. Two other imperial mints operated on Spanish soil. These, tentatively assigned to Caesaraugusta and Colonia Patricia (Corduba),²³ were at work in the early years of Augustus' principate,²⁴ and their types fell into three main categories, underlining respectively the "accession-honours" of Augustus of 27 B. C., the Parthian *coup* of 19 B. C., and the general material

¹⁹ *Id.*, p. 112, nos. 691 ff. The fact that this issue (of tetradrachm standard) was intended exclusively for eastern circulation is not generally appreciated: see, e.g., *C. A. H.*, X, p. 127, and E. T. Salmon, *History of the Roman World from 30 B. C. to A. D. 138* (London, 1944), p. 7.

²⁰ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 98, no. 599; p. 100, nos. 609, 615.

²¹ *Id.*, pp. cviii ff. In "The Gold and Silver Coinage of Spain under Augustus," *Num. Chron.*, 1945, pp. 58 ff., I have suggested certain alterations in the sequence and dating of Emeritan issues.

²² *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. 51 ff. No account is here taken of the coins lacking Carisius' name (*id.*, p. 56, nos. 305 ff.), which may (cf. *Num. Chron.*, *cit.*) precede the signed issues.

²³ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. cviii ff.

²⁴ Mattingly (*ibid.*), *ca.* 19-15 B. C.; I should prefer (*Num. Chron.*, *cit.*) *ca.* 24-16 B. C.

progress of the new régime. No place was found for any local Spanish allusions. So far, and only so far, is there a true resemblance between these two mints, for while one of them ("Colonia Patricia") embroiders on these common themes with a wealth of spontaneous detail and innovation, the other ("Caesaraugusta") supplies no more than a dull echo.²⁵ At the one mint the "accession-honours"²⁶ of Augustus are associated with types applicable in a more personal way to the *princeps*, such as the capricorn and Aurora²⁷—the happy circumstance of Augustus' birth, and the prelude to the New Age. No such compliment appears at the other. The one mint is careful to add to the "Parthian" types proper a number which specifically emphasize the triumphal nature of Augustus' diplomatic victory.²⁸ Not so the other. Thus, although each of these two mints was, quite clearly, administered by a man steeped in the thought and symbolism of Rome and Italy, only the actual workmanship of the coins being Spanish, nevertheless it can be said that one man was vigorous and the other unenterprising, that one did the maximum with his material and the other the minimum. It should, however, be noted in passing that each of them—unlike the soft-spoken and conciliatory mint-masters of the East and the barrack-room official at Emerita—emphasized the achievements against the East of the man to whom the western *consensus universorum* of 32 B. C. had given such a comprehensive mandate.²⁹

From Spain we may turn to Gaul, where, *ca.* 15 B. C., the great imperial mint of Lyons superseded all others in the production of gold and silver on a world-wide scale.³⁰ It is well to remember the times in which this mint began to operate. The initial phase of the New Age—that of *Octavianus triumphator*, from 31 to 27 B. C.—was already becoming remote; and indeed

²⁵ A full and detailed comparison of these two mints will be found in *Num. Chron.*, 1945, pp. 58-72.

²⁶ I. e. shield, laurels, wreath.

²⁷ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 62, nos. 344-50.

²⁸ E. g. *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 67, no. 384; p. 69, no. 397; p. 73, no. 427.

²⁹ *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, 25.

³⁰ The temporary series of gold and silver struck at Rome ceased *ca.* 12 B. C.; see below.

the conception of Augustus newly-created was yielding apace to that of Augustus consolidated and consolidating. Consequently it would be unnatural to expect from Lyons a repetition of the types previously struck elsewhere to commemorate the "accession" and the Parthian triumph. Those days were over; the Secular Games of 17 B. C. had officially ushered in a fresh era; and from 15 B. C. onwards came the spade-work of internal rehabilitation and frontier defence, not always spectacular but of infinite importance and considerable difficulty, giving scope for the most varied allusion to road-building, to the Alpine campaigns, and to all the general results of increased security. But the mint of Lyons made no play with this material, all of which was dismissed without comment. For the best part of a decade the types of Lyons were, with one or two exceptions,³¹ stereotyped in character and often vague in their suggestive content,³² until, first about 8 B. C. and later from 2 B. C. onwards, the mint turned over to a prodigious blast of dynastic types, wholly Roman in idiom, which was to occupy it until the end of Augustus' principate.³³

Finally, there was the Senatorial mint of Rome. Entrusted temporarily with the production of gold and silver from *ca.* 19 B. C. onwards, this mint began with types steeped in the most conservative Republican tradition.³⁴ But in 16 B. C. its lethargy was shattered by the impact of a fresh personality who procured the advertisement of the Augustan achievement by an astonishing series of pro-Augustan announcements.³⁵ Then it lapsed again into something like its former state, and *ca.* 12 B. C. the issuing of gold and silver at Rome was discontinued. Henceforth the Senate's monetary activities were confined to the production of bronze, which, under Augustus, was never to show any flexible recognition of topical events or changes.³⁶

³¹ Cf. *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 80, nos. 465-7.

³² *Id.*, p. 77, nos. 443 ff.; even ACT(ium) and SICIL(ia) were words which, repeated indefinitely, would lose their original magic.

³³ *Id.*, p. 85, nos. 498 ff.; p. 87, nos. 506 ff.; p. 88, nos. 513 ff.

³⁴ *Id.*, pp. xciv ff.; pp. 1-14.

³⁵ *Id.*, pp. 14-18; cf. Sutherland, "The Senatorial Gold and Silver Coinage of 16 B. C.," *Num. Chron.*, 1943, pp. 40 ff.

³⁶ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. xcvii; Sutherland, *loc. cit.*, p. 48.

What can be learned from the behaviour of these Augustan mints in the East, in Spain, at Lyons, and at Rome? Three principal suggestions appear to emerge. First, all types of all imperial mints at all times showed the authentic Roman touch in idiom and symbolism. Local allusions, save in the somewhat exceptional case of Emerita,³⁷ were almost wholly absent from those mints which were situated in the provinces. The Altar of Lyons—virtually the standard type of the bronze coinage issued at Lyons by the *concilium Galliarum*³⁸—received no mention whatever on the imperial coinage of Lyons. Secondly, and conformably, it would seem that Rome, and Rome alone, furnished the general instructions on which was based, from time to time, the advertisement of certain well-defined themes. The metropolitan idiom, just noted, was the result of metropolitan guidance, which recommended types to wean the East from its unhappy association with Antony; which ensured the appearance of types alluding to the “accession honours” simultaneously at two Spanish mints, and then replaced them with the “Parthian” group, and finally dropped these in favour of civil and internal references; which, at first content with empty or passive types at Lyons, suddenly turned this great Gallic mint to the steady transmission of dynastic ideas. Thirdly, the general instructions issued from Rome depended for their success upon the ability and enterprise of the local mint-superintendents. Two mints in Spain (to use the phrase of modern journalism) “covered” the same news, but one achieved a vividness altogether lacking in the other. These three suggestions, working in combination, urge us to look for someone in Rome responsible for the transmission to mint-procurators abroad of advice upon their choice of coin-types. Unfortunately the Augustan principate does not allow us to draw back the veil and disclose the man or men concerned. Possibly some member of the still embryonic imperial civil service discharged the task; possibly the cultured Maecenas or his like; or even Augustus himself. But, though the veil conceals identity, it cannot conceal the presence, which, under succeeding *principes*, begins to grow much clearer.

³⁷ Above, p. 53.

³⁸ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 92, nos. 548 ff.; p. 94, nos. 565 ff.

Tiberius, anxious to preserve all the salient features of the Augustan régime, on which his own security ultimately depended, retained the chief imperial mint at Lyons. This mint, after producing two initial issues of topical interest,³⁹ settled down to a coinage more stereotyped than any that was to be seen for three centuries. For twenty-three years it concentrated (apart from specially struck gold *quinarii*) upon a single type, of a conspicuously non-informative kind.⁴⁰ Such a type, calling for no innovation in idea or design, must surely point to a desire for economy which could be secured by the appointment of a man of inferior status and competence. Possibly the mint was directed by an imperial freedman, though it is more likely that a senior slave would have been sufficient for what was a purely routine task of supervision. In either case it is plain that Tiberius was content to abandon the advantages which an actively vocal mint at Lyons might have exercised in the provinces. Not so at Rome. For whereas the Senatorial mint had, under Augustus, accommodated its voice to the imperial policy on only a single occasion,⁴¹ under Tiberius its bronze became for a time the chief medium through which the imperial case was presented, emphasizing the mild justice, the well-being, and the sense of responsibility which were inalienable from an administration founded upon Augustan principles.⁴² This striking development may be held, on good grounds, to have coincided with the rapid extension of Sejanus' influence in the early twenties; and it is legitimate to consider whether the coincidence is an empty one. Tacitus has clearly painted the combination of feebleness and obstinacy with which the Senate confronted a diffident and suspicious *princeps*; and Sejanus may have found congenial enough work in dictating to that body the service which its coinage could best render to his master's

³⁹ *Id.*, pp. 120 f., nos. 1-11; p. 124, nos. 28-9.

⁴⁰ *Id.*, pp. 124 ff., nos. 30 ff. See Sutherland, "Roman Coin Propaganda under Augustus and Tiberius," *Num. Rev.*, II (1944), pp. 9 f.

⁴¹ Above, p. 55.

⁴² *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. 131 f., nos. 79-90; p. 133, no. 98; p. 130, no. 74; pp. 140 f., nos. 141-5. On the dating of the last group see Sutherland, "Divus Augustus Pater," *Num. Chron.*, 1941, pp. 97 ff.

cause—later, perhaps, to be his own.⁴³ At all events, with the removal of Sejanus the alien influence upon the Senate's coinage was drastically weakened (though it did not wholly vanish),⁴⁴ and it may be suggested that the functions which a Sejanus had abused were afterwards more discreetly performed, under closer supervision, by an official of the emperor's private household. Evidence suggests that the Financial Secretary of the absentee Tiberius enjoyed a freer hand and a wider responsibility than his Augustan counterpart.⁴⁵ The same may be predicated of those other household officials whose activities under Claudius were to become a byword.

The principate of Gaius produced deadlock or reaction in most affairs of state. His chief contribution to the subject of our study was the removal of the imperial mint from Lyons to Rome, though not before its controller (still, presumably, Tiberius' nominee) had automatically—and mistakenly—presumed Tiberius' consecration.⁴⁶ Once established in Rome, its activities were closely co-ordinated with those of the Senatorial mint, and both embarked upon a new tradition, employing coin types devoted almost wholly to the conception of Gaius as head of the imperial house.⁴⁷ Herein the fundamental autocracy of Gaius' policy was abundantly evident; Gaius was Gaius rather than *princeps*, and the state was an expression of him. The coinage of each mint impartially exalted the *dominus*; the empire looked to its centre, and the failure of the central figure to look abroad to provincial horizons is shown by the complete absence of types suggesting empire prosperity or peace.⁴⁸ Yet, simply because Gaius *was* autocratic, his coin types fail to suggest any signs of personality in their choice. A despot's servants are all alike servile; their identities are nebulous, their initiative negligible: qualities which explain the static nature of Gaius' types, whether

⁴³ Cf. Sutherland, "Two 'Virtues' of Tiberius," *J. R. S.*, XXVIII (1938), pp. 129 ff.

⁴⁴ *Num. Chron.*, cit., p. 116.

⁴⁵ Sutherland, "*Aerarium* and *Fiscus* during the Early Empire," *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945), pp. 151 ff.

⁴⁶ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. cxlii f., cxliv.

⁴⁷ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. 147 ff., *passim*.

⁴⁸ Such as the coinage of Tiberius had included; cf. *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 135, nos. 104-7.

imperial or senatorial, whether before or after his public avowal of hostility to the Senate. All that can be noted is that the imperial mint, at work in Rome, marches in step with the Senatorial. The same imperial officer controlled the choice of types for both; and the strength of imperial pressure can be judged by the production, in the senatorial mint, of non-senatorial bronze—the famous “Adlocut(io) Coh(ortium)” *sestertii* without the sanctioning formula “S(enatus) C(onsulto).”⁴⁹

Claudius employed very different methods. His autocracy, though no less firm, was at once more enlightened and more humane, and the coin types of his reign, whether of the imperial or the Senatorial mint, were more sensitive and more varied. It is, indeed, as if the new tendencies which had been hardly more than latent under Tiberius now naturally rose to view, with all thought of the intervening despotism forgotten. The Senatorial mint no longer furnished a faithful echo of the imperial, though it was none the less devoted to the imperial theme; and the imperial mint, while naturally emphasizing the degree of Claudius’ reliance upon the army,⁵⁰ did not neglect the fruits of military policy, as seen in Germany and Britain,⁵¹ or the peace which Victory secured.⁵² To the Senate was assigned, in particular, the advertisement of the spirit of the times—*libertas* and *constantia*,⁵³ upheld by that Minerva who protected the soldier-student,⁵⁴ blessed by the gifts of Ceres,⁵⁵ and destined to endure under Claudius’ heir.⁵⁶ The reign of Claudius is notable for the first real attempt (encouraged by the emperor himself) to regard the system of principate objectively. With Augustus it had been the conqueror’s personal

⁴⁹ *Id.*, p. 151, nos. 33 ff.; p. 156, no. *; p. 157, nos. 67-8. Cf. J. M. C. Toynbee, *Roman Medallions* (American Numismatic Society’s *Numismatic Studies*, no. 5 [New York, 1944]), p. 28.

⁵⁰ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, p. 165, no. 5; p. 166, nos. 8-10; pp. 167 f., nos. 20-5, 28; p. 169, nos. 37-8.

⁵¹ *Id.*, p. 164, no. 2 (cf. p. clii); p. 168, no. 29; p. 169, no. 36; p. 171, nos. 49-50.

⁵² *Id.*, p. 165, nos. 6-7; p. 168, nos. 26-7; p. 170, nos. 39-41; p. 171, nos. 51-3; pp. 172 f., nos. 55, 58-9, 61-3; p. 174, nos. 68-9.

⁵³ *Id.*, pp. 184 f., nos. 140-6; pp. 199 f., nos. 199-205.

⁵⁴ *Id.*, p. 185, no. 149; p. 192, nos. 206-7.

⁵⁵ *Id.*, p. 183, nos. 136-7; p. 191, nos. 197-8.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, p. 182, nos. 124-8; p. 191, nos. 192-5.

creation, so firmly blended with him "that any attempted separation would be fatal to both."⁵⁷ That creation had been inherited by Tiberius, who fostered it with the minimum change. Gaius had diverted attention from the principate as an institution to the *princeps* who was its central symbol. Now, with Claudius, the personality of the principate itself began to emerge, and the theory of imperial responsibility (cursorily treated in Augustus' coinage,⁵⁸ momentarily expressed—though perhaps in unfortunate circumstances—by Tiberius' coinage, and wholly absent from that of Gaius) is for the first time adequately expressed in conceptions which are the germ of the much fuller statement in Seneca's *De Clementia*.⁵⁹ It was, indeed, not surprising that the *princeps* who lectured his Senate upon the meaning and responsibilities of privilege should ensure that the qualities of his own régime were properly expressed and publicized.⁶⁰

Who, then, was the official responsible for this delicate and characteristic adjustment of the coinage? The changes which he effected were fully consonant with the Claudian policy as a whole, and must therefore be regarded as having been inspired from a source very near to the emperor himself. It may be suggested, tentatively, that this source was in fact Polybius, Claudius' *procurator a studiis*. Holder, during the first years of the reign, of one of the three notorious State-secretariates, Polybius (freedman though he was) possessed high standing⁶¹ and wide responsibilities, which included the direction of the emperor's cultural policy and the shaping of the official history of the times, and centred wholly on the person of the *princeps* himself.⁶² Constantly in touch as he was with Claudius, Poly-

⁵⁷ Seneca, *De Clementia*, I, 4, 3.

⁵⁸ Though brilliantly displayed in the fifth Cyrene edict: *J.R.S.*, XVII (1927), pp. 36, 43.

⁵⁹ E.g. the remarkable passage I, 1, 2-4.

⁶⁰ *B.G.U.*, 611 (ed. by J. Stroux, *Sitzb. Bay. Akad.*, 1929, Heft 8), *ad fin.*

⁶¹ Cf. Suetonius, *Claud.*, 28.

⁶² See in general A. Momigliano, *Claudius: the Emperor and his Achievement* (Oxford, 1934), p. 103, with references there cited. The wholly imperial focus of Polybius' task is shown by Seneca, *Ad Polybium De Consolatione*, 5, 2 (his "occupationes" = "studium" and

bius' connection with his fellow-secretary Pallas, in charge of the State finances, cannot have been less close; and it was upon the Financial Secretary, as has been seen already, that administrative control of the mints now fell—openly in the case of the imperial mint, and scarcely less effectively in the case of the Senatorial.⁶³ Polybius may well have laid down the rules to be followed in the selection of Claudius' coin types, leaving it to Pallas to ensure that his directions were observed. Support for such a theory might be drawn from the fact that, from *ca.* A. D. 50, Claudius virtually took second place in his own coinage, priority going to those new luminaries, Agrippina and Nero.⁶⁴ Already, by A. D. 48, Polybius was disgraced and dead;⁶⁵ and it is plain that the officials who thereafter selected the coin types, after repeating for two more years those which had hitherto prevailed, were compelled to conform with servile obedience to a policy which emanated from Agrippina herself.

The early years of Nero's principate add their own quota of information and suggestion. For two years the imperial mint continued to issue gold and silver, which, as in Claudius' last years, were devoted to the joint conception of Nero and Agrippina;⁶⁶ and the person responsible for the expression of imperial policy in the choice of coin types was perhaps unaltered. From the very beginning of the reign, however, it appears that the Senate succeeded in the partial recovery of its ancient control over coinage in all metals, as is shown by the special formula EX S · C—"in accordance with a decree of the Senate"—which even these earliest Neronian issues of gold and silver bear.⁶⁷ That is to say, the authority which Agrippina exercised through an imperial subordinate in the dictation of types was not unevenly

"Caesar"), while the more purely literary and propagandist aspects of his task are suggested by chap. 8 of the same work; note especially "Caesaris tui opera, ut per omnia saecula domestico narrentur praeconio, quantum potes, compone; nam ipse tibi optime formandi condendique res gestas et materiam dabit et exemplum." Seneca's own suggestions for presenting the imperial case are inherent in chap. 13, 1-2.

⁶³ Above, p. 50.

⁶⁴ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. 174 ff.

⁶⁵ Dio Cassius, LXI, 31, 2.

⁶⁶ *B. M. C. Rom. Emp.*, I, pp. 200-1.

⁶⁷ *Id.*, pp. clxxi f.

matched by the authority which the Senate felt able to exercise in the technical and administrative control of the imperial mint. After A. D. 55, with Agrippina's sudden loss of influence, it is plain that the Senate widened that authority, probably by the dismissal of that former imperial subordinate. Henceforth for some years the gold and silver of Rome, though it was clearly regarded as held in trust for a Nero Caesar who was also *princeps*, accorded to that *princeps* the barest and most puritan recognition of his imperial status, shown by a plain, unchanging type-sequence⁶⁸ which was shattered only when Nero himself shattered the influence of Seneca and Burrus.⁶⁹ At once the imperial coinage returned to its old path of imperial propaganda; and the senatorial coinage, wholly in abeyance until ca. A. D. 64, faithfully trod the same path.⁷⁰ In other words, the direction of coin types in the years after Agrippina's first discomfiture lay with a man of strong senatorial and "constitutional" convictions; thereafter it reverted to an agency in the closest touch and sympathy with Nero's aspirations and achievements—presumably a freedman-procurator.

Such are the main phases of the Julio-Claudian coinage. The lines of experiment and development—and even of occasional reaction—are surely clear enough. Republican Rome had, towards the end of its life, produced out of her regular coinage a medium for the transmission of news and views. That medium was perhaps neither very thorough nor flexible; but it was to become so when the precious-metal coinage was converted, under the Principate, into an imperial monopoly, and when a parallel control was increasingly exerted upon the Senatorial mint. News and views then also tended to become an imperial monopoly; and it is precisely because the Julio-Claudian coinage emanated almost wholly from this special source and reflected this special attitude that it must be carefully approached. The informative

⁶⁸ *Id.*, pp. 201 ff., nos. 9-24.

⁶⁹ The coinage of A. D. 60-1 shows the first signs of Nero's restlessness; the "constitutional" types were then abandoned in favour of others of a plainly propagandist nature (*id.*, pp. 204 ff., nos. 25-30), which continued until the major reform of A. D. 64 (*id.*, p. 208). It should, however, be noted that the formula EX S · C remained on gold and silver until A. D. 64.

⁷⁰ *Id.*, pp. clxvi f.; pp. 214 ff.

content of its types, often so bland and reassuring, cannot be swallowed any more safely than, for example, the seemingly frank but frequently disingenuous *Res Gestae*. Historians of imperial Rome have not always plainly perceived that, in handling the imperial coinage, they are handling a biased and even grossly perverted source of evidence, which demands an acceptance no less cautious and critical than a Velleius Paterculus. And yet the proper appreciation of that bias brings its own rich reward; for, instead of regarding the imperial coinage (in a way in which it has too often been regarded) as the mere automatic concomitant of the principate, to be duly quoted whenever its types and legends appear to echo the historian's factual narrative, we may at last more profitably see it as a powerful imperial instrument for presenting the imperial case. In short, after studying the history of the Empire from the senatorial standpoint which the majority of texts inevitably impose, we may in a curiously revealing manner study it from the standpoint of the *princeps* himself if we once attempt to appraise those personalities whose activities on his behalf may be discerned, however dimly, behind the vast bulk of coinage.

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TWO NOTES ON CLAUDIAN'S *IN RUFINUM*.

I.

Punitive Metempsychosis in *In Ruf.*, II, 480-490.

Cum gesta superni
curriculi totosque diu perspexerit actus,
exaequat damnum meritis et muta ferarum
cogit vincla pati. Truculentos ingerit ursoris
praedonesque lupis; fallaces vulpibus addit.
At qui desidia semper vinoque gravatus,
indulgens Veneri, voluit torpescere luxu,
hunc suis immundi pingues detrudit in artus.
Qui iusto plus esse loquax arcanaque sive
prodere, piscosas fertur victurus in undas,
ut nimiam pensent aeterna silentia vocem.

Although the verses given above are among the most frequently discussed¹ of Claudianean *loci*, apparently none of the scholars commenting on the passage has noticed that it contains a curious anomaly. It is the purpose of this note to call attention to the discrepancy, and to suggest the reason for its presence.

Claudian is here setting the stage for the last scene in his drama of Rufinus' downfall. As the shade of the hated tyrant is dragged toward the infernal judgment-seat by the souls of those whom on earth he wrongfully condemned to death,² the poet pauses to describe the court which awaits the culprit. The

¹ T. Birt, *De Senecae Apocolocyntosi et Apotheosi Lucubratio* (Marburg, 1888), p. iv; G. Ettig, "Acheruntica," *Leipz. Stud. zur Class. Phil.*, XIII (1891), pp. 386 f.; L. Ruhl, *De Mortuorum Iudicio* (Giessen, 1903), pp. 66 f.; R. Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 31, n. 5; J. P. Postgate, *C. Q.*, IV (1910), p. 259; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia* (2nd ed., Leipzig, 1913), p. 144, and p. 159, n. 1 *ad fin.*; O. Ferrari, *Athenaeum*, IV (1916), pp. 335-8; I. Lévy, *La Légende de Pythagore de Grèce en Palestine* (Paris, 1927), pp. 120 f.; P. Fargues, *Claudian, Études sur sa Poésie et son Temps* (Paris, 1933), p. 188. The passage under consideration is not discussed either in W. Stetinger, *Die Seelenwanderung bei Griechen u. Römern* (Stuttgart, 1934) or in C. Hopf, *Antike Seelenwanderungsvorstellungen* (Leipzig, 1934). For a recent summary of Greek thought on metempsychosis, see M. P. Nilsson, *Eranos*, XXXIX (1941), pp. 9-13.

² *In Ruf.*, II, 458-60.

inexorable Minos sits on a lofty throne in a tower where the waters of Cocytus and of Phlegethon meet. The shades appear before him in an indiscriminate crowd.³ As we see from the passage set forth above, the souls of the guilty are condemned, after careful inquisition, to condign punishment, which takes the form of transmigration into the bodies of sub-human creatures.

As far as metempsychosis is concerned,⁴ Claudian is here clearly following doctrines of the Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean schools,⁵ though it is not unlikely that he was influenced by Orphic teachings as well.⁶ The passage is especially reminiscent of Plato, *Phaedo* 81 E-82 A:

Ἐνδoύνται . . . εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη ὅποι' ἅπτ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκῶσι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ . . . τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας μεμελετηκότας . . . εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι. . . . Τοὺς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη . . . ἵέναι.

In the Platonic passage, the souls of the wicked are embodied in the brute beasts which severally typify the culprits' earthly vices—a concept which, says Stettner,⁷ originates with Plato himself. In Claudian, similarly, the soul of the *truculentus* is embodied in a bear, that of the *praedo* in a wolf, of the *fallax* in a fox; the soul of the *voluptarius* is transplanted into the body of a swine—and here the symmetry of the series ends, and

³ *In Ruf.*, II, 466-78.

⁴ In the general picture which the *In Ruf.* gives of the lower world, correspondences with Vergil, *Aen.* VI are marked; see Ettig, *op. cit.*, p. 386. Lévy, *loc. cit.*, prefers to trace the passage to a prototype common to Claudian and to Lucian.

⁵ Stettner, *op. cit.*, p. 67. See the following note.

⁶ See O. Kern, *Orphicorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1922), p. 68; see also p. 241 (frag. 224), and Nilsson, *loc. cit.*, p. 11. Stettner's otherwise masterly account of metempsychosis seems to suffer from a tendency (under Wilamowitz' influence) to play down the importance of Orphism; see W. Nestle, *Phil. Woch.*, LV (1935), pp. 780-4; V. E. Alfieri, *Leonardo*, VI (1935), p. 497.

⁷ Stettner, *op. cit.*, p. 23. See also *ibid.*, p. 40: "Der Gedanke an eine ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit ist das Hauptmotiv, das Platon zur Seelenwanderung geführt hat." For a later portrayal of punitive metempsychosis, with a last-minute commutation of the sentence, see Plutarch, *De Ser. Num. Vind.*, 567 F.

we come to the anomaly which I mentioned above as the subject of this note.

The *proditor arcanorum* will not continue his treacherous activities in his new form, as the *praedo* will still exercise his wolfish rapacity, the *voluptarius* still indulge his swinish lusts: on the contrary, he alone is punished in an antithetical fashion. As a denizen of the deep, he will compensate by utter soundlessness for the criminal loquacity of his former life.

Why does Claudian introduce this asymmetrical note into his picture? The notion of underwater creatures as hosts to transmigratory souls is not original with our poet; we find the idea both in Empedocles and in Plato. The Empedoclean passage is brief (frag. 117, Diels; cf. frag. 115):

ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμενν κούρος τε κόρη τε
θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ ἕξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

In the Platonic account, the watery tribe is sprung ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα ἀνοηράτων καὶ ἀμαθεστάτων . . . δίκην ἀμαθίας ἐσχάτης ἐσχάτας οἰκήσεις εἰλοχότων.⁸ What is original with Claudian—as far as can be determined from an examination of ancient texts dealing with metempsychosis—is the idea of using transmigration into a sea-creature as retribution, not for senselessness and stupidity, as in Plato and pseudo-Timaeus, but for the loquacious disclosure of entrusted secrets.

The reason for Claudian's simultaneous departure from logical symmetry and from accepted doctrine is, in my opinion, to be found in the necessities of invective composition. Claudian is here approaching the final episode of his polemic. Rufinus has been removed from the earth by a violent and ignominious death,⁹ but this does not satisfy the poet. He pursues the culprit to the underworld, where punishment will be meted out to him. The penalty finally decided upon is heightened in its effect by being approached through two intermediate steps.

First we have punishment by metempsychosis, which has been the subject of our discussion; that penalty, dreadful enough to the anthropocentric Greeks and Romans, is passed over as too mild even to be considered in Rufinus' case. Then come, in

⁸ *Timaeus* 92 B; cf. *ibid.* 42 C, and pseudo-Timaeus Locrus, 104 D-E (see *R.-E.*, s. v. "Timaios," no. 4, cols. 1217-20). For similar ideas occurring in Hermetic writings, see Stettner, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁹ *In Ruf.*, II, 404-53.

dramatic recital, the fabled penalties of the cosmic transgressors: Sisyphus, Ixion, Tantalus, Tityos, and Salmoneus. The irate judge considers visiting their combined punishments on Rufinus' guilty head: *Genus omne dolorum / in te ferre libet*.¹⁰ But he sets even these aside as insufficiently severe to punish the tyrant for his awful crimes.¹¹ At last he pronounces Rufinus' doom: banishment from the House of Hades itself, and eternal immersion in the abyss below the bottom-most recesses of Tartarus.¹²

In this crescendo of crime and punishment, each vice mentioned must sound the proper note, either as especially heinous, or as especially appropriate to Rufinus, or, if possible, as both. The first three points amply fulfill both requirements: to Claudian, Rufinus is an ideal example of the *truculentus*,¹³ the *praedo*,¹⁴ the *fallax*.¹⁵ He is not, to be sure, a *voluptarius*,¹⁶ but the vileness of the vice as portrayed, and the loathsomeness of the punishment, give dramatic justification for the inclusion of this item in the enumeration.¹⁷ But the dulness of the ἀμαθής τε καὶ ἀνόητος is ruled out on both grounds: it is neither sufficiently shocking in itself, nor is it at all appropriate to Claudian's villain: even his worst enemy could not call Rufinus stupid.¹⁸ Claudian must either refrain from mentioning τὰ ἐνδρα, or must alter the nature of the fault which is to result in transmigration εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐνδρῶν ἰδέαν. He has, as we see, chosen the latter course.

Among the vices, real or imagined, with which Claudian taxes Rufinus,¹⁹ is one which the poet must have thought particularly

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 506 f.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 516-19.

¹² *Ibid.*, II, 522-7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, I, 265: *trucem . . . hostem*, 261 f.: *rapacem . . . feram*, 100: *plenus saevitiae*.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 305: *avidus praedo*, 220 f.: *praedae . . . incestus . . . amor*. Symmachus, *Epist.*, VI, 14, 1, calls Rufinus *praedo annosus*.

¹⁵ *In Ruf.*, II, 367: *fallere cuncta solebat*; I, 238: *causis fallacibus*.

¹⁶ Claudian's silence on this point is strong testimony in Rufinus' favor: contrast the poet's treatment of Rufinus' successor, the eunuch Eutropius (*In Eutr.*, I, 66-8, 280, 360-70).

¹⁷ Note the similar inclusion in *In Ruf.*, II, 515: *inconsulto Tityos deliquit amore*.

¹⁸ See H. L. Levy, *The Invective In Rufinum of Claudius Claudianus* (Geneva, N. Y., 1935), p. 18 and n. 113. The word *iners*, *In Ruf.*, II, 53, refers to military ineptitude.

¹⁹ *In Ruf.*, I, 179: *profert arcana*; 229: *nusquam reverentia mensae*. No specific evidence of the betrayal of secrets is found in our sources:

grievous, for he attributes it to Eutropius²⁰ as well: it is the *proditio arcanorum*, in regard to which Claudian shares Horace's detestation.²¹ The word ἄλλοπος in the Empedoclean passage cited above,²² or an echo of it in a later Pythagorean, may have suggested to the poet the solution of his problem: let the silent depths of the sea still the mouth of the guilty babbler! Thus by an ingenious shift from the traditional homeopathic to a newly-engendered allopathic concept of punitive metempsychosis,²³ Claudian has contrived to retain an otherwise unusable element in his portrayal of infernal justice, and at the same time to stigmatize a trait without the mention of which his final delineation of Rufinus' fate might have seemed incomplete.²⁴

II

Tisiphone and Dualism in the *In Rufinum*

In a highly original article written nearly three decades ago²⁵ Fabbri discusses Claudian's concept of the Furies as prime

see Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-26, for an estimate of Rufinus' character based on sources other than Claudian.

²⁰ *In Eutr.*, I, 128 f.: *arcana tueri / mens infida vetat*.

²¹ *Serm.*, I, 4, 84 f.: *commissa tacere / qui nequit, hic niger est*; cf. *Odes*, III, 2, 25-9. By contrast, Claudian is lavish in praise of the discretion of the Eastern troops in keeping secret the plot against Rufinus: *In Ruf.*, II, 283-90, ending with the words: . . . *et fuit arcanum populo*.

²² *Frag.* 117, Diels. I am assuming that Claudian's contemporaries understood the word to mean "voiceless": see Liddell and Scott⁹, s. v. ἄλλοψ.

²³ In Plato, *Republic* 617 D-621 B there are instances of metempsychosis by opposites (so Odysseus becomes an *ιδιότης ἀπράγμων*), but here the punitive element is absent, and the souls themselves choose their new forms of life: οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε (617 E).

²⁴ It is hoped that this note will compensate in some measure for a lack felt by M. Fargues in the edition cited in n. 18, above. In the *Rev. Ét. Anc.*, XXXVIII (1936), p. 371, he writes, "... on aimerait trouver ... quelques indications précises ... sur les idées philosophiques que Claudien développe, par exemple sur les traditions pythagoriques dont il s'inspire, lorsqu'il représente la condamnation de Rufin aux Enfers."

²⁵ P. Fabbri, "Il Genio del Male nella Poesia di Claudiano," *Athenaeum*, VI (1918), pp. 48-61.

movers of evil. He admits²⁶ that the idea of the Fury as "un genio di perdizione" had already been adumbrated in the *Aeneid*: *Allecto . . . cui tristia bella/ iraeque insidiaeque et crimina noxia cordi*.²⁷ But Claudian differs from his predecessors in the degree to which he presents the Furies not as *speculatrices . . . et vindices facinorum et sceleris*,²⁸ nor as inciters of mischief at the behest of the supernal gods,²⁹ nor as glorying in the midst of strife already in progress,³⁰ but rather as independent initiators of evil for its own sake, as implacable foes of the human race, as enemies of peace, righteousness, and justice.³¹ Thus, says Fabbri,³² Claudian's Furies represent the genius of evil in the true significance of dualistic doctrine, with a much closer resemblance to the Zoroastrian Ahriman or to the Manichean Satan than to any classical concept or Graeco-Roman folk-belief by which Claudian may have been influenced. He suggests that Claudian became acquainted with dualistic ideas through contact with Christians (or with Christian writings³³) involved in the Manichean controversy.³⁴

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁷ Vergil, *Aen.*, VII, 324-6. Cf. Roscher, *Ausf. Lex. d. Gr. u. Röm. Myth.*, I (1890), col. 1564, "So mussten die Furien auch von der römischen Anschauung aus zu Gottheiten des Todes und Verderbens werden, was auch die Römischen Dichter des weiteren ausführen."

²⁸ Cicero, *N. D.*, III, 18, 46; cf. Vergil, *Aen.*, VI, 570 f.; Statius, *Theb.*, XII, 772 f.

²⁹ Vergil, *Aen.*, VII, 324-571; Ovid, *Met.*, IV, 472-511; Lucan, I, 576 f.

³⁰ Vergil, *Aen.*, X, 761; Ovid, *Met.*, I, 241. Fabbri somewhat neglects this aspect of Vergil's and Ovid's portrayal of the Furies, but this does not detract appreciably from the soundness of his remarks.

³¹ *In Ruf.*, I, 25-61: *Invidiae quondam stimulis incanduit atrox/ Allecto, placidas late cum cerneret urbes./ . . . / "Sicine tranquillo produci saecula cursu, / sic fortunatas patiemur vivere gentes? / . . . Agnoscite tandem / quid Furias deceat; consuetas sumite vires / conventuque nefas tanto decernite dignum."*

³² *Op. cit.*, pp. 52 f.

³³ For Claudian's familiarity with Christian writers, see Birt's edition (= *Mon. Germ. Hist., Auct. Ant.*, X [1892]), pp. lxxv f. Fargues, *op. cit.*, pp. 158 f., goes too far in his rejection of Birt's theory: cf. the many striking correspondences between *In Ruf.*, I, 1-24 and Minucius Felix, XVII, 3-9, XIX, 8, and XXXVII, 7.

³⁴ Cf. C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture* (2nd ed., Oxford, 1944), pp. 342, 382, 447.

In this discussion of Claudian's dualism, Fabbri seems to me to overlook a point quite pertinent to his argument. He notes in passing³⁵ that the *In Rufinum*, in which both Allecto and Megaera plays important parts,³⁶ makes no mention of Tisiphone. He attaches no significance to her absence. Yet in Latin literature as a whole Tisiphone is the most frequently named of the three sisters.³⁷ She is thrice mentioned in the *Aeneid*;³⁸ Ovid makes her the agent of Juno in inflicting madness upon Athamas,³⁹ a deed which Claudian himself mentions;⁴⁰ in the *Thebaid* of Statius, Tisiphone plays a leading rôle. Says an editor of the last-named work, "Magnas partes Statius deis tribuit, nemini tamen maiores quam Tisiphonae. . . . Thebais epos Tisiphonae plenum appellari potest."⁴¹ Now Claudian closely imitates the very passage in the *Thebaid* in which Tisiphone's name first appears: compare his words (*In Ruf.*, I, 92 f.) *meo de matre cadentem / suscepi gremio* with Statius' *me de matre cadentem / fovisti gremio* (*Theb.*, I, 60 f.). To top it all, Claudian himself, when introducing the Furies in another work, mentions Tisiphone's name to the exclusion of her sisters'.⁴² Why, then, is she omitted from the *In Rufinum*, and why does Allecto⁴³ there usurp her place as *πρόσβαρα Ἐρινύων*?⁴⁴ The answer is, I believe, to be found in a further consideration of the point which Fabbri's article suggests.

The *In Rufinum* as a whole is fraught with an essential dualism. It is a narrative of the struggle, *certamen sublime . . . virtutum scelerumque* (*In Ruf.*, I, 297 f.), between Good, as embodied in Stilicho, and Evil, as personified in Rufinus.⁴⁵ In the Preface to Book I, the outcome of the struggle is symbolized as the victory of the radiant Apollo over the dark monster Python. If the Furies are to serve as embodiments of pure

³⁵ Fabbri, *loc. cit.*, p. 52.

³⁶ Allecto, *In Ruf.*, I, 25-67; Megaera, *In Ruf.*, I, 74-171, 354-79.

³⁷ *R.-E.*, V A (1934), col. 150.

³⁸ VI, 555, 571; X, 761.

³⁹ *Met.*, IV, 472-511.

⁴⁰ *In Ruf.*, I, 81; he assigns the deed to Megaera.

⁴¹ H. Heuvel, *Thebaidos Liber Primus* (Zutphen, 1932), p. 83.

⁴² *Rapt. Pros.*, I, 39-41.

⁴³ *In Ruf.*, I, 25-8.

⁴⁴ Euripides, *Iph. Taur.*, 963; cf. *R.-E.*, V A (1934), col. 151.

⁴⁵ Cf. Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 19, 39.

evil in a dualistic scheme of this sort (Apollo: Python = Stilicho: Rufinus = *Furiae: Iustitia*⁴⁶), they must be divested of every concept associating them with the Good. But the Furies, especially as assimilated to their Greek counterparts the Erinyes,⁴⁷ are the guardians of familial and other human rights⁴⁸ through the stern but righteous punishment of those who have infringed them. Both because of her name, "Avenger of Murder,"⁴⁹ and because of her portrayal in the *Aeneid* (VI, 570 f.: *sondes ultrix accincta flagello / Tisiphone quatit insultans*) Tisiphone must have appeared to Claudian, whose native tongue was Greek, and who was steeped in Vergil,⁵⁰ to be the one of the three sisters most closely associated with the Erinyes' retributive function,⁵¹ and hence with that very *Iustitia* whom Claudian presents as the Furies' antithesis. Still another influence may possibly have been at work: Lucilius, who seems to have been the first Latin author to mention Tisiphone, calls her *Eumenidum sanctissima Erinyes*,⁵² and Birt has made out a fairly good case for Claudian's familiarity with the works of the early satirist.⁵³ Whatever may have been the case as regards Lucilius, it seems likely that the Vergilian passage was the decisive factor. Claudian ends his poem with a scene of infernal judgment which displays marked Vergilian traits.⁵⁴ Yet he studiously avoids—for reasons which should by now be apparent—asso-

⁴⁶ *In Ruf.*, I, 56, 354-87.

⁴⁷ Roscher, *op. cit.*, cols. 1560-2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, cols. 1320-4; cf. Cicero, *N. D.*, III, 18, 46.

⁴⁹ *R.-E.*, V A (1934), col. 150, "... der Name bezeichnet die Hauptaufgabe der Schwestern."

⁵⁰ Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 38; Fargues, *op. cit.*, pp. 6, 51.

⁵¹ Both Allecto and Megaera are sometimes portrayed as *ultrices* (Statius, *Theb.*, I, 712; Silius Ital., II, 673; XIII, 611); but the passages in question are not to be compared with *Aen.* VI in their influence on later thought in general or on Claudian in particular. Moreover, the names of the other sisters ("Restless" or "Implacable," and "Envious" or "Hateful") contain no explicit reference to retributory functions.

⁵² Lucilius, 169 f.; cf. *R.-E.*, V A (1934), col. 151.

⁵³ T. Birt, *Zwei Politische Satiren* (Marburg, 1888), pp. 69-73, 112-25; cf. A. Kappelmacher, *Die Literatur der Römer* (Potsdam, 1934), p. 194. For a conflicting view cf. Kurfess, *Hermes*, LXXVI (1941), pp. 94 f., and the references there cited.

⁵⁴ *In Ruf.*, II, 458-527. Cf. Ettig, *loc. cit.*, p. 386.

ciating the Furies in any way with the administration of Acherontic justice. The scourge which forces reluctant wrongdoers to confess is attributed to Rhadamanthys himself, or to an unnamed attendant;⁵⁵ unnamed, too, are those servitors to whom the command *Agitate flagellis* is finally given.⁵⁶ Had Claudian, earlier in the poem, employed Tisiphone as a personification of cosmic evil, he would have been giving prominence to the very Fury who—as the well-remembered handmaiden of Vergil's Rhadamanthys—would tend most to introduce into his closing picture a discordant element. In conclusion let us turn to the one passage in which Claudian does mention Tisiphone. This occurs in the *De Raptu Proserpinae*,⁵⁷ a poem which (though, like the *In Rufinum*, it portrays an abortive revolt against the supernal gods⁵⁸) is, as Fabbri⁵⁹ points out, utterly devoid of any dualistic concept. Pluto, the would-be rebel, is by no means portrayed as a force of evil: he is addressed (*Rapt. Pros.*, I, 56-60) as . . . *arbiter . . . qui vitam letumque regis, nam quicquid ubique / gignit materies, hoc te donante creatur . . .*; he is the ruler (II, 280 f.) . . . *cui machina rerum / servit et immensum tendit per inane potestas*; finally, he is the mighty judge of all the shades, who woos his Proserpina with the promise of an equal share in the majesty of the infernal tribunal.⁶⁰ Thus Tisiphone, both in name and in Vergilian depiction, is most appropriate as a leader of Pluto's hosts, and as such she is restored to her normal position of seniority, from which the dualism of the *In Rufinum* had served to exclude her.

The omission of Tisiphone from the *In Rufinum* would seem, then, to be no mere accident, but rather to spring from the very nature and plan of the poem. If this is so, a consideration of Tisiphone's absence both lends weight to Fabbri's interesting suggestion, and affords renewed⁶¹ evidence of the sensitive

⁵⁵ *In Ruf.*, II, 476-80: *Minos / . . . quos nolle fateri / viderit, ad rigidi transmittit verbera fratris: / nam iuxta Rhadamanthys agit.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 520-3.

⁵⁷ *Rapt. Pros.*, I, 39-41.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 32-75; cf. *In Ruf.*, I, 68 f., 86 f.

⁵⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 54.

⁶⁰ *Rapt. Pros.*, II, 300-4.

⁶¹ In addition to Part I of this article, cf. H. L. Levy, "Claudian's

eclecticism with which Claudian handled the materials that went into the making of his poem on Rufinus' downfall.

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THEMISTOGENES OF SYRACUSE

AN ERROR OF A COPYIST.

The second book of the *Hellenica* ends with the fall of Athens, the peace dictated by the Lacedaemonians, the restoration of the Athenian democracy in 403 B. C., and the reconciliation of all parties at Athens about two years later. But the events of these last two years are given only in a very brief summary in the final section, *Hellen.*, II, 4, 43. The third book of the *Hellenica* begins with the words: "So the civil war at Athens ended." Immediately after this is a reference to the application made to the Lacedaemonians by Cyrus in 401 B. C., for aid in his expedition against Artaxerxes, and to the assistance which the Lacedaemonians gave to him at that time. The next sentence, sec. 2, is as follows: "How Cyrus collected an army and with this went up against his brother, and how the battle was, and how he was killed, and how thereafter the Greeks got safely back to the sea, has been written by Themistogenes of Syracuse." Sec. 3 takes up the narrative from the arrival of Tissaphernes at the coast as satrap of Ionia in place of Cyrus.

Apart from this statement in *Hellen.*, III, 1, 2, nothing at all is known about Themistogenes of Syracuse.¹ Plutarch² says that Xenophon himself wrote the account of the expedition of Cyrus (i. e. the *Anabasis*), and assigned it to Themistogenes in order that he (Xenophon) might be more readily believed,

In Rufinum . . . and a Vatican Vase-Painting," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXII (1941), pp. 239 f.

¹ See L. Dindorf, *Xenoph. Hist. Gr.* (1853), pp. 131-134; Felix Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, Zweiter Teil, B, No. 108 (1929), and commentary (1930); Richard Laqueur, in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Themistogenes" (1934), cols. 1684-6; Malcolm MacLaren, "Xenophon and Themistogenes," in *T. A. P. A.*, LXV (1934), pp. 240-7.

² *De Gloria Athen.*, sec. 1 (p. 345 E).

telling about himself as if about another. But evidently this is only a deduction made by Plutarch from the passage in the *Hellenica*. Suidas³ says that Themistogenes (was) an historian (who wrote the) *Anabasis of Cyrus*, which is current among the (works) of Xenophon, and some other (books) about his own country. About this J. J. Hartman⁴ said very properly: "Equidem multo libentius credam Suidam, quo nemo est grammaticorum ineptior, de Themistogene aliquid annotare voluisse, praeter id quod omnibus notum esset, sed quum ex nullo scriptore quidquam cognitum haberet, de suo id commentum esse, quod cuivis in mentem venire posset. Quid enim facilius est quam, quum de historico aliquo, cuius nil nisi nomen noris, aliquid dicendum est, eum 'nonnulla de patriae suae historia conscripsisse' conicere." A similar comment may be made on a passage in Tzetzes⁵ in which it is said that Xenophon ascribed the *Anabasis of Cyrus* to Themistogenes "for the sake of his beloved."

Among modern scholars, E. A. Richter⁶ believed that *Hellen.*, III, 1, 2 was an interpolation, like the passages at the beginning of *Anabasis* II, III, IV, V, and VII, and in VI, 3, which are commonly regarded as interpolations. He says, on pp. 691 f.: "Für die Unechtheit dieser ganzen Stelle spricht vor allem die Art der Anknüpfung durch $\mu\epsilon\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\nu$. Dieses $\mu\epsilon\nu\ \sigma\upsilon\nu$ kann hier nur als Übergangsformel zu dem, was im Folgenden berichtet wird, aufgefasst werden." Richter thought that this objection would not apply to an interpolator whose attention was fixed on filling what he considered a gap in the narrative. Laqueur, in *R.-E.*, agrees with Richter at least to the extent of holding that the passage in the *Hellenica* was not originally composed for this place. But this opinion depends on the supposition that sec. 2 in the *Hellenica* continues, in summary, the narrative of events given in sec. 1, whereas in fact sec. 2 merely defines the *Anabasis*, and does so adequately: its implication is that since

³ S. v. "Themistogenes."

⁴ *Analecta Xenophontea* (1887), p. 31.

⁵ *Chiliades* VII, 937-41: Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.*, B, p. 522.

⁶ "Kritische Untersuchungen über die Interpolationen in den Schriften Xenophons," in *Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*, Suppl. VI (1872-3), pp. 557-783.

the *Anabasis* has been written Xenophon does not need to recount here the events contained in it.

Hartmann⁷ maintained that Xenophon published the first four books of the *Anabasis*, ending with the arrival at Trapezus, under the name of Themistogenes, added the last three books much later, and then published the whole under his own name. To this Alfred Körte⁸ replied: "Die ganze Anabasis ist meiner Überzeugung nach ein Werk aus einem Guss. Hartmann's, neuerdings wieder von Münscher⁹ . . . verteidigte, Annahme einer Zerteilung ist schon von Dürrbach¹⁰ mit Recht abgelehnt worden."

Most modern scholars have believed that *Themistogenes* was a name assumed by Xenophon as the author of his own account of the expedition of Cyrus. So Eduard Schwartz¹¹ wrote: "Da dieser Themistogenes sonst nirgends vorkommt . . . ist jeder unbefangene Leser . . . auf die Vermuthung verfallen, dass Xenophon mit Themistogenes niemand anders meint als sich selbst." Eduard Meyer:¹² "Dass Xenophon Hell. III, 1, 2 unter Themistogenes' Namen seine eigene Anabasis citirt, hätte nie bezweifelt werden sollen." Wilhelm von Christ:¹³ "Ferner hat Xenophon die Schrift (*Anabasis*) unter fremdem Namen (*Themistogenes*) veröffentlicht." U. von Wilamowitz¹⁴ thought that Xenophon wrote a "Selbstverteidigung" under the name *Themistogenes*, but that this was much shorter than the extant *Anabasis*. Felix Jacoby¹⁵ says: "Da die *Anabasis*, wie das fehlende prooimion beweist, anonym erschienen ist, handelt es

⁷ *Analecta*, pp. 32-4.

⁸ "Die Tendenz von Xenophons *Anabasis*," in *Neue Jahrbücher für Pädagogik*, XXV (1922), pp. 15-24.

⁹ Karl Münscher, in *Philol.*, Suppl. XIII (1920), 2, p. 15, note 2.

¹⁰ Félix Dürrbach, "L'apologie de Xénophon dans l'anabase," in *R. E. G.*, VI (1893), pp. 365 ff.

¹¹ In *Rh. Mus.*, XLIV. (1889), pp. 192 f.

¹² *Geschichte des Alterthums*, III (1901), p. 277, and Anm. See also *G. d. A.*, V (1902), p. 185, Anm.

¹³ *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur* (I, 6th ed., 1912), p. 502. This work also doubts that Themistogenes wrote any account of Cyrus' expedition at all, and considers that the extant *Anabasis* was written by Xenophon.

¹⁴ *Platon*, II (1920), p. 145.

¹⁵ *F. Gr. Hist.*, Zweiter Teil, C, p. 349.

sich um eine momentane fiktion, nicht um pseudonymität: ein *Anabasis*exemplar, das Th.s namen trug, hat es nie gegeben." W. W. Tarn:¹⁶ "Sophænetus wrote the first story of the expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own account, the *Anabasis*, largely because he thought Sophænetus had overlooked his merits; he published it under the assumed name of Themistogenes." Richard Laqueur:¹⁷ "In der Tat scheint es durchaus unglaublich, dass Xenophon ein anderes Werk als das seine zitiert haben sollte."

Still, it remains strange that Xenophon, if he wished his *Anabasis* to appear anonymous, or if he wished to avoid attaching his own name to it, should have assigned it to a definite, even if fictitious, person. Perhaps he did not do so.

Our text of *Hellen.*, III, 1, 2, as we have it, was known to Plutarch. Consequently, any corruption in this passage must have occurred before Plutarch's time. But there were nearly five hundred years between Xenophon and Plutarch. Not much is known about the script in which books were written in the centuries before the Christian era. But the papyrus copy of the *Persæ* of Timotheus, which is commonly assigned to the second half of the fourth century B. C., and other papyrus fragments dated before Christ show that in manuscripts of that time it was easy to mistake Ω for O and Σ for Γ.¹⁸ In the Timotheus manuscript the horizontal stroke at the top of the Σ is sometimes so emphasized that, if the rest of the letter were at all indistinct, a Γ might be read. Also, after the fifth century B. C., all distinction in sound between Ω and O, and between EI and I, was gradually lost.

If Xenophon, in *Hellen.*, III, 1, 2, wrote

ΘΕΜΙΣΤΟΥΣΕΝΙΤΩΝΚΥΡΟΥΚΟΣΙΩΓΕΓΡΑΨΑΙΤΑΙ¹⁹

it would have been very easy for a scribe to read

ΘΕΜΙΣΤΟΓΕΝΙΤΩΙΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΩΓΕΓΡΑΨΑΙΤΑΙ.

¹⁶ *C. A. H.*, VI (1927), p. 5.

¹⁷ In *R.-E.*, s. v. "Themistogenes."

¹⁸ See E. M. Thompson, *An Introduction to Greek and Latin Palaeography* (1912), pp. 106 f.

¹⁹ In this reconstruction I have had the assistance of Professor G. M. Bolling. For the suggestion of *καὶ δόλος* I am indebted to Professor J. B. McDiarmid.

If so, then Xenophon really said: "Has been written, rightfully and dutifully, by one of Cyrus' men." If in the antecedent of our extant MSS the Σ was written Ο, if ΤΩΝ was written ΤΩ̄, and ΚΥΡΟΥ was written ΚΥΡ & the corruption would have been still easier; but in that case I think that Ω would have been written ω, which is not so easily confused with Ο. 'Ενί, instead of τινι, is natural enough where one particular person is meant: compare εἰς τῶν ἀργυρολόγων νεῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγός (Thucydides, VI, 50, 1), πέριξ μὲν εἰς κάπηλος ὠνομάζετο χολός (Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1292), Εἰς Ἀθηναίων (Demosthenes, *Against Meidias* = XXI, 87 = p. 542).

It seems to me, however, quite possible that Xenophon wrote originally θεμιστῶς ἐνὶ τῶν Κυρείων γέγραπται, and that seems to me more like what Xenophon would have written. If a scribe read Θεμιστογένει τω, he would naturally expect an adjective denoting this person's nationality, and τῷ Συρακοσίῳ would have suggested itself. Xenophon used the expression οἱ Κύριοι for the Greek soldiers in Cyrus' army, e.g. in *Hellen.*, III, 2, 7 and III, 4, 20.

In any case, my conclusion is that Themistogenes of Syracuse was not even a fictitious name, but just a mistake.

WILLIAM K. PRENTICE.

PRINCETON, N. J.

VARIA PUNICA.

1. *Dido—virago—Elissa.*

It has long been recognised that the explanation of the name *Dido* as having been given to the foundress of Carthage on account of her many wanderings¹ is a piece of Punic *Volks-etymologie* connecting the name with the Semitic root 𐤔𐤓𐤁 "flee, wander."² A second account connects the queen's

¹ Καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Λιβύων διὰ τὴν πολλὴν αὐτῆς πλάνην Δειδῶ προσηγορεύθη ἐπιχωρίως, *Tractatus Anonymus de Mulieribus* cited by Geffcken, *Timaïos' Geographie des Westens* (*Philologische Untersuchungen*, XIII [1892]), p. 163; cf. *Etymologicum Magnum* s. v. Δειδῶ. The word Θειοσσῶ, under which the above statement is entered in the *Tractatus de Mulieribus*, appears to be in part a translation (θεῖα = 'el) and in part a transliteration of *Elissa*; cf. below, n. 6.

² Bochart, *Chanaan* (1674), p. 516. The true etymology, first sus-

name with the manner of her death. It appears in Servius' commentary on *Aeneid*, IV, 36³ and 674⁴ and in the anonymous additions published by Daniel on *Aeneid*, I, 340 and IV, 335, and in three of the four versions of this account it is traced to the Punic tongue. But a misplacement has occurred in the transmission of the account. It is impossible in Punic to explain *Dido* as *virago* or to connect the name with the precipitation into the fire. But the name *Elissa* in Punic fits both features of the account. For 'ēl 'iṣṣā = "god-woman," i. q. *virago*,⁵ and 'ēl 'eš or 'ēl 'eššā⁶ = *in ignem*. It is noteworthy that Vergil uses the name *Elissa* only in the later episodes of the Dido cycle; he may have had some knowledge of the Punic etymological accounts, and the double name may be due to the combination of a "wandering queen" motif with a "faithful widow" motif.

The historian Justin, who never uses the name *Dido*, presents a third version of the Punic etymology of *Elissa*,⁷ according to which it stands for 'ēl 'iṣā⁸ "ad virum (suum)" and at the same time contains an allusion to 'ēlā "goddess." From the variety of etymologies preserved for this one name it is clear that the Carthaginians had the same penchant for the aetiological onomastic saga as their cousins whose unphilological speculations survive in the Biblical Genesis.⁹

pected by Gesenius, *Phoeniciae Monumenta*, I (1837), p. 406, and set forth by Bauer in *Z. D. M. G.*, LXXI (1917), p. 411, is akin to that of Hebrew *Dawid*.

³ DESPECTUS IARBAS rex Libyae, qui Didonem re vera voluit ducere uxorem et, ut habet historia, cum haec negaret, Carthagini intulit bellum. cuius timore cum cogeretur a civibus, petiit ut ante placaret manes mariti prioris, et exaedificata pyra se in ignem praecipitavit: ob quam rem Dido, id est virago, quae virile aliquid fecit, appellata est; nam Elissu proprie dicta est.

⁴ Didonem vocat, ut supra diximus, Poenorum lingua viraginem: nam Elissa dicta est; sed virago est vocata, cum se in ignem praecipitavit.

⁵ Cf. Bochart, *op. cit.*, p. 515, followed by Gesenius.

⁶ This form can be inferred from its congener in the Ugaritian dialect of Canaanite. On the vocalic restorations and changes in Punic, cf. Harris, *Grammar of the Phoenician Language* (1936), pp. 24 f., 34 f.

⁷ Justin, XVIII, vi, 7-8: *pyram conscendit atque ita ad populum respiciens ituram se ad virum, sicut praeceperint, dixit vitamque gladio finivit. quam diu Karthago invicta fuit pro dea culta est.*

⁸ For the form with the suffix, cf. Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁹ Cf. Gunkel, *Genesis* (3rd ed., 1910), pp. xxi f., Eissfeldt, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* (1934), p. 38.

2. *Methres*.

Servius, *In Aen.*, I, 343 and (in D only) 642 is the sole source for the information that Dido's father was called Met(h)res. It has been pointed out¹⁰ that Servius' note on the former passage¹¹ communicates a correct philological observation, *Sychaeus* being in fact a Punic hypocoristic of *Sicarbas*,¹² and that where Servius deviates from the Punic tradition represented by Justin, the deviation sometimes goes back to the Punic.¹³ It is thus more than plausible to separate the word *Methres* from the word *Mutlo* which is Justin's name for the father of Dido.¹⁴ *Methres* is a transliteration of the word מֵתְרֵס found in some eight Punic inscriptions. It forms part of the title of various prominent persons and has reference to their religious function as "husband" of the mother-goddess.¹⁵ In Carthage this position was held by *sufetes* and high priests. If the office existed in Tyre in the late ninth century, it would naturally be held by the king; if, as is more likely, it did not, it would readily enough be ascribed anachronistically to the king. Thus, apart from the mistaking of a title for a personal name, Servius appears to draw upon authentic Punic information.

3. *Aliquis nostris ex ossibus*.

The statement in Daniel's Servius that the Carthaginians reckoned issue to be "of the bone" rather than "of the blood"¹⁶ is worthy of credence although it lacks direct corroboration. The Asiatic Canaanites reckoned kinship in terms of bone as

¹⁰ Honeyman in *Transactions of Glasgow University Oriental Society*, XI (1946), p. 35.

¹¹ *Nam Sychaeus Sicarbas dictus est; Belus, Didonis pater, Methres; Carthago a cartha, ut lectum est et in historia Poenorum et in Livio.*

¹² Less importance attaches to his explanation of the name *Carthago*, for the explanation is incomplete and was, in any case, one of the few pieces of Punic lore which were common knowledge among the Romans. The ascription in C of the Sychaeus-Sicarbas note to some *historia Poenorum* results from a wrong anticipation of the phrase at the end of the sentence.

¹³ Cf. the instance discussed in the first part of this paper.

¹⁴ Justin, *Historiae Philippicae*, XVIII, iv, 3.

¹⁵ Honeyman in *R. H. R.*, CXXI (1940), pp. 5-17.

¹⁶ *In Aen.*, IV, 625, *sane Punici ex ossibus dicunt oriri posteros, quos nos ex sanguine.*

well as of blood and flesh;¹⁷ they considered that the principle of life resided in the bone, even after death,¹⁸ and might be educed by a spell¹⁹ or transmitted by contact.²⁰ From the respect shown by the Carthaginians to their dead, in collecting them into ossuaries²¹ and on occasion offering them veneration,²² it may be inferred that they held similar views on the bone as the ultimate seat of life.

4. *A Hippiatric Prescription by Mago.*

To the Carthaginian veterinary writer Mago there are ascribed treatments for dyspnoea²³ and dysuria of horses.²⁴ Equine ailments are also dealt with in two fragmentary Canaanite alphabetic cuneiform texts of SS. XV-XIV B.C. from Ras Shamra-Ugarit,²⁵ and they provide a close parallel to the latter of Mago's sections. Mago's prescription reads, *asserit autem, cum urinae difficultate torqueatur equus, si priorum pedum ex infimis unguibus delimata scobis in hemina vini, per nares infundatur, cieri urinam.*²⁶ The Ugaritian text runs,

¹⁷ Genesis ii, 23, xxix, 14; Judges ix, 2; II Samuel v, 1, xix, 13, 14; I Chronicles xi, 1; cf. W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites* (3rd ed., 1927), p. 274.

¹⁸ Isaiah lxi, 14; Ecclesiastes xi, 5; Ecclesiasticus xlii, 12, ii, 10; cf. the idiomatic Hebrew expression "the bone of the thing" for "the thing in itself, the very thing."

¹⁹ Ezekiel xxxvii, 6 and 7.

²⁰ II Kings xiii, 21; cf. Trumbull, *The Blood Covenant* (1887), p. 146, Nassau, *Fetichism in West Africa* (1904), p. 234, Walker, *Folk Medicine in Modern Egypt* (1934), p. 43.

²¹ Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, I (1902), pp. 164-9, line 4; III (1909), p. 61; *Répertoire d'Épigraphie Sémitique*, II, 906, 937 (1912); cf. Gsell, *Histoire Ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, IV (1920), pp. 450 ff.

²² Optatus, I, 16; Augustine, *De Opere Monachorum*, XXVIII, 36; cf. W. R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 448, Zwemer, *Influence of Animism on Islam*, p. 207.

²³ *Veterinariae Medicinae Libri Duo*, Graece ed. Grynaeus (1537), p. 95, Latine ed. Ruellius (1530), p. 37 vo.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, ed. Grynaeus, pp. 113, 116, ed. Ruellius, pp. 44 vo, 45 vo; Vegetius, *Mulomedicina*, ed. Lommatsch (1903), II, 79, 19; Pelagonius, *Ars Veterinaria*, ed. Ihm (1892), 150.

²⁵ Virolleaud in *Syria*, XV (1934), pp. 75-83, cf. p. 304.

²⁶ Ruellius, p. 44 vo. The other recensions of the prescription present no material difference.

[*k*¹] *lyttn*² *msš*³ *št*⁴ *qlql*⁵
 *dh*⁶ *dh*⁷ *wsq*⁸ *bāph*⁹

¹ [*k*]: the Ugaritic prescriptions are all of the same form; the ailment is introduced by *k* "when," and the apodosis gives the recipe in imperatival form.

² *lyttn*: ifta'al stem of the root *ty* "make water."

³ *msš*: "decoct, infuse," cf. Hebrew מִסַּס "melt"; the form is intensive with causative force.

⁴ *št*: from the root *šty* "drink"; cf. שָׁתָּה.

⁵ *qlql*: "make light, fine, grind, pound"; cf. קָלַקַּל.

⁶ *dh*: if the word is complete, it is an imperative (cf. next note) from the same root as Hebrew דָּהַךְ.

⁷ *dh*: so regularly in these veterinary prescriptions; in line 3 of the verso of this tablet and line 35 of the second tablet it is a noun with 3 sing. suffix, and should be so construed here. The root is that of Hebrew יָחַד and Arabic وَحَد "be united"; hence "the mixture, combination thereof."

⁸ *wsq*: either imperative or infinitive absolute of the Ugaritic congener of Hebrew יָצַק "pour."

⁹ *bāph*: "in his nostril"; cf. Hebrew בָּאָפוֹ.

Translation. "¹ [When] him to make water, infuse a potion; pound ² crush the mixture fine and pour into his nostril."

This is the oldest known reference to the dosing of horses by insufflation, and so far as it can be reconstructed the prescription is similar to that laid down by Mago and approved by the Greek and Latin hippiatrists.

5. The Numismatic Legend פִּיץ

A. H. Lloyd has shown clearly²⁷ that the legend found on Siculo-Punic coins of various denominations from eleven Sicilian cities from ca. 450 onwards denotes neither the place of issue nor the denomination of the coins on which it appears. His suggestion²⁸ that the word has a more general meaning like the slang "shiner" is less felicitous.²⁹ Any explanation of the word פִּיץ must also explain the legend מְבַעֲלִיץ found on other coins of the series, and Lloyd's interpretation of the latter legend as "coin issued by the rulers of the city" is inadmissible on grounds of Semitic syntax.³⁰

²⁷ *The Numismatic Chronicle*, Fifth Series, V (1925), pp. 129-150.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 139 ff.

²⁹ Cf. McEwen, *ibid.*, pp. 393-4.

³⁰ The two members of a simple construct nexus are interchangeable in position only when they are co-extensive.

In the elucidation of rare words etymology is by itself an unreliable guide, since it affords no indication as to possible semantic developments. For these usage provides much surer clues, and those who have sought to deduce the legend פִּיץ from its root meaning "shine" have failed to take into account the meaning of the word in the closest parallels, viz. Exodus xxviii, 36, xxxix, 30 and Leviticus viii, 9. In these passages the word פִּיץ is used of the plaque of pure gold, inscribed with the legend "sacred to JHVH" to be worn by the Aaronic priests on the front of the turban.³¹ The Alexandrian translators render the word by πέταλον, the Vulgate by *laminam*, and the Jewish and Samaritan Targums by various words for "plate, rosette." In the coin-legends the word must have had a very similar sense, and it would seem that it was stamped on the Punic coins to guarantee the quality of the metal and the authenticity of the new issue; to the users of the coins פִּיץ meant "Punic plate" i. e. "coinage of the Punic metal standard" or "(Punic) mint" and פִּיץ בְּעֵלֵיץ "belonging to the masters of the metal plate" i. e. "issued by the controllers of the (Punic) mint."³²

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ECHI DEL RITO ELEUSINIO IN EURIPIDE (*Suppl.* 53, 470).

I. Un'aria decisamente eleusinia—l'aria dei misteri—circola per entro la prima parte delle *Supplici* euripidee. La suggestione dell'ambiente è creata sin dal primo verso colla invocazione a Demetra, che ha in custodia gli altari di Eleusi, Δήμητερ ἑστιούχ' Ἐλευσίνος. Aithra, la veneranda madre di Teseo, che proferisce tali parole, ci appare presso gli altari delle dee di Eleusi, dove essa, come regina, si è recata in veste ufficiale per il rito delle προηρόσια, il sacrificio preliminare della aratura (28-29: ὑπὲρ

³¹ The same word is used of the ornamental rosettes on the woodwork of the Solomonic temple, I Kings vi, 18, 29, 32, 35.

³² For a similar development in meaning cf. Spanish *plata*.

χθονὸς | ἄρότον προθύουσα). Dagli altari stessi essa non può più allontanarsi, ora che i rami delle Supplici argive hanno creato, tutto intorno a lei, una invalicabile catena di fronde. Essa non può oltrepassare il cerchio magico delle imploranti, prima che esse, da altri, ne sieno allontanate a forza, ovvero si ritraggano spontaneamente, esaudite nella loro preghiera. Luogo dell'azione si immagina dunque che sia il terreno sacro di Eleusi, dove poi sorse, dal VI secolo in poi, il tempio dei misteri, il telesterion, che gli scavi del secolo passato ci hanno fatto conoscere. Non fa meraviglia perciò che sieno numerosi i riferimenti concreti a particolari del luogo e del rito eleusinio.

Il santuario è caratterizzato, nei vv. 30-31, come il σηκός, dove per la prima volta è apparsa agli uomini la spiga del grano:

ἐνθα πρῶτα φαίνεται
φρίξας ὑπὲρ γῆς τῆσδε κάρπιμος στάχυς.

Gli altari presso i quali Aithra sacrifica sono le ἀγναὶ ἐσχάραι δυοῖν θεαῖν (v. 33), che divengono le σεμναὶ Διὸς ἐσχάραι del v. 290. Nè manca, al verso 392, 'il ricordo dell'augusto pozzo Kallichoros (σεμνὸς Καλλίχορος), noto dall'inno omerico a Demetra (v. 272). Anche la ῥῆσις di Teseo, vv. 201 sgg., sul progressivo incivilimento umano, può esser considerata come un elogio indiretto delle divinità eleusine.

La suggestione del rito eleusinio è dunque presente all'animo degli spettatori ateniesi. Nè occorre ricordare la partecipazione in massa della cittadinanza ateniese alla cerimonia eleusinia, il 20 di Boedromione (Euripide, *Ion*, 1076).

Premesso ciò, riportiamo un *locus classicus* sui misteri, per la prima volta noto grazie alla edizione del Miller (1851), il passo di Hippolytos, *Refutatio Omnium Haeres.*, V, 8, p. 96 Wendland: ὁ ἱεροφάντης . . . νυκτὸς ἐν Ἐλευσίνι ὑπὸ πολλῶ πυρὶ τελῶν τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ἄρρητα μυστήρια βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγε λέγων· “ἱερὸν ἔτεκε πότνια κοῦρον. Βριμὼ Βριμόν.” τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἰσχυρὰ ἰσχυρόν. Qual'è il “sacro bambino” che nasce nella notte di Eleusi? Iakchos, come parve al Rohde, o non piuttosto Ploutos come pare al Kern, secondo l'inno a Demetra (v. 489)?

Comunque sia di ciò, torniamo a Euripide, dove, nella parodos, il coro delle Supplici, invoca, vv. 53 sgg.:

ἔτεκες καὶ σύ ποτ', ὦ πότνια, κοῦρον,
φίλα ποιησάμενα
λέκτρα πόσει σῶ.

E' vero, le parole son rivolte ad Aithra, e il kouros è Teseo, ma la coincidenza delle espressioni non può essere fortuita, è sicuramente intenzionale. Nella disperata invocazione delle Supplici lo spettatore ateniese con un fremito di commozione religiosa, sente riecheggiare il grido che rompe, tra la trepida attesa dei misti, il silenzio della notte sacra di Eleusi, il grido che annunzia la nascita del sacro bambino.

Da questa constatazione discende una conseguenza importante, anche per la storia dei misteri. Cade lo scrupolo metodico del Rohde, il quale giustamente rilevava a proposito del citato luogo di Ippolito, *Psyche*⁴, I, p. 285 (262), n. 1: "Freilich ist aber diese, wie die meisten der aus Nachrichten älterer Zeit nicht zu bestätigenden Mittheilungen christlicher Schriftsteller über Mysterienwesen höchstens als für die Zeit des Berichterstatters gültig zuzulassen." Il passo di Euripide reca la desiderata conferma alla tarda testimonianza di Ippolito. La nascita di un kouros divino era dunque parte essenziale del rituale eleusinio già nel V secolo a. C.

II. L'araldo tebano nel suo *ultimatum* a Teseo ingiunge di non accogliere Adrasto sul suolo attico, o, se vi si trovasse, di farlo uscire prima che cada il sole:

470 εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἐν γῇ πρὶν θεῶν δῶναι σέλας
λύσαντα σεμνὰ στεμμάτων μυστήρια
τῇσδ' ἐξελαύνειν . . .

La interpretazione corrente del v. 470 fa di *στεμμάτων* un complemento di *μυστήρια*, e l'espressione nel suo insieme è intesa come un equivalente del semplice *στέμματα*. Il Fix, nella Didot, traduce *soluta (posthabita) infularum religione*, Parmentier e Meridier (*Euripide*, III [Parigi, 1923]) interpretano "rompant le charme sacrosaint des bandettes." Il nostro Giuseppe Amendola, nella sua edizione commentata (Palermo, 1922) spiega "la sacra religione delle bende," mentre il Romagnoli traduce, in versi,

sciogliere
 devi l'incanto delle sacre bende.

Il senso corre apparentemente, ma a spese del testo greco, al quale la interpretazione fa manifesta violenza. A parte che le bende avvolte ai supplici rami non hanno nella religione greca nulla di incantato o di misterioso, lo stesso vocabolo *μυστήριον*, e tanto

meno nel plurale, non è mai attestato nel senso di religione o di incanto. Si aggiunga che l'epiteto *σεμνά* implica un riconoscimento della santità degli *στέμματα* che mal si concilia con l'invito a violarla. Infine la formula stessa *στεμμάτων μυστήρια*, nel suo nesso grammaticale, non ha precedenti, è sospetta. Di tali difficoltà dovette rendersi conto il Nauck, nel correggere in *ικτήρια* il *μυστήρια* della tradizione manoscritta, seguito in ciò dal Wecklein (Lipsia, 1898). La correzione non è soddisfacente, ma la aporia resta. Così pare anche al Pearson, il quale nella nota a Sophocl., fr. 804 osserva che la elocuzione *σεμνά στεμμάτων μυστήρια* *awaits elucidation and is perhaps corrupt*.

A tali difficoltà può ovviare una interpretazione che crediamo più aderente al testo e grammaticalmente più plausibile. Basta intendere *λύω* nel senso non meno attestato (cf. Aesch., *Pr.*, 1006: *λύσαι με δεσμῶν*) di liberare (coll'accusativo e il genitivo) e dare a *μυστήρια* un approssimativo valore locale (non tanto di *misteri* quanto di *luogo dei misteri*). "Liberare gli angusti misteri dalla presenza delle supplici bende," è la interpretazione che proponiamo. C'è una difficoltà logica o piuttosto razionalistica. L'araldo tebano non ha assistito alla precedente scena della supplicazione. Come può dunque alludere ad essa? Ma egli ha potuto bensì, arrivando, con un colpo d'occhio, afferrare il significato del quadro che si offre ai suoi sguardi, e nel quale la scena stessa si continua: la vecchia regina presso l'altare, e intorno le madri argive, che le fanno siepe e corona coi supplici rami. Il significato di tale scena non può sfuggire all'araldo e lo spinge a dare una forma più concreta al secondo termine dell'*ultimatum* che da parte di Creonte egli reca a Teseo. Che poi *μυστήρια* abbia un valore in certo modo locale (e non solo qui anche al v. 173 di questo medesimo dramma: *πρεσβεύματ' οὐ Δῆμητρος εἰς μυστήρια*) ci par verosimile, anche in considerazione della etimologia. Prima di assumere il senso astratto e generico di "riti segreti," equivalente del più antico *ἄργια* (che ricorre per la prima volta in *h. Cer.* 273 e 476) e del posteriore *τελεταί*, il termine dovrebbe avere un significato concreto, strumentale e locale. Non solo cioè di *oggetti* e *strumenti* del rito mistico (come in Aristoph., *Ranae*, 159: *ὄνος ἄγω μυστήρια*) ma anche di *luogo* del rito, un equivalente, insomma del successivo termine *τελεστήριον*, "il luogo della iniziazione" (Plut., *Them.*, 1). Si rilevi infatti che *μυστήριον* deriva ovviamente da *μύσση*, e dovette

But can the rejected reason be that presupposed by the Stephanus emendation? It will be noted immediately that the phrase adds no new facts to what is already obvious from the previous line, namely that Xuthus is not Ion's father. Since Apollo has just been declared to be Ion's father, it is superfluous to say that his reason for giving Ion to Xuthus was not that Xuthus was the father. Obviously he made the gift *despite* the fact that Xuthus was not the father. Some translators have, therefore, suppressed the *ἀλλά* and treated *οὐ φύσασί σε* as if it were descriptive or vaguely concessive. But this is no solution.

The clue is to be found in Ion's question (1532-3): how Apollo could be his father and yet send him away? He is afraid that the god may be simply casting him off (on this note also 1344). It is not enough, then, for Athena to tell him that Apollo is his father but wants him to go to Xuthus' most noble house; Ion already knows what to expect at Athens. She must persuade him of what Creusa could not, that Apollo is acting out of concern for his welfare (note Creusa's *ἐνεργεῶν*, 1540, and *ὠφελῶν*, 1545). I suggest, therefore, that *οὐκ ἀφείς γέ σε*, rather than *οὐ φύσασί σε*, should be read for *οὐ φασί σε*. Translation: "He gave you as he did, *not because he has forsaken you*, but to bring you into a most noble house." (For *ἀφίημι* = *leave alone, neglect, abandon*, see Liddell and Scott, s. v., A. III. 1; Euripides, *Hec.* 117, *Supp.* 491; Sophocles, *Aj.* 496, *Ph.* 486. For *ἀφίημι* of a father disowning a son, see especially Aristotle, *N. E.* 1163 b 22.)

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□

EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

The Editorial Board announces the election to its membership of Professor James H. Oliver.

REVIEWS.

RHYS CARPENTER. Observations on Familiar Statuary in Rome.
Pp. 110; 34 pls. (*Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*,
Vol. XVIII [1941].)

This is the third time that a monograph by one author fills a whole volume of the *Memoirs*, the others being Vols. XIV (1937) and XVI (1939). The title is too modest. Although based on observations made in Roman Museums, it is really a kind of history of Greek and early Roman sculpture, beginning with Myron and ending with a relief of the period of Tiberius and Claudius, thus bringing us from the fifth century through the fourth century and the Hellenistic period to the early Roman imperial period. The author has looked at the familiar works of art with new eyes and an open mind; he tries to get away from the philological method of drawing the inference that our surviving statuary must reflect the selective canon of ancient artistic judgment, just as the body of literary manuscripts which has survived through the Middle Ages into modern times is representative of the canonic literary judgment of antiquity. He believes that Furtwängler in his *Masterpieces* was wrong when he tried to combine the statuary types which have survived with the list of names of famous sculptors and their works in Pliny and other authors. He finds this celebrated book "pretty thoroughly erroneous from cover to cover." Carpenter's own intention is not to "re-create sculptors," but to "arrange, analyse, and comprehend sculpture" (p. 2). His own conclusions are for the larger part based on detailed anatomical and technical observations. The results are often startling and provocative. I am afraid that Carpenter's book will be judged as he judges Furtwängler's *Masterpieces*; it will be admired as a masterpiece, but most scholars will quarrel with one or the other part of it.

Carpenter begins by taking away the Marsyas of the Lateran not only from Myron, but from the middle of the fifth century. He dates him not earlier than the final decades of the fifth century (pp. 5 ff.) "or more probably" in the early fourth century (p. 13). This new assignment is based on a very careful and exact observation and description of the different anatomical renderings of the bodies of Marsyas and the discobolos, a difference which I cannot see as sharply as Carpenter does, and which we might expect from Pliny's saying (*N. H.*, XXXIV, 58): *Primus hic multiplicasse veritatem videtur, numerosior in arte quam Polyclitus*. I find in both statues a similar differentiation between the two halves of the body, a similar grasping of the most fertile moment, when one movement is going to change into the opposite direction, and a similar simplicity in rendering the short hair of the athlete as well as the long hair and beard of the satyr, in agreement with Pliny's saying: *Capillum . . . non emendatius fecisse quam rudis antiquitas instituisset*. The short tail, which Carpenter cannot date earlier, is already found

about 460-450 on the calyx crater by the Niobid painter with a satyr-Pan chorus dancing around Pandora, in the British Museum No. E 467 (Webster, in Beazley-Jacobsthal, *Bilder griech. Vasen*, VIII, p. 18, Pl. 15 a-b).

Together with the Marsyas, Carpenter removes from the middle of the fifth century the Protesilaos and gives him, against his intention not to "re-create sculptors," to Deinomenes who flourished in 400-397. Gisela Richter (*Metropolitan Museum Studies*, I [1929], pp. 187 ff.) has given the right dating 450-445. The same is true of the Perseus in the British Museum and Museo Mussolini (pp. 18 ff.). Here Carpenter uses the right criterion: when we have to choose between two different copies of an original, we must discard the one carelessly executed and reconstruct the original from the more carefully, and therefore more accurately, executed copy. He accordingly bases his analysis on the head in Rome. His comparison with the Hygieia from the Palatine on Pls. 7-8 does not convince me that the Perseus belongs with her into the opening years of the fourth century. Even if it is, as Carpenter assumes, a Hermes and not the Perseus of Myron or Pythagoras, I do not see enough reasons to remove it from the middle of the fifth century.

On the other hand the Youth from Subiaco is dated in this period (pp. 25 ff.), near the Stumbling Niobid (p. 28, Pl. 12), which even Carpenter cannot date otherwise than 450-440. He thinks the statue from Subiaco even earlier than the Niobid and would like to put it 470-460. This seems to me impossible, for the complicated movement and the soft rendering of the flesh have no parallel in the early classical style but many parallels in the Hellenistic period: The rich movement in a closed frame and the smooth surface agree with such compositions as those of the Aphrodite of Doidalsas (A. W. Lawrence, *Later Greek Sculpture*, p. 17, Pl. 25a), of the Niobids, the so-called Jason, and the Youth from Cythera, with which Lawrence (*op. cit.*, pp. 12 ff. and 97, Pls. 11-15) has rightly combined the Subiaco boy (Pl. 14) as works of the early Hellenistic period. The conception is quite different from the Spinario, which, like the Esquiline Venus, Carpenter regards as ancient frauds or *pastiche*, i. e. composite creations (pp. 30 ff.). Both have heads in the style of the fifth century but Carpenter regards the body of the Spinario with della Seta (*Il Nudo nell' Arte*, I, p. 610) as hardly earlier than the Lysippan school, while the body of the Esquiline Venus is composed of the upper portion of the torso of a boy and below the waist of a body resembling the Aphrodite from Cyrene with which it is very appropriately combined on Pl. 14. The upper part of the torso is a rectangle, the lower a cylinder. Thus we have a composite creation, which I, however, would prefer to call an eclectic work, not a fraud, of the early Roman period. The knot of hair is not in line of the main axis of the skull, not because the original was tying a fillet around the hair, but it is shifted to the left in order to make it visible in the front view since the head is seen from its left side (see Pl. 13). The Spinario, on the other hand, is not a classicizing reworking of the Hellenistic type of the British Museum marble (No. 1755), but a conception very similar to the crouching boy in the Olympia East pediment, thus a creation of the period about 460 B. C. The marble

head in the Museo Mussolini (Pl. 16 A and C. Mustilli, *Il Museo Mussolini*, pp. 144 ff., Pl. LXXXIX) is not a replica of the bronze Spinario, but of a stylistically related figure; it was carried erect on a straight neck of a standing statue, while the bronze figure has the neck bent forward. Carpenter believes that the bronze easter modelled and "cast separately an entirely new strip of neck to connect the head with the torso." There is no evidence for this complicated procedure.

Another intricate technical procedure is in contrast well grasped and convincingly described for the Ludovisi Throne (pp. 41 ff.). The lower corners have been cut down for the attachment of ornaments as parallels to the counter-part, now in Boston (L. D. Caskey, *Catalogue of Greek and Roman Sculpture*, pp. 30 ff., No. 17), where such ornaments belong integrally to the composition while they are irrational in the Ludovisi Throne. Carpenter makes the right inference that the counterpart was of later date, but he believes rightly that both belong to approximately the same period (p. 50) and that the Boston throne is authentic Greek, not classicizing Roman or modern. The central figure of the Ludovisi Throne he explains not as Aphrodite, but as Eileithyia, in the kneeling attitude of a woman giving birth to a child, while the counter-part shows the procreative Eros. Eileithyia was identified with the Argive Hera. In the sanctuary of Hera, close to the mouth of the river Sele, the excavators, Mrs. Zancani Montuoro and Mr. Zanotti Bianco, found the terracotta figure of a kneeling woman with two attending Erotes, which they also named Eileithyia (*Notizie degli Scavi*, 1937, p. 219, note 6; Carpenter, p. 59, Pl. 20). If the interpretation is right, the fish and pomegranate on the Boston counterpart might be interpreted as fertility symbols. The purpose of the monument Carpenter does not decide. The reviewer is of the opinion that the two three-sided reliefs were the ends of a balustrade surrounding a bothros or favissa or pit or sacred well for sacrifices or votive offerings. The wings slope downward in the direction of the center balustrade which was made lower, so that the offerings could be thrown down or deposited in the pit.

One of the theories which will hardly find adherents is the assumption that the Peliad on the relief in the Lateran standing opposite Medea was originally Medea herself, derived from a Polycleitan type in the shape of the "Thusnelda" in the Loggia dei Lanzi at Florence (pp. 62 ff., Pl. 21). The stance, as well as the drapery of the two figures, is absolutely different in each. There is no indication of a sword or sheath in the Florentine statue. The Amazon to which Carpenter compares her is not the one by Polycleitos, but by Cresilas (Pl. 21; see Furtwängler's reasoning, defended with new arguments by Bieher, *Jahrb.*, XXXIII [1918], pp. 49 ff.). The relief is not a second-rate original, but a good copy (see Goetze, in *Röm. Mitt.*, LIII [1938], pp. 200 ff., Pl. 38). Carpenter disregards the copy in Berlin, perhaps regarding it with Kern, *Jahrb.*, III (1888), pp. 68 ff. and Löwy, *Bull. Com.*, XXV (1897), pp. 45 ff. as a forgery.

The last part of the book (pp. 73 ff.) is dedicated to Hellenistic sculpture and the important problem of the transition from Hellenistic to Roman art. Here one finds many excellent remarks some-

times inextricably entangled with unacceptable theories. The importance of the study of coins is stressed, but they are misused for dividing not alone them but all Hellenistic sculpture into "glyptic" and "plastic" statuary. Under glyptic, Carpenter understands statuary cut down from a solid block, with contour lines as boundaries and interior lines for details in terms of surface pattern, while under plastic, he understands statuary which substitutes linear analysis with stereomorphic configuration of solid actualities. He derives the schematic formulae and archaic qualities of early Greek sculpture from this technique of cutting into a solid block. While the glyptic approach is external, the plastic is internal, worked from within with the help of a mobile medium of wet clay or softened wax. "The shift of creative emphasis to the fluid clay—which is the fundamental form behind this new technique—must have profoundly influenced statuary composition" (p. 80). This shows distinctly how Carpenter believes technique to be the leading factor in the development of style. He accordingly separates (pp. 77 f.) in Hekler's portrait book the glyptic constructions of the fourth and third centuries (Maussolos to Philetairos, about 350 to 250) from the plastic ones (Sokrates Albani to the seated boxer of Apollonios, 250 to 50). Lysippos thus belongs to the classical glyptic tradition, as do the statues of Demosthenes and Poseidippos, which are still composed of multiplication of linear indications (p. 76). "The technique of physiognomical expression was not adequately mastered until the Hellenistic Age" (p. 74). Carpenter believes that this age has invented and perfected the art of human portraiture.

The reviewer is of a different opinion. Individual portraiture was "invented" in the fifth century, "perfected" in the fourth century, variegated, made more subtle and more passionate, and adapted to ugly and alien features in the Hellenistic period. When Lysistratos, the brother of Lysippos, corrected and improved the rendering of the human form by taking it in plaster from the living model (Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXV, 153) he did not prepare the development of "plastic" portraiture, but he gave to the great portrait sculptors of the fourth century a new technique, which helped to develop their already existing realistic trend. I do not believe that technique is leading in the development of a style. It can hamper the artistic trend when undeveloped, and it can further it, when developed in accordance with the artist's conceptions.

Carpenter could not, of course, fail to see that there are "plastic" heads which do not agree with his belief that they begin not before the middle Hellenistic period. He tries to get rid of them by dating them in the first century B. C. The head of Epikouros is explained as an imaginary later version (p. 78, Pl. 34A) and, following Lippold and Crome, Menander becomes Vergil (pp. 96 ff., Pl. 30). But besides these two heads, which clearly stand in Lysippan tradition, we have the heads of Ptolemy I and Seleukos I on coins as well as in sculpture, all belonging to the same period of the early third century and all in the "plastic" style. I cannot see the identity of the Menander-Vergil with the della Valle relief from the Ara Pietatis Augustae, vowed by Tiberius in A. D. 22 and dedicated by Claudius A. D. 43 (pp. 98 ff., Pls. 31-32). The togati on the

relief have decidedly Roman features. They might be Propertius, Vergil, and Horace (p. 101), although this interpretation is only a "seductive hypothesis"; but the head of which we have about 88 versions has only recently again been confirmed as Menander through the inscribed mosaic of Antioch (*Antioch-on-the-Orontes*, III, Campbell and Stillwell, pp. 185 ff., No. 131, Pl. 63; Friend, *ibid.*, pp. 248 ff.) and through theater tickets showing the name and bust of Menander, holding one of his masks as on the relief in the Lateran.

The "Hellenistic Ruler" of the Terme had already formerly been brought down by Carpenter from his generally accepted place in the middle of the second to the first century. He attributed him to Apollonios and tentatively named him Lucullus (*A. J. A.*, XXXI [1927], pp. 160 ff.). In the *Memoirs* (pp. 80 ff.) he is separated from Apollonios and tentatively given to Arkesilaos. In a recent article (*A. J. A.*, XLIX [1945], pp. 352 ff.) the identity is changed to Sulla while in the same volume Phyllis Williams combines the ruler with the boxer of the Terme to form a group of Amykos and the Dioskouroi (*ibid.*, pp. 330 ff.). I do not think that the right solution has been found.

A last ingenious hypothesis is the one which makes the Belvedere Torso of Apollonios a flute playing Marsyas (pp. 84 ff., Pl. 26). The idea of using the two sockets in either leg above the knees for small marble struts supporting the ends of double flutes of unequal length makes an old suggestion of Hadaczek (*Jahresh.*, X [1907], pp. 312 ff.) very likely. A reconstruction on paper would be desirable. On the other hand, I am doubtful about the use made of a colossal torso from the Giardino della Pigna, now in the vestibolo rotondo of the Belvedere of the Vatican, for a colossal standing Apollo combined in a group with this Marsyas (pp. 88 ff., Pls. 27-28). I do not know of any Apollo in a similar dress. The fragment to me looks female, and it seems to be part of an architectural decoration, being itself built up of blocks like the drums of a column.

Carpenter is afraid that the whole study of Greek portrait sculpture "threatens to come to a standstill or even a complete breakdown because of a failure to put proper emphasis on morphological evolution." He did not then know the new books on portraiture: L. Laurenzi, *Ritratti Greci* (1941), and K. Scheffold, *Die Bildnisse der antiken Dichter, Redner und Denker* (1943), which are arranged according to periods and phases of sculpture. Another book by M. Bieber and A. B. Brett, *Greek Portraits in Sculpture and on Coins*, which—we hope—may appear in 1947, also will clarify some of the problems attacked in the last part of this inciting and challenging book by Carpenter.

A word of praise is due to the Scuola tipografica Pio X, who printed the book, and the studio d'Arte fotografica Prof. Gaggiotti, who executed the clichés for the American Academy in Rome.

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Les Papyrus Théodore Reinach, Tome II, publié par l'Institut de Papyrologie de la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris sous la direction de PAUL COLLART. Cairo, Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1940. Pp. ix + 139. (*Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale*, Tome XXXIX.)

Although the preface is dated January 15, 1939, this publication of the remaining papyri of the Reinach collection was not ready until the War had interrupted normal channels of trade, and my first acquaintance with it came through a visit to the French Institute in Cairo in the winter of 1944/45. Following by some thirty-five years the first volume, edited by Théodore Reinach himself, it owed its preparation to the presentation of the collection of papyri and ostraca as a bequest to the Papyrus Institute of the University of Paris in 1930, and subsequently to the devotion of Paul Collart. Editing took the form which may well be followed more and more, as papyrologists settle down to the slow and sober business of publishing systematically entire collections in place of the more exciting and easier business of publishing notabilia. Professor Collart, over a period of several years, put his students to work on the texts, re-examining them himself at the same time. The result was the gradual perfection and completion of reading and interpretation, so that at the end of the process, it was impossible to give specific credit. The names of the seminar members are given in the preface, and it is pleasant to see among them three Americans who have continued to distinguish themselves in the field, Lewis, Pearl, and Youtie. All collaborators may well be satisfied with the form in which their efforts appear. Editing is accurate, adequate, and restrained, the documentation sufficient without being overweighted with unnecessary references. Each text is translated, and only problems of interpretation not made clear in the translation are treated in the notes. In general, the essential problems or importance of the texts are indicated clearly and briefly, and it is remarkable how much interest attaches to even small forbidding fragments, when properly studied.

Of the eighty-five texts (nos. 59-143), thirty (nos. 59-88) are literary, or thirty-two, if one includes here a magical fragment (no. 89) and a Coptic writing exercise (no. 90). They comprise, in addition to the ostrakon with Psalm CXL which has been much discussed, part of Exodus XL from a third century manuscript which contained all of that work, a late papyrus codex of the Psalms containing part of C and CI, a page from a fifth century Codex of the Hexahemeron of St. Basil, which appears here for the first time in the papyri, and small fragments of a prayer to the Virgin and of a homily. There are twelve fragments of Homer (nos. 65-76) which were published in 1931 by Bataille and Collart, and, in the classical field, fragments of Xenophon's *Treatise on Hunting* and Aristotle's *History of Animals*, both newcomers in the papyri. Of the later writers, noteworthy is a verse encomium by the egregious Dioscorus of Aphrodito (no. 82). The little bat-conundrum (no. 84) was earlier published by Collart.

Of the remaining texts, eighteen (nos. 91-108) are legal or business documents, eleven (nos. 109-119) are private letters, and twenty-

four (nos. 120-143) are receipts of various sorts written upon ostraca. Of particular interest are no. 91, a letter of the Prefect Maevius Honoratianus of A. D. 235 or better 238, with a bearing on the chronology of the reign of Maximinus in either case; nos. 93/94, which throw some new light on the *hierotektones*; no. 97, a denunciation of a refugee woman, perhaps a slave, who had joined a soldier in the "fort"; the denunciation is made by another woman in the sixth year of a Ptolemy, presumably Philopator or Epiphanes, and because the soldier is a Greek (Demus) one would prefer the earlier date, placing the text shortly after the battle of Raphia, and letting one speculate that the woman may have come to Egypt as part of the spoil; no. 101, a payment in advance for wine to be delivered at the harvest; this type of document (see also the recently published *P. S. I.* 1245-1247) has bothered the jurists who approach it from the point of view of Roman law, but the conception is Greek, and eminently sensible; payment in advance gives the farmer money to finance his crop, and in the case of wine, where the procedure is so common as to be regular, it assures him an immediate market, without even the obligation of furnishing his own containers; in Egypt, it should have been fairly easy to forecast the yield; no. 103, a nursing contract to provide lactation and care of a baby girl *apo koprias*; the cost to the owner was to be sixty drachmae plus extras each year for two years; rearing a slave was not cheap, and adults must have been scarce and expensive at the time (Tiberius; the text was published by Collart in 1932, the lower part having been acquired by the Rylands collection, *P. Kyl.* 178); nos. 111-115 are further to the archives of Heroninus, one of our best sources for the late fifties and sixties of the third century; no. 115 is of special interest, as anticipating the well-known irrigation reforms of Probus (*P. Oxy.* 1409); no. 116, a letter of a son to his mother, with something of the freshness and charm of the famous letter of Apion (*B. G. U.* 423); and finally nos. 117 and 118, private letters with much more life than the usual private letter from Egypt.

There follow a few observations in detail.

No. 84, the bat-conundrum. The second question is: τί τῶν τετραπότων οὐ λα[.]κτεῖ. Coming between the questions "What quadruped is least seen by daylight?" and "What flying creature suckles its young?" I am inclined to wonder whether the letters κτεῖ could not be read as κτεῖ, i. e., π[α]τεῖ, giving some such restoration as χε[σπ]ατεῖ: "What quadruped does not walk upon the ground?"

No. 94, a sworn return by two *hierotektones* to the nome governor stating that they had (from the temple of Theoris and Isis and Sarapis and associated gods in Oxyrhynchus) no χειρισμὸν ἢ πρόσδοον, except at the time of the ἀγνεία in the month Hadrianus, when they received cakes or scones. In addition to the general bearing this has on the temple returns in general (γραφαὶ ἱερῶν καὶ χειρισμοῦ; see the forthcoming publication of the examples from Baechias in the *Yale Classical Studies* by Elizabeth Gilliam), the text shows that, like the priests, the *hierotektones* submitted the return through representatives; the editor hesitates on this point, but I think unnecessarily.

No. 95 purports to be a receipt for payment of the 3% customs

at the "Gate" of Soknopaïou Nesos. In addition to the many other difficulties with the text that the editor lists, childish handwriting, anomalous form, reversal in the order of the term Soknopaïou Nesos, the association of the *eremophylakes* and the *dekanoi* in one notification, and the enormous number of animals in one receipt to one importer (20 camels and 1,000 donkeys), there remains the additional problem of the amount of toll paid, 60,204 drachmae, giving at 3% a capital value of 15,000 drachmae per camel and 1,650 drachmae per donkey, entirely impossible under Claudius, when the currency was sound. The name of the month used, μηνὸς Σεβαστοῦ Ἀγικῆτου θεοῦ <με>γάλου Σωτήρος, suggests that the writer was thinking in third century terms. If the whole document be not a forgery pure and simple, composed in the secretariat of an antiquities dealer, and the thing is not impossible, though association with the dealers themselves inclines one to regard it as unlikely—their attempted compositions take the form of chicken tracks—the editor's theory of a schoolboy exercise may be accepted. It is certainly not genuine.

In no. 96, Μουσαίου should be a man's name whether it be part of a place name or not, Μουσαίου χάραξ or τείχος Μουσαίου or something of that sort, as it is in the χ(ωρίον) Μουσαί[ου cited by the editor. His comments somewhat obscure this point. It is not the Μουσαίου that bothers me here, but the ἐπί which precedes it.

In 98, a catoeic cession of A. D. 109, the editor expresses uncertainty over the name Οὔσπελλίου. I should be inclined to take it as a variant of Vipsellius = Vipsanius.

No. 106 is a loan from Euhemeria under Claudius or Nero. The basic structure, so far as it exists in the preserved right half of the papyrus, is as follows: ὁμολογεῖ ὁ δεῖνα τῶι δέινῳ ἔχειν παρ' αὐτοῦ . . . [. . . δρ]αχμὰς ἑκατὸν ὀγδοήκοντα [. τ]όκον τοῦ ἀργυρίου δραχμῶν. The accusative τόκον makes me wonder whether we have not a new contract setting up a new obligation both for the original loan (the 180 drachmae) and for the unpaid interest. This type of "fictitious" contract is common in the first century; witness the many documents in *P. Mich. Teb. II.*

No. 108 is a lease of a mill and bakery of the sixth century, where the daily payment of the rent and the right of immediate recovery of the property by the owner are noteworthy.

No. 109 is a letter to a subordinate dealing with various business matters, but the account is not entirely clear. The editor reads as follows: κομίζ[όμε]νος δὲ . . . [. . . χ]αλκοῦ παρ' Ἀλκιμήδου καὶ πλη[ρώσας] Ἀβ ἐξαπόστειλόν μοι· ἔστιν [ὁ λόγος] ἀπὸ Ἀγ, ἱ ἀργ(υρί)ου ις Ἀα φέ καὶ [.]υ Ἀχπ, ὥστε σοι γ(ίγνεται) Ἀα ἔσμι [. . .]. αὐτοῖς Ἀα ἱψέ, and does not explain the arithmetic. I should restore ἔστιν [δὲ καὶ] ἄλλο Ἀγ ἱ ἀργ(υρί)ου ις Ἀα φέ καὶ [χαλκο]ῦ Ἀχπ, and [κα]ὶ αὐτοῖς. Taking the exchange ratio of 1:610 between silver and bronze, which is not unreasonable at this time (131 B. C.), the account balances. "Collecting (the amounts due in silver and) bronze from Alcimedēs, and making up 2 talents, send them to me. There remains 3½ talents (16 drachmae of silver = 9,760 drachmae of bronze and 1 talent 560 drachmae of bronze—i. e., in one account, or something of that sort—and 4,680 drachmae of bronze), so that there are for you 1 talent 5,240 drachmae and for 'them' 1 talent

3,760 drachmae." The exact situation remains obscure, as commonly in papyrus letters.

In the ostraca nos. 120-123, payment is made to the royal bank from collections from linen weavers over a period of sixteen months by one Psenchonsis son of Patemis, whom the editor regards as an oekonomos or the agent of the oekonomos; I do not see why he would not more naturally be the telones. In two of them, the percentage of extra charges varies unaccountably, according to the editor's interpretation. These are nos. 122/123, dated on the same day, and it seems easier to take the charges as made up of two parts, a 2% and a fixed fee of 6 drachmae.

In no. 134, I wonder why the charge $\iota\pi(\epsilon\rho) \gamma\epsilon\omega(\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma)$ cannot be actually for the survey, which must have been made or checked annually.

In nos. 120 and 141, reference is made to lines of Demotic, neither reproduced nor translated. This seems a pity, even taking into consideration the scarcity of Demotists. Would not a tracing or photograph have been possible?

Two minor misprints may be noted. In no. 125, line 7, \dot{A} is presumably for \dot{B} , and in the translation of no. 139, the words "Horos fils de" were omitted before "Thotsutès."

With it all, the editor and his assistants are to be congratulated on a job well done, and to be wished equal success with the third part of the Reinach collection still unpublished.

Postscript. In discussion with Octave Guéraud, Conservateur au Musée Égyptien in Cairo and a friend of papyrologists everywhere, whom I asked to read the above, a number of additional observations developed, derived from his own reading of the volume, which he has had the kindness to allow me to add here.

No. 117, line 5. Εἰδὲ ἕάν (translated "Vois si") must be for ἕάν ; cf. the twice repeated εἰ τι ἄν in the same text (lines 1 and 13). In the same text, Ἀκυλείνος is the Latin Aquilinus, a fact obscured by the rendering "Aculeinos."

No. 82. Guéraud has noted two facts of vital importance for understanding Dioscorus' encomium of Romanus, that the poem is, like its sister in London which formed part of the same *diploma*, an acrostic, giving the initial letters of the lines 4-17 as Ο ΚΥΡΙΟΣ ΡΩΜΑΝΟΣ , and that the last four lines, after the acrostic, lie outside the poem proper, and are a variant of a tag which Dioscorus used commonly to append to his encomia. This is particularly true of the last two,

$\alpha] \gamma\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma \delta \gamma\rho\acute{\alpha}\psi\alpha\varsigma \pi\omicron\tau\epsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \delta\upsilon\omicron \pi[\lambda] \acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\varsigma$
 $\kappa] \alpha\iota \sigma\omicron\upsilon \chi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \delta\iota\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota.$

Cf. *P. Masp. Byz.* 67131, Verso A (p. 15), 17 f.:

$\text{Ἐγ}[\rho\alpha\psi\alpha\varsigma \eta\delta\epsilon\omega\varsigma \delta\alpha\kappa\tau\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\omega \delta\upsilon\omicron \pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\varsigma$
 $\kappa] \alpha\iota \sigma\omicron\upsilon \chi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \chi\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \delta\iota\pi\lambda\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota;$

ibid. 67279, Verso (p. 10), 12 f.

$\text{Ἐ}[\gamma\rho\alpha\psi\alpha\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\iota \lambda[\iota]\chi\alpha\varsigma [- - -$
 $\kappa\alpha\iota \sigma[\omicron]\upsilon \chi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \chi[\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \delta\iota\pi\lambda\omega]\mu\alpha \tau\acute{\iota}.$

Possibly *ibid.* 67315, 38 f. may be an expression of the same idea; although the language is something less than perspicuous:

. . . λ [γρ]αφίδεσσι λιχας ποτε θεσμοχαραξας
διπλοον ἀμφ[ι]βόητον ὅσον χρόνον ὕμμι χ[αρ]άσσει.

Except for the last, it seems clear that the correct reading and restoration in each case is δ γράψας, and the meaning is: "He who has written this tablet (or folded piece of papyrus, which the reader holds) will also inscribe your 'times' in one." *P. Maspr. Byz.* 67131 adds

Νῦν μὴ κατόκνει συγκροτεῖν με δυστυχῇ,

which is another form of the same sentiment that the Paris papyrus expresses in two lines:

Τ]οίνυν σύ γ' αὐτὸς συνδραμὼν τῷ μῶ σκοπῶ
κ]αὶ μὴ κατόκνει συγκροτεῖν ξ[έ]νους ποτέ

(where the editor prints κατ' οκνεῖ and adds "Lire κατοκνεῖ). The meaning is: "Only do not be unwilling to approve (or 'support') wretched me," and the author is referring to himself as ξένους ποτέ, just as earlier in the poem he called himself

ρήτωρ ἄριστος εἰ μὴ εὐφυνῆς πανύ.

While certainty in such matters is obviously impossible, it is natural to think of Dioscorus circulating his encomia among possible clients, with the offer of similar praise in return for their patronage.

The central, fragmentary, part of the poem is difficult. In line 11, γνώμην becomes ῥώμην, and probably one should print μὲν ἀνδρείαν instead of Μεανδρείαν. Probably line 10 should be printed

σο]φός, παλαιὸς ὥς> Μένανδρος, τοῖς λόγοις.

Line 12 is certainly π[α]ρ' ἡμῖν instead of γ[α]ρ, but the sense remains obscure. In general, the poem is an elaboration of the antithesis expressed in lines 14 f.:

ἄ]κριτος ἔφυς τὰ διπλᾶ τῶν ἀρετῶν
ν]εώτερος παν[έ]ντιμος τύχης [καὶ] γένους,

and the arrangement is largely, if not entirely, by couplets. Cf. lines 10 f.: σοφός . . . ῥώμην; 16 f.: ὀλβιοδαίμων . . . σοφός. This would lead me to expect in line 9 something to contrast with the λογισμὸν ἀκριβοῦς of line 8, and an antithesis of some sort to occur in lines 12 f., although I do not see the solution. The reference to Isocrates is mysterious. He does not, so far as the indices show, use the term ῥώμη ἀνδρεία, and while one might read the adjective ἰσοκρατῆς, the subject of λέγει would then be to seek. The writer uses the second person of the subject of the poem, Romanus, and of the reader (if the theory of the closing lines is correct), and only refers to himself in the third person, seemingly, in lines 6 f., and perhaps with the ξένους of line 19. But commendation of himself at this point would leave little room for the encomium proper (e.g., "wise like old Menander in the arts of speech—or 'verse,' since σοφός is especially appropriate of a poet—equally mighty in manly strength, he

states"). The key probably lies in lines 12 f., tantalizing with only one or two missing letters, but Dioscorus does not always make sense to us moderns.

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ROBERT COHEN. *La Grèce et l'Hellénisation du monde antique*. Nouvelle édition. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1939. Pp. xlvii + 696. 300 fr.; 13/- in England. (*Clio*, *Introduction aux Études Historiques*, Vol. II.)

The first edition was reviewed only twice in English, though by no less authorities than W. W. Tarn (*J. H. S.*, LV [1935], p. 255) and J. A. O. Larsen (*C. P.*, XXX [1935], pp. 182-3), both very favorably; on the continent there were at least eighteen reviews. Of the second edition, which is now available outside France, I have seen no reviews. Since *La Grèce* is incontestably the best bibliography of Greek history in existence, and yet remains little known in the U. S. A., some notice would seem to be in order.

The *Clio* series was planned to cover in 13 volumes the history of the Middle East and of Europe from the earliest times to 1919, and all but the volume on the eighteenth century were actually issued. (In addition there were to be two volumes covering the history of art [not yet issued], four fascicules of historical maps [that on *l'Époque contemporaine* only not issued], and four fascicules of *Textes et Documents* [two not issued].) The design of the series seems to have been to provide "handbooks" which could actually be held in one hand, containing "introductions" which would really introduce the reader—with a bow, a title, and a witty French remark—to all the authorities worth knowing. M. Robert Cohen's book, the longest but one of the *Clio* series, will illustrate the difficulties as well as the good sense of this conception.

Any bibliography of a field so vast and so productive as Greek history ages rapidly. The first edition of *La Grèce* was printed in 1934; the second is dated 1939, but since the preface was written on Jan. 1, 1939, there is really not much material later than 1937. The second edition records more reviews and articles in periodicals than the first edition, which it supersedes in all other respects as well. Being now virtually ten years old, it too will soon be ready to be superseded.

A bibliography ought to lie open and flat, and ought to be easily legible. The date 1945 on the last page of the copy before me indicates a new printing and excuses the poor quality of the paper and the handling of the signatures, which is so faulty that I am advised not to have the volume bound; my copy of the first edition, a better book but also too plump, became awkward enough in buckram. As in the first edition, the bibliographical matter is set in a font so minute that there are 62 lines on each page, with eleven lines to the inch; it is no joy to read. Moreover the swarm of tiny letters has

bred numerous typographical errors, so that, for instance, along with eight other slips, one scholar's name appears in three different forms, two of them erroneous, all within one paragraph (p. 233). Defects of this sort are especially unhappy in a bibliography, and they ante-date the war.

The author divides Greek history into 26 chapters, and writes several pages of his own as text for each. These pages are sometimes straight factual summaries, but more often are points of view, correctives, novelties, syntheses, abstractions, or observations of some other kind; if not always profound, they are generally stimulating and often acute. Their length increases from about a dozen pages each for the earlier periods to more than 30 pages each for the chapters on the Hellenistic period, a difference which doubtless reflects the author's own studies. The meat of the book, however, is in the bibliographical *Notes*, which occupy some 212 out of 660 pages. Between the author's "text" and the *Notes* there is no organic connection, in the sense that there are no references from the one to the other, so that the *Notes* can be used without the text. This is sensible.

The *Notes* themselves on (or rather after) each chapter are divided in each case into *Sources*, *Bibliographie*, and *État actuel des questions*. These categories naturally tend to run into one another, so that it is necessary, as Cohen is careful to point out (p. xlv), to read all three parts in order to get what the chapter provides. Avoiding mere lists, the author usually writes his items into consecutive prose, so that a certain logic and movement animate each paragraph, and an occasional word of praise or scorn adds sting.

Hardly a living person could appraise accurately the quality of the whole. From many samplings at points where I happen to know the "literature" better than at others, I can only record the impression that any specialist would be able to add to, rearrange, and generally improve what is printed on his own section; items of unequal scope or of dubious merit are sometimes lumped together; some important works are omitted, and numerous consequential articles. Naturally too the author, though he ranges over all aspects of the subject, from numismatics to religion, and all the relevant languages, has not quite the same knowledge of or sympathy for non-French works that he has for French. At the same time, I venture to assert that few scholars, no matter how expert, can read far in any of the 26 sets of *Notes* without encountering some new and welcome title. Taken as a whole, *La Grèce* is an astonishing show of knowledge.

To use the book properly, one should note that the 26 chapters are preceded by a systematic *Bibliographie générale* of Greek history (pp. ix-xlv). The abbreviations are concealed on page xlv. It should be noted further that repetition has been generally (and wisely) avoided, so that titles bearing, for instance, on the Athenian constitution appear in several places, and a scholar who wishes to learn about it in the Fourth Century should consult not only pp. 358-62, but also xxix-xxxii, and besides 120-9, 196, 230-40, 282, 306-7, and 308-9. The index, pp. 663-81, will help, in conjunction with the table of contents, pp. 683-95.

Distinguished already as the devoted but by no means slavish

(p. xxx) pupil and collaborator of Gustave Glotz, M. Robert Cohen had the courage to tackle two or three other jobs of comparable magnitude simultaneously. One can only wish that with unimpaired fortitude he may soon carry through the contemplated third edition of *La Grèce* (p. vii); and that in doing so he may make the whole body of *Notes* into a thinner separate volume, easily opened, and legibly printed from revised, up-to-date copy. Just as several scholars, Cloché particularly, helped on this present edition (p. vii), so there are many others now who would be pleased to express gratitude by assistance. Only a third edition could make the second cease to be indispensable.

Note. After the above was in proof I learned with regret that Cohen died in 1941. He held the post of *professeur* at the Lycée Henri-IV, and was a son-in-law of Glotz.

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EIRIK VANDVIK. *Genetivus und Ablativus Qualitatis*. Oslo, Jacob Dybwad, 1942. Pp. 115.

Descriptive grammars of Latin are accustomed to recognize a difference between the genitive and ablative of description, or quality, in the sense that the former is used of permanent, innate characteristics and the latter of conditions which are usually of a more temporary nature (cf., for example, Kühner-Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache* [Hannover, 1912], pp. 454 ff.).

The monograph under consideration aims to define more precisely the usage of the two constructions in question, to explain deviations from normal usage, and to compare the practice followed by a rather wide range of authors, including not only most of those of the Republican Period but also Livy and several authors of the Silver Age, especially Tacitus.

Careful prose-writers of the Republic, according to evidence summarized on page 60, observe the conventional usage for expressions of innate quality or character: if the expression is predicative, the ablative is used, but if it is adnominal, the genitive is used, with exceptions allowed in either case if departure from normal practice is necessary in order to preserve clearness of sense or concinnity among coördinated word-groups. The use of the genitive, however, is further restricted by a tendency to avoid its application among nouns and adjectives of the third and fourth declensions. The reason is an attempt to avoid endings in -s, which were disagreeable to the ear of Cicero, as they were to that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The genitive of words of the fifth declension seems also to have been in disfavor, though presumably not for the same reason. Some readers may perhaps find the portion of the book dealing with euphony unconvincing and prefer a different explanation for the preponderance of second-declension words in the genitive of quality. Bennett,¹ II, pp. 93 ff., follows the doctrine of Wackernagel,

¹ *Syntax of Early Latin* (Boston, 1914).

Mélanges de Saussure, pp. 135 f., in regarding the designation of quality as an old inherited function of the Italo-Celtic *i*-genitive. It should be observed, however, that in the present connection Bennett is dealing chiefly with expressions of the type *flocci facio* rather than with the adnominal genitive of quality. In any case Vandvik seems to have proved his point where Cicero is concerned (pp. 28 ff.). Whether we are to assume that Sallust, Caesar, and Nepos also adhered to the same practice is not entirely clear, though the brief summary of facts on page 35 is evidently intended to include them. Unfortunately their works are so limited in extent that statistical method cannot be applied to them with nearly the same hope of success as in the case of Cicero.

Parallel with the careful practice observed by the educated prose-writers of the Republic, there were two other traditions which made their influence felt in the prose of even good writers in the Empire. One was the careless speech of the uneducated masses, said to be reflected in the works of the "Continuators of Caesar," the authors of the Alexandrian, Spanish, and African Wars. The other factor was Republican and Augustan poetry, where normal syntactical usage is frequently sacrificed for metrical reasons. The careful writers of the Republic, however, are also held partly responsible for the breakdown of the old case-distinction, because they sometimes allowed stylistic considerations to influence their case-usage. The "Second Group," in which the author includes the Continuators of Caesar, Cicero's correspondents, Livy, and most writers of the Silver Age, was characterized by an increased use of the genitive where old usage called for the ablative, and also by disregard for Cicero's habit of avoiding third and fourth-declension genitives. Tacitus shows a partial reversion to Ciceronian practice and observes concinnity to an extent which is surprising in view of his usual avoidance of it.

The monograph is excellently organized and extremely useful as a detailed analysis of a phase of syntax which is touched only very lightly in the familiar grammars. The range is wide enough to cover all the prose-writers of the first rank, and the evolution from early Latin to Tacitus is well illustrated in several statistical tables. Considerable space is also devoted to the case-usage for particular words or word-classes expressing qualities (pp. 64 ff.).

On page 65 the passage quoted from Livy 6, 42, 4 should read: . . . *obsidionem, tardi magis rem exitus quam dubii* . . . On page 92 the reference to Nepos 12, 3, 1 should be cited as 11, 3, 1.

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LUIGI M. UGOLINI. *L'Acropoli di Butrinto*. Rome, Scialia—Editore, 1942. Pp. xv + 291; 248 figs.; 25 pls. Lire 300 in 1942. (*Albania Antica*, III.)

Butrinto was the Venetian name for the site of Buthrotum or Buthrotos, on the mainland opposite the northern bulge of Corfu.

Protinus aerias Phaeacum abscondimus arces
 Litoraue Epiri legimus portuque subimus
 Chaonio et celsam Buthroti accedimus urbem.

The site achieved importance early as a market for the Corcyraeans. In Hellenistic and Roman times it constituted the main port of the Epirote coastal plain and a starting point for the journey to Dodona.

The Italian excavations of Buthrotum were directed by Luigi M. Ugolini from 1928 until his death in an airplane accident at the end of 1936. The results were to be published in three volumes of *Albania Antica*: one installment devoted to the Acropolis walls, the fountain of Junia Rufina, the Roman a \acute ula, the nymphaeum, and the sanctuary of Asclepius; a second devoted to the theatre; and a third devoted to the baptistry and minor excavations. G. Q. Giglioli saw the first installment through the press in 1942, six years after the author's death, but the other two installments had not yet reached the printer by the summer of 1944. The one published installment, *L'Acropoli di Butrinto*, constitutes the third volume of a series in which the second volume, concerning the Acropolis of Phoenice, appeared in 1932.

Buthrotum is mentioned by Hecataeus, but the archaeological evidence on its early history is not yet clear. Traces of two as yet undefined periods precede that part of the walls dated by Ugolini to the end of the fifth or beginning of the fourth century B. C., while he assigns other sections to the fourth and third centuries and to later periods. These fourth century and Hellenistic walls are the most impressive ancient fortifications on Albanian soil after those of Phoenice. Buthrotum and the Chaones of course belonged to the Epirote kingdom. An inscription, which Ugolini assigns, without explanation but perhaps on the basis of the lettering, to the second half of the third century B. C. and which might have been engraved even in the second century, is dated by the president (*προστάρας*) of the Chaones and by the priest of Asclepius.

Sometime in the second century the Prasaebi replace the Chaones in control of Buthrotum, where the inscriptions are now dated by both the general and president (*προστάρας*) of the Prasaebi, and, in one case, by the priest of Zeus Soter as well. The author, who perhaps intended to discuss the problem elsewhere, offers no suggestion as to the occasion and manner of this important change. The reviewer believes that the change came about as a result of the Roman reaction to the nefarious behavior of the Chaones during the ascendancy of Charops, the most bestial and brutal man of whom Polybius had ever heard. Without knowledge of the development at Buthrotum H. H. Scullard, "Charops and Roman Policy in Epirus," *J. R. S.*, XXXV (1945), pp. 58-64, has indicated the strong probability that Charops belonged to the tribe of the Chaones and that the extraordinary Roman brutality, which fell, as Polybius says, chiefly on the Molossians and which effected the destruction of some seventy centers of inhabitation and the enslavement of 150,000 Epirotes, was incited by Charops for the sake of eliminating the ancient rivals of the Chaones. The indignant reaction of Aemilius Paullus and of the pontifex maximus Aemilius Lepidus and, pre-

sumably, of other Roman leaders must have struck the Chaones shortly after the death of Charops in 157 B. C. The Romans now ruled a more divided Epirus. The Molossians had been in large part extirpated, and the Chaones lost at least the chief Epirote port and the revenues therefrom. Possession of the main coastal town by a weak tribe assured the Romans easy access to the country and a control more rapidly assertible.

Ugolini cites Stephen of Byzantium to show that the Prasaebi were a Thesprotian tribe. The reviewer, furthermore, identifies them with the Perrhaebi *quorum mons Pindus* of Pliny (*N. H.*, IV, 1, 2), with the Epirote Perrhaebi of Strabo (IX, 5, 12), with the Perrhaebi to whom Appian (*Illyrica*, 2) assigns an Illyrian origin, and with the Perhaebi who are mentioned in the *Iliad* (II, 749-50) as dwelling about Dodona, where the Molossians appear to have supplanted them. Since the month *Kάρπειος* appears in a decree of the Prasaebi (Ugolini, p. 207) as *Κράπειος*, the reviewer believes that the name *Πράσαιβοι* can be equated with a form **Παρσαιβοι* = *Πεπραιβοι*. Published at Buthrotum, the proxeny decree of the Council and Assembly of the Prasaebi in favor of a Coreyraean extends to him privileges *ἐν Πρασαιβίᾳ*.

After the civil war Julius Caesar settled some of his veterans here and Buthrotum became a colony. Subsequently both Greek and Latin inscriptions occur with the Greek predominating by the second century. The one official document, an honorary inscription, belongs apparently to the late second or early third century after Christ, and it is composed in Greek.

Along with the inscriptions from the Acropolis of Buthrotum Ugolini publishes on page 214 a document found near Phoenice in 1930. It is edited as follows:

Q. Trebonius ----
 dec(urio) Buthrot(i) m ----
 Annal. incol. f[a ----
 Iunia A(uli) l(iberta) Amm[ia ----
 5 [d]e suo fece[runt]

Ugolini dates the document correctly to the first century of the principate. In regard to line 3 he writes: "La formula *annal. incol.* si riferisce evidentemente a qualche aspetto dell' *incolatus*; se qui, come sembra, si tratta di *annalis incola*, è un' espressione di tutta nuova." However, the excellent photograph reveals not *fa* but *ea*. Hence I restore *m[ag(ister)] | annal(is) in col(onia) ea[dem]*. If two letters only are missing at the end of line 2, then two letters only are missing at the end of line 1, where a phrase like *Q. f.* may be postulated. This style without the cognomen is quite possible in the first century of the principate.

In line 5 the last complete letter is I, not E, and after it appears the horizontal bar of a T. The inscription may be re-edited:

Q. Trebonius [. .],
 dec. Buthrot., m[ag.]
 annal. in col. ea[dem].
 Iunia A. l. Amm[ia]

ruined the harbor sites of Paestum, Selinus, and perhaps even Agrigentum, just as subsidence has affected the area of Buthrotum, Sybaris, and Metapontum.

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INGEMAR DÜRING. Aristotle's *De Partibus Animalium*: Critical and Literary Commentaries. Göteborg, Wettergren and Kerbers Förlag, 1943. Pp. 223. Kr. 10. (*Göteborgs kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhälles Handlingar*, Sjätte Följden, Ser. A, Band 2, No. 1.)

In this useful and pioneer edition there are three preliminary discussions: 1. Structure and growth of the lectures *On the Parts of Animals*; 2. The manuscript tradition; 3. The Y-recension. Then follows the commentary, including a revised text of 691b 28-695a 28, from which the too sophisticated influence of Y is eliminated. There are three brief indexes: subject matter, language, and passages discussed.

In a full discussion of Aristotle's biological works the author deduces that there were three successive courses of lectures. *De Part. An.* II-IV with its emphasis on function rather than on structure appears first in the second course. The first book was written later and served to introduce the third course, which was delivered at Athens soon after 335 B. C. It comprised *Hist. An.*, *De Part. An.* II-IV, *De Incessu*, *De Anima*, *De Motu An.*, *Parva Naturalia*, *De Gener. An.* The argument is detailed and includes a complete list of references in *De Part. An.* to other works of Aristotle and a partial list of references to *De Part. An.* With regard to the text the author's most novel conclusion, which I find justified, is that Y in many places offers a paraphrase rather than a copy of the work. She gives long lists of concordances and disagreements between manuscripts and lists of emendations, including fifteen of her own. She rejects most other proposed emendations including all but seven of Peck's approximately 150. She gives a stemma, but agrees that manuscripts were provided with variant readings and were corrected from each other, so that in practice the editor must be an eclectic. The Commentary of Michael of Ephesus is equivalent to another manuscript in many respects. No help is derived from scholia. One reading is taken from the Latin translation of William of Moorbeke. The unpublished Arabic version and Michael Scot's unpublished Latin translation of it have so far hardly been used.

It would be easier to trace the relations of manuscripts if the author had been able to carry out her original intention of making new collations and publishing a complete critical text. Her argument that E derives from a papyrus with twelve letters to the line seems to me unproved. Homoeoteleuton vitiates any such conclusion. In any case all the contents of a manuscript should be considered together, not merely a single work.

The commentary will be indispensable to future editors, since it provides in most cases decisive evidence in favor of the tradition, often making points that editors and translators have missed. She has caught two mistaken accents that were becoming traditional. Her emendations, however, are probably no more final than those of others. The statement that in one sense (so Peck) a part of a blood-vessel is a blood-vessel at 647b 18 is confirmed by 654b 2-4, where we read that all blood-vessels are but parts of a single blood-vessel. At 694a 23 *θερμόν* for *ἐξορμον* is most unpalatable. Uncials will not explain the xi. Sophocles uses *ἄφορμος*, which is a good parallel; and in the *Meteorologica* we find *ἐξω δρμών*, which would be a plausible emendation, if any were needed. At 650a 6 it would be easier to read *καὶ ταύτην <πολλήν> ὥσπερ κτλ.* At 661a 4 the same result may be got by taking *ἐστὶν ἡ (ἡ MSS) αἰσθεσις* as standing by incorporation and attraction for *ἐντα αἰσθεσις ἐστὶν, ἡν.* At 696a 29 I differ from her and Peck both: "for the flat part does not hinder their movement there." At 693a 12-14 the correct translation provides convincing evidence in favor of her treatment of the text: "For such a (hooked) beak is useful for domination and essential for feeding on animals." The mistake of Cicero in taking for Aristotle's the work that he translated in his *Topica* explains the statement of his about style that puzzles the author.

While much remains to be done, a good foundation has been established by this commentary. It is, as the author says, a torso. Let us hope that she will soon be able to continue her study of the manuscripts. Above all we may be grateful that she writes in English, not in Swedish. Naturally there are many slips in the English, but they are seldom or never fatal to understanding. The Greek is almost free from misprints. I liked the remark that those are most scornful of medieval Greek scholars who have least acquaintance with them.

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PIERRE CHANTRAINE. *Grammaire homérique (phonétique et morphologie)*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1942. Pp. 526. (*Collection de philologie classique*, I.)

The scholars of France worked industriously at their scholarly tasks during the German occupation; scholarship was for them pretty nearly the only safe career at that time, for the French universities were, as one correspondent writes, centers of the underground resistance. Many of my friends, I hear, were imprisoned for shorter or longer periods; but the vast majority have come through with their lives at least.

Among those who were ever active at their studies is the author of this volume, which represents the fruits of years of hard work. As I read it through attentively, it seems as if no linguistic problem of the Homeric poems is left untouched, and as if all the previous studies, countless as they are (p. 3), had been digested and utilized. The volume is divided into 43 chapters, on the following subjects: I, orthography; II-XIII, phonology; XIV-XV, aspiration and ac-

centuation; XV-XXI, morphology of nouns, adverbs, adjectives, pronouns; XXII-XXXII, the present stems of verbs; XXXIII-XXXVI, the aorists; XXXVII, the perfect: XXXVIII, the future; XXXIX, the modes; XL, the personal endings; XLI, the augment; XLII, the infinitives; XLIII, use of the particles *ἀν* and *καί*. An index (pp. 503-23) lists about 3500 words and passages discussed in the text.

But such an index does not give an idea of the meticulous detail of the work: there must be at least five times as many words and passages cited in the text as are listed in the index. It would be hard to find any omission of word or form that is troublesome to the scholar. Thus two chapters, comprising pages 116 to 164, are devoted to the digamma, the first to the initial digamma, the second to the vocalization of the digamma. His summary of conclusions on the initial digamma (p. 157) is typical of conclusions on other problems as well; I translate and condense slightly: "The initial digamma existed in the oldest epic formulas (Aeolic), but when the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were formed it made itself felt in the metrics only by tradition. Thus inside the old formulas the digamma was preserved by the metrics, even in sections of later composition; and in most of the poems, forms with digamma and forms without digamma stand in close neighborhood. Even in the old formulas the text has often been modernized, as by the insertion of a particle or a change in a declensional ending, to compensate for an unappreciated digamma. But it is quite impossible to restore systematically the digamma in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and the philologists who attempt this restoration give an inexact picture of the text and of the language."

A few special points may be noted. Page 7: The doctrine that in the oldest written Greek a repeated vowel (i. e., representing two syllables) may be written but once, is current among French scholars, but I have never found or seen any evidence in its favor. When consonants are thus reduced, and they were so reduced, there is no reduction of the obvious number of syllables. Page 25: The *υ* of Aeolic (and of some other dialects) for the *ο* of general Greek may rest upon a pre-Greek reduced *ο* (sometimes represented by *Ϝ*, as *shwa tertium*), with extensions: cf. also *νύξ νυκτός* and Latin *nox noctis*, with accented *ο* of the nominative generalized in Latin, and unaccented *Ϝ* of genitive and dative generalized in Greek.

Page 33: Can it not be possible that at the outset the long syllable of the arsis could be replaced by two shorts, as in iambs? Then such contractions as *ὑψίκερων* for *ὑψικέρα[ρ]ον* would have been unnecessary, and could be late innovations to meet the later requirement of no resolutions. Page 71, line 14: *μεμνέωτο* does not occur in Ψ 323, but in Ψ 361. But the misprints are not commonly confusing, though the lack of a comma after *ῥαορίστε* in § 186, line 3, makes the sentence hard to understand. Page 99 inf.: *εἰν* before a vowel may stand not for *ἐν* with lengthening, but for its alternative *ἐνί > ἐνι > εἰν*. Page 114, line 26: It must be an inadvertence that *πίοντες* is said to be used at end of the verse. Page 114, line 34: Latin *fera* has *e*, not *ē*. Page 159 med.: *ἀνέρυσαν* for the impossible **ἀνέρυσαν* is not merely an instance of vocalizing the digamma, but of assimilation in **ἀν-φέρυσαν* to *ἀφφέ-*, whence *αὔε-*. But where *-νφ-* is not a product

of composition, the nasal remains, as in *κατὰνεται* (misprinted *κατὰνεται*, page 161, line 19). Page 212: on *ἰχώρ ἰχώ*, cf. now Bolling, *Lang.*, XXI (1945), pp. 49-54. Page 406: Chantraine demonstrates the correctness of his conclusion that the aorist in *-θην* is a new development, replacing more frequently athematic aorists, but sometimes sigmatic aorists. As he has shown in other studies, the Greek verb has gone an astonishing distance from its Proto-Indo-European antecedents. Page 418 inf.: Aorist 3d pl. *ἔξον* might be explained as a contamination of imperfect *ἔκον* and aorist **ἔξαν*. Page 497, note 2: In *Ω* 417, where Chantraine expects *φανήη* but the manuscripts, he says, have *φανείη*, Mazon's Budé edition of 1938 has *φανήη* on the authority of two papyri, and I find *φανήη* also in G. Hermann's edition of 1827.

Chantraine's volume—as those who are acquainted with his previous work will know without being told—is a credit to its author and to French scholarship, and at once receives a permanent and honorable place in the essential literature of Homeric studies.

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Mémoire des Études latines, publié à l'occasion du vingtième anniversaire de la Société et de la Revue des Études latines; offert par la Société à son fondateur J. Marouzeau. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1943. Pp. 688.

Jules Marouzeau is well known in this country as an outstanding exponent of sound classical scholarship in all its aspects. It was to promote such studies that in 1923 he founded the Société des Études latines and established its *Revue*, of which one volume has been issued for every subsequent year, even for those of the German occupation—except that the volumes for 1943 and 1944 were combined into one publication (pp. 314: issued in 1945). To celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the society and of its review, Marouzeau planned that a special volume should be issued containing a balance sheet of scholarly results and a programme for future activities. But the Society took over the project and with J. Cousin as general editor brought out the volume as a well deserved tribute to Marouzeau himself. It was presented to him in a private ceremony at the Sorbonne, on December 19, 1943.

The original plan was followed. Each article is a summary of the progress of the last twenty years in some special field, with indication of problems still awaiting solution. There are thirty-seven articles, grouped under the headings linguistics and philology, literary history, historical and auxiliary sciences, teaching and documentation—a distribution which corresponds to the wide range of Marouzeau's own interests and publications. Each article deserves careful study; it is in fact a little monograph, with rich references to the recent literature. The most considerable of these, by far, is that by Ch. Picard of the Sorbonne, on the arts of ancient Italy; it extends from page 500 to page 605, and with a full review of

studies in this large field is devoted to showing that the arts of Italy were not a mere imitation of the arts of Greece. An unusual feature is that the article on Latin stylistics (pp. 104-116) consists of extracts from Marouzeau's own writings; as he was the foremost worker in this rather elusive field, it was felt that it could be better represented in this way than by entrusting it to another scholar.

I might, I suppose, give a critique of a selection of the articles in the volume; but I should doubtless select those which interest me rather than those which will interest the readers of this review. I therefore prefer to say something of him whom the volume honors.

Marouzeau has always been interested in investigations whose results shall advance man's knowledge of the field concerned. Under his influence his *Revue* has made a practice of suggesting topics which deserve further study, and every five years it carried an index of these topics. The present *Mémorial*, originally planned as volume XXI of the *Revue des Études latines*, carries an index of these topics in the whole twenty volumes (amounting to 293 items with 385 references. Truly those who say that there is nothing more to do in the classics should peruse this exhibit, which applies to Latin alone!

But Marouzeau is not merely a scholar. Those who have the volume should look at the photograph which serves as frontispiece; if he does not appreciate the human qualities which are there revealed, he is blind indeed. For I have seldom seen a more expressive representation. In it I can see why Marouzeau is so beloved by his students—not merely admired, but beloved. In 1932 I was with him at Nîmes, at the first international meeting of the Association Guillaume Budé: he came there from Paris with about twenty-five young men and women, his students and the students of his immediate colleagues. He treated them as though they were younger members of his own family, and they loved it. I saw much of him and them at this time, and noted not merely their respectful affection for him, but also their exemplary behavior toward one another. The whole picture is a very happy memory to me.

That the *Mémorial* should appear as a tribute to the founder of the journal, is, as I have said, most fitting. Those who have written for it represent the Sorbonne and the other important foundations in Paris, and ten of the provincial universities, with a scattering from other institutions and places. But in the authorship there was a great gap: the German occupation prevented the participation of foreign scholars, with two exceptions. Therefore, to mark the international character of Marouzeau's influence and reputation, there is now in preparation a volume, the contributors to be non-French, under the editorship of Dr. Juliette Ernst of Bâle (52, Rüttimeyerstrasse), who is well known in the United States; the other members of the sponsoring committee are C. J. Fordyce, N. I. Herescu, J. Hubaux, R. G. Kent, E. Löfstedt, A. Rostagni. American scholars will be among the contributors, as is right, for Marouzeau has twice come to our country as visiting professor. We trust that this volume also may be a worthy offering to Jules Marouzeau.

ROLAND G. KENT.

DAG NORBERG. "Faire faire quelque chose à quelqu'un." Recherches sur l'origine latine de la construction romane. Uppsala, 1943. Pp. 106.

In this study which, as the title indicates, is mainly concerned with the construction: "indirect object with *faire* + infinitive," Dr. Norberg begins by considering the general problem represented by the use of the dative as logical subject of the predicate infinitive, which is to be found also with verbs of the meaning "*laisser*," "*voir*," "*entendre*." The first part of the work is given up to a discussion of the theory of M. H. F. Muller (the preceding theories of Tobler and Mlle Richter are dismissed in a few lines), who would trace such a sentence as *je vis écrire une lettre à Jean* to *vidi epistulam ad Iohannem scribere* (<*vidi epistulam Iohanni scribi*). Since Muller's theory has been accepted by many distinguished scholars, Norberg proceeds to investigate at length the two problems of Latin syntax which this involves: the dative of agent, and the use of an active infinitive with passive meaning.

As concerns the Latin dative of agent, it is well known that this was limited originally (Ennius, Plautus) to personal pronouns in combination with the perfect and (above all) the gerundival participles (*edepol me uxori exoptatum credo adventurum domum; scio . . . tibi uxorem ducendam iam*;¹ by the time of Cicero, however, we can find it with nouns, in combination with finite verbs (*sic dissimillimis bestiolis communiter cibus quaeritur*), and it is the belief of Muller that this unrestricted use of the dative of agent was, already in classical times, a favorite colloquial construction which came to appear more and more frequently with late writers (from whom he offers many citations). But Norberg shows that most of the late writers quoted by Muller were poets (or prose writers influenced by poetic style), who were fond of exploiting and exaggerating archaic patterns (and were also susceptible to Greek influence); in works of a genuinely popular nature (*Cena Trim.*, *Mulo-medica*, *Peregrinatio*) he has found the dative of agent to be almost non-existent. It is Norberg's contention that this construction, though found with Plautus, had ceased to be popular by the time of the Empire: while the *dativus commodi*, which is the source of the dative of agent, had, undoubtedly, a popular appeal (as is shown by its substitution, in late Latin, for the possessive genitive—though only with human beings), this same emotional appeal (reinforced, in popular language, by the restriction to personal pronouns) was largely based on its use with the gerundival (less so with the perfect) participle (*tibi hoc faciendum est* = "here's a job for you" vs. ". . . something to be done by you"), so that the loss of this participle in popular speech—a loss which is commonly conceded—would necessarily entail the dwindling of the dative of agent. Perhaps it would be possible to interpret Norberg's theory by saying that the popular language never possessed a distinct dative of agent (as illustrated by *Vergilio Caudinus acerbo Laus Amano sternitur*: Silius, XVII, 441), but only a dative of interest (or reference): *scio*

¹ All the Latin examples are taken from Norberg.

equidem sponsam tibi . . . et tibi uxorem ducendam iam = "she is betrothed to you and marriageable for you"; *edepol me uxori exoptatum credo adventurum domum* = "my home-coming is desirable in the eyes of my wife."

After having discredited the theory of the dative of agent, Norberg turns next to the so-called passive use of the active infinitive which, according to Muller, came about (in very late Latin) by phonetic causes, as the final syllables of *-āri*, *-ēri*, *-īri* became confused in pronunciation with those of *-āre*, *-ēre*, *-īre* (since the passive infinitive of the third conjugation was better protected, the use of *-ēre* in a passive meaning was, supposedly, found at a relatively later date). While Norberg agrees that, in some cases, one must count with the development described by Muller (cf. "quicquid dici aut nominare potest"), he points out that many of the examples cited by the latter depend upon the verbs *iubere* and *facere* (*Iube ergo te deportare ad locum . . .*; *omnes Gothos ad christianam legem baptizare fecit*); then, isolating the type *iubeo* (*facio*) *domum aedificare*, he proceeds to show that in this type, which is not limited to late Latin but already appears with Plautus (*iube oculos elidere*), we have to do with an active use of the infinitive—exactly as in *iubeo te oculos elidere*. In the example from Plautus the object of *iubeo* is omitted because it is given by the immediate situation; more frequently, its omission is to be explained by the indefinite (but obvious) reference: *militēs, servos, homines* (*hortum confodere iussi*); in addition to *iubere* we find, in the same "active" construction, many other verbs of commanding, permitting, prohibiting, including not only *imperare, sinere, vetare, prohibere*, but also *facere*, which came to be used, in late Latin, as a synonym of *iubere*.

Having lined up the verb *facere* (with which, obviously, we are most concerned for our French construction) with the verbs of commanding, etc., and having shown thereby the possibility of an active interpretation of the predicate infinitive (this seems to have been already conceded by grammarians for *iubere*, etc.), Norberg then takes up the problem of the dative represented in the type *facio alicui facere aliquod*. And, here again, it is the development of (the type) *iubere* which provides the clue: since, of the many verbs of commanding, etc., some took the accusative, others the dative, a confusion arose as a consequence of which we find, for example, *mandare, dare* with acc., and *iubere* (*pati, sinere*) with dative. Before the period of the Empire, the only examples of *iubere* + dat. cum inf. are to be found in two passages, one from Catullus (*non haec miserae sperare iubebas*) and one from Cicero (*quamquam hae mihi litterae Dolabellae iubent ad pristinas cogitationes reverti*), which many editors have sought to emend but which Norberg thinks should be kept intact, in view of the increase of this construction in later periods. Because of this development with *iubere*, it is not surprising if we find (though not before the sixth century) the same construction with *facere* (. . . *ut faciam ei . . . invenire mercedem*).

Thus the way is prepared for such OF examples with the dative (Norberg also gives similar examples from Portuguese, Provençal, and Italian) as *L'une fist prandre a deus puceles . . . and arriver*

lur fait a terre (not to mention the type with the accusative: *Voldrent la faire diavle servir: St. Eul.*; Norberg has, perhaps, not stressed enough the hardy survival of *facere* + *acc. cum inf.*). It remained only to restrict the use of the dative to cases in which the predicate infinitive is transitive, and the use of the accusative to cases in which it is intransitive, to give us the modern French system.

As for the indirect object after *laisser*, this should go back to a *lazare* + *dative*; Norberg gives no example of this but it is obvious that, since *lazare*, after losing its concrete meaning, came to supplant *sinere* in Romance, it would follow the development of the latter. Again, given the influence of *faire* and *laisser* in OF, the dative after *voir* and *entendre* + *inf.* may be explained by analogy.

Norberg concludes with a consideration of the French type (already found in OF) *Ce refus le faisait plaindre en secret par elle*. Muller had appealed to such French examples as proof that the construction goes back to a Latin passive. Norberg, while denying such an origin, does consider the possibility that the infinitive after *faire* had begun to have, by the time of OF, a passive emphasis; and, though he questions the degree of this (secondary) emphasis, he nevertheless points out certain factors which might encourage the development of a passive interpretation—particularly, the original “doublesidedness” of the infinitive of purpose, which flourished anew in late Latin and OF and is still to be found today (*une maison à vendre*). In my opinion, this final section is weak and confused; the infinitive after *faire* is no infinitive of purpose (nor is there a “passive” reference in *une maison à vendre: vendre* is simply a verbal noun = “sale”). I see no reason to assume any alteration of the original active force of *facere aedificare domum*, in which *facere* is simply used absolutely: “to make [the proper agent] build a house,” i. e. “to see to the building of a house”—and to which *per* could be added, already in Latin, in order to introduce, as an afterthought, the intermediary.

It is unfortunate that Norberg, who proved so convincingly the active origin of our construction in late Latin, in which field he is an expert, allowed himself to become influenced by Muller’s interpretation (and even by Plattner’s grammar), when he came to the period of French. But this final vacillation is not important, in the light of what Norberg has achieved: he has exploded two false conceptions about late Latin syntax which had been generally accepted, and he has offered the first convincing explanation of Fr. *faire faire qqch. à qqn*. And this last he was able to do by making one simple, brilliant move: by bringing *facere* in line with *iubere*. Just as one may dispel the darkness of a closet by opening the door into a lighted room, so Norberg has allowed the light from *iubere* + *inf.* to shine upon *facere* + *inf.* And the obscurity that once surrounded the latter construction is simply and incontrovertibly made to disappear.

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SOME WAR-TIME PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING PLATO.

I.

The editor of the *American Journal of Philology* has invited me to put into a single article an account of some books dealing with Plato which, though published at different times during the last seven years, have because of the turmoil and the exigencies of this period either reached the Journal only recently or failed to receive earlier notice in its pages.¹ I wish to express my gratitude for the opportunity thus given me to present a critique of a number of modern works in this field. At the same time it is only fair to warn the reader that it is not my intention and is not within my competence to give a full report or even a bibliography of all the Platonic scholarship done during the war.

Joseph Moreau's two complementary theses appeared on the eve of the war.² In the larger of these, *La Construction de*

¹ Several important books on Plato published during this period have already been reviewed in this Journal: J. B. Skemp's *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXV [1944], pp. 298 ff.), F. Solmsen's *Plato's Theology* (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXVI [1945], pp. 92 ff.), and R. Hackforth's *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (cf. *A. J. P.*, LXVII [1946], pp. 378 ff.).

² Joseph Moreau, *La Construction de l'Idéalisme Platonicien* (Paris, Bovin et Cie., 1939), pp. 515; *idem*, *L'Ame du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1939), pp. 200. The former will hereafter be referred to as *La Construction*, the latter as *L'Ame du Monde*.

l'Idéalisme Platonicien, the author is concerned with the early dialogues and with the *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*,³ his purpose being "to seek in the teleology of the Socratic dialogues the origin and meaning of Platonic idealism" (p. 25). That this origin was reflection on the moral problems raised by Socrates and not on the conditions of mathematical knowledge is shown, he believes, by the very order of the dialogues, for the use of the dialogue-form guarantees that the exposition, even if not contemporaneous with the discovery, represents the evolution of Platonic thought as Plato himself saw it or wished others to see it,⁴ so that we have here the unique case of a doctrine the exposition of which is equivalent to an intellectual autobiography (pp. 21-9).⁵ Accordingly Moreau devotes his first three chapters, entitled "the problem of education," "technique and practice," and "practical reflection," primarily to an analysis of the *Protagoras*, *Charmides*, *Hippias Minor*, and *Gorgias*, drawing in the *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, *Laches*, and *Republic I* as supplementary to the main current of his interpretation.⁶ It is in the

³ The *Phaedo* he inclines to put later than the *Republic*, certainly later than *Republic II-IV* and *X* and in the same period as *V-VII* (p. 26). His reason, as it later appears (pp. 259, 395-6, 415-16), is his interpretation of the final argument in the *Phaedo*, in which he thinks it possible to find his own conception of idealism, as the most profound expression of Plato's psychology.

⁴ These two possibilities are quite different, though Moreau takes no account of that. It is quite possible that what Plato considered the best way of leading others to his conclusions was not the way in which he first came to them himself. The so-called "intellectual autobiography" of Socrates in the *Phaedo* would be a case in point if, as Moreau apparently believes (pp. 18-20; p. 22, n. 1), it is not meant to be historical.

⁵ This does not mean that Moreau subscribes to an "Entwicklung der platonischen Philosophie" in the usual modern sense of the phrase. He maintains that it was from the beginning "oriented towards a doctrine of finality" (p. 21); he denies that the criticism of the ideas in the *Parmenides* represents the beginning of a new orientation of Plato's thought (p. 471); and he adopts (p. 472) the interpretation of "the friends of the ideas" in *Sophist* 248 A that Ritter proposed in his *Neue Untersuchungen*. Similarly he denies any "evolution in the moral thought of Plato" from the *Protagoras* to the *Republic* (pp. 89-90).

⁶ Some of the specific conclusions of these chapters are the following. Pp. 90-92: The *Protagoras* is a pedagogical artifice by which Plato opposes to the popular conscience two notions which he does not himself

fourth chapter, however, "Finality and Hierarchy," that the meaning of Platonic idealism as Moreau conceives it first clearly emerges. Having brought the *Menō* and the *Lysis* into conjunction with the *Euthydemus* (278 E-282 E and 288 D-293 A) to show that all three seek to establish a notion of absolute good which is intelligence, all other "goods" being only ambiguous means, and having concluded that similarly to the reasoning of Kant the Socratic dialogues show that "the Good, the object of moral volition, can be defined only by the pure form of rational activity" (p. 188), he contends that in *Republic* I the value of justice or morality is established in accord with the *Euthydemus* by analogy with techniques, of which it contains the form but the form in a pure state (p. 194). Arguing then that no technique is a pure form, since each is attached to a material by which it is specifically defined, he arrives at the notion of a "hierarchy of techniques" (p. 194) and from this derives a "hierarchy of forms, each of which can be defined only by that which is immediately superior to it" (pp. 197-8). This conclusion Moreau reaches by using "form" in an ambiguous sense⁷ and by employing the Aristotelian notion of matter as the potentiality of opposites (pp. 198-200).

accept and wherein Socrates indicates where the liberation of the intelligence ends if, rejecting external norms, it is incapable of discovering any within itself. P. 108: The purpose of the *Hippias Minor* is to overthrow the ambition of a teaching that lays claim to universality but lacks knowledge of the ends to which man's activity should be directed; at the same time it shows that, if virtue is science, it is nevertheless radically different from the technical sciences or arts. Pp. 129-33: The *Charmides* opposes an inadequate interpretation of Socrates who, the dialogue suggests, meant that true wisdom consists in the knowledge of good and evil, which implies the knowledge of our rational nature. Pp. 149-50: The *Gorgias* has as its foundation an analysis of the will which establishes two fundamental propositions: 1) every act of will implies search for a supreme end to which an absolute value is given, and 2) every voluntary activity is characterized by an adaptation of means, the subordination of the parts to the whole of the work realized.

⁷ It is true that a tool, e.g. a lyre or a halter, can be judged good or bad only by the one who uses it, not by the artisan who makes it; but this does not mean that the idea of the tool and the idea of the art constitute an ontological hierarchy and certainly not that one idea is less determinate, that is more material (p. 198!), than another. And where does Plato speak of "the pure form of rational activity"? Or what could this mean to him for whom reason is just the state in the soul produced by its vision of the ideas (*Republic* 508 B-D)?

This notion of a hierarchy of ideas, derived from the idea of good or rather the systematic representation of it, is an essential characteristic of the "idealism" which Moreau constructs and in the subsequent chapters, "The System of Morality," "Love," "The Ideas," "Soul," and "The Good," seeks to vindicate to Plato. Like all modern idealism it traces being back to knowledge; but, as it is not merely nominalistic, it claims to go beyond essence to existence, that is to absolute and categorical truth, which (since idealism recognizes no existence in itself) can be only a requirement of the practical reason, and this is why it makes the idea of good the principle which communicates truth and reality to essences of all kinds (p. 388). So the ideas cannot be independent realities, for that would make Plato's doctrine "naïf realism" and not "idealism" at all; they are productions of the mind, and that they draw their reality from the Good means that they have their source in pure spiritual activity determining the hierarchy of its ends (p. 464). For idealism the absolute end is not distinguished from the activity of the subject; on the level of reflection the duality of subject and object is thus abolished, but it is not the consciousness that is engulfed in the representation of an object raised to an absolute, on the contrary it is the object that vanishes in the pure transparency of a value, in the interiority of the absolute activity of mind (p. 457). Outside of this pure spirituality there is really no object. The essences draw all their reality from a hierarchical principle which expresses the transcendence of the Good, and the kinship of knower and known only translates at the level of understanding in the duality of subject and object, the transcendental intimacy of pure act and value (p. 461). It suffices therefore for the soul to recover its absolute activity in order to find itself immediately in contact with the absolute essences, and this is evidently because the nature common to the soul and the idea has its principle in pure activity adequate to its own ideal and generative of every real object (p. 462). Properly speaking there is in Platonism no other absolute than that of act and value; the idea of Good, which is the expression of this, is endowed with a motive activity symbolized by the myth of love; the other ideas represent the models elaborated by the mind itself to serve as norms for its own activity, and they express

just as they determine the very life of the spirit in its autonomous progress (p. 474).

Moreau dismisses, of course, as metaphorical formulae (e.g. p. 462) the "realistic language" that Plato uses of the ideas.⁸ Going beyond this, however, he argues (pp. 302-3) that *Republic* 476 E-478 C is proof that τὸ ὄν is just εἶν, not an independent reality but the object of knowledge, since Plato could not have declared *a priori* τὸ παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν (477 A 3) unless he meant simply that the perfection of knowledge is characterized by the perfect determination of its object⁹ and because 478 B 12-C 1 (ἀλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γὰρ οὐχ εἶν τι ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὁρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο) indicates that μὴ ὄν is nothing because it is not a determinate object (εἶν τι), μηδέν being expressly the absence of unity and determination before thought.¹⁰ He contends (pp. 336-7) that in *Republic* 507 C-509 D the representation of subject and object of knowledge as distinct from each other does not imply any realism, because the subject as well as the object is there posited independently of knowledge and they become knowing subject and known object only in the light of knowledge without which intermediary the two terms have only the virtuality of their functions. The question, however, is not whether there is an *actual* object of knowledge apart from a knowing subject but whether the ideas exist apart from being known; and even in the figurative language of this passage it is in the light of the good that they have their being and knowability and not through the fact of being known by a subject any more than the visible objects are "unrealized" apart from their relation with a seeing subject.

⁸ On this question see Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* I (hereafter referred to as *Aristotle on Plato*), pp. 207-11.

⁹ I confess that I cannot see how the Greek could possibly mean this, but in any case it is not an *a priori* declaration. As οὐν shows (477 A 1) it is the conclusion drawn from 476 E 7-11. Moreau should have observed that *Parmenides* 132 B-C starts in the same fashion in order to draw the conclusion that thought implies as object an idea existing outside of the mind.

¹⁰ The μὴ ὄν here is *absolute* non-being, the μὴ ὄν μηδαμῇ of 477 A 3-4 *supra*; and the sentence means simply that absolute non-being would properly be called not any one thing but nothing at all, i.e., as the parallel passages, *Theaetetus* 188 E-189 B and *Sophist* 237 D-E (cf. 238 C) show, that it cannot properly even be spoken of.

As was to be expected, the doctrine of reminiscence is explained as a myth of the same kind as the creation-myth in the *Timaeus* which translates a transcendental relation by means of chronological order (pp. 367, 372); and "participation in an idea" is taken to mean "receiving from the mind a determination *a priori* and consequently mathematical" (p. 384). This last phrase, Moreau thinks, is implied in the example used in *Phaedo* 101 C (ἐν τοῦτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τιὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἄλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν), an interpretation which is very strange in view of the immediately preceding μετασχόν τῆς ιδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστων οὗ ἂν μετάσχη. It is no stranger, however, than the conclusion previously drawn (p. 309) from *Phaedo* 102 B ff., that only the comparatives "greater" and "smaller" which express a relation denote an essence; in this very passage it is said that a person is larger or smaller than another because he participates in the ideas "largeness" and "smallness," which ought to imply that "larger" and "smaller" are *not* ideas (*Phaedo* 102 C 1-9 and 100 E 5-6; cf. Campbell on *Politicus* 283 D and Plotinus, *Enn.*, VI, 1, 8). Nevertheless, Moreau declares that all Platonic ideas are pure relations (pp. 312, 471-2) and then that every idea is in essence number, since numbers constitute proportions or systems defining the absolute essence of a form (pp. 322-5, 347-51).

The soul should then be "a system of mathematical essences conditioning the harmonies of celestial phenomena and of human conduct." Assuming (p. 366) that this has been made out for the world-soul by Robin's mathematical construction,¹¹ Moreau explains away Socrates' refutation of the harmony-theory in the *Phaedo* by saying that it means that soul cannot be the resultant of organic life, because soul is the knowing subject without the activity of which there would be no object of knowledge and consequently no body (p. 372). Socrates opposes then, according to Moreau, only the materialistic doctrine that soul is a harmony of physical elements and not the notion that it is a harmony in another (i. e. idealistic) sense (p. 373). The final argument of the *Phaedo* is interpreted to mean that the idea of

¹¹ The reference in *De Anima* 429 A 27-29 to soul as *τόπος εἰδῶν*, on which Moreau seizes, does not refer to Plato's doctrine at all (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 565); Robin's interpretation of the psychogonia is otherwise erroneous also (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, notes 339 and 366).

life is the system of organization, the activity of which is represented by soul (p. 402) and that "it is the harmony of the Whole that requires the perpetuity of individual souls" or in other words it is the Idea of Good "which guarantees their imperishable existence" (p. 406).

By this time Moreau is using "the One" as a synonym for "the Good" (p. 407).¹² He goes on to identify the truth which is the object of *φρόνησις* in the *Phaedo* with the idea of Beauty in the *Symposium* and this with the idea of Good in the *Republic* (p. 543); and the idea of Good is in the end the idea of the Whole, the autonomous system of relations, the hierarchy of forms, the representation in which the mind determines itself for itself and objectifies its own pure activity (p. 473). This is the *παντελὴς ὄν* of *Sophist* 248 E and *Republic* 477 A and the *παντελὴς ζῶον* of *Timaeus* 31 B, which are, of course, supposed to be the same "idea of the Whole" though in different aspects. Now, each of these many identifications has been suggested many times in the past, and each has been so often refuted that it would be useless to repeat here these refutations point by point.¹³ The modern idealist who desires to read his system into the text of Plato would in any case remain unconvinced; and the unsophisticated philologist who protests that Plato's Greek does not support Moreau's "construction" and often flatly contradicts it will cite texts to no avail against the argument that "only by this resolutely idealistic interpretation do the arguments of the dialogue escape the reproach of puerility" (p. 416).

Philologist or philosopher, however, may wonder how Moreau avoids *Parmenides* 132 B-C which appears to reject "conceptualism" of all kinds. He does not answer the question in his

¹² He refers here to §§ 273-4. If one turns back to these sections, one finds not the expressed identification but two propositions of which it is apparently the unexpressed conclusion. These are: 1) Every idea is a number, being a pure relation, and 2) They possess reality because they answer to an absolutely undeniable obligation, the total unification of activity, because they have for their principle the Good. Presumably then the Good is the One because it is the principle of the ideas, which are numbers!

¹³ On the *παντελὴς ὄν* of the *Sophist* cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 437-9 and 606-7; on the *παντελὴς ζῶον* of the *Timaeus* see the reference in note 16 *infra*; on the identification of the ideas of Goodness, Unity, and Being cf. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 56-8.

larger book; but in *L'Ame du Monde* (p. 36, n. 5; cf. p. 48) he asserts that νόημα in this passage of the *Parmenides* means "a contingent and particular mode of thought" and that the dilemma there presented is to be avoided by recognizing that each idea has reality only in its connection with the total system of the ideas, that is as object of absolute thought. In short, every idea has existence only in the total system which cannot be separated from the thought of god. Moreau offers no argument, however, for limiting as he does the sense of the passage, which in the first place puts its argument quite generally (νόημα . . . ἐν ψυχαῖς) and does not restrict it to human minds, in the second place expressly concludes that any "thought" implies an object distinct from the act of thinking, and finally presents as the crowning absurdity of conceptualism the fact that it implies "idealism" of one sort or another. Furthermore, whatever Plato's motive may have been for presenting this refutation of conceptualism,¹⁴ there is no text of his which indicates that he for his part meant the ideas to be products of mind in any sense more subtle or profound than that which the young Socrates here proposes and abandons. Finally, Socrates here speaks of the ideas existing ἐν τῇ φύσει as an alternative to his proposal that they exist οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς (cf. 132 D 1-2 and 132 B 4-5); and this should imply at least that Plato when he refers to them elsewhere as existing ἐν τῇ φύσει (cf. *Phaedo* 103 B, *Republic* 598 A) does not mean that they are "determinations of practical reflection that human art fragmentarily realizes" (*La Construction*, p. 478).

To Moreau, however, *Republic* 597 B-D appears to be in perfect accord with his interpretation. There God is called the φηγουργός of the ideal bed, the bed existing ἐν τῇ φύσει; and Moreau, taking this isolated passage as serious Platonic doctrine,¹⁵ interprets it

¹⁴ From Alexander, *Metaph.*, pp. 92, 18-28 and 103, 1-4 as well as Aristotle, *De Anima* 429 A 27-29 (see note 11 *supra*) it appears that persons other than Plato did identify the ideas with νοήματα; and the passage in the *Parmenides* may well be directed against them.

Moreau does not mention the *Seventh Epistle* attributed to Plato; but he would probably reject it as spurious, since there at 342 C 4-7 it is said that ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, and ἀληθὴς δόξα being ἐν ψυχαῖς are obviously different from the ideas.

¹⁵ That Aristotle did not make use of the passage in his polemics against the doctrine of ideas is itself evidence that it was not considered

to mean that God "determines the model ideally by his transcendent reflection," this ideal genesis, as distinguished from the demiurgic action, being represented in the *Timaeus* by the calculations attributed to the Demiurge (*La Construction*, p. 350, n. 1 and pp. 477-8).

Moreau's systematic treatment of the *Timaeus* constitutes the first chapter of his complementary thesis, *L'Ame du Monde* (see note 2 *supra*). He takes the generation of the universe as mythical, in which he is justified by Plato's own indications; but his interpretation of the object of this account, what he calls the organization of the whole, rests ultimately upon the mistaken assumption, an assumption which he makes no attempt to substantiate, that the "model" of *Timaeus* 31 A-B is "the idea of the Whole" (p. 7) which he straightway identifies with "the One" and "the Good" and a totality of the hierarchy of forms subordinated to the supreme form of the Good (p. 8). From this he concludes that "all the transcendental metaphysics of the *Timaeus* flows from the original decision to think the datum as a whole" (p. 9) and later (p. 35) that "the idea of the Whole . . . furnishes the principle of an ontological argument which gives its justification and meaning to the artificialism of the *Timaeus*." It is really because the Universe is by definition a Whole, he says (p. 36), that it must be endowed with organization and thought and must be the work of a benevolent and calculating activity. He admits that this is the reverse of the course of reasoning in *Timaeus* 29 E-30 D; that, he explains, is because the ontological argument is concealed by the demiurgic mythology. Well and good; but that will not explain why Plato makes no mention in all this passage of an "idea of the Whole" or "the One" or "the idea of Good" or "the total hierarchy of ideas" but on the contrary says clearly that the "model" is

to be a serious expression of Plato's theory (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 609). J. Tate (*Class. Rev.*, LX [1946], p. 33) insists that "this plain, non-mythical passage is worth innumerable speculations based on rhetorical and ambiguous remarks from the *Timaeus* and *Phaedrus*"; but his reason seems to be his conviction that God must be supreme in any really philosophical system. My reasons for believing that the passage was not meant as a serious expression of the theory of ideas are given in *A. J. P.*, LIII (1932), pp. 233-42; cf. also to the same effect Frutiger, *Les Mythes de Platon*, pp. 105-6.

just the general "idea of living being" and later (39 E-40 A) lists the four sub-generic ideas which this includes, whereby it becomes indisputable that the model ζῶον is expressly *not* inclusive even of all the ideas later mentioned in the dialogue.¹⁶

Moreau, however, assuming that this model is "the idea of the Whole" gets into it by means of his ontological argument "the idea of perfect intelligence in actuality" and the necessary implication of its own realization; and this "idealistic" reasoning leads him on to the discovery that this "absolute living being" includes "three aspects of the divine: first, the Intelligible or the Word, i. e. the absolute revealing itself in us, apprehended by reflection as the condition and ideal of knowledge; then the Intelligence, the Cause or Father whom we reach by ontological argument; finally the third aspect proceeding from the first two, the Will, the Soul, or the Goodness of God" (p. 39).¹⁷ All this is derived from "the principles of Platonic ontology" (cf. p. 43), principles which follow only from the assumption that Plato must be an "idealist" and not from an unprejudiced consideration of his words. It is only from these principles that Moreau can interpret the psychogony as "a purely ideal construction," i. e. as the objective expression of the absolute Intelligence determining by its reflection the ideal model, which

¹⁶ On the *παρελὸς ζῶον* cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 575-8 and the references to Cornford and Shorey on p. 577. Moreau in § 3, note 7 (pp. 7-8) is mistaken in saying that the reasoning of *Timaeus* 31 A has its echo in Aristotle's *De Caelo* 278 B 4-8; that argument of Aristotle's proceeds from the assumption that the universe contains all the matter there is and is an adaptation of *Timaeus* 32 C-33 A. Moreau is also mistaken, however, in trying to differentiate *Timaeus* 31 A and *Republic* 597 C on the ground that the argument of the former turns upon an essential property of the whole in virtue of which there can be only one whole even *in concreto*, for not only is there no mention of a "whole" in the passage but Plato gives a specific reason for the uniqueness of the physical universe and this is not even the argument that there *can* be only one because the model is unique (cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 43; *Aristotle on Plato*, note 347). The reason for the use of μέγας in *Timaeus* 31 A 6, which has so much impressed Moreau, is simply τὰλλα ζῶα καθ' ἑν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια (30 C 6).

¹⁷ Moreau assumes without discussion (p. 81) that *Timaeus* 92 C declares the world to be an image of the intelligible God, although it has been shown with certainty, I think, that the sentence does not have this meaning (cf. e. g. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, p. 359, n. 1).

he then identifies with the activity of the *φύσσις* of *Republic* X (pp. 43-5; see note 15 *supra*).¹⁸ *Timaeus* 35 A 1-B 3 properly construed (cf. Grube, *Class. Phil.*, XXVII [1932], pp. 80-82; Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 59-61) makes it impossible to identify the World-Soul with the ideas or the "model," just as *Timaeus* 52 A-D makes it impossible to say that the receptacle is the physical expression of non-being which on the plane of the intelligible Plato calls the "other" (pp. 26-30; cf. *La Construction*, pp. 442-3). Neither the intermediacy of soul nor the reality of *χώρα* independent of the ideas is compatible with idealism and the ontological argument, and so Moreau must explain them away in the face of Plato's straightforward assertions.

The second chapter of *L'Ame du Monde* is concerned with the "physico-theology" of the *Laws*. Although Moreau admits that the doctrine of ideas and the dialectic are not abandoned in the *Laws* and even professes to see in 898 A-B, though concealed, the foundation of the ontological argument (pp. 74-5, 81, 86-7), still not even he can find in the argument of the tenth book "the idea of the One-Whole" or "the dialectical deduction of reality from a self-sufficient idea, an absolute, the idea of Good" (pp. 67 and 81).¹⁹ This falling-off from the ontological reflection which he had read into the *Timaeus* he explains not only by the popular character of the discussion in the *Laws* but also by Plato's desire to call positivistic science to testify in favor of the religious spirit (pp. 71-72). The

¹⁸ Moreau cites (p. 45, n. 8) *Sophist* 265 E in support of his statement that "nature is a divine art . . . which in its perfection excludes the properly demiurgic factor with the transcendence of model to worker." Yet the products of the divine art are listed in *Sophist* 266 B-C; and they are not the ideas but 1) phenomenal objects, living and inanimate, and 2) dreams, shadows, and images, i. e. the natural objects of the two lower sections of the "divided line."

¹⁹ On p. 81 occurs the statement: "la totalité du Monde γ (*scil.* in the *Laws*) est identifiée au Dieu suprême (τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον VII 821 A)." The sentence from which these accusatives are taken not only does *not* identify god and the world but it expresses not Plato's opinion but a popular attitude which the speaker proceeds to combat (cf. England *ad loc.* and Mayor, *Ciceronis De Natura Deorum*, I, p. 118 on I, xii, 30). The cream of the jest is that Harvard (*The Epinomis of Plato*, p. 116 on 977 B 2) quotes just this phrase from the *Laws* as a parallel to the identification of *ὁπάρης* and god in the *Epinomis*.

absence of the theory of "the One-Good" and of the ontological argument from the *Laws* might well have caused Moreau to question whether he had rightly seen them in the *Timaeus*;²⁰ but on the contrary he asserts that Plato reserved this fundamental part of his doctrine for esoteric use and in so doing opened the way for those of his successors who for want of philosophic vigor rejected it (p. 84). One would have thought, then, that those who knew this esoteric doctrine would have been the last to be misled by the "popular apologetics" of the *Laws*; yet according to Moreau it was Plato's accommodation of his true doctrine to the practical purposes of the arguments in this writing that opened the way to those who were to reject the world of ideas, confuse astronomy with theology, and fall into a confused immanentism in which the distinction of mind and matter is abolished.

This rupture with the intelligible in the Academy Moreau finds completed in the *Epinomis* (p. 84), where the confusion of the sensible universe and the intelligible marks the end of idealism; and the repetition of some formulae that recall those of Plato concerning dialectic is only one example of the "manifest parrotry" of the dialogue (pp. 92-3). While Moreau's observations of difference between the attitude in the *Epinomis* and in the admittedly genuine dialogues of Plato are frequently correct, his case for athetizing the *Epinomis* is weakened by the fact that it is made to depend upon his interpretation of the nature of Plato's "idealism." It is unfortunate that he apparently did not know the study of Dr. Benedict Einarson, "Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Structure of the *Epinomis*" (*T. A. P. A.*, LXVII [1936], pp. 261-85), which would not only have provided him with more formal arguments for the spuriousness of the dialogue but would also have presented him with the strong probability of its dependence from Aristotle.

To Aristotle in his "pre-Aristotelian period," represented by the *De Philosophia*, the *De Caelo*, and parts of the biological writings, Moreau ascribes (pp. 114-45) a "biological dynamism" or "cosmobiology," a kind of "Stoicism before the Stoics." During this period, he contends, Aristotle made the fifth essence

²⁰ Especially so, since the exposition in the *Laws* corresponds so closely with the concise argument of the *Phaedrus* (cf. J. Stenzel, *Ueber zwei Begriffe der platonischen Mystik*, pp. 14-15 and p. 16, n. 1).

the substance of soul and the first heaven, which is this substance in its purest state, the immanent principle of movement and as it were the soul of the universe, thus installing as the Absolute the sensible universe instead of the intelligible. This whole construction depends upon the highly questionable, though presently fashionable, thesis that the notion of an unmoved mover is later than the *De Caelo* and upon a misinterpretation of *De Gen. Animal.* 736 B 29-737 A 12.²¹ Nevertheless, as evidence for the diffusion of this pre-Stoic, post-Platonic cosmobiology which, progressively repressed in classical Aristotelianism, was maintained, he believes, by other authors who guarantee the transition between the Old Academy and Stoicism Moreau adduces (pp. 145-157) the pseudo-Philolaic fragment *περὶ ψυχῆς* and the extract of Alexander Polyhistor preserved by Diogenes Laertius (VIII, 24-33). He scarcely succeeds even to his own satisfaction, however, in proving that the latter is pre-Stoic; and his treatment of the former certainly falls far short of his claim that it must belong to the same period as the *De Caelo* (p. 149).²²

²¹ Aristotle does not there say that the constitutive nature of the soul is an analogue of the element that constitutes the stars (Moreau, *L'Ame du Monde*, p. 139) but that the analogue of that element is the immediate vehicle of the soul, this vehicle in turn being contained in the *pneuma* which is itself contained in the sperm (observe also that *πάσης ψυχῆς δύναμις*, 736 B 29-30, does not mean "toute âme en tant que puissance" but "the faculty of every soul"). This question as well as Moreau's contention concerning the unmoved mover and the interpretation of the pertinent fragments of the *De Philosophia* I have discussed in *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 584-602.

²² Moreau argues (pp. 152-3) that *De Caelo* 293 B 4-15 shows that Pythagorizers contemporary with Aristotle tried to establish a strict parallelism between the structure of the universe and that of an animal. It does, in fact, just the opposite, for Aristotle contends that his opponents understand "centre" in an unambiguous geometrical sense whereas there is also as in animals another vital centre which does not coincide with this. The passage of Simplicius (*De Caelo*, p. 512, 10-12), cited by Moreau, is shown by Simplicius' own words to refer to a later "Pythagoreanism" unknown to Aristotle and Simplicius' source for which was probably Iamblichus (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 562).

Moreau's translation of *ἐξ ἀρχαίου* in the pseudo-Philolaus fragment (Diels-Kranz, I, p. 417, 14) as "poste de commandement" (p. 148) is certainly wrong, and his later interpretation of this as "the central fire" (p. 153) is quite without substantiation. The phrase itself is

The thesis to which this leads and which is developed in the fourth chapter of *L'Âme du Monde* is that Stoic physics is neither an innovation nor a deliberate return to the ancient physical philosophers but a cosmobiology made inevitable by lack of dialectical reflection on the soul and closely connected with the conceptions which immediately preceded it. Moreau's scheme for the development of Stoicism is expressed in the somewhat paradoxical statement that starting from premises borrowed from a dualistic dialectic it culminates by way of a physiological materialism in a spiritualistic monism that lacks only a critical consciousness of the spirit (p. 173). The Stoics, he believes, maintained in the theory of the World-Soul the essential affirmations of Plato's rationalistic teleology but detached from their dialectical justification and supported only by biological analogy. There is reason in Moreau's protests against the extravagant modern attempts to derive Stoicism from oriental sources and in his view of it rather as a stage in the development of Greek thought; but on the other hand, even apart from his notion of Platonic "idealism" which casts its shadow over all of his interpretations, one may demur at his tendency to represent Stoicism as a simple unit in this development and the development itself as a single current without eddies and storms, debates and cross-influences.

P. Brommer in his book,²³ which appeared a year after Moreau's theses, rejects out of hand the idealistic interpretation, which for him is represented chiefly by Natorp's version, and asserts that the key to Plato's thought is to be found in the distinction of meaning of the two terms, *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*. The latter is in origin the Socratic—and so primarily moral— notion

probably an error; but in any case *περιαγόμενος* is not to be taken with it and separated from *φύσει διαπνεόμενος*, as Moreau does (p. 147) in order to get the doctrine of *πνεῦμα* from the first half and a *ἡγεμονικόν* of the universe from the second; *φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιαγόμενος* means simply "pervaded and made to rotate by nature"; and *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* or whatever it stands for is the complement of the main clause of the sentence.

²³ P. Brommer, *ΕΙΔΟΣ et ΙΔΕΑ, Étude Sémantique et Chronologique des Oeuvres de Platon (Philosophia Critica, Deel I [Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N. V., 1940])*.

which is supposed to arise spontaneously in the soul as soon as the maieutic art has eliminated all that prevents its birth; the former Plato got from Pythagorean geometry, and it he conceived to be the real structure which accounts for the formal aspect of existence and accords perfectly with the image that we have of it in the soul. The combination of the Socratic *idea* and the Pythagorean *eidos* was a hybrid union, for the former was essentially dynamic while the latter was static; and it was this static *eidos* that brought in its train all the difficulties involved in participation. Plato, though fascinated at first by the logical appearance of this static *eidos*, is always brought back to the dynamistic conception of the *idea* which seems better to account for reality. The *eidos*, then, from the time of the *Meno* onward is "real structure," the essence of which exists outside of our minds and our concrete existence and of which our souls have simply had knowledge. "*Idea*," however, has not one meaning for Brommer but two: it is on the one hand "the primary image which is the source of reality" (i. e. of realized structure) and on the other "the concomitant image which represents in the soul the structure of the real" (p. 68).

From this one gathers that for Brommer *ἰδέα* is finally 1) a transcendent and separate entity and 2) the notion in the soul, while *εἶδος* is 3) the immanent structure caused by *ἰδέα* in the former sense and to which *ἰδέα* in the latter sense exactly corresponds;²⁴ but in the end he states that the *eidos* is immanent or separate depending upon our point of view because "in its very immanence it is separate and it is immanent by reason of its separation" (p. 266), while the *ἰδέα* which is real and which engenders the *eidos* in the physical world and its *idea* in our minds (p. 267) turns out to be the content, product, or manifestation of a Mind with which in one way or another the Idea of Good is identified.²⁵ Is this not to make the ideas in effect

²⁴ "Elle (*soit*. l'Idée) est certainement l'image primaire qui préside à la réalisation d'une Structure; mais d'autre part elle reste identique à elle-même comme contenu de Nous, et doit par conséquent, nécessairement, coïncider avec l'image idéale qu'on fait correspondre à telle structure, dans l'Esprit ou dans l'âme (p. 68).

²⁵ "Every Form and every Measure supposes a . . . creative Cause which is precisely the Idea of Good. This . . . is a rational and reasoned power which must have its location in a Spirit from which it

the thoughts of God? And, since Brommer says further (p. 268) that the *ιδέα* that we have in ourselves must be identical with that which encloses the *εἶδος* and consequently our *νοῦς* must be identical with the creative *Νοῦς* and our soul directly related to the Principle of which the essential function is to be the Idea of all Reality, surely the idealists would be justified in asserting that of their interpretation he has rejected only the name and has adopted as his own the essential meaning.²⁶

There is a similar reversal and confusion in Brommer's analysis of Plato's "dynamism," of which he takes *Sophist* 247 E to be a "frank confession" (pp. 128-9). Although he tries to establish the "dynamic" character of the *eidos* throughout the whole of Plato's work, pressing every appearance of

emanates spontaneously as its specific manifestation" (p. 73); cf. p. 71 ("the creative Image which has its seat in the divine Mind"), p. 89 (. . . "God who alone has the power to form the real as he informs himself: the Idea of Good engendering the good"), p. 252 ("What is more natural than to identify the *Νοῦς* and the Idea of Good, it being understood that *Νοῦς* is the 'place' of the Idea"), p. 274 ("God is the measure of everything; by reason of the *Eidos* of Good which is his Being, the divine Idea is the Standard . . .").

²⁶ *Phaedrus* 247 D Brommer interprets as follows (pp. 100-101): "The gods rejoice in the comprehension of the One which is as the summit of the celestial vault; but its full intelligence carries them outside, where above Being (*ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*) Reality in all its immaculate purity is enthroned. This supra-celestial place . . . is at once the ineffable domain where in the divine Mind are drawn up the creative images which will engender Justice and all the moral values . . . but it is also the serene region in ourselves where we have Intuition in its purest actuality . . ." Brommer then immediately protests that these two "regions" are not one and the same, for, if they were, "the Real would be reduced to a subjective Ideal." He should not have read into this passage then that of which it contains no hint, with the result that he has to ascribe to Plato confused subtleties for which there is no support in his words to save him from a danger to which he never exposed himself but to which in the end Brommer himself succumbs. There is in *Phaedrus* 247 no mention of "the One"; the supra-celestial region is not "above Being," for Plato says *ἡ . . . οὐσία ὅντως οὐσα . . . τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον* and what is seen there is *τὸ ὄν*; all the ideas are there (*τὰλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως*), and the figures and the language all imply that they are *not* in a divine mind or in anything else. Certainly there is no suggestion that this supra-celestial region symbolizes "the region of intuition in us."

δύναμις and its cognates into evidence for this conclusion,²⁷ he is constrained to admit in the end that "dynamism" in the sense of efficient causality or cause of all movement is assigned by Plato to the soul; but he seeks to compromise this admission by insisting that the *eidos* ultimately is not static in its original sense but has a "static dynamism" and then that the *Being of the Eidos* has also a character of spirituality which raises it above every formal and dynamic function (pp. 269-72).

Brommer's insistence upon finding in *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* the distinctive technical meanings that he has assigned them *ex hypothesi* is responsible for most of his difficulties of philosophical interpretation and for the distortions and mistranslations of the Greek which alone would be sufficient to disprove his thesis. Instead of attempting so much as to list even the more flagrant of his mistakes, I shall here examine a few crucial passages which should show whether or not Plato when he used *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in a technical sense gave them the distinctive meanings which Brommer maintains that he did or, if not these, any distinction of meaning at all.

In *Republic* 596-597 Brommer (p. 89) says that *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are not used indifferently but that Plato means that the true *ἰδέα* such as the perfect artisan contemplates in his soul is not fashioned but is in direct relation with the essential structure which alone constitutes the real in all similar objects and which structure is the creation of God who alone has the power to form the real just as he informs himself. Now at the beginning of this passage Socrates says (596 A 6-7) *εἶδος γάρ ποῦ τι ἐν ἑκάστων εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκάστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταῦτ' ὄνομα*

²⁷ E. g. on p. 55 he states that the *eidos* is "une force, une puissance qui est même qualifiée de 'divine'," referring for this to *Phaedo* 99 C which has nothing to do with the *eidos*; on p. 28 he finds the dynamic nature of structure in *Hipp. Maj.* 296 D, translating by "la puissance vers le bien" Socrates' dialectical definition *τὸ δυνατὸν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιῆσαι*; and on p. 26 he professes to see in *τὸ διὰ πάντων πεφνυκὸς* of *Laches* 192 C, which he translates "la nature qui pénètre toutes les formes particulières," the dynamic concept of "real power."

With regard to the passage of the *Sophist* Brommer does not mention 247 E 7-248 A 2, which shows that Plato did not consider *δύναμις* a final definition or even characteristic of reality, or 249 D 6-251 A 4, which states that nothing hitherto said is the answer to the question, "What is reality?"

ἐπιφέρομεν. In 596 B 3 in doing this for chairs and couches he says that there is one *ιδέα* for each of these classes. In 596 B 7 he says that the craftsman makes the couches we use by looking to the *ιδέα* and in 596 B 9-10 that none of the craftsmen makes the *ιδέα* itself. In 597 A 1-2 he asks: "Did you not just now say that the couch-maker does not make the *εἶδος* ὃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίνη," and to this the answer is "Yes, I did." Later he calls this ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη (cf. 597 C 3) ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὕσα κλίνη (597 B 5-6, C 2). In short Plato here says that what he has called ἡ *ιδέα* is what he also calls τὸ *εἶδος* and that both or either can be called ὃ ἔστιν and τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. None of Brommer's subtleties can circumvent this passage; but there is worse behind. In 596 A 6-7, quoted above, *εἶδος* τι ἐν ἑκάστων τίθεσθαι κτλ. is called "the customary method." In 507 B 5-10 Socrates had said καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων ἃ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν πάλιν αὖ κατ' (or καί, cf. Adam, *ad loc.*) *ιδέαν* μίαν ἐκάστων ὡς μιᾶς οὐσης τιθέντες, "ὃ ἔστιν" ἑκάστων προσαγορεύομεν (cf. τὰς *ιδέας* in the next sentence, B 9-10). This is "the customary method" referred to in 596 A 6-7, and in one expression of it *ιδέα* is used exactly where *εἶδος* is in the other. The verbal similarity shows beyond the possibility of cavil that Plato *did* use *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* indifferently and by both or either meant just ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστων or that which later became the standard term for a Platonic idea, αὐτό prefixed to any common noun or neuter adjective.

In the same way *εἶδος* in *Phaedrus* 249 B 7 must mean exactly the same thing as *ιδέαν* in *Phaedrus* 265 D 3. This correspondence Brommer finds no way to eliminate and is reduced (pp. 101-2) to explaining *εἶδος* in the former passage as a purposeful etymological pun on *εἶδεν* in the next sentence (249 C 2); but this is incredible, for in the *preceding* sentence and nearer to *εἶδος* than this *εἶδεν* appears in the same sense *ἰδοῦσα* (249 B 6), so that, if Plato's choice of a term was to be determined by etymological considerations, *ιδέα* would more probably have been used than *εἶδος*.²⁸ In any case, if the choice between *εἶδος* and

²⁸ It is amusing to notice that when on p. 145 Brommer tries to read into *Politicus* 292 a reference to the ideas he says: "In view of Plato's inclination toward etymology it is not improbable that the term *ιδεῖν* (292 D 5) contains an allusion to the *εἶδος* or better to the *ιδέα* that is to be tracked down." Incidentally Brommer takes with deadly seriousness the etymologies of the *Cratylus*, as if they were really meant to

ἰδέα could have been determined by the desire for an etymological pun, the distinction between the two cannot have had any real importance for Plato's thought.

Perhaps the best example of the reasoning by means of which Brommer tries to extricate himself from difficulties into which his own thesis has thrown him is his explanation of *Republic* 518 C, 526 E, and 532 C, in all of which Being appears to be ascribed to *ἀγαθόν*, although in 509 B the idea of good had been said to surpass Being in majesty and power. Brommer decides (pp. 79-80) that in these three passages there is no question of the *idea* of good but of the good simply and that the good as *eidos* is Being in its plenitude. In other words, he maintains that these three passages, since they say *ἀγαθόν* and not *ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* must mean *ἀγαθόν* as *εἶδος* which is something different. In 526 E 1, however, the whole phrase *τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν* does occur, and *τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος* two lines later must refer to this. This Brommer tries to avoid by referring to "the confusion or rather the assimilation of the creative image of the Good which is before all Being to the inspiring image as we conceive it in the soul"; and anyway "the parallel with 518 C indicates that the object of immediate research is the *ἀγαθόν* as it is expressly called in that passage." Let that pass; but what of 509 B itself where supposedly it is said that the *idea* of good surpasses Being? There is no *ἰδέα* mentioned there but only *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* expressly in this form and twice (509 B 7 and 8-9). Either we accept the rigid formalism of Brommer and try to maintain that it is not the *idea* of good that surpasses Being even in the famous and unique passage of 509 B or we have to admit—what is obviously true—that *τὸ ἀγαθόν* "tout court," like *αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν* (540 A 8-9), is used by Plato to mean *ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, that *ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον* is *ἡ ἰδέα*, that in short there is no difference between *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος*.²⁹

express tendencies of Plato's philosophy; *Cratylus* 406 C 1-3 was lost on him. The fantasies of the *Cratylus* are not sufficient for him; and he sees "etymologies" everywhere, reaching the height—or depth—in his statement (p. 124) that the *ἄπορος τόπος* into which the sophist has dived (*Sophist* 239 C) is a deliberate reference at once to the *τόπος* of the *Timaeus* (by which, I suppose, he means *χώρα*) and the *ἐπειρον* of the *Philebus*!

²⁹ Brommer (p. 68) assumes that in *Republic* 479 A (mistakenly referred to by him as 479 D) a distinction is made between "le Beau

Finally Brommer is quite mistaken in arguing (p. 257) from *Eth. Nic.* 1096 B 13-26 that Aristotle's usage proves the distinction between εἶδος and ἰδέα to be genuinely Platonic. Without introducing the extra complication of Aristotle's use of εἶδος in his own system and to take but two examples for many, a comparison of *Metaphysics* 1078 B 9-10 (τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν δόξαν) with B 12-13 (ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα) or of 1078 B 33 (ἰδέας) with 1079 A 1 (εἰδη) will prove that Aristotle was unaware of any Platonic distinction between the two terms.

Brommer's semantic and historical study must be said to have failed to prove either that Plato made any technical distinction between εἶδος and ἰδέα or that his employment of them shows any kind of change or development throughout the course of the dialogues. Moreover, Plato used both terms without technical significance for the ideas much more often than is admitted by Brommer³⁰ and in many important passages concerning the ideas used neither (e.g. *Symposium* 210 E-212 A, *Phaedrus* 247 C-E, *Philebus* 58 A, 59 C, 61 E), a fact which of itself should make one hesitate to ascribe to these two words

en soi" and "l'Idee de la Beauté," the former being εἶδος to which the latter is anterior. The passage runs: . . . ἀποκρινέσθω ὁ χρηστός ὃς αὐτὸ μὲν καλὸν καὶ ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίαν ἡγείται ἀεὶ μὲν κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν πολλὰ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει. The αὐτὸ καλόν and ἰδέαν . . . κάλλους are not two things but one and the καὶ is explicative, as the position of μὲν reinforced by its repetition after ἀεὶ and answered by the δέ after πολλὰ shows. The αὐτὸ καλόν is one of the αὐτὰ ἕκαστα καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ὄντα (479 E 7-8, cf. 480 A 3-4) and these are the ἰδέαι.

³⁰ Some examples of the extreme cases in which Brommer forces the technical sense upon these terms are φρονήσεως τὸ μικρότατον εἶδος (*Lysis* 689 D), ἐν μέρους εἶδει (*Timaeus* 30 C), ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα οὕσα (*Cratylus* 418 E); ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἰδέα (*Politicus* 289 B), τὸ ἐπ' εἶδει καλόν (*Symposium* 210 B), βίου εἶδος (*Philebus* 35 D). When in *Philebus* 23 C 12 εἶδος is used of ἀπειρον (as well as πέρας), he says in his embarrassment (p. 183) that "in a slightly paradoxical fashion Plato applies the denomination of structure to the absence of structure." He says nothing of τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν in *Philebus* 16 D 7. In none of these cases does εἶδος or ἰδέα mean "idea" or "structure" in any sense. It is far more disastrous, however, when Brommer (pp. 193-5) gives his technical sense to τριτον οὐσίας εἶδος in *Timaeus* 35 A and then through misconstruction of the passage, misconstruction which is no longer excusable after Grube's clarification (*Class. Phil.*, XXVII [1932], pp. 80-82; cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 59-61), supports his mistaken conclusion (p. 196) that the soul is an idea.

in his vocabulary as much significance as this study presumes from the outset.

A word will suffice for the "chronological" aspect of Brommer's study. He adopts in principle Constantin Ritter's order of the dialogues, but that counts for little against his assumption that Plato reworked them throughout his life so that there are "later modifications" in the earliest and "earlier parts" in the most mature of the writings. This assumption is employed with such abandon, vagueness, and lack of system and supporting evidence that it is impossible to be sure just what part of any dialogue Brommer himself believes is early or late, since almost every one appears to belong in part before and in part after almost every other.³¹ Since the marshalling of proofs in such matters seems to Brommer to be an archaeological task of little interest from the philosophical point of view (p. 95), it is difficult to understand why he added the adjective "chronological" to the title of his book.

The books of Moreau and Brommer would have offered Professor Richard Robinson many examples of the five types of misinterpretation against which he protests in the introductory chapter of his study, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*.³² Mosaic inter-

³¹ For example, the *Phaedrus* is the earliest dialogue; but the third discourse is late, in fact parts of it are later than the *Timaeus* and are built upon the *Epinomis* (pp. 95, 99-100). Then again the *Phaedrus* and the last reworking of the *Symposium* both fall between the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* (p. 102), though the last part of Diotima's speech presupposes both the *Republic* and the *Timaeus* (p. 49), although the *Republic* is, of course, supposed to have undergone so many revisions that almost anything in any other dialogue may be earlier or later than some part of it. So the "supreme idea" in the *Republic* is the reply to the criticism of the ideas in the *Parmenides* (p. 156), but the second part of the *Parmenides* is the transcendent mathematics for the lack of which the mathematicians are criticized in the *Republic* (p. 170); yet Plato was writing the *Parmenides* during all the period in which he was working on the *Sophist* and *Politicus* (p. 6), and the last part of the *Theaetetus* is later than the *Sophist* (p. 117), although the *Theaetetus* in its first form is intermediate between the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* (pp. 110-111) while the section on method in the *Phaedo* and the final argument in that dialogue are later additions (p. 57).

³² Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1941), pp. viii + 239.

pretation, misinterpretation by abstraction and by inference, insinuating the future, and going beyond a thinker's last words—in order to avoid these errors Robinson proposes “not to attribute to Plato any inference that he does not make in so many words or any abstraction that he does not have a name for, without giving a special reason for doing so.” In addition to this rigorous canon he enunciates two fundamental assumptions of his interpretation: 1) “to possess a single name for an idea, is a later stage than to be able to express it only in a sentence” and 2) “there is an evolution of ideas, transcending the lives of individuals, even the most obvious ideas were once obscure and still earlier unknown, and this evolution, while often proceeding by sudden leaps or ‘mutations,’ often also advanced by very gradual ‘variations’.” However obvious these assumptions may appear to the “historically minded” majority today, they are nevertheless not free of danger for the interpreter. The former assumption must be carefully qualified in its application to dialogues written by a philosopher who in them may purposely have avoided the use of technical terminology (cf. *Theaetetus* 184 C; *Politicus* 259 C, 261 E; *Republic* 533 D 7 ff.). The latter assumption disregards the fact that some notions held by some individuals to be true have become obscure, have been forgotten, and after many years have been rediscovered by other individuals. Robinson objects (pp. 29-30) to the belief that certain propositions *must* have been obvious to Plato because they *are* so obvious to any intelligent person; but it is no less objectionable to believe that what is obvious to any intelligent person was not obvious to Plato, just because he lived a long time ago, or even that a true proposition of which I have only recently become aware could not have been obvious to Plato for the same reason. Robinson states that the belief to which he objects “is destructive of any true history of human thought”; it is so only on the assumption that the true history of human thought is “an evolution of ideas, transcending the lives of individuals,” an assumption against which there are contradictory instances to be cited.

Professor Robinson announces his subject as the examination of what Plato has to say about method apart from the theory of synthesis and division, prominent in the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and *Philebus*, and the methodology of the *Parmeni-*

des.³³ His book is consequently divided into two parts, one on Socratic elenchus and definition, which is said to be the outstanding feature of the early dialogues, and another on dialectic and specifically hypothesis, which is supposed to be prominent in the middle dialogues.

Of the elenchus as depicted in the early dialogues Robinson draws a picture "by no means favorable." The method, he says, involved persistent hypocrisy, showed a negative and destructive spirit, and caused pain to its victims (p. 10). He believes that he can conjecture what answers Plato would have made to his objections that the elenchus only tells you that you are wrong without telling you why and that it would in any case be more effective without the Socratic irony; but these conjectural answers apparently do not mitigate his disapproval of the method which, he says, in the middle and later dialogues loses its irony, is incorporated into the larger whole of dialectic, and, though often referred to and recommended, gradually ceases to be actually depicted. A certain scepticism of this chronological distinction and its implications is aroused by the fact that of the three passages cited by Robinson as alone offering any general discussion of the purpose of elenchus one, *Sophist* 229 E-230 E, and that the one which calls the method "the greatest and most sovereign of the purifications" is from a dialogue of the "middle period"; and this scepticism can only be intensified when one recalls that the *Theaetetus*, which is not mentioned here, is one long and complicated elenchus highly seasoned with the irony that should have disappeared. Later (pp. 87-88) the elenchus of the *Theaetetus* is represented as a kind of independent personality adopting subterfuges "to maintain itself in Plato's alien mind," the figure of Socrates' midwifery being a purely Platonic invention which "serves the unconscious purpose of enabling the elenchus to maintain a good standing in an otherwise very un-Socratic mind." One need not take too seriously this personification and conscious invention for an unconscious purpose which hardly conform to Robinson's severe canons of interpretation, for in the last chapter of the book (p. 216) it is suggested that not only the long elenchus of the *Theaetetus*

³³ The *Parmenides* is the subject of an article by Professor Robinson in *Class. Phil.*, XXXVII (1942), pp. 51-76 and 159-86.

but that of the *Cratylus* and of the *Parmenides* too represent what after a long detour Robinson practically identifies with the dialectic of the "middle period."

The main contention of chapter 3 is that Plato, though unaware of the logical distinctions involved, thought of elenchus as being always indirect, as never using an independent premise, and as always reducing the thesis to a contradiction. This proposition Robinson seeks to establish by citing examples of refutations in the dialogues which are in fact direct but to which Plato refers in words which Robinson believes must imply that they are indirect reductions to a contradiction. There is a highly questionable literalism about Robinson's interpretation of most of these examples;³⁴ but apart from these *Phaedo* 101 D is the strong evidence on which he really rests his case. This passage according to him shows Plato to have consciously assumed that the consequences of a single thesis may contradict each other without the aid of any extra premise. This "logical monstrosity," Robinson says, is a natural accompaniment of the assumption that all elenchus reduces the thesis to self-contradiction; but later in his longer discussion of the *Phaedo* passage he points out (p. 137) that an hypothesis really can have consequences which contradict one another or itself if the hypothesis is not an atomic proposition and that a definite distinction between complex and atomic propositions probably cannot be made.

The main conclusion of the next chapter is that Plato shows

³⁴ They are (pp. 30-31) *Republic* 341 C-343 A, *Republic* 380 C, *Gorgias* 487 B, *Theaetetus* 155 B. The last is a half-humorous passage which is correctly explained by Campbell, *The Theaetetus of Plato*², p. 53. The statement in the *Gorgias* that Polus and Gorgias διὰ τὸ ἀσχύνησθαι τολμᾷ ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς ἐναντία λέγειν is not a technical description of the "direct" refutation of Gorgias; it occurs in the ironical speech to Callicles and is a purposeful echo of the statement of Callicles in 483 A who has there introduced the "contradiction" of φύσις and νόμος. In *Republic* 380 C οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς does not say, as Robinson states, that Homer's and Hesiod's tales about the gods contradict themselves; it refers to κακῶν αἴτιον φάναι θεῶν τινα γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα at the beginning of the sentence. As regards the first passage, Robinson's notion that ὁ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τοῦναντίον περιεστῆκει (343 A 2) must mean that the thesis entailed its own contradictory has been adequately refuted by Friedländer in *Class. Phil.*, XL (1945), p. 253.

no methodological consciousness of epagoge and that therefore his depiction of it in the earlier dialogues made no impression on his own theory of method (pp. 47-8). In fact, Robinson finds epagoge to be much less frequent in the early dialogues than it seems to be on a casual reading and explains the chief reason for this to be that it is only a part of a more pervasive feature which he calls "the use of cases" or "analogy."³⁵ In this connection he observes (p. 45) that where epagoge is conceived as a form of intuition each case is sufficient by itself, an observation which has some bearing upon his earlier remarks that Plato did not distinguish intuitively certain, enumeratively certain, and probable epagoge (p. 38) and that the elenctic dialogues show no trace of entertaining in the abstract such a connection between epagoge and intuition as Aristotle proposes in *Anal. Post.* 100 B (pp. 39-40). The kind of explanation offered by Aristotle in that chapter Plato had already rejected (*Phaedo* 96 B 5-8); and, considering that the particular serves only to remind us of the universal to which we then refer it (*Phaedo* 75 B-E, 76 D-E; *Phaedrus* 249 B-C), he speaks of *ἀνάμνησις* where Robinson talks of intuitively certain epagoge. There would be for Plato then no question of "enumeratively certain" and "intuitively certain" epagoge, for in any case just enough particular instances must be cited to "remind" the interlocutor of the universal or, since Plato was writing dialogues, to make it seem plausible that the particular interlocutor would be so reminded.

The final chapter on the elenchus is concerned with the Socratic quest for definition or, as Robinson puts it, "the What-is-X question." Robinson says that in the early dialogues no justification is offered for the unlimited priority assigned to this question;³⁶ and to the argument for this priority in *Phaedrus* 260 he replies that we can and do make useful statements about

³⁵ By this he means substantially what Aristotle calls *παραβολή*, a sub-class of *παράδειγμα* which is *ὅμοιον ἐπαγωγῇ*, and ascribes to Socrates in *Rhetoric* 1393 B 3-8 (cf. A 26-27), a passage not mentioned by Robinson in his discussions of the Socratic use of cases and of Aristotle on Socratic epagoge.

³⁶ In view of *Protagoras* 360 E-361 D the course of that whole dialogue might be taken as a proof by example of the necessary priority of the question. Cf. also *Meno* 86 D and 100 B.

X without being able to say what X is in the way Socrates desires. In rejoinder one can almost hear Plato asking the "twentieth-century philosopher" what he means by "useful" in this context and how he knows that his statements are "about X" at all if he does not know what X is. Robinson analyses thoroughly the possible ambiguities of "What is X?", which he considers the vaguest of all questions, at least out of context; but he admits that Socrates' explanations give a context determining this vague form to mean the search for essence (p. 61). Moreover, Socrates was not asking the question merely as an exercise in method. People in Athens used the words "virtue," "justice," "good," "useful" as if they were univocal and used them to justify all sorts of actions and theories; it is in the case of such words, Socrates points out (*Phaedrus* 263'A-B), which people use without clearly defined agreement as to their meaning that oratory has its greatest power of deception, words which, as Robinson says (p. 55), Socrates and his companions would be said in unphilosophical circles to know the meaning of perfectly well. Socrates' question was designed to suggest that they did not know the meaning so well as they supposed and that perhaps their actions and theories were not so well supported by these words as they assumed. "For unless you clearly understood 'pious' and 'impious' it is not possible that you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your father for murder," Socrates says to Euthyphro at the end—ironically, no doubt; but is not irony in place? "I say that 'pious' is what I am now doing," Euthyphro had declared; and any newspaper will show that Euthyphro is neither a straw-man for Socrates' "What-is-X question" nor an archaeological monument of the history of human thought and action.

The second part of the book opens with a chapter on dialectic in general and another on hypothesis, which, Robinson maintains, is the keyword for dialectic in the middle dialogues, *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Parmenides*; and these are followed by chapters on hypothesis in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic* respectively. The first of these chapters contains many sound observations on what may be called the constant characteristics of dialectic and is concluded by a demonstration that Plato invented both the notion and the name, a demonstration which is on the whole cogent despite the desperate and unnecessary

contention (p. 94) that *Philebus* 16 C is to be taken seriously as Plato's "deliberate statement that he was himself inspired in inventing dialectic."³⁷ Quite unsatisfactory, however, is Robinson's notion of the real reason for Plato's doctrine that the supreme method of dialectic entails question and answer. Question and answer, he says (p. 87), being necessary to the Socratic elenchus, entered into the blood of Socrates' pupil who never fully appreciated the distinctness of Socrates' destructiveness from his own constructiveness. That dialectic demands question and answer because it demands elenchus which demands question and answer was not a reasoned conclusion but merely an assumption carried over from Plato's pupilage; otherwise, he asserts, it could not have still commanded his absolute confidence even in his late period when dialectic had taken the form of division and synthesis. Now, that the dialectic of the late period was thus radically different from that of the early and middle periods is a highly questionable assumption; but as an assumption not argued in this book it falls outside the scope of this review, although it should be observed in passing that one of Aristotle's objections to diaeresis is that it *does* depend upon question and answer (cf. *Anal. Post.* B, chap. 5). Robinson himself, however, cites *Theaetetus* 189 E and *Sophist* 263 E, dialogues of the "middle period," for Plato's definition of thinking as the dialogue of the soul with itself; and it is a work of the "late period" in which Plato applies this notion of the internal dialogue even to the case of simple perceptions (*Philebus* 38 C-E). It is most unlikely that this notion would be developed precisely in that period when according to Robinson "the pretence of question-and-answer misfits the form" of the writings, if it had been merely an unconscious assumption carried over from Plato's pupilage. It is more reasonable to say, as Robinson in fact does later say (p. 93), that the idea of using exclusively conversational question and answer in dialectic is the result of reflecting on the Socratic elenchus. Nor is Plato's conclusion from that reflection antiquated, despite Aristotle's dicta of which Robinson apparently approves (p. 88), for it has been affirmed even in this century that the scientific investigator proceeds to discovery by putting to himself pertinent questions.

³⁷ Are we to take seriously *οι παλαιοι κτλ.* (16 C 7) too; and, if so, how can *διὰ τινος Προμηθέως* refer to Plato himself?

The most important conclusions of the next chapter (chap. 7) are that for Plato an hypothesis is not necessarily existential or of any other form (pp. 104-9) and (pp. 115-17) that an hypothesis, being a proposition posited *at the beginning* of a train of thought, is naturally and normally posited for the proof of some *other* proposition, a premise and not a demonstrand. There is difficulty in maintaining the latter conclusion in the face of the many passages where the refutand is called an hypothesis; Robinson does so by contending that hypothesis has this sense only subordinately and came to have it because of Plato's conception of elenchus as always indirect. This conclusion as to the primary meaning of hypothesis is Robinson's reason for deciding in the next chapter (pp. 122-3) that the hypothesis in the *Meno* is "if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable"; and, having come to this conclusion, he declares (p. 126) that Plato by choosing this as his hypothesis practically destroys the essence of the hypothetical method as it afterwards became. Despite Robinson's analysis, however, it seems certain that the hypothesis is not the alternative on which he has decided but the one which he rejects, namely "virtue is knowledge";³⁸ and, if this is so, the procedure in the *Meno* is in accord with that recommended in the *Phaedo* (save, of course, that no *ικανόν* is reached), for "virtue is good," which is unquestionably called an hypothesis (87 D 3), is posited in order to deduce from it that virtue is knowledge, which was first set up as an hypothesis from which the teachability of virtue was deduced.

The first part of the chapter on the *Phaedo* is devoted to the "metaphor" of *συμφωνεῖν* in 100 A and 101 D. Robinson decides that the word means "consistency" in both passages,³⁹ although

³⁸ This is also the conclusion of Friedländer (*Class. Phil.*, XL [1945], p. 255) who points out that 87 B 3-4, *ὑποθέμενοι αὐτὸ σκοπῶμεν εἴτε διδασκτὸν εἴτε οὐ διδασκτὸν ἔστι* demands this interpretation and rightly interpreted makes the analogy with the mathematical example precise. In this example τὸ συμβαῖνον is not part of the hypothesis itself, which is just τοῦτο τὸ χωρὶον τοιοῦτόν ἐστι; and similarly with virtue the hypothesis is ἀπερὶ τοιόνδε τι τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντων (87 B 5), namely ἐπιστήμη. This is further proved by 89 C 2-4 where the position of ὅτι shows that the sentence means "it is clear that it is teachable according to the hypothesis if virtue is knowledge" (cf. 89 D 2).

³⁹ The meaning of *συμφωνεῖ* need not coincide with either "is con-

he thinks that in the first case Plato really had in mind two things, implication and inconsistency, but expressed himself inadequately in order to preserve conversational simplicity and he has in the second to explain how the consequences of an hypothesis can be inconsistent one with another. As to the *ικανόν* of 101 E which is the end of the process of hypothesizing a higher hypothesis, Robinson states that it means an hypothesis adequate to satisfy the particular interlocutor and that, since Plato is merely aiming at an hypothesis that the objector will agree to, epistemology does not enter into the matter at all and as a consequence there is no connection between the *ικανόν* of the *Phaedo* and the *ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή* of *Republic* 511. Plato does not say, however, that you will not posit the higher hypothesis *unless* the interlocutor objects to your present hypothesis. If he does so object, you will *not* at once set up the new hypothesis (101 D 3-5); but *ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης αὐτῆς δέοι σε δίδοναι λόγον* certainly does not imply that you won't do so at all unless he does so object. Socrates' statement at 107 B 5-6, *τάς γε ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρώτας, καὶ εἰ πιστὰ ἡμῖν εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτέαι σαφέστερον*, surely shows that a serious thinker must of his own accord in the proper course proceed back to a *ικανόν*. Nor has Robinson any reason for saying that this *ικανόν* is meant to be an hypothesis in the same sense as the hypotheses which lead up to it. The very wording *τι ἱκανόν* in contrast to the *ὑπόθεσιν ἣτις . . . βελτίστη* immediately preceding implies that Plato is thinking of it as something different, and the *περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς* immediately following suggests that he is thinking of it as an *ἀρχή* in a special sense, while *εἴπερ βούλοιοι τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν* (101 E 3) shows that he is not here concerned simply with methodology divorced from ontology. There is every reason then to take the *ικανόν* here as the equivalent of the *ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος* of the *Republic* or rather to take the latter as a special case of the former.⁴⁰

sistent with" or "is implied by," as Robinson assumes that it must (pp. 131-2). It is certainly not equivalent to the latter, but the neutral logical meaning of the former is not specific enough for it either. It has rather the positive meaning of "fitting together" as its use in *Sophist* 253 B illustrates, where it is used of the "kinds" that mix or join as opposed to those which *ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται* and is parallel to *συναρμύττει* in 253 A.

⁴⁰ There is a curious echo of this in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* where the

Robinson believes, however, that the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή of the *Republic* is a distinctive addition to the hypothetical method of the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* which changes it from a merely approximative method, at variance with Plato's belief in the possibility of incorrigible knowledge, to a means of reaching absolute certainty. This, of course, determines his interpretation of the "upward path." After examining at length and criticizing with acuteness the principal interpretations, 1) the view that the dialectical procedure is merely self-criticism and self-correction, the readiness to reconsider and go behind any postulate,⁴¹ 2) the "synthesis" theory, 3) the mathematical interpretations, and 4) the "intuition theory," he adopts what he calls the "elenchus theory," which is in fact a combination of 1 and 4 above and his description of which (p. 179) may be summarized as follows. You take an hypothesis and deduce its consequences, trying to discover some contradiction in those consequences. When you do, the hypothesis is refuted and you take another, designed to avoid the contradiction. You continue this process for a long time. One day you reflect that this hypothesis has endured every test; and it dawns upon you that this hypothesis is true, is in fact no longer an hypothesis but an anhypotheton. The "dawn" is equivalent to an intuition; all that precedes is the hypothetical method as previously elucidated but here exercised solely in order to test the hypothesis itself. According to Robinson's interpretation, therefore, the hypothesis which in the *Meno* was only a premise and in the

ἀνυπόθετον in 1005 B 14 makes the philosopher's ἀρχή in his field equivalent to the ἱκανόν of the special sciences (1005 A 25).

Robinson's view of the discrepancy between the ἱκανόν and the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή appears to be responsible for his notion that Plato in the *Phaedo* made the abandonment of the search for the Good simultaneous with the adoption of the hypothetical method. Friedländer (*Class. Phil.*, XL [1945], p. 256) has adequately shown that there is in the *Phaedo* no renunciation of the search for the kind of causal explanation that Socrates had hoped to get from Anaxagoras; and, as I have suggested elsewhere (*Aristotle on Plato*, p. 451), the very wording of the *Phaedo* indicates that Plato had in mind here the account of causality given in the *Timaeus*.

⁴¹ What Robinson gives as the "second theory of the upward path," namely that it is the process of giving an account of your hypothesis described in the *Phaedo* (p. 168), was conceived by Shorey to be the same as the first, which Robinson gives as Shorey's interpretation.

Phaedo was mainly a premise but secondarily a proposition to be tested by the consistency of its consequences becomes in the "upward path" primarily and exclusively a proposition to be tested by means of the elenchus. The new claim for certainty, according to Robinson (p. 184), is made on the ground of the old hypothetical method; and the hypothetical method itself is even older than it was in the *Phaedo* or the *Meno*, for it has gone back to being practically the Socratic elenchus.

It is certainly true that elenchus is an important factor in the highest section of the "line"; but Robinson's attempt to restrict this to elenchus is certainly an erroneous limitation.⁴² If it were accurate, there would be no "upward path" in any sense; but that μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν ἰών (511 B 6-7) means motion "upward" in some sense is guaranteed both by the following πάλιν αὖ . . . ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνει and by the preceding οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν (511 A 5-6). There is no reason—except Robinson's gratuitous refusal to equate ἱκανόν and ἀνυπόθετον—for not taking this upward motion to be the ἄλλην αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος ἥτις τῶν ἄνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνεται ἕως ἐπὶ τι ἱκανὸν ἔλθοις of *Phaedo* 101 D-E; and only this can explain the πορεύεται τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιρούσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν of *Republic* 533 C 8, for each hypothesis as soon as it is deduced from a "higher" hypothesis ceases to have the character of an hypothesis. This "destruction" occurs at each step on the upward path and is *not*, as Robinson says it is (p. 167), "contemporary at the earliest with the final instant of that progress," although one cannot be sure that the destruction is final and correct until one has reached the ἱκανόν or ἀνυπόθετον. The tense of the participle ἀναιρούσα itself proves this, and to make doubly sure that this sense should not be overlooked Plato put the participial clause between πορεύεται and ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν.

As to ἀνυπόθετον, Robinson rightly observes (p. 163) that Plato apparently coined it for use here in the *Republic*; but it is

⁴² "Division" is certainly not absent from Plato's conception of the method represented by the highest section of the line, for not only is it given in 454 A as the distinctive mark of διαλέγεσθαι as opposed to ἐρίζειν but in 534 B-C, a passage which Robinson calls "complementary to the Line itself" (p. 181), the process is unmistakably described (B 8-C 1) as part of the distinctive method of the διαλεκτικός.

strange for him to add (p. 164) that it seems to be equivalent to "beginning" in Plato's terminology here, for in the first of its two appearances it is an adjective modifying ἀρχή (510 B 7). Since it is a coinage and not merely a negative of ὑπόθετος, a form which Plato does not use, it probably has an etymological sense connected with the etymological turn given to ὑπόθεσις in 511 B 5-6, τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, in which sense ὑποθέσεις is contrasted to ἀρχάς. It ought not then to be thought of as "unhypothesized," the negative of the action "to hypothesize," but as "not resting under something else to which it is a stepping-stone." On Robinson's interpretation of the Divided Line or that of anyone else the ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή is an "hypothesis" in the sense that it has been "posited," at any rate at first—how else did you reach it?—but it is ἀνυπόθετος in the sense that you cannot posit another hypothesis from which you can deduce it, and that is why it is a true ἀρχή. The idea of good is such an ἀρχή, not because all else is ontologically derivative from it but simply, as Cornford has said (*Parmenides*, p. 132), because "you cannot ask for a reason for goodness; the good is an end in itself."

Chapters 11 and 12 constitute a kind of pendant to the study of hypothesis. In the first of these it is argued that there is no precise correspondence between the Divided Line and the Cave. This position, so long as the limitation "precise" is observed, is certainly correct, although some of Robinson's supporting arguments are exaggerated.⁴³ At any rate, the main points of this

⁴³ Friedländer (*Class. Phil.*, XL [1945], p. 259) properly criticizes Robinson's interpretation of *Republic* 515 D and 532 A-C (pp. 195-6). The important point, however, is that, since the chained inhabitants of the cave can see only the shadows on the wall and because of the echo suppose these shadows to be speaking, the shadows cast on the wall of the cave symbolize *all the sensible objects* of our world, not merely the lowest division of the line (cf. 515 C 1-2, 516 C 8 ff. and E 8 ff.). The objects which cast these shadows are simply necessary machinery (cf. Shorey, *Idea of Good*, p. 237 and Cornford, *Republic*, p. 223, n. 1), which, if they stood for anything, would have to symbolize the ideas. Nor is there in what we are told of the functioning of *διάνοια* which uses as *εἰκόνας* the objects imitated by the lowest section of the line (τοῖς τότε μιμηθεῖσιν, 510 B 4), that is the sensible objects themselves, any parallel with the shadows and reflections outside of the cave or with the figurines within.

chapter are both right and well brought out: 1) the division of the upper line is one of method only, the point being that we must distinguish a lower and a higher way of getting at the intelligible world, 2) there are no "objects of mathematics" apart from the ideas,⁴⁴ and 3) Plato in the Line is proposing not a change in mathematics but a step out of and beyond mathematics.

The final chapter develops the thesis that whereas the hypothetical method is recommended in the "middle dialogues" very little use is made of that method in these works, which rely rather on analogy and imagery although what Plato says of analogy and imagery is usually unfavorable. That Robinson can be so much troubled by this apparent incoherence between Plato's method and methodology despite his own interpretation of the method used in the *Theaetetus*, the *Cratylus*, and the *Parmenides* and despite his recognition of *Politicus* 277-279 as a justification of the use of analogy is the natural result of his attempt to treat Plato's "logic" apart from his epistemology and ontology. The questions raised by Robinson and his method of treating them are important especially because they bring into sharp juxtaposition the attitude toward philosophy of the modern logician and that reflected in Plato's dialogues. Plato wrote no treatise on method; and the passages which are the subject of Robinson's study not only constitute but a tiny part of the writings from which they are extracted but all occur in those writings in contexts which are something other than "methodological." Moreover, the form of these writings itself constitutes a "method," behind which with important bearing upon its usefulness and justification lies Plato's theory of ideas and reminiscence with all of its consequences for discovery, demonstration, and teaching. Professor Robinson, like Glaucon, desires Plato to give an exhibition of the dialectic leading to an "anhypothetos arche"; he does not notice the way in which Socrates excuses himself from complying with Glaucon's request (*Republic* 533 A), a request which overlooks the very nature of dialectic and its necessary propaedeutics which by the figures of the sun, the line, and the cave Socrates has just tried to explain.

⁴⁴ These points are made by Moreau also in *La Construction*, pp. 343-6, though he arrives at the conclusion in quite a different manner.

If, then, Plato often points out the dangers of analogy and imagery and speaks scornfully of imitation, he still can hold that there is a proper and necessary use of these devices for those who are not yet dialecticians; for man, so long as he is man, one kind of imitation remains the highest goal, *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*, and even of the imitation which is tragedy there is a good kind as well as a bad: *ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγωδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δὴ φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγωδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην* (*Laws* 817 B).

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THE DESCENDANTS OF ASINIUS POLLIO.

C. Asinius Pollio died in 5 A. D. at the age of 79, surrounded by wealth and the respect of the world. One son, Herius Asinius, had already preceded him to the grave, but he was survived by his daughter, who had married into the ancient noble family of the Claudii Marcelli, and by his son of consular rank, C. Asinius Gallus, who had in 12 B. C. married Vipsania, daughter of M. Agrippa and ex-wife of the future emperor Tiberius.

The son C. Asinius Gallus, who was a very considerable orator himself, continued the cultural tradition and in other ways imitated his father, but he had also great political ambitions. Even if the real talents of Asinius Gallus fell far below his ambition, it indicates the eminence both of the man and of the family that near the end Augustus is said to have considered the desirability of leaving the principate to Asinius Gallus.¹

Distinguished for wealth, culture and in public affairs, the Asinii were now one of the great houses of Rome, revered throughout the empire; hence its membership and connections call for close examination.

The five sons of C. Asinius Gallus bore different praenomina as well as different cognomina. The eldest son, who became consul in 23 A. D. in what was doubtless the first year of his eligibility according to the custom for nobles who co-operated with the government, was born in 10 B. C. and was named for his famous paternal grandfather, C. Asinius Pollio. The second son, who became consul in 25 A. D., was accordingly born in 8 B. C. and was named for his famous maternal grandfather, M. Agrippa. The son who bore the father's own cognomen Gallus (but not the father's praenomen already bestowed upon the eldest son) surely came next in order. There are still two others, Celer and Saloninus. Servius Asinius Celer did not arrive apparently until all the more suitable relatives had already been honored with a namesake. Asinius Saloninus, although he hardly derived his cognomen from a paternal uncle²

¹ Tacitus, *Ann.*, I, 13.

² Dubiously attested by a scholiast according to whom he smiled once

who died in infancy, may have been the fourth, and Celer the youngest son. We have no means of calculating the ages of the last three exactly, but for a rough estimate we might postulate at least a two-year interval in each case. For example, Gallus might have been born in 6 B. C., and of Saloninus and Celer, one in 4 and the other in 2. A *terminus ante quem* for the birth of Servius Asinius Celer, who became consul in 38 A. D. just after the death of Tiberius, would be 5 A. D., but in his case we assume that, even if eligible as to age, he could not have risen to the consulate in the later years of Tiberius who killed the father. Asinius Saloninus died in 22 A. D., when he could hardly have been more than twenty-six years old and may have been two, three or even four years younger. He had had no chance to attain the age for an important office, and yet because of the great family to which he belonged his death was notable. "In that year," wrote Tacitus, "there died the illustrious men Asinius Saloninus . . . and Ateius Capito": *obiere eo anno viri inlustres Asinius Saloninus, M. Agrippa et Pollione avis, fratre Druso insignis Caesarique progener destinatus, et Capito Ateius*, etc. The inscription at Puteoli, *C. I. L.*, X, 1682, which concerned Saloninus or Gallus, provides at least another praenomen:

Cn. Asinio
Pollionis et Agrippae nepoti
Puteolani patrono publice

It is interesting to note that a special tie connected the family with the spiritual capital of Hellenism. First of all two Athenian inscriptions honor an Asinius who may have been Gallus' eldest son Pollio:³

and died, he is justifiably rejected by R. Syme, "Pollio, Saloninus and Salonaë," *C. Q.*, XXX (1937), pp. 39-48.

³ The first of these is *I. G.*, II², 4158. The text of the second is given just as I read and restored it at the beginning of the war during the composition of this article; subsequently the document was published by B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XV (1946), pp. 231-3, as follows: [Ὁ δῆμος] Γάιον Ἀσίνιον Γαίου υἱὸν στρατηγὸν ἀποδεδεργμένον ἀπερῆς [τε καὶ εὐχολας τῆς] εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἔνεκα ἀνέθη[κεν]. On the main point, however, the character and subject of the inscription, we are in agreement.




FIGURE 1. The family tree of the Asinii. The fall of C. Asinius Gallus occurred in 30 A.D. For Asinia's connections see Figure 2. Vipsania's first marriage (to Tiberius) was dissolved in 12 B.C. Of her children Salomonius and Gallus, one certainly had the praenomen Cnaeus while the other may have been Quintus (cf. Figure 3).

Ὁ δῆμος
Γάιον Ἀσίτιον
Γάιον υἱὸν
στρατηγὸν
5 ἀποδεδειγμένον
ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα
καὶ εὐνοίας
τῆς εἰς αὐτὸν
ἀνέθηκεν

Γάιον Ἀ[σίτιον Γάιον υἱὸν
στρατηγ[ὸν ἀποδεδειγμ]ένον
ἀρετῆς [ἔνεκα καὶ ε]ὐνοίας τῆς
εἰς αὐτὸν ὁ δῆμος ἀνέθη[κεν]

Then another member of the family appears in *I. G.*, II², 4172 which Graindor⁴ dated after the Augustan Period and before the Hadrianic:

[Ἡ πόλις]
[Γάι]ον Ἀσί[τιον - - -] υἱὸν
Πλακεντε[ῖον ἀρετῆς ἔνε]
κα καὶ εὐνοί[ας τῆς πρὸς τὸν]
δ[ῆμον]

The family tree is sufficiently familiar so that we may exclude for C. Placentinus, who is otherwise unknown, both the generation of Gallus and that of his five sons, on the basis of the praenomen spatially most acceptable. On the other hand, the style renders improbable a date under Trajan or Domitian. Placentinus, accordingly, appears to be a grandson of Gallus.

Still another member of the family, I propose to show, was honored at Athens in *I. G.*, II², 4111 (with addendum on p. 352), which I edit with the erasures restored as follows:

Ἡ βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου Πάγου καὶ ἡ βουλὴ
τῶν Ἑξακοσίων καὶ ὁ δῆμος [Κ[λαύ]δ[ιον]
[Μάρκελλον Αἰσερνεῖον καὶ] Καλονεῖ
σίαν Φλακκίλαν Καλονευσίου Σαβεῖνον
5 θυγατέρα Κλαυδίου Μαρκέλλου γυναῖκα
σωφροσύνης ἔνεκα

Because of conservative and even archaistic tendencies among Athenian stonecutters, it is extraordinarily difficult to date accurately many inscriptions which fall within the period from 60 B. C. to 60 A. D., but in my judgment the lettering of this inscription falls definitely within the first half of the first century after Christ. This view based on the style of lettering

⁴ P. Graindor, *Athènes de Tibère à Trajan* (Cairo, 1931), p. 30.

finds further corroboration in the erasure of lines 2 and 3, for such erasures of the names of prominent Romans strongly suggest condemnations for *laesa maiestas* from the reign of Tiberius on.⁵

A recent editor⁶ pointed out the marked similarity between the lettering of this inscription and that of *I. G.*, II², 4106 in honor of the proconsul Γάιος [...] κώνιος Γάλον νίος. The latter document really dates from the principate, but mistaking the man honored therein⁷ for one known from an inscription of

⁵ See R. Cagnat, *Cours d'Épigraphie Latine* (4th ed., Paris, 1914), p. 175. In one case Antony's name was erased and then re-engraved. The first permanent erasures cited by Cagnat are from the reign of Tiberius. In 20 A.D., moreover, the consul Aurelius Cotta proposed that the name of Germanicus' enemy Cn. Piso be erased from the *fasti*, but Tiberius objected: *ne nomen Pisonis fastis eximeretur, quando M. Antonii, qui bellum patriae fecisset, Iulli Antonii, qui domum Augusti violasset, manerent* (Tacitus, *Ann.*, III, 18, 1).

⁶ O. Broneer, *A. J. A.*, XXXVI (1932), pp. 393-7.

⁷ Th. Mommsen (*apud* Lolling, *Δελφῶν τῆς Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας*, 1889, p. 133) identified the man as the father or brother of M. Paconius who was legate of the proconsul of Asia, C. Silanus, in 22 A.D. and who was put to death by Tiberius for *laesa maiestas*. P. Graindor, *Athènes sous Auguste* (Cairo, 1927), p. 70, accepted this identification and dated the inscription to the reign of Augustus or to that of Tiberius. Broneer, however, thought that he had rediscovered the proconsul . . . κώνιος in the C. Orconius C. f. honored in a Delphian inscription of 66 B.C., *Fouilles de Delphes*, III, 4, p. 70, No. 46. This identification, on the other hand, was rejected by the late E. Groag, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten von Achaia bis auf Diokletian*, coll. 13 f. (= *Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien, Schriften der Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abt.*, IX [1939]). Groag argued 1) that because of the lettering the Athenian inscription was very much later, perhaps Augustan; 2) that in 66 B.C., before the creation of the province Achaia, a proconsul would have had to be a proconsul of Macedonia, in whose relatively complete *fasti* no governor named Orconius can be found. Either of these arguments is in my opinion convincing by itself, and I cannot imagine anyone with the name Orconius obtaining between 68 and 66 B.C. so coveted a province as Macedonia. The Orconius of the Delphian inscription, let it be remembered, is not described as a proconsul, nor is there any indication that he belonged to a senatorial family. Since the name of the proconsul ought to be sought among the senatorial families, it was probably either [As]conius or [Pa]conius, that of a family which rose to prominence in the double revolution of Caesar and Augustus. Broneer's restoration and date reappear *apud* S. J. De Laet, *De Samenstelling van den Romeinschen Senaat gedurende de eerste Eeuw van het Principaat*, no. 469

66 B. C., he dated also *I. G.*, II², 4106 near 66 B. C. Furthermore, largely because of its similar lettering he assigned the above inscription in honor of [Claudius Marcellus and] Calvisia Flaccilla to the middle of the first century B. C. and identified the Claudius Marcellus with the enemy of Caesar, C. Claudius Marcellus, consul in 49 B. C., who died at Athens in 45 B. C. and was honored by the Athenians with a monument after his death.⁸ Clearly this was not the monument because our Marcellus was very much alive and unlike the other he was accompanied by a not insignificant wife. Moreover, why the erasures if it was Caesar's enemy? The Athenians, who were partisans of Pompey as later of Antony, had no reason to insult an opponent of Caesar, while the latter, who paraded his magnanimity and clemency, would hardly have injured a dead enemy by ordering the erasure of his name.

Again it is unlikely that before the dictatorship of Caesar a prominent man from a great noble family like the Claudii Marcelli would have sought a wife among the still obscure Calvisii. It might have worked the other way: a Calvisius might have married a daughter of the Claudii Marcelli as Marius married a Julia, but in that era of political marriages a Claudius Marcellus would have spurned an alliance with a mere Calvisia. Furthermore, the father of Calvisia Flaccilla is unnecessarily recorded as if he added to her glory. This situation points definitely to the principate when the Calvisii Sabini had risen to be one of the great families of Rome.

The filiation, moreover, is never recorded by the praenomen of the father when the son's praenomen is omitted, so that whatever may have stood in the gap in line 3 did not include the phrase *Μάρκου υἱόν*.⁹ Thus neither Calvisius Sabinus nor Claudius Marcellus nor his father is mentioned by the praenomen, the omission of which would be very rare under the republic but is again very common under the principate when the praenomen tended to become less and less important.

If then the restoration *Μάρκου υἱόν* cannot be considered for line 3, what followed the nomen and cognomen of Claudius

bis (= *Rijksuniversiteit te Gent, Faculteit van de Wijsbegeerte en Letteren*, 92^e a.fl. [1941]).

⁸ Letter of Sulpicius Rufus to Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, IV, 12.

⁹ So Broneer, followed by Kirchner and Groag.

Marcellus must have been an additional cognomen, for a title would not have been erased. Apart from the nephew of Augustus, the Claudii Marcelli who were prominent in the early principate belonged to the branch of the Claudii Marcelli Aesernini. Now it is surely no mere coincidence that the cognomen Aeserninus fills exactly the rest of the space. If we are right in our date for the inscription, the Claudius Marcellus would almost have to be a member of this branch, and his name, formally registered as that of the person honored, would have to contain either the praenomen and filiation or the element Aeserninus. Also both methods of formal identification could of course be combined. He was commonly called just Claudius Marcellus, as by Seneca and as here in line 5, but not where his name was registered with independent identification.

One Marcellus Aeserninus, who was banished by Caesar but later recalled and covered with honors under Augustus, achieved the consulate in the year 22 B. C. Another, who was a grandson of Asinius Pollio, is known to have been praetor peregrinus in 19 A. D. As Groag¹⁰ has convincingly argued, the latter cannot be the son of the former, who held the quaestorship as early as 48 B. C., but ought to have been his grandson. Thus still another Marcellus Aeserninus must have been the son-in-law of Asinius Pollio and the father of the praetor of 19 A. D.

The Marcellus Aeserninus whose name has been erased in the Athenian inscription cannot well have been the husband of Asinia because Calvisia Flaccilla is recorded as his wife. Nor can he have been the consul of 22 B. C., who seems to have antedated the inscription and to have passed the latter part of his life in honor and security. By elimination, therefore, he was the praetor of 19 A. D., after whose death the old name of the Claudii Marcelli Aesernini appears to have come to an end.

He was a gifted orator, one of the four to whom the consul designate Silius, addressing the senate in the year 47 A. D. against fees for advocates, pointed as to the greatest and noblest orators of the last three generations: *meminissent Asinii, Messalae, ac recentiorum Arruntii et Aesernini, ad summa provectos incorrupta vita et facundia*.¹¹ These famous orators had not

¹⁰ *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*², II (1936), p. 215.

¹¹ Tacitus, *Ann.*, XI, 6, 4.

accepted fees. "They could afford such generosity, but not we," replied the opponents of Silius: *facile Asinium et Messalam, inter Antonium et Augustum bellorum praemiis refertos, aut ditium familiarum heredes Aeserninos et Arruntios magnum animum induisse*.¹² From this it appears that L. Arruntius and Marcellus Aeserninus both inherited great wealth and rose to the top by means of their eloquence, personality, and social position. Of Arruntius it is well known that he became consul in 6 A.D. The phrase *incorrupta vita*, moreover, applies primarily to their refusal to accept fees for their services. It does not mean that they could not have been condemned for *laesa*




FIGURE 2. The relatives-in-law of Asinia, daughter of Asinius Pollio.

maiestas in the reign of terror. Indeed, Arruntius took his own life in 37, because he felt sure of conviction and execution or at least because life under the terror had become too much for him. So it went also with Marcellus Aeserninus, whose name significantly has been erased in the inscription at Athens. *Sub Tiberio Caesare fuit accusandi frequens et paene publica rabies, quae omni civili bello gravius togatam civitatem confecit*.¹³

It may be possible to date the Athenian inscription honoring Aeserninus and his wife for their *σωφροσύνη*. It was not the

¹² Tacitus, *Ann.*, XI, 7, 5.

¹³ Seneca, *De Ben.*, III, 26, 1. For a reply to recent attempts to whitewash the character of Tiberius compare C. W. Mendell, *Yale Classical Studies*, V (1935), pp. 1-53, especially pp. 19-23 and 44-53. In the last years of the reign of Tiberius there was a veritable plague of trials and executions under the *lex maiestatis*. Even Tacitus, who mentions one hundred and eight senatorial cases of this type, has presented only a selection, enough to give the atmosphere and indicate the development.

year of his praetorship, but it presumably postdated his rise to international prominence as praetor peregrinus. From an Athenian standpoint the orator conspicuously displayed wise restraint when in 20 A. D. like C. Asinius Gallus he refused to defend Piso against the accusation of having murdered Germanicus.¹⁴

A new branch, the Asinii Marcelli, appear from the middle of the first century to the middle of the second century after Christ. At the beginning we have two consulars, Q. and M. Asinii Marcelli. The career of Quintus began under the Julio-Claudian emperors, because, although a patrician, he served as *decemvir stlitibus iudicandis*, a post not held by patricians from the time of Vespasian on.¹⁵ Since, moreover, he is known to be the son of another Quintus, Marcus Asinius Marcellus was not his father. Yet because of the similar nomenclature they must have been related, and it is not too rash to assume that they were brothers. The consulate of M. Asinius Marcellus occurred in 54 A. D. If he advanced to this post in the minimum time, as a noble might advance, then he was born in 21 A. D. His brother may have been born about two years earlier, for example.

M. Asinius Marcellus, *Asinio Pollione proavo clarus*,¹⁶ must have been descended from Asinius Pollio through Herius Asinius, through one of the five sons of C. Asinius Gallus, or through Asinia the mother of the Marcellus Aeserninus who was condemned, we have shown, for *laesa maiestas* toward the end of the reign of Tiberius.

Descent through an unrecorded son of Herius Asinius appears unlikely, and if Q. and M. Asinii Marcelli were grandsons of C. Asinius Gallus, cos. 8 B. C., descent of M. Marcellus from Agrippa would have been emphasized equally with that from Asinius Pollio, as in the case of Saloninus. There remains only the line of Asinia. Q. and M. Marcelli were mere children in the reign of Tiberius, and when Marcellus Aeserninus was condemned, his relatives would presumably have looked after the children.

That Q. and M. Marcelli were not descended from Asinius Pollio through the male line is further suggested by the invari-

¹⁴ Tacitus, *Ann.*, III, 11.

¹⁵ E. Gróag, *P. I. R.*², I, p. 250, no. 1234.

¹⁶ Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIV, 40, 3.

ability of the cognomen, which was not bestowed in order to honor a relative or friend in the occasional manner of earlier generations of Asinii but in order to assert membership in a separate branch of the *gens*. It records the noble family out of which the boys had been adopted by a relative of their father. The adoptive father, Q. Asinius (), could have been, hardly an unrecorded son of Herius Asinius who died so young, but a son of C. Asinius Gallus cos. 8 B. C. If he was a son of C. Asinius Gallus, it could only be Gallus because Saloninus died too young, while Pollio, Agrippa, and Celer are known to have had praenomina other than Quintus. By elimination, furthermore, it would establish Cnaeus as the praenomen of Saloninus.

The M. Asinius Marcellus who became consul in 104 A. D. is more likely to have been a son than a grandson of the M. Asinius Marcellus born in 21 A. D., for nobles were no longer being advanced to the consulate with the same rapidity and certainty. The consul Q. Asinius Marcellus of 96 A. D. can scarcely have been a man born around 20 A. D., so he must have been the son of the first Q. Asinius Marcellus. They are not identical. The consul of 96 A. D., however, born before 64 A. D. at the very latest, would probably not have been that proprietor of the tile factory who died in 141. Thus we are dealing, I rather suspect, with three men who bore the name Q. Asinius Marcellus. The tiles stamped with this name begin in the Trajanic Period,¹⁷ and the *figlinae* in which they were produced may at first have belonged to the consul of 96 A. D. as later to the Q. Asinius Marcellus from whom the factory passed in 141 to Asinia Quadratilla.¹⁸

¹⁷ See now the careful study of H. Bloch, "I bolli laterizii e la storia edilizia romana," *Bull. Arch. Com.*, LXIV (1936), pp. 142-225; LXV (1937), pp. 83-187; LXVI (1938), pp. 193-353. Tiles of Q. Asinius Marcellus are found at Rome in the Atrium Vestae in a wall which belongs to the Trajanic Period, as Bloch demonstrates, *loc. cit.*, LXIV, pp. 208 and 218 (cf. LXV, pp. 88, 90 f., and 175).

¹⁸ H. Bloch, *Bull. Arch. Com.*, LXVI (1938), p. 195, assumes that the name Q. Asinius Marcellus on the stamps applies to one person, namely the consul of 96 A. D., and that Asinia Quadratilla, accordingly, was not the granddaughter of the consular but his daughter. E. Groag, *P. I. R.*², I (1933), p. 250, lists the proprietor of the tile factory under no. 1236 and the consul of 96 A. D. under no. 1235, where he comments: "vel idem atque Q. Asinius Marcellus qui sequitur vel pater eius."

In the third century after Christ the cognomen and the Italian descent of the consular (and historian) C. Asinius Quadratus suggest that he and his son the consular C. Asinius Julianus¹⁹ were relatives of Asinia Quadratilla; but a family connection, if it existed, might have gone back merely to an adoption.

From the generation after Asinius Pollio, who created the greatness of the family, its history may be summarized as




FIGURE 3. The Asinii Marcelli.

follows. Under the leadership of C. Asinius Gallus cos. 8 B. C. it became one of the most influential families of Rome. Gallus, himself, appears repeatedly in the pages of Tacitus as the senatorial spokesman. In the factions which grew up during the reign of Tiberius, the Asinii were closely connected with Germanicus, whose wife Agrippina was a half-sister of the wife of C. Asinius Gallus. The latter's nephew Aeserninus became praetor²⁰ in 19 A.D. and an Arval Brother; one of the sons

¹⁹ On this family see the remarks of E. Groag, *Die römischen Reichsbeamten von Achaia bis auf Diokletian*, coll. 90-91 (= *Akad. d. Wiss. in Wien, Schriften der Balkankommission, Antiquarische Abt.*, IX [1939]).

²⁰ Later perhaps also consul as suggested by K. Th. Schneider, *Zusammensetzung des römischen Senates von Tiberius bis Nero* (Diss., Zürich, 1942), p. 43, no. 79.

of Asinius Gallus became consul in 23 A. D., and another in 25 A. D. It was intended that another son who died in 22 A. D., *Caesari progener destinatus*, should marry the emperor's grand-niece, daughter of Germanicus. At Athens, which had been rudely castigated by Piso²¹ and treated with deference by Germanicus²² and his friends, a statue was erected at least to Aeserninus. Relations with Tiberius, despite the insinuations of Tacitus, appear to have been excellent so far. Gallus cultivated Sejanus.²³ In 23 A. D. occurred the death of Drusus Caesar, and the children of Germanicus were now in line for the succession. The ambition of Agrippina, widow of Germanicus, and the influence of Sejanus aroused the suspicion and hostility of Tiberius against Agrippina and her friends. Her open display of hostility to Tiberius is recorded by Tacitus²⁴ among the events of 26 A. D. In 29 Tiberius openly assailed Agrippina. In 30 occurred the condemnation of Gallus,²⁵ who was now seventy years old. Subsequently Tiberius accused Agrippina of adultery—a common cloak for an unavowable political motive—with Asinius Gallus and of being in despair because of the latter's death. Aeserninus too was condemned.

From 26 A. D., the whole family of the Asinii, including Marcellus Aeserninus, must have been seriously compromised with Tiberius, and all advancement closed. On the other hand, they were highly esteemed by Agrippina and were favorably treated in the memoirs of her daughter, Agrippina the Younger.

But as soon as Tiberius died and Caligula, son of Germanicus, succeeded, the Asinii were restored to something like prominence, and Ser. Asinius Celer achieved the consulate in 38 A. D.

Under Claudius the Asinii lost their special influence, and in

²¹ Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 55, 1.

²² Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 53, 3-4: *hinc ventum Athenas, foederique sociae et vetustae urbis datum, ut uno lictore uteretur. exceperere Graeci quaesitissimis honoribus, vetera suorum facta dictaque praeferentes, quo plus dignationis adulationis haberet.*

²³ Dio Cassius, LVIII, 2.

²⁴ *Ann.*, IV, 54.

²⁵ Dio Cassius, LVIII, 2. The pertinent section of the *Annals* of Tacitus has not been preserved. It was surely Gallus whom Agrippina in 26 A. D. had wanted to marry, as suggested by F. B. Marsh, *The Reign of Tiberius* (Oxford, 1931), p. 179, note 4, and by R. S. Rogers, *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), p. 155.

his disaffection Asinius Gallus conspired against the emperor. When his bungling machinations were uncovered, he himself was punished and the family was once again seriously compromised so that they forfeited the imperial patronage necessary for political advancement.

But with the rise of Agrippina the Younger, daughter of Germanicus, to a position of controlling influence, the Asinii once more emerge into political prominence. M. Asinius Marcellus achieved the consulate in 54 and Q. Asinius Marcellus at some unknown date in the same period. With a sense of favors to come, Athens at this time erected the dedication for C. Asinius Placentinus.

Agrippina, it seems, was distributing patronage, but the favors were not all one way. Especially at a time when a change of regime was ripe or had to be consolidated, the support of the illustrious old and wealthy families, to whose *clientela* other families and even cities naturally still gravitated,²⁶ meant a great deal both for prestige and for immediately practical reasons.

No further consulates are recorded for the family until 81 when Asinius Pollio Verrucosus achieved that distinction.²⁷ In 96 another Q. Marcellus and in 104 another M. Marcellus became consuls.

The connection of the family with Athens went back to the days of T. Pomponius Atticus. When Agrippa married the

²⁶ Tacitus, *Hist.*, I, 4, 3: *pars populi integra et magnis domibus adnexa*.

²⁷ The proconsul of Sardinia, C. Asinius Tucurianus (= *P. I. R.*², I, 1254), whose date is not recorded, probably belonged to the second half of the first century A.D. like Placentinus and Verrucosus. It is tempting to identify him with the benefactor of Corone in Messenia and to restore his name in the inscription published by N. Valmin, *Rapport préliminaire de l'Expédition en Messénie*, pp. 44-46 (= *Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund, Årsberättelse*, 1934-1935, I): 'Α πό[λις] | ἃ τῶν Κο[ρωναίων] | Γ. Ἀσίνιον [Τουκουρι] | ἀνὸν τὸ [ν] ἑαυτᾶς] | ἐπε[γέραν] | ἀπερᾶς [ἔνεκα]. The photograph indicates that the lacuna in line 3 requires a restoration longer than the name of C. Asinius Julianus, for whom, moreover, the inscription is surely too early. The cognomen, which I presume to be derived like Tocernius and Togernius ultimately from the Etruscan praenomen *thucer*, may have been written in Greek with tau or theta.

daughter of Atticus, he inherited these ties and made them for the Athenians vastly more important. The huge monument at the approach to the Acropolis was rededicated to Agrippa, who thus received with other honors one even beyond his legitimate expectations. From him the tie had descended to the families into which his daughters had married, namely to the Asinii and to the house of Germanicus. This is the background which influenced the behavior of Germanicus and of his enemy Piso on their visits to Athens, and it is the background which called forth more than one monument at Athens in joyful celebration of the impending praetorship of a young Asinius.

P. APPULEIUS VARUS.

The Athenian inscriptions *I. G.*, II², 4106 and 4111, for which on pages 150 ff. above we have proposed a date in the first half of the first century after Christ, resemble both in lettering and in general appearance another Athenian base with an inscription which B. D. Meritt publishes in *Hesperia*, XV (1946), pp. 234-5. Meritt would admit a date from the second century B.C. to the second century after Christ. It reads:

Ἡ βουλὴ ἡ ἐξ Ἀρχόν Πάγου
καὶ ὁ δῆμος Πρόπλιον Ἀππολήγιον
Οὐᾶρον ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐνοίας
ἔνεκα

While monuments are commonly erected by the πόλις or the δῆμος or the Areopagus alone, also by the Demos in conjunction with the Council of the Six (or Five) Hundred with or without the Areopagus, monuments erected by the Areopagus and the Demos in conjunction, without mention of the Council of the Six (or Five) Hundred, are less frequent. Two such monuments, *I. G.*, II², 3258 and 3259, are securely dated in 18 A.D. or close thereto. This reinforces our impression that the new monument in honor of P. Appuleius Varus belongs in the first quarter of the first century after Christ or close thereto.

The man is not otherwise known, but in view of the date a likelihood exists that he was not some *negotiator* but a representative of a distinguished Roman family. At this time the Appulei, producing consuls, were indeed a great family, among whom the cognomen Varus appears in the feminine form Varilla. Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 50, identifies Appuleia Varil(λ)α (= *P. I. R.*², I, 968) as *sororis Augusti neptem*. She was accused in 17 A.D. of adultery. P. Appuleius Varus was, I think, a relative of hers and then almost certainly a senator.

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THE FIRST ELEGY OF SOLON.

The reflective elegy of Solon, 1 Diehl,¹ has already been made the subject of extensive and intelligent discussion.² The poem is, however, so full of matter, and presents so many problems, that finality of demonstration has not yet been achieved; and a re-reading of the text suggests that certain passages have not even yet received full analysis. In particular, attempts to outline the structure of the elegy have invariably encountered difficulties, since there are apparent inconsequences in the articulation of parts, and even internal contradictions in sense, so that it has been thought to be a mere patchwork.³ I believe

¹ Diehl's text has been followed throughout this study. All other references to lyric poets are also to Diehl's text.

² The following works have been consulted: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 257-75; K. Reinhardt, "Solons Elegie els éavrov," *Rh. Mus.*, LXXI (1916), pp. 128-35; I. M. Linforth, *Solon the Athenian* (*Univ. of California Publ. Class. Phil.*, VI [1919]), pp. 105-13; K. Ziegler, "Solon als Mensch und Dichter," *Neue Jahrb.*, XLIX, 1 (1922), pp. 193-204; G. Perotta, "L'elegia di Solone alle Muse," *Atene e Roma*, V (1924), pp. 251-60; T. Hudson-Williams, *Early Greek Elegy* (Cardiff and London, 1926); P. Friedlaender, "In Solonis c. 1," *Hermes*, LXIV (1929), pp. 381-3; W. Schmid, *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, I, 1 (Munich, 1929), pp. 367-8; E. Roemisch, *Studien zur älteren griechischen Elegie* (Frankfurt, 1933), pp. 1-37; 70-76; J. M. Edmonds, *Elegy and Iambus* (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1931); C. M. Bowra, *Early Greek Elegy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), pp. 90-8; K. Bielohlawek, *Hypotheke und Gnome* (*Philologus*, Supplbd. XXXII, 3 [Leipzig, 1940]), pp. 27-8; W. C. Greene, *Moira* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944), pp. 36-7; W. Jaeger, *Paideia* (Eng. trans. G. Highet, 2d ed., New York, 1945), I, pp. 144-7. References to these works will be made in the simplest possible form.

³ So Perotta. He argues that to the genuine opening (1-8) is appended a string of gnomic lines, including some from the works of Solon himself. The true conclusion he outlines from the concluding couplet in the parody by Crates, 1, 10-11:

τῶν δὲ τυχῶν Ἑρμῆν καὶ Μούσας ἱλάσσοι' ἀγνάς
οὐ δαπάναις τρυφεραῖς, ἀλλ' ἀρεταῖς ὁσίαις.

There is nothing in our poem which corresponds to this, but (so Perotta) there must once have been; namely, the true, original ending of Solon's prayer. The alternative would be that Crates began, but did not end, with a close parody.

a new approach may help to clarify some of the obscurities in structure and sense, which are interdependent. This discussion is put forward in all humility as a contribution toward the understanding of a poem of enormous interest and admitted difficulty.

To discuss as a unit an elegy of 76 lines is, as Wilamowitz has complained,⁴ a very awkward task. In this study the structure will be analyzed first by following the textual transitions as they appear; then by studying the character of the construction as a whole. Finally, certain passages will be re-examined from the point of view of content. This method is cumbersome and involves some repetition, but under the circumstances appears to be the only one practicable.

If, instead of trying to articulate the poem according to some known or postulated framework, we proceed inductively from passage to passage, looking for the occasion of each new subject in the implications of the previous subject, a new impression is received. The elegy seems no longer to fall into a series of sections, or even into two main parts,⁵ but becomes a progression of thought, each subsequent stage being an expansion, or revision, or illustration of a previous stage. It is thus a self-generating series of connected ideas.

Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζητὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα,
Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτὲ μοι εὐχομένωι.
ὄλβον μοι πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων δότε καὶ πρὸς ἀπάντων
ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθὴν.
5 εἶναι δὲ γλυκὺν ὥδε φίλοις*, ἐχθροῖσι δὲ πικρόν,
τοῖσι μὲν αἰδοῖον, τοῖσι δὲ δεινὸν ἰδεῖν.

It has been pointed out that elegy is always addressed to someone.⁶ In this case, the opening address to the Muses gives

⁴ P. 258. Wilamowitz prefaces his analysis with a paraphrase in Greek prose.

⁵ So Bowra, Greene, and even Wilamowitz, with whose analysis of the poem I find myself in general agreement.

⁶ See Jaeger, p. 89. This poem has been named Solon's Prayer to the Muses or, alternatively, his Elegy *eis éautón*. Both are justifiable titles but likely to be misleading, the former because the reflections wander so far from the initial prayer, the latter because the elegy is not addressed by the poet *to* himself (like Archilochus, 67, which is trochaic self-exhortation, Odysseus-like) but is rather written *for* himself.

the poem the formal appearance of a prayer. But the prayer is contained entirely in these lines or, at most, in lines 1-8. This does not mean that the poem is conventional and meaningless.⁷ The prayer is real and is a real beginning, but in itself simple. Of the three things prayed for, wealth, reputation, and power (to help friends and injure enemies, the product of wealth and reputation combined) the latter two are not developed. The word that leads to expansion is *ὀλβόν*.

χρήματα δ' ἡμεῖρω μὲν ἔχειν, ἀδίκως δὲ πεπᾶσθαι
οὐκ ἐθέλω· πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη.⁸

χρήματα repeats *ὀλβόν* and the couplet completes the modification of the prayer. The request in its first form was too simple. Solon's surviving work shows throughout a disapproval of greed for money, of those persons who always want more when they already have enough.⁹ This feeling, a directing force in political activities presumably subsequent to this poem, could almost be called an obsession, were it not so well justified by the realities of his time. The prayer in the first six lines has given the impression that the poet is simply asking for wealth, whether deserved or not, and this will not do. Hence the modification.

- 10 πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί, παραγίγνεται ἀνδρὶ
ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεότητος πυθμένος ἐς κορυφὴν·
ὃν δ' ἄνδρες μετίωσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται, ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται αὐτῇ·
ἀρχὴ δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου γίγνεται ὥς τε πυρός
15 φλαύρη μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνιερὴ δὲ τελευταί·
οὐ γὰρ δὴ<ν> θνητοῖς ὕβριος ἔργα πέλει,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος, ἐξαπίνης δέ,
ὥστ' ἄνεμος νεφέλας αἶψα διεσκέδασεν
ἡρινός

πλοῦτον resumes *ὀλβόν* (3) and *χρήματα* (7). *ἀδίκως* (7) is expanded to *ὑφ' ὕβριος* and the implied *δικαίως* to *ὃν μὲν δῶσι θεοί*.¹⁰

⁷ So Bielowlawek.

⁸ Compare Sappho, 92; Pindar, *Pyth.*, V, 1-4.

⁹ As later in this poem, 72-73. See also 3, 5-6; 4, 5-7; 5, 9-10. For *χρήματ' ἀνὴρ* see Solon's contemporary, Alcaeus, 101; later, Pindar, *Isth.*, II, 11, also Theognis, 699-700.

¹⁰ Compare Hesiod, *Op.* 320: *χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἀρπακτά, θεόδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω*.

The prayer is done, but the opposition of just and unjust money-making, and the simple statement that punishment attends the latter, can be developed. The imagery shifts, from standing grain ready to be reaped, to an unwilling follower being dragged along by violence, then to a fire, finally to a hurricane. The point that punishment follows unjust profit has already been made (8); we are now told why, because it is against nature, therefore against the gods. But line 8 needed expansion also in another way. It implied that punishment came immediately or simply; and Solon knows that this is not true. Punishment may be delayed, or may seem at first insignificant; the end is terrific, and no one can tell when Zeus will strike. Yet the very statement "Zeus strikes" is missing, because we are involved in mid-sentence in another sort of progression, in which anacolouthon is characteristic.

20 ὃς πόντου πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτοιο
 πυθμένα κινήσας, γῆν κατὰ πυροφόρον
 δηιώσας καλὰ ἔργα θεῶν ἕδος αἰπὺν ἰκάνει
 οὐρανόν, αἰθρίην δ' αὖτις ἔθηκεν ἰδεῖν.
 λάμπει δ' ἡελίοιο μένος κατὰ πύονα γαῖαν
 καλόν, ἀτὰρ νεφέων οὐδὲν ἔτ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

This progression is in the manner of the Homeric simile. It differs from previous stages in that there is no expansion or development of thought, but pure illustration. ὥστ' ἀνεμος originally was to form part of a statement like "Zeus strikes as the wind does." But now not meaning, rather imagery, expands, and the imagery is anchored at the beginning in its context but free at the other end. So the simile of the gale ends with calm, and cloudless skies, because the figure of the gale once started transfers interest from the preceding context to itself, until it has been run out to its conclusion. Solon drops his text for the moment to follow this splendid storm he has started. This progression is quite different in content from the organic expansion of thought we have been tracing hitherto. It is at home in the epic,¹¹ and can also appear in close forms, such as the

¹¹ On the characteristics of the Homeric simile see Schmid, I, 1, pp. 102-3. This manner of digression is not restricted to the simile; compare II., I, 234-239, where Achilles, about to swear by the king's staff, interrupts himself to describe it and tell its story.

Sapphic ode.¹² At the same time, on the formal side it represents, through a known and familiar technique, the projection of a sequence irrelevant to the original context.

- 25 τιαύτη Ζηγνός πέλεται τίσις, οὐ δ' ἐφ' ἐκάστωι
 ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὀξύχολος,
 αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέλθθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρών
 θυμὸν ἔχῃ, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνῃ.
 ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, ὃ δ' ὕστερον· οἱ δὲ φύγῳσιν
 30 αὐτοί, μὴ δὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιούσα κίχῃ,
 ἤλυθε πάντως αὖτις· ἀνάτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν
 ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γέ(ν)ο(ς) ἐξ(ε)πίσω.

τιαύτη accordingly goes back to the beginning of the simile, not to its end, or rather beyond the simile to include also the statement which occasions it, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος. The complement to this is οὐ δ' ἐφ' ἐκάστωι ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὀξύχολος. Like the storm, which destroys καλὰ ἔργα, Zeus seems somewhat indiscriminate. His view, unlike ours, is the long one, and he is not concerned about details. Again, the fact of delay in punishment is reaffirmed more precisely. The escape of the guilty, the punishment of their innocent children, are expansions of the above thought, which springs originally from τέλος (17).¹³

- θνητοὶ δ' ὥδε νοεῦμεν ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε,
 ε(ὐ) δ(ε)νὴν αὐτὸς δόξαν ἕκαστος ἔχει,¹⁴
 35 πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ' αὖτις ὀδύρεται· ἄχρι δὲ τούτου
 χάσκοντες κούφαισ' ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.

Those who have considered that the poem falls into two main

¹² See for example Sappho, 98, 6-14, where ὥς . . . μήνα introduces the full unfolding of a moonlit night.

¹³ ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφορᾷ τέλος is resumed, after the interruption of the simile, by πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνῃ.

¹⁴ I have given this line as it stands in Diehl's text. Yet this emendation (which is Buecheler's) of the MS ενδηνην, though attractive, is unlikely, implying as it does δεινός = "terrific" = "magnificent." To other proposed emendations cited in Diehl's commentary, now add Jaeger's ἔρδειν ἦν and see his note, *Paideia*, pp. 450-1. I believe, but hardly expect to convince others, that the right reading is ἐνδον ἦν, so that the line means "each man keeps himself his own inward ideas." For the quantity, compare Homer, *Il.*, XVII, 260: τῶν δ' ἄλλων τίς κεν ἦσι φρεσὶν οὐνόματ' εἴποι. That is, a short vowel followed by a consonant before oblique cases of δς is syllaba anceps. See also *Od.*, I, 5; IX, 34; XIX, 400, etc. Thus ὥδε νοεῦμεν would be left intransitive, its content being supplied in the following line.

divisions¹⁵ would place the break here. But there is no real break. The essential point has been made that Zeus looks only in the large and toward the end (17; 25-28); this brings us, via *θητοί*, to the contrasted human way, which is to look at what is immediate and *not* to see the end.¹⁶ In *ὁμῶς ἀγαθὸς τε κακὸς τε* there is an indication that the subject has now proceeded from the consideration of evil and divine punishment to the question of human, as contrasted with divine, intelligence. Against the absolute knowledge of Zeus, our flimsily founded expectations (*κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα*) whenever we try to go beyond the immediate.

χῶστις μὲν νούσουσιν ὑπ' ἀργαλέησι πιεσθῆι
 ὥς ὑγιὲς ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο·
 ἄλλος δειλὸς ἐὼν ἀγαθὸς δοκεῖ ἔμμεναι ἀνὴρ
 40 καὶ καλὸς μορφὴν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων·
 εἰ δέ τις ἀχρήμων, πενίης δέ μιν ἔργα βιάται,
 κτήσεσθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ.

These lines are a simple expansion of the foregoing, to exemplify the way in which we delude ourselves with false interpretation of our own nature¹⁷ or false expectation of the close future. Such expansion is characteristic of the poem. To belong strictly in sequence, *ὥς ὑγιὲς ἔσται, τοῦτο κατεφράσατο* should mean "thinks he will be healthy," but from the construction it is more likely to mean "makes plans to become healthy." In either case, it expresses an optimistic hope. With the last couplet in this sequence, and the important word *χρήματα*, we are back on the important subject of money and money-making, which while not originally selected as the subject of the poem is a matter of such absorbing interest to Solon that it is likely to generate a further expansion of thought. Again, the methods of making money are various. *χρήματα* therefore launches us once more on an illustrative series, within illustrative series.

σπεύδει δ' ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος· ὃ μὲν κατὰ πόντον ἀλάται
 ἐν νηυσὶν χρήζων οἴκαδε κέρδος ἄγει
 45 ἰχθυόεντ' ἀνέμοισι φορεῦμενος ἀργαλέοισιν,

¹⁵ See above, note 5.

¹⁶ So Wilamowitz, p. 265.

¹⁷ *δοκέω* can refer to the future as well as the present, and *ἐλπίζω* to the present as well as the future; thus we are prepared (*δόξαν, ἐλπίσιν*) for either. The point is that we cannot break loose from our subjective notions.

- φειδωλὴν ψυχῆς οὐδεμίαν θέμενος·
 ἄλλος γῆν τέμνων πολυδένδρεον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν
 λατρεύει, τοῖσιν καμπύλ' ἄροτρα μέλει·
 ἄλλος Ἀθηναίης τε καὶ Ἑφαιστοῦ πολυτέχνῳ
 50 ἔργα δαεῖς χειροῖν ξυλλέγεται βίοτον,
 ἄλλος Ὀλυμπίδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθεὶς,
 ἡμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος·
 ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἀναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων,
 ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον,
 55 ὣι συνομαρτήσωσι θεοί· τὰ δὲ μόρσιμα πάντως
 οὔτε τις οἰωνὸς ῥύσεται οὔθ' ἱερά·
 ἄλλοι Παιῶνος πολυφαρμάκου ἔργον ἔχοντες
 ἱητροί, καὶ τοῖσ' οὐδὲν ἔπεισι τέλος·
 60 πολλὰκι δ' ἐξ ὀλίγης ὀδύνης μέγα γίγνεται ἄλγος,
 κοῦκ ἂν τις λύσται ἥπια φάρμακα δούς·
 τὸν δὲ κακῶς νοῦσοισι κυκώμενον ἀργαλέησιν
 ἀψάμενος χειροῖν αἵψα τίθησ' ὕγιη.

The transition to this series was, as we have seen, obvious.¹⁸ As to its inner structure, there may be a progression from the life of the merchant, most obviously controlled by motives of profit (even to the risk of life¹⁹), toward those professions, farmer, smith, poet, seer, doctor, in which this motive is less clearly dominant. Even if the transitional idea of *χρήματα* is considered to have faded by the end of the series, this is once again only the technique of the simile (progression of imagery) applied to the progression of ideas; fast at one end, free at the other. There are also modifications of statement within the passage. Concerning the seer, the first couplet (53-54) could, logically and grammatically, stand by itself. The three previous exponents of their professions have had only one couplet apiece; but to finish with the *μάντις* here would be over-simple, since it might leave concerning his powers an impression that would be false. For, first, the seer can read the future only if the gods help him (55), that is, if the godlike view is conferred from without, since as man he is fallible like other men; and, secondly, no foreknowledge, no omen, can prevent what is fated to happen

¹⁸ Note that the famous parallel in Horace, *Carm.*, I, 1, is an *initial* series without preliminary context. Horace perhaps has in mind also Pindar, *Isth.*, I, 47-9.

¹⁹ For sea-faring as an example of the most desperate need or desire for money, see Hesiod, *Op.*, 632-4; 646-7; Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 411-18; Tibullus, I, 1, 49-50.

from happening (55-56).²⁰ This correction-in-stride of a too-simple statement parallels the correction of line 3 by lines 7-8. Next, the physician. He also does not see or control the end (τέλος) when he goes to work.²¹ The meaning of καὶ τοῖς οὐδὲν ἔπεισι τέλος becomes clear, I think, if we remember ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πάντων ἐφοραῖ τέλος (17) and πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη (28). τέλος in any sense, perfection of power,²² perfection of vision, ability to see to the end, belongs to the gods; the physician is without final authority, a mere mortal doing his best with immediate appearances, and subject to favorable as well as unfavorable surprises (59-62).

Μοῖρα δέ τοι θνητοῖσι κακὸν φέρει ἡδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,
δῶρα δ' ἄφικτα θεῶν γίγνεται ἀθανάτων.

- 65 πᾶσι δέ τοι κίνδυνος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν, οὐ δέ τις οἶδεν,
ἥ μὲλλει σχήσειν χρήματος ἀρχομένου·
ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν εὖ ἔρδειν πειρώμενος οὐ προνοήσας
ἐς μεγάλην ἄτην καὶ χαλεπὴν ἔπεισεν,
τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἔρδοντι θεὸς περὶ πάντα δίδωσιν
70 συντυχίην ἀγαθὴν, ἐκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης.

These last phenomena, unexpected aggravation of disease (59-60), unexpected recovery (61-62), now are summarized and generalized, first as (respectively) κακὸν and ἐσθλόν bestowed by fate, then together as δῶρα θεῶν.²³ In other words, the success and failure of the doctor contrary to the expectation of his judgment are examples which can be extended to apply to human experience in general. It simply follows from this that the man who tries to proceed the right way may fail, the mistaken man may succeed. This completes the description of mortal knowl-

²⁰ It is nowhere said to be the business of the seer to *control* the future; yet such lines as *Il.*, I, 108: ἐσθλὸν δ' οὔτε τί πω εἶπας ἔπος οὔτ' ἐτέλεσσας seem to indicate that such might be his function according to popular belief.

²¹ Edmonds translates: "for these too there's no end to their labors." Plausible in itself, but the endlessness of work has not been the main point.

²² See Liddell-Scott-Jones, *s. v.* τέλος.

²³ The terms Μοῖρα (63), θεοί (64), Ζεὺς (76), ἀθάνατοι (74) are not here used with particular circumspection, but are at least roughly equivalent. At any rate, Μοῖρα = θεοί, since the δῶρα θεῶν (64) are the same as the κακὸν and ἐσθλόν given by Μοῖρα (63). It would be as futile to try to make accurate distinctions here as to distinguish among ὄλβος (3), χρήματα (7), and πλοῦτος (9).

edge, its extreme inadequacy as contrasted with the divine. οὐ προνοήσας attaches no particular blame.²⁴ It is not through want of trying, but through sheer lack of vision and power, that no man can count on the success of his careful plans.

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται.
οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι,
75 ἄτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεύς
πέμψῃ τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

Here the link is least obvious, the transition most abrupt. Yet the last six lines must be generated from *συντυχίην ἀγαθήν* (70). This means, of course, success. But since Solon is haunted throughout this work by the idea of money, it is not unnatural that he should seize on that aspect of *συντυχίη ἀγαθή* which particularly fascinates him, and proceed from "success" as if it meant "financial success." Those who have won this undeservedly bring him back at last to the present, to Attica here and now (οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων). It is they who are at the heart of troubles in Athens, and the thought of them at the outset made Solon modify his simple prayer to become rich. Such men are short-sighted; they do not realize that wealth has come to them by divine dispensation, not through their own cleverness; and they want more. With a reminder that this brings *ἄτη* (75, recalling 17), and the more sinister reminder that Zeus works in a large way and is not troubled concerning details (25-32), so that no man can tell who will suffer on account of these greedy ones, Solon comes to a close.

If the above analysis is justified in detail, the poem is, then, a progression from idea to idea, self-generated; we are in effect watching Solon think. Wilamowitz describes the structure as a chain,²⁵ and so far this view repeats his. He also warns us

²⁴ The essential meaning of these lines is repeated in the lines which appear at the end of several plays by Euripides. See the endings of *Alcestis*, *Medea*, *Andromache*, *Helen*, *Bacchae*.

²⁵ "Glieder einer Kette" (p. 265). He adds: "Da ist die Aufgabe des Erklärers zu sehen, erst das jedes Glied nach vorn und hinten seinen Anschluss hat; so viel kann der Dichter leisten, können wir also fordern; aber als Ganzes und Geschlossenes zu erfassen müssen wir die Kette als Ganzes übersehen und vor allem darauf achten, woran sie

against trying to force the work into any pattern or scheme, as in stylized forms such as drama or oratory. Further, however, he would make this simply a matter of the paratactic archaic style, characteristic of one who lacks training to subordinate. If this were so, the poem would find closer analogies in the rest of Solon's work and early elegy in general. Wilamowitz also, as do others, believes that the thought is guided by a single idea: the universal desire for wealth.²⁶

The assumption of such a guiding theme, if taken seriously, contradicts the analysis made above and indicated previously by Wilamowitz. The initial prayer becomes, except for one element, a decorative forefront; the passages on punishment become digressions, not progressions. What is the subject of the poem? The desire for wealth and its effect on human conduct and experience? The difference between mortal and divine intelligence? The nature of divine punishment? The point is that there is no subject. Solon is simply proceeding from thought to thought; talking to himself, that is, thinking,²⁷ in such a way that we are not given the end product, with reasons, but follow the train from its outset. Hence the contradictions, which arise from a shift or advance in thought. Yet it is also true that the direction of the thinking is dictated much (not all) of the time by a consideration which was of constant and absorbing interest to Solon: the desire of all men, including himself, for prosperity. In other words, so far as there is any guiding idea, it is subconscious, not formal.

It is this absence of subject which makes such descriptions as "paratactic" and "archaic" not incorrect, but inadequate. In detail, we find development not only by epic simile and analogous projections, but also by paratactic arrangement. But the series of progressive thoughts which composes this poem has no exact parallel. Not in Tyrtaeus, in whose work as we have it each fragment and each complete piece is dominated by a single idea. Tyrtaeus had an assignment and a program, and was not

hängt: das ist hier der Wunsch, reich zu werden." I regard the first part of this as absolutely correct, the second part as at least misleading.

²⁶ See also Schmid, p. 367, note 1.

²⁷ See Plato, *Theaet.* 189E: τοῦτο γὰρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται (sc. ψυχῇ) διανοομένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα.

at liberty.²⁸ Similarly, elsewhere Solon has either chosen a single idea for elaboration (as in 19, on the ages of man) or, as in the political poems, he has a position to vindicate, a point of which others must be convinced, and is therefore restricted by his own purpose. Even Archilochus, who talks to himself in verse, restricts himself (in what we possess of his work) always to a single idea. The nearest resemblance is to be found in the iambic meditation of Semonides, the influence of which on Solon's poem is marked,²⁹ and which is also carried out by expansion much in Solon's manner.³⁰ Semonides, however, develops only one thought, and his development is summarized in a definite conclusion.

Our poem is, then, the work of a man who had much to say, but—unlike Homer, Tyrtaeus, Pindar, Herodotus, and Solon himself elsewhere—no definite assignment or purpose to dictate the form in which he must say it. We do in fact find parallels to Solon's method in both Pindar and Herodotus, but these parallels are limited in that the self-generated sequences do not extend to an entire work. Once again, the presence of contradictions left standing in the text is evidence for the style of composition. Pindar's progressive manner in the evocation of image by image, in the transition to, and even selection of, certain myths, is better understood in the light of this poem by Solon. Particularly reminiscent is Pindar's way of dealing with a thought which he himself has expressed and sees immediately he must reject or modify. Pindar, instead of cancelling the passage in question and starting over again, leaves it standing

²⁸ Wilamowitz considers (p. 257, note 1) that Tyrtaeus, 9 cannot be a genuine archaic poem because the logical structure belongs to or after the age of the sophists. This view has not been generally accepted. The single idea: "Any other virtue, or all others together, will be meaningless without courage" is so simple and concise compared to the welter of big and disturbing thoughts drifting through Solon's mind, that the sequence can be far more easily manipulated.

²⁹ Semonides, 1. Note *ἐλπίς δὲ πάντας κάμπυιθείη τρέφει/ ἄπρηκτον ὀρμαίνοντας* (6-7) and *τέλος μὲν Ζεὺς ἔχει βαρύκτυπος* (1).

³⁰ The development is: men's *ἐλπίς* (6) and *δόκησις* (9) are unfulfilled, since men are overtaken first by old age or death (*Ἰδὼς*, 14). Different modes of death are then run out. The conclusion is that life is evil, and we should not torture our hearts about it. There is more articulation than in Solon's poem, but the reflection is shallow.

and proceeds *from* it toward renunciation or modification,³¹ exactly as Solon has done here. This indicates for Pindar also a development in progress during the actual process of composition, rather than a scheme worked out before composition was begun. But for Pindar, at least in the epinician odes, much of the subject matter must always have been dictated in advance.

Herodotus also, though concerned with narrative rather than reflection, uses a method reminiscent of Solon's. He possesses what we found lacking in Solon, a main theme: namely, the story of the rise of the Persian empire and its collision with the Greek states. But within that tremendous framework there is a great deal more which he has to tell, the telling of which constitutes a more loosely defined second purpose. So, within the limits of his general task, he is sometimes in the position of Solon in the elegy under consideration: with much on his mind that he wishes to say, and free to say it. Accordingly, in so far as the train of narrative and exposition can be called analogous to the expansion and reconsideration of ideas, the digressions of Herodotus are likely to develop themselves in the progressive style of Solon's elegy.

Within the main narrative, also, there are aspects of development which find analogies in our poem. Consider Herodotus, I, 5, 3-26, 1. After dealing with legendary hostilities between Europe and Asia, the historian passes to "that man who to my knowledge was the first to do injuries to the Hellenes": namely, Croesus. He proceeds to recount how the family of Croesus, the Mermnadae, came to be kings of Lydia when Gyges usurped the throne of Candaules; then chronicles the deeds of Gyges and his descendants until he returns, once more, to Croesus.

There are two important points here. First, the narrative is allowed to develop itself from a point of departure (Gyges) until its return to Croesus, so that we proceed, for instance, from Alyattes' war with Miletus under Thrasyboulus to the alliance

³¹ See for example *Ol.*, IX, 28-41. The sequence is: "Men are wise or brave by the divine element in them. How else could Heracles have fought against the gods? Yet, do not touch that story, for to belittle the gods is hateful." More subtle is the weighing of thought against counter-thought, *Ol.*, IX, 100-112; *Pyth.*, II, 72-96. On this subject, see G. Norwood, *Pindar* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 80-1.

of Thrasylboulus with Periander, and from Periander to his protégé Arion and the story of Arion and the dolphin. Secondly, it appears during the account that Gyges and all the intervening kings did in fact make attacks on Greek cities, so that the introductory statement—that it was *Croesus* who opened hostilities against the Greeks—has now been contradicted and is not strictly true. Without thinking of the contradiction, possibly forgetful of it, Herodotus chose Croesus as his starting point. Now, instead of making a fresh beginning, or returning to cancel the original statement or correct it by some simple qualification, as for instance “the first to do injuries to the Hellenes *on a large scale*,” he simply lets it stand, while the correction is made without advertisement during the development of the narrative. “He (Gyges) *also* invaded the territory of Miletus and Smyrna,” etc.; this is not a contradiction, but a correction.³²

The common factor in these specimens taken from different orders of literature is, therefore, that all are written *forward*, as if the writer were speaking³³ rather than writing, so that, if he must reject a certain element, of thought or fact, already set down, he is not allowed to turn back and remove it but must, driven forward, negate the content by some further statement which will express the truth as he now understands it. The greater the complexity of the subject or the uncertainty of the author, the greater is the effect of disorder and inconsequence in the writing. This effect in our poem arises from a failure to control, not so much medium, as material. Solon has blundered into problems too hard for his solution, but goes sturdily forward from the comfortable simplicity of *πάντως ὕστερον ἦλθε δίκη* to the perplexities of a universe ruled by gods whose ways are different in kind from ours and whose purposes cannot be measured in terms of human feelings and understanding. The result is a poem often uncouth and graceless in expression, but written throughout with great honesty. It was in the same spirit that, without optimism but also without resignation,

³² I hope in the future to deal in greater detail with Herodotus and his methods of composition.

³³ Thus Plato, in the Socratic dialogues, contriving a representation of *oral* discourse, avoids all appearance of *a priori* design. Conversation is made to generate itself, and new subjects arise as the interest of the speakers extracts them from what has gone before.

Solon faced the social problems of Athens, prepared to do what he could, strenuously, but without hope of perfect success.

During the analysis of the stages in the poem, it seemed advisable to be brief, in order that the transitions in the series might not be obscured. Several passages require more detailed comment than was given them before. We return to these passages.

- 25 τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις, οὐ δ' ἐφ' ἐκάστωι
ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὀξύχολος,
αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέλθθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρόν
θυμὸν ἔχῃ, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνῃ.
ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν αὐτίκ' ἔτεισεν, ὃ δ' ὕστερον· οἱ δὲ φύγωσιν
30 αὐτοί, μὴ δὲ θεῶν μοῖρ' ἐπιούσα κίχῃ,
ἤλυθε πάντως αὐτίς· ἀνάτιοι ἔργα τίνουσιν
ἢ παῖδες τούτων ἢ γέ<ν>ο<ς> ἐξ<ο>πίσω.

These distinctions are occasioned by the inadequacy noted by Solon in his own previous account of the punishment of the unjust. The impression there given was that, despite occasional delays, retribution generally must descend swiftly, surely, and conspicuously, upon sinners. Such also is the impression to be derived from stories like those of Aias the son of Oileus,³⁴ Lycurgus,³⁵ and other legendary exponents of ὕβρις. Yet Hesiod has already been visited by doubts, though he puts them aside, *Op.* 270-273:

νῦν δὲ ἐγὼ μὴτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος
εἶην μὴτ' ἐμὸς υἱός· ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον
ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἔξει.
ἀλλὰ τὰ γ' οὐ πω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα.

Are the wicked always punished? Solon is too honest to insist that they are, once he has examined his initial claim and found it fallacious. He clings to his faith that the gods are just, but acknowledges that their anger is different from ours, and therefore the wicked themselves often continue to prosper. This thought sticks in the back of his mind, and breaks out once

³⁴ *Od.*, IV, 499-511.

³⁵ *Il.*, VI, 130-140, a passage perhaps in Solon's mind when he wrote, since οὐ γὰρ δὴν seems to recall οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος υἱός, κρατερὸς Λυκόοργος/ δὴν ἦν.

again (67-68). It was to exercise others after him.³⁶ Yet in general Pindar, Herodotus,³⁷ and the Attic tragedians tend to retire from the advanced position of Solon and to speak as if the proud and greedy man were always struck down by catastrophe. This simpler view, or greater faith (whichever it may be), was perhaps partly occasioned by the striking examples of debacle in the early fifth century, in the careers of Miltiades, Cleomenes, Pausanias, Themistocles, above all in the downfall of Xerxes with his outrageous armies. Solon, when he wrote this poem, could perhaps think of comparatively few edifying examples, in real life, of the punishment of *ἕβρις*.

That the entire passage influenced Attic tragedy seems to require no proof.³⁸

36 *χάσκοντες κούφαισ' ἐλπίσι τερόμεθα.*

ἐλπίς in this sense has appeared before, in Hesiod, *Op.* 498-499:

*πολλὰ δ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμων,
 χρῆζων βιότοις, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ.*

Closer, however, is Semonides 1, 6-7:

*ἐλπίς δὲ πάντας ἀπιπαιδείῃ τρέφει
 ἀπρηκτον ὀρμαίνοντας.*³⁹

This, coming from a poem which Solon had evidently studied, is plainly the inspiration of our passage. Yet where Solon has borrowed, he has also improved. Homer's use of *ἐλπίς*, *ἐλπομαι* (the substantive twice only),⁴⁰ is somewhat colorless, as is Hesiod's. But as the substantive is here more vivid than the

³⁶ See in particular Theognis, 373-80; also Pindar, frag. 201 Bowra; Plato, *Rep.* 358E-361D.

³⁷ See, for instance, Herodotus, I, 34, 1: *μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα ολιχόμενον ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον, ὥς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑαυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιώτατον.*

³⁸ See Jaeger, pp. 144-5. Yet the influence of Solon on tragedy seems to have been generally underestimated, when we consider the nature of his concepts and the fact that his work continued to be read in Athens (see Plato, *Tim.* 21B).

³⁹ See also Semonides, 29, 4. This poem may not, however, be the work of Semonides of Amorgus.

⁴⁰ For an essentially delusive expectation, Homer seems to prefer a special sense of *φῆμί*, as *Il.*, II, 37: *φῆ γὰρ ὁ γ' αἰρήσειν Πριάμου πόλιν ἡματι κείνῳ.*

verb-forms, the *plural* of the substantive is more vivid than the singular since, especially in the company of the adjective *κοῦφος*,⁴¹ it calls up the image of a swarm of unsubstantial, winged, and ravishing illusions. Finally, there is the use of that superb word of comedy, *χάσκω*,⁴² which may denote the dropped jaw of sheer fatuous incomprehension, Semonides 7, 110-111:

κεχηγνόςτος γὰρ ἀνδρὸς—οἱ δὲ γείτονες
χαίρουσ' ὀρῶντες καὶ τόν, ὡς ἀμαρτάνει,

or the amorous smirk of illicit desire, Anacreon 5, 8:

πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει,

Aristophanes, *Nub.* 996-997:

μηδ' εἰς ὀρχηστρίδος εἰσάπτειν, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς ταῦτα κεχηγνός,
μήλω βληθείς ὑπὸ πορνιδίου, τῆς εὐκλείας ἀποθραυσθῆς.

Solon seems to fuse the two meanings; that is, our doting upon our own attractive and flighty fancies is like the idiocy of those besotted through love. Thus also Sophocles, *Ant.* 615-617:

ἀ γὰρ πολύπλαγτος ἐλπὶς
πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνασις ἀνδρῶν,
πολλοῖς δ' ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων.⁴³

Now the plural, with its amplified *κοῦφος*, is transferred so that the image is that of a swarm of desires.⁴⁴

⁴¹ In Attic tragedy, Hesiod's *κενός* tends to replace *κοῦφος* as descriptive of hope or hopes; see Aeschylus, *Pers.* 803-4; Sophocles, *Ajax* 477-8; Euripides, *Phoen.* 396-9. *κενός* is more logical and precise, but certainly less evocative. Compare also Pindar, *Nem.*, VIII, 45: *κενεῶν δ' ἐλπίδων χαῦνον τέλος*.

⁴² *χαῦνος* describes greedy and false optimism in Solon, 8, 6 and 23, 16. See also Pindar's phrase quoted in the note above.

⁴³ This seems to have been adapted by Euripides, *Iph. Aul.* 548-51:

δίδυμ' Ἔρως ὁ χρυσοκόμας
τόξ' ἐντρίβεται χαρίτων,
τὸ μὲν ἐπ' εὐαίονι πότμῳ,
τὸ δ' ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς.

Note that here *ἔρως* has actually replaced *ἐλπὶς*, so that hope, instead of being attended by desires, has been transformed into love. In Sophocles, *Ajax* 693: *ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι*, the word *ἔρως* must actually mean "hope." See also Thucydides, III, 45, 5.

⁴⁴ On *ἐλπὶς*, *ἐλπίδες* in this general sense, see also Pindar, *Pyth.*, III, 19-23; frag. 38, 31-32 Bowra; Theognis, 637-8; Euripides, *Supp.* 479; F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (Cambridge, 1907), pp. 167-8;

Line 36 with what follows is also a very early description of day-dreaming combined with what is called wishful thinking. What Solon applies to all judgments of all men, Pindar conjures up in an amused way from the delights of the symposium.⁴⁵

The complete contempt expressed in this line of Solon is intensified by the fact that the poet certainly means to include himself in the condemnation. Yet it is to be noted that in practice Solon tried to take the godlike long view so far as he was able.⁴⁶ One of his most endearing characteristics is his unwillingness to suffer fools gladly, particularly those fools who pass as realists and practical men.⁴⁷

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κείται·
οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλασίως σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;
κέρδεά τοι θνητοῖς ὥπασαν ἀθάνατοι,
75 ἅτη δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται, ἣν ὁπότε Ζεὺς
πέμψη τεισομένην, ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

"There is no established (κείμει = passive of τίθημι) limit of wealth that can be discerned" (71). This means, perhaps, that wealth (unlike, for instance, strength) is capable of infinite expansion. Solon then passes from the infinite nature of wealth to the desire for infinite wealth. Whether he actually wrote διπλασίως or διπλάσιον,⁴⁸ he probably means the latter. "Those

221-8; H. M. Hayes, *Notes on the Works and Days of Hesiod* (Diss., Chicago, 1918), pp. 207-9. On the nature of these alive and sinister abstractions, see Jane Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (2d ed., Cambridge, 1908), pp. 163-217.

⁴⁵ Frag. 109, 4-8 Bowra:

καὶ κυλίκεσιν Ἀθανάισι κέντρον·
ἀνίκ' ἀνθρώπων καματώδεις οἰχονται μέριμναι
στηθέων ἔξω, πελάγει δ' ἐν πολυχρύσοιο πλούτου
πάντες ἴσθ' νέομεν ψευδῇ πρὸς ἀκτάν·
ὅς μὲν ἀχρήμων, ἀφρονὲς τότε . . .

Compare Bacchylides, 20 Suess.

⁴⁶ See in particular 23, 8-12.

⁴⁷ See 8, 5-6:

ὁμέων δ' εἰς μὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώπεκος ἔχνευσι βαίνει,
σύμπασι δ' ὁμῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος.

The point here seems to be that the foxy selfishness of individuals makes them collectively, and therefore ultimately, into a set of fools.

⁴⁸ διπλασίως in Solon (Stobaeus) but διπλάσιον in the MSS of Theognis where these six lines are repeated (Theognis, 227-32) with several varia-

of us who now have the most money want twice as much as they have got. Who can ever satisfy them all?" (72-73).

"It is the gods who dispense money to men, but ruin grows out of money, and when Zeus sends punitive ruin, various persons get it in turn" (74-76).

There are two questions here. First, the object of ἔχει. Nearest and most natural is ἀτῆ. Ziegler would, however, make κέρδεα the object.⁴⁹ There can be no doubt that this is possible; that is, when Zeus sends ἀτῆ, the *money* changes hands. Such an interpretation would be supported by Solon 4, 12; while virtue is constant, χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει. On Ziegler's view, then, while Solon has not expressed himself very clearly, ἀτῆ means loss of money, which goes elsewhere. Is this strong enough for the content of ἀτῆ? Perhaps. On the other hand, if ἀτῆ is the object of ἔχει, we are reminded of the indiscriminate character of divine punishment. The greed of men already rich threatens disaster not only to themselves (or not to themselves at all) but to others who are innocent (families, or fellow-citizens).

Next, to what does αὐτῶν refer? I would refer it to κέρδεα.⁵⁰ Does Solon mean, then, to contradict his earlier statement (9-13). He has said that money given by the gods stays with men, and only what is won by violence (ἵφ' ὕβριος) brings retribution. Now he says that all wealth is given by the gods, and that wealth given by the gods brings retribution.

Solon has worked away from the earlier thought. He implied then that the righteous must prosper, the wicked must be punished. The realization that this was too simple, therefore false, led him to evaluate more carefully the difference in outlook between gods and all men, good or bad. He has, therefore, progressed from the distinction between just gain (given by the gods) and unjust gain (taken by force in spite of nature, that

tions. It seems likely that Solon wrote διπλάσιως meaning διπλάσιον and the author of the Theognidean repeat, so understanding it, made a "correction."

⁴⁹ Ziegler, p. 204. See also Jaeger's important note, p. 451, note 52. While making ἀτῆ the technical object of ἔχει, he considers that the idea of money changing hands is implicit in the thought.

⁵⁰ Wehrli, cited with approval by Greene, would refer it to men (θνητοῖς). This is also possible, but not, I believe, necessary.

is, of the gods); for since the intervening development, the difference between man and god forbids us any longer to imagine man's doing anything which the gods seek to prevent. In that way, all wealth is the gift of the gods.

It does not follow that ἀτῇ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀναφαίνεται means that ἀτῇ arises equally from all wealth, good or bad. In the two lines preceding this, Solon has been speaking specifically of new wealth piled up by greedy rich men who do not need it. Nevertheless, he is too vague; and any person reading this passage without consideration of the full context might be justified in assuming him to mean that all wealth, sheer wealth, breeds ἀτῇ.⁵¹ This is, again, that apparent incoherence which can be directly traced to Solon's intellectual honesty, his unwillingness to be content with a statement once made when the pressure of his thought has carried him beyond it.

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⁵¹ It may be that these lines are referred to by Aeschylus, *Agam.* 750-62, as a "saying of long ago which has grown old among men"; that is, that the mere fact of great prosperity begets sorrow. Certainly this would be one way in which our passage could be read, and the respectful manner of Aeschylus in introducing a view with which he proposes to take issue is suitable for an allusion to Solon. But the terms ἄλβος, οἰζύς used by Aeschylus do not appear in these lines of Solon, and it is possible that Aeschylus is not alluding to any specific pronouncement.

PROGRESS AND PRIMITIVISM IN LUCRETII.

The Epicurean view of civilization has been the subject of much controversy in the last sixty years. It was the French scholar, Guyau, who first maintained that Lucretius' picture of man's rise from savagery presents a conception of progress, and one that was new in human thought.¹ The conventional view had been that of the Golden Age when earth bountifully satisfied all men's needs, and man himself lived in god-given wisdom and peace, untroubled by the passions and complexities of so-called civilization. In striking contrast Lucretius' account sets forth vividly the earliest struggles of the primitive savage, his grim, relentless battle for existence on the purely physical plane. We hear of his discovery of the use of fire, of his first crude shelters, clothing and weapons, discoveries and inventions which came from dire need and experience; then the growth of language, the beginnings of social life in the family group, the uniting of neighbors in larger groups from the need for mutual protection, the origin of concepts of justice and morality in utility. All these and more are described with an imaginative power and vividness which have made this one of the most famous and familiar passages in Lucretius. The account concludes, after setting forth the development of various special arts, with these words:

Navigia atque agri culturas moenia leges
arma vias vestes et cetera de genere horum,
praemia, delicias quoque vitae funditus omnis,
carmina picturas, et daedala signa polire,
usus et impigrae simul experientia mentis
paulatim docuit pedetemptim progredientis.
sic unumquicquid paulatim protrahit aetas
in medium ratioque in luminis erigit oras.
namque alid ex alio clarescere corde videbant,
artibus ad summum donec venere cacumen

(V, 1448-57).

Here we find perhaps the most explicit statement which has been regarded as an affirmation of progress. With the further

¹ F. Guyau, *Morale d'Epicure* (Paris, 1886), pp. 157 ff.

claim that Lucretius was the first to give adequate expression to the concept we shall not concern ourselves. Reinhardt has convincingly argued that it was Democritus, not Epicurus, much less Lucretius, who first developed in any detail the view that primitive men were animal-like savages rather than god-like dwellers in a pastoral idyll, and that Epicurus simply incorporated this view into his system with some few modifications.² Our concern will be rather with the relation of this view as found in Lucretius with the system as a whole.

The assertion that the poet has actually given expression to a concept of progress has met with some vigorous denials. Robin, in a careful analysis,³ with special reference to the arguments of Guyau, maintains that Lucretius regarded primitive man and primitive society as constituting a condition of life superior to that of civilization. Man's physical strength was admittedly superior, his needs were simpler, he was free from specific perils and vices inherent in the complex civilization of a later time; moreover, as a product of atomic combinations which have their laws of growth, maturity and decay, the ultimate answer can be only dissolution when the *moenia mundi* give way and leave not a rack behind. Man may to be sure find some amelioration for his increasing wretchedness through his inventive power, but this very power has brought him more distress. Robin not only finds the very negation of progress, he finds also the idealization of the simple life of nature, free, to be sure, of the fantasies of a mythical golden age, but perilously close to Rousseau's "natural man." This position is substantially repeated and further developed in some details in the edition of the *De Rerum Natura* on which he collaborated.⁴

More recently the fundamental pessimism of Lucretius has been stressed, as by William Green in his analysis of the poet's anticipation of the end of the world and its relation to his outlook on human history. He marshalls considerable evidence to show that Lucretius believed that decline had already set in, with earth's powers failing, man's own achievements past their

² K. Reinhardt, "Hekataios von Abdera und Demokrit," *Hermes*, XLVII (1912), pp. 492-513.

³ "Sur la Conception Épicurienne du Progrès," *Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale*, XXIII (1916), pp. 697-719.

⁴ Ernout and Robin, 1925. See especially vol. III, pp. 126 ff.

peak, the final dissolution of the world itself perhaps even imminent.⁵

The analysis in the chapter devoted to Lucretius in Lovejoy and Boas' *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity*⁶ concludes that Lucretius' position is not wholly clear; that whereas no case can be made for the life of the first earth-born savages, the account of the intermediate phase, with its stress on the simple pleasures and healthy tone of the pastoral or early agricultural society, in contrast to the vices of later times, reveals a sense of retrogression and loss on the one hand, while granting certain values in the advances in the arts on the other.

It is then evident that there is a problem here. The denials of a concept of progress have been carefully and cogently set forth, for the most part blandly ignored by those who assert the affirmative. And the idea persists that a new note has been struck.⁷

There are of course many connotations of the word "progress." We speak of man's progress in the knowledge and control of nature. With regard to the past and apart from the moral issue, there can be on this point only one answer. Savagery has given way to civilization because man out of his need and experience has learned to use fire, to forge weapons, to destroy or tame wild animals, to grow food and construct shelters for himself. The argument begins only with the question of the desirability of this advance in knowledge and power. The knowledge and power have been achieved and furthermore, the end is not yet come. "Even now, certain arts are being perfected, even now they are in a stage of growth" (V, 332 f.).

It does not follow that this process will or can continue throughout an infinite future. Basic to the Epicurean view is the theory of growth and decay, and above all the mortality of man, his earth, even his universe, of everything *praeter spatium et primordia caeca* and his baffling gods. The point needs no laboring and admits of no denial. If the concept of progress necessarily implies a process which is infinite, the argument is

⁵ "The Dying World of Lucretius," *A. J. P.*, LXIII (1942), pp. 51-60.

⁶ Baltimore, 1935, pp. 222-42.

⁷ Cf. e.g. T. Frank, *Life and Literature of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley, 1930), pp. 237-42; J. O. Hertzler, *Social Progress* (New York, 1928), p. 3.

closed. He would today, however, be bold indeed who would deny all meaning to the concept of the progress of knowledge without the guarantee of an infinite future for man and his world.

The matter may seem to acquire a different hue, however, if one acknowledges that decline has set in and the end may be even imminent. It is difficult to reconcile two passages in Lucretius which are especially relevant here: in V, 324-37, the brief span of human history is cited as evidence for the youth of the world, with the explicit statement,

Verum, ut opinor, habet novitatem summa recensque
naturast mundi, neque pridem exordia cepit.

On the other hand, in the gloomy finale of the second book, we hear that earth's strength is spent, that we are already suffering from the decay which leads to the ultimate dissolution.

It is perhaps impossible to find a completely satisfactory solution of this contradiction. These passages must of course be considered in their contexts, and it is natural that signs of earth's decay and senility should be stressed when the theme is earth's mortality, while vitality and freshness on the other hand belong to the story of creation. The poet's mood and emotional response will intensify each in turn. With all such allowances, however, something of a contradiction remains.⁸

Even if we accept the darker picture, it should be observed that the poet nowhere envisages man's gradual loss of the knowledge and arts which he has won, in a retrogression to savagery. Catastrophes of world-wide scope might conceivably blot out man with his civilization (V, 338 ff.), but such temporary disasters are cited neither as incontrovertible facts of the past nor probabilities in the future, rather to suggest that if you believe them, you must accept their implications and admit the cogency of the argument for ultimate dissolution. A little later (V, 380-

⁸ Green's contention (*loc. cit.*, pp. 53-4) that the notion of the imminence of earth's doom was Lucretian and not Epicurean would help to account for the inconsistency. He demonstrates very convincingly that the finale of the second book is out of harmony with Epicurus' cheerful outlook. He does not discuss the inconsistency between these two passages in Lucretius, but if he is correct, as seems to me probable, it would be the result of the imperfect amalgamation of Lucretius' own view with that of his master.

415) the poet recalls the myths of Phaethon and Deucalion which have been supposed to symbolize disasters from fire and flood in the past, and thus augur the potential triumph of one or another of the elements as the possible route of the ultimate dissolution. He reminds us that the stories themselves are imaginary (405-6), but even in depicting hypothetically such an unlikely catastrophe he nowhere suggests the loss of the arts—short of the destruction of man himself. Rather, in accordance with the view that necessity has spurred man to invention in the past, one might more reasonably assume that as earth's powers fail he will be driven to find new techniques. Progress in knowledge and mastery of the natural environment is a fact in the past, continues in the present, and presumably will continue as long as man exists, whatever view we may take as to the duration of his future.

More complex and controversial is the question whether this advance in knowledge and the arts has been desirable, in other words whether we can speak of progress in human history in the sense that man's lot has really improved, that he is better and happier in the civilization he has achieved than was his savage ancestor. Here the answer is not so obvious, since now the subjective connotations of "better" and "happier" enter the picture. We must clarify our approach to the problem at this point. Progress has meaning only in terms of an ideal or goal. Any discussion of progress in relation to Epicureanism should then be related to Epicurean values. And here the goal is clear. It is of course the life of pleasure, in the Epicurean sense of freedom from pain and fear, that serene *ataraxia* enjoyed by the gods. Has there been any progress towards this goal and has man's advance in knowledge and the arts of civilization aided or hampered him?

We have grouped knowledge and the various arts together. Lucretius does so in the lines already cited, where he refers to new developments in navigation, in musical instruments, and finally the knowledge of nature's laws, all of these achievements recent enough to indicate that the world is still young (V, 333-7). Again, at the close of the book, after describing the various practical arts of civilization, he includes poetry, painting, and sculpture, *delicias vitae*, all the products of *usus*, *experientia*, and *ratio*. The knowledge of nature's laws, the achievements of

philosophical speculation are derived from the same impulse as his technical skills, namely that desire for security and freedom from fear without which happiness is unattainable.⁹

The achievements of philosophy—Epicurean philosophy—are of course infinitely more important for human happiness than any specific art or craft. This is explicit in the prooemium of Book V where Epicurus' gifts to humanity are extolled above those attributed to Ceres and others. What is significant here for our purposes is that these great truths could never have been discovered or shared without man's rise from savagery. This is particularly clear in the poet's discussion of language (V, 1028-90). Human speech, we are told, was slowly and laboriously developed in answer to man's need, as were the first crude dwellings, the first stages in social organization. Ultimately it made possible man's crowning achievement, philosophical truth. Lucretius' own struggles with the paucity of the Latin vocabulary may be cited in this connection. The discovery of adequate words he felt to be essential to convey his message (I, 136-45). Again only recently in terms of human experience have nature's laws been discovered and Lucretius claims to be the first to set them forth in the Latin tongue (V, 335-7), an achievement evidently included among the *artes* of line 332.

One should observe too that Lucretius recognized the contributions of the long line of Epicurus' predecessors in philosophy. Epicureanism did not spring full-grown from the head of a founder oblivious of human thought before him. Here too the achievement was the culmination of long ages of effort.¹⁰

It is surely obvious that some development in the arts was indispensable to the good life, given the Epicurean interpretation of human history and the good life. The conditions of savagery precluded any possibility of attaining even elementary physical security, much less the more important peace of the soul. Man's first conquests of nature, his primary skills were early and fundamental aspects of the great cumulative process which included language and thought. On this supremely important point, then, we can speak of progress in terms of human values

⁹ Cf. also Epicurus, *Princ. Doctr.*, XI-XIII.

¹⁰ Cf. L. Edelstein, "Primum Graius Homo," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. 78-90, especially p. 85.

during the past and even up to the poet's day. The question remains, how far and how long? ✓

Much emphasis has been laid on the Epicurean acknowledgment that in the growing complexity of civilization many vices have been produced or accentuated which were unknown or certainly less prevalent in simpler days. Lucretius' assertion of the greater physical vigor and stamina of primitive man, his charming idyll of a rustic festival (V, 1390-1407) which concludes with comparisons highly unflattering to more "civilized" ages, not to mention his many scathing indictments of contemporary morality, have been cited to prove that deterioration is already well under way; if the world and mankind are becoming steadily weaker and more vicious, talk of progress has an empty ring. ↵

Before examining further Lucretius' attitude toward the virtues of a simpler age, it may be instructive to recall certain similarities and contrasts with various Stoic views on this subject. One can scarcely speak of an "orthodox" Stoic theory, so wide were the divergencies within the school, but some sort of ideal condition, superior at least to later ages, is usually assumed or described in any account of man's remote past. Its character ranges from the poet's fantasies of innocent perfection, peace and beauty of a truly golden age, to the more realistic "hard primitivism" of a simple, toilsome but essentially healthy and virtuous society. Striking parallels between accounts of the latter sort and the Lucretian picture have often been observed, notably in Polybius and Seneca. The rôle of the arts of civilization in these accounts is of particular interest. To Seneca these arts have been a curse to mankind, introducing or enhancing greed and all the vices. In the ninetieth epistle he directs his argument on this point against Posidonius who attributed the various techniques and crafts to the early philosophers, and who speculated on their invention and development with evident interest and sympathy. Seneca claims agreement with Posidonius in describing the life of earliest humanity as one of peace and virtue under the guidance of philosopher-kings, under whose beneficent and just sway there was neither incentive nor inclination to evil conduct (XC, 4-5). It was in accordance with nature that the better—and in the case of man that meant the rational—rule the worse. Posidonius appears to have believed that these gifted rulers, because of their superior talents, had ↵

made the discoveries and inventions which have improved the physical lot of mankind, giving him greater mastery over the world about him. Knowledge of the ultimate laws of nature and interest in the details, in man's mastery of specific techniques, were closely related, both belonging to the province of the philosopher. In this combining of the arts with philosophy Posidonius and Lucretius would stand together in opposition to Seneca.¹¹

But that there could have been no practice or understanding of the good life without the arts seems not to follow in Posidonius' view, since we have the philosopher-kings at the very beginning. Furthermore, however great his interest in the process of discovery, if he looked back, as Seneca says, to the time when men were *incorrupti*, closer to their divine origin and true nature, he must, like Seneca, have regarded human history as a long process of moral degeneration. This is entirely consistent with the Stoic doctrine of cyclical creation and ekpyrosis, in which Posidonius probably concurred.¹² Men were at the start of the cycle actually *a dis recentes*, to use Seneca's phrase, living in peaceful conditions to which violence was unknown, and all subsequent change until the ultimate conflagration could only be for the worse.¹³

The fact that the picture of primitive society presented in Polybius is closer in spirit to that of Lucretius may perhaps be related to his different view of the cycles. They are referred not to a universal conflagration but to periodic destructions of civilization, not of all mankind, as a result of tremendous natural disasters which ravage but do not destroy the earth. The struggles of mankind to survive, the slow development of the arts are only suggested, not described in detail, as the historian is more

¹¹ This is not to imply the derivation of Lucretius' views from Posidonius, a problem which in any case is beyond the scope of this paper. The likelihood of such influence is rejected by E. Reitzenstein, "Theophrast bei Epicur und Lucrez," *Orient und Antike*, no. 2 (Heidelberg, 1924), pp. 63 ff.

¹² See L. Edelstein, "The Philosophical System of Posidonius," *A. J. P.*, LVII (1936), pp. 294 f., especially note 37.

¹³ Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1921), pp. 392-401, especially pp. 400 f. Controversies of scholars as to what is Posidonian and what Senecan in later sections of this epistle have no bearing on the main point here.

concerned with the cycles of government. There is little to conjure up thoughts of a golden age in those early days when men herded together like animals for protection (VI, 5, 5-9). As in Lucretius the development of concepts of morality is attributed to self-interest (VI, 6, 1-9). It is probable that this account was influenced by or at least in harmony with the views of Panaetius.¹⁴ In any case Panaetius' rejection of the ekpyrosis seems practically certain¹⁵ and it appears not unlikely that there is a logical connection between this fact and the values he assigned to the rôle of the arts in the development of civilization. The natural virtue of those first men still close to their divine origin in the cosmic fire seems very remote from the desperate plight of survivors of a terrible cataclysm, embarking on a new cycle in the grimmest of conditions.

We have important testimony to Panaetius' evaluation of the arts in Cicero, *De Off.*, II, 4, 15, where we are told that it is thanks to them that human life is so far superior to that of the beasts. Elsewhere in the same treatise (I, 4, 11) it is observed that the same fundamental instincts of self-preservation and propagation of the species are common to man and beast, whereas by the light of his rational faculty man is set apart; it is moreover thanks to this power of reason that man has produced his civilization. The implication is clear that the arts are to be considered a gain. It is also true that in the vices of an increasingly complex civilization the arts through their material gifts and powers play an important rôle (I, 7, 24).¹⁶ Thus the view of Panaetius and Polybius is in many respects close to that of Epicurus and Lucretius, in spite of the gulf between the schools.

Returning to the summary of Polybius, it must nevertheless be stressed that in his account of the first organized societies he attributes the highest degree of virtue and wisdom to the early kingship which succeeded the regime of savagery, when men had first received from nature their concepts of the good and the just (VI, 7). The kings themselves were chosen for their superior intelligence and ruled in the interest of their subjects.

¹⁴ R. Philippson, *Phil. Wochenschr.*, L (1930), pp. 1183 ff. N. Tatakis, in his *Panétius de Rhodes* (Paris, 1931), pp. 102 ff., stresses their differences, denying to Panaetius the hopeless determinism of Polybius.

¹⁵ Cicero, *N. D.*, II, 46, 118; Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, I, 414.

¹⁶ Cf. Polybius, VI, 7, 6.

There is a moral superiority in this early stage which is succeeded by cycles of degeneration and political revolution, brightened, to be sure, by better conditions at the beginning of each new type of government. The deadly inevitability of the cycles, however, precludes any ultimate hope and the brightest period was at the beginning.¹⁷

Thus in spite of the similarities between these Stoic views and the Lucretian account, we find as a consistent element in the Stoic outlook an inevitable deterioration in the lot of man. From this inevitability the Epicurean is free, to a point, within the physical limitations of his atomic universe.

But, inevitable or not, does Lucretius actually present us with a comparable picture of decline as has been asserted? Here again we must underline the Epicurean conception of the good life, the goal of all activity in pleasure, in bodily and mental peace. To Lucretius possibly in even greater degree than to his master, freedom from fear is the absolutely indispensable condition for any happiness, and fear itself ultimately the root of all evil. One need only recall the proemium of the third book.

As one looks back over the poet's picture of primitive life with this principle in mind, it loses some of its charm. It is hard to see that on any basis his picture of the earliest phase, that of pure savagery, could be considered superior to the later. Physical vigor and hardihood were of course conditions of survival, and the survivors at least had found the means to satisfy their primary needs. Their perils, however, were quite as real as those of a later age and more immediately pressing at times. We hear of the fugitives fleeing their rocky caves in the dead of night, *paventes*, at the approach of some hostile beast of prey (V, 982-7). This is followed by the fearful description of death from the jaws of these beasts, or the horrible mangling for which the victim in his pitiable ignorance knew no cure. As Robin notes in his comment on these lines, the poet adds that at least the savage escaped the fears of organized warfare and shipwreck. Lucretius certainly held no brief for the virtues of organized war, but the length and vivid horror of the account of the death or mutilation of the savage in this instance makes it preposterous to assume that such a fate seemed preferable to the poet.

¹⁷ Cf. VI, 9, 12-3 for his explicit assertion of the degeneration which must inevitably overtake Rome in time.

Even in passages in which human vice and folly are assailed there is implicit the recognition that the comparative security of civilized life is a gain. In the prooemium of VI the poet makes this physical security the ground for castigating the false values which bring men such unnecessary misery. Since life's basic needs can be satisfied so easily under present conditions and life is as far as possible safe (VI, 9-11), man's folly is the more culpable. But surely it is a gain to have surmounted the conditions in which any security at all was unattainable. Epicurus' message was scarcely designed for the struggling savage.

Lucretius also stresses the point that changes from savagery had the aim, probably but dimly realized, of greater security. Mutual protection and help were the rewards of the first formation of any social group, rewards dependent upon the members' recognition of the *foedera*. But for such association, he says explicitly, the human race would never have survived at all (V, 1026-7).

But these first associations developed into more complex communities, the consequent increase of possessions brought the familiar vices in its train. And it is just here that for many the poet has abandoned the concept of progress, assuming there had ever been one. His indictment of contemporary life is indeed a powerful one, depicting its contemptible false values, lust for power, violence, wretched new fears. And when we envisage the simple country festival described in connection with the first invention of musical instruments (V, 1379-1411), the sheer pleasures of which were quite as keen as any to be derived from the more complex equipment and lavish entertainment of later days, one readily grants that the poet dwelt happily upon the scene and found a health and soundness in the simple peasants which later urban civilization had lost.

But the issue is not settled by observing that earlier ages have, in their ignorance, escaped some of the worst features of later times. This escape was due to ignorance, not inherent virtue. The peasant was unaware of his blessings or he would not have altered his way of life. Change is a sign of dissatisfaction with one's present lot (V, 170-3), or the thoughtless response to novelty for its own sake (V, 1412-15). The ignorant peasant by the very fact of his ignorance was not only the victim of the same primary fears which beset modern man, a point to which we

shall revert, but he was incapable of truly appreciating the kind of security he had.

Apart from this, however, what of the picture as a whole? Was that simple life really so pleasant and secure? Lucretius tells us that the man who made himself a coat from some wild beast's hide was probably murdered by his jealous neighbors and the hide itself torn to pieces in the struggle for its possession (V, 1419-22). He adds that we are more culpable for like conduct in our wars for wealth and power, in that we actually need the wealth and power far less than our freezing ancestor needed that hide. Still, the picture is hardly conducive to nostalgia for those happy by-gone days. Although this last instance belongs more properly to a stage earlier than that of the rustic festival which had just been described, the poet cites it as an example of the greed which leads to violence and the destruction of all true pleasure, and is characteristic of all stages of human history.

In the account of the growth and changes of political systems there is much to remind us of Polybius. Conspicuous by its absence, however, is that early stage in which wisdom and virtue prevailed. Man's first leaders were to be sure distinguished by physical strength and intelligence, but there is nothing to suggest superior virtue. The physical endowments yielded to the power of greed with the increase of material possessions. It is not until the violence incited by tyranny has become in itself intolerable that we hear of the emergence of law, rooted in man's longing for security (V, 1136-60). That this was a very real gain is clearly stressed in these lines. The human race which was worn and weary under the regime of force has now achieved at least comparative security, inasmuch as man cannot hope to attain happiness through the violation of the laws (1154-5).

Man's basic impulses have always been much the same. The process of civilization has been the result of struggle for security, freedom from fear. Progress in the arts has been a fact in the past and is a possibility for the future. These arts have been a blessing in part in so far as they have contributed to his physical security and to the knowledge of nature's laws which alone can free him from fear. In so far as they pander to luxury and greed, they may be productive of evil. The diatribes against contemporary excesses which we find in Lucretius are of course

common to all the moralists, regardless of philosophical dogma. That the arts have been misused does not condemn them of themselves.

But in all this matching of profit and loss, there is one dominant consideration, always of paramount importance to Lucretius. The ultimate good, the goal, can be attained only by casting out fear, the ultimate root of evil. This fear is twofold, fear of death and fear of the gods. From neither could man possibly free himself without knowledge—that knowledge of the laws of nature which could only be attained in a condition of civilization. Those shepherds with their simple holidays may well have been better off than many a restless and equally unenlightened millionaire, but they still were the victims of ignorance and the terrible curse of fear and for them, unlike the millionaire of later times, there was no salvation at hand in the gospel of Epicurus. The fundamental causes of fear, the *simulacra* which made men believe in the gods but failed to bring understanding of their true nature, and which also led to a false and terrifying belief in survival after death, together with the grandeur of the cosmic order, which in their ignorance men attributed to divine powers, arbitrary and therefore fearful—these fears could only be allayed by knowledge of the truth, in other words of the Epicurean doctrine.¹⁸

And this knowledge, this insight into the laws of nature, is inconceivable for savage or primitive man. While not specifically stated this is surely self-evident. The immediate and pressing physical perils which threatened the life of the savage presumably left him little time to speculate on the perils of the unseen. In fact Lucretius implies as much in noting that he accepted the changes of day and night without alarm, preoccupied as he was with threats from wild beasts (V, 973-87). It was precisely in the succeeding age, the much extolled simple life of the shepherd and farmer, that the poison of superstitious fear made its way. In the charming description of the phenomenon of echo (IV, 572-94) we are told of the fanciful beliefs of ignorant peasants who attributed the sounds to nymphs and satyrs lest they be supposed to dwell in places deserted by

¹⁸ V, 82-90, and especially 1161-93; cf. III, 1053-75; IV, 29-41; VI, 50-67.

the gods. Lucretius elsewhere attributes superstition to the ignorance of the uneducated. Thus notions of Centaur and Scylla, Cerberus and the ghosts of the dead are due to chance combinations of the *simulacra* (IV, 732-48). Against these fears and the terrifying phenomena of the heavens which impressed him profoundly, the simple peasant had absolutely no defense. Neither had he, on the positive side, equipment or opportunity for the study of nature, which Lucretius regarded as the most rewarding life (III, 1071-2). Time and experience had been essential to the discovery of the great truths which alone could bring peace of soul. Only "recently," as one reckons the whole span of human life, had these truths been revealed (V, 335-6).

Thus progress, in the only sense in which it was important to the Epicurean, had been achieved and was still possible. In comparison with this enlightenment the concomitant evils of a complex civilization become less significant. They were serious, and we should not underestimate them. It would be absurd to insist that the outlook was truly bright. One may even grant that Lucretius himself was profoundly pessimistic as to the future, and may well have believed that the ultimate dissolution would come before any large proportion of mankind could be persuaded of the enlightenment which would bring him happiness. He surely believed that earth's powers would fail and physical conditions become increasingly severe. Nevertheless the fact remained that man had achieved the knowledge which was indispensable to the good life, and that the way was open for further development in the present and future. The potentiality was there. "There is nothing to prevent his leading a life worthy of the gods" (III, 322). Lucretius was surely no primitivist, dreaming of the glories of a pastoral age of innocence—and ignorance. As he believed that fear was the great root of evil, he believed that only knowledge could cast it out, since ignorance was its cause.

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque (I, 146-8).

The Epicurean's vigorous insistence upon the freedom of the will and his view of the soul did not assure him of inevitable

progress, but neither did it preclude hope, as the familiar Stoic doctrine of the cycles ultimately did.

It is within this framework and in the light of the concept of the final good that we find a limited truth in the assertion, often repeated and often challenged, that some concept of progress is found in Epicureanism. Man was not searching for what had once been his and then lost in a long retrogression. The physical security and enlightenment which were essential for the attainment of the good life could only have come with the process of civilization, and despite the new problems which that process entailed, the door was still open to further knowledge and enlightenment. There is, we repeat, nothing inevitable about it and Lucretius himself frequently dwells on the darker side of the picture. But that he would have exchanged the knowledge and security which civilization had brought for the life of savage or primitive man is surely inconceivable in the light of his own ideals. His very diatribes against contemporary society are the more bitter because man fails to avail himself of the happiness within his reach. It remains within his reach—as long as the world shall last.

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THE ATTIC ARCHONS DIOKLES-TIMARCHOS.

The discovery of an inscription near Athens in 1933, and the publication of its text by Kyparissis and Peek,¹ have given new evidence for the Athenian archons of the second century before Christ. The inscription is a decree of orgeones, dated in the archonship of Timarchos, honoring their ἐπιμελητής Serapion, son of Poseidonios, of Herakleia, who served in his appointed capacity in the archonship of Diokles. The opening lines of the decree read as follows:

[Ἀγ]αθεὶ Τύχει· ἐπὶ Τιμάρχου ἄρχοντος, Θαργηλιῶνος
 ἀγορᾷ κυρ[ίαι].
 [Ἔ]δοξεν τοῖς ὀργεῶσιν· ἐπειδὴ Σεραπίων Ποσειδωνίου
 Ἡρακλεώτ[ης]
 ἐπιμελητῆς κατασταθείς εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ Διοκλέους ἄρχοντος
 ἐνιαυτ[όν]

The editors record the fact that the normal interpretation of these lines places Diokles in the archon-year immediately preceding that of Timarchos, but they reject the identification of Timarchos with the known archon of that name in 138/7 for two reasons: (a) The archon Diokles of the Delian inventories cannot have been later than 141/0, and (b) the year 139/8 is already occupied by Apollodoros of *I. G.*, II², 973. Neither argument is binding, for Pritchett has shown that the Diokles of the Delian inventories was a Delian, not an Athenian, archon,² and Apollodoros may be assigned to any year near the middle or end of the second century B. C. where a secretary from Oineis is in order. There is no tie between him and Timarchos and the only reason for dating him in 139/8 has been the exigency of the secretary-cycle. It was the suggestion of Kyparissis and Peek that the new combination of archons Diokles-Timarchos might be put in any pair of unoccupied years earlier in the century. Theoretically, of course, this is true, but, as the editors remark, the character of the lettering of the new inscription is remarkably like that of *Hesperia*, IX (1940), No. 26, which belongs in

¹ *Ath. Mitt.*, LXVI (1941), pp. 228-232, with photographs in Plates 75 and 76.

² Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology*, p. 129.

the year 135/4, and they take it for certain that the date cannot in any case have been far from the middle of the century; so for practical purposes there is no place to put the two new archons except in the years of uncertainty between 154 and 147.

The alternative is to make the natural assumption that the Timarchos of the new text is the same as the Timarchos of 138/7. Diokles then falls in 139/8 with the usual interpretation that the archonship in which the incumbent of an office served precedes immediately that in which he was honored. The necessary readjustment to be made in the archon tables is to provide a new date for Apollodoros of *I. G.*, II², 973.

There are many places where Apollodoros cannot belong. Within the range of the second century secretaries from Oineis (VII) are known for 199/8, 187/6, 175/4, 163/2, 127/6, and 103/2. Furthermore, Apollodoros cannot belong in 115/4, for that year is occupied by Nausias;³ nor can he belong in 139/8, for that year has just been assigned to Diokles. This leaves 147/6 as the only other year where the present tables call for a secretary from Oineis, and apparently Apollodoros cannot be assigned there because the year is already occupied by Archon, who is tied to his successor Epikrates of 146/5.

The secretary in the archonship of Epikrates was from the deme Sypalettos (VIII).⁴ Here an old problem comes once again to our attention. The presence of a secretary from Sypalettos (VIII) in 146/5 immediately before a secretary from Lamptraï (I) in 145/4 indicates a break in the cycle. Another break has been assumed between 154/3 and 153/2, where there is no evidence, by way of compensation. There are consequently two unexplained breaks in the secretary-cycle in the middle of the second century and both of them could be avoided if one would only assume that part of the deme Sypalettos had been assigned in 201 B. C. to the new tribe Attalis which after its creation became XII in the official order. The possibility that this subdivision took place has been raised several times but has always been denied.⁵ The evidence favoring the division of the

³ The exact date is known because of the tribal cycle of the priests of Serapis; see Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, p. 229.

⁴ See Pritchett and Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. xxx.

⁵ W. K. Pritchett, *The Five Attic Tribes after Kleisthenes* (Baltimore,

deme seems at first glance good. A dedication to the philosopher Karneades was erected near the Stoa of Attalos by Attalos II and his relative Ariarathes, both of the deme Sypalettos (*I. G.*, II², 3781). Just as Hadrian was later enrolled as an Athenian citizen in the tribe which bore his name, one would have expected Attalos of *I. G.*, II², 3781 to belong to the tribe named after his father and hence to discover in this dedication the indication that Sypalettos, or at least part of it, belonged to Attalis; but later members of the family who are known, also citizens of Sypalettos, were members of the tribe Kekropis.⁶ Hence, if one wishes to assume a division in the deme he must also assume a division in the family. This has been considered unlikely and the prevailing opinion is that Sypalettos always belonged to Kekropis.

The difficulty of placing Apollodoros in the archon tables of the second century leads one to inquire again whether there may not have been a division in the deme which perhaps lasted only through the second century or until the time of Sulla. This would permit regular secretary-cycles with no breaks and one could then have Apollodoros with his secretary from Oineis in 151/0. The alternative is to assume: (a) a period of confusion in the secretary-cycle between 154 and 145 in which case Apollodoros might be placed in one of several years during that interval, or (b) that the cycle from 157 to 145 was in allotted order in which case again Apollodoros might be assigned to one of several years, or (c) that the cycle continued unbroken from 157/6 long enough to include a secretary from the seventh tribe in 151/0 in which case that year is available for Apollodoros, and the assumption may be made that the break in the cycle, now posited in 153, may have occurred at some time between 150 and 146.

There are thus four possible ways of tabulating the archons and their secretaries in the cycle from 157 and 145. In two of the schemes Apollodoros falls definitely in 151/0, and in the other two of the schemes he may be dated there anyway; so it is to this date that we tentatively assign him and his secretary

1943), p. 36, note 13, with references; B. D. Meritt, *Hesperia*, XV (1946), p. 239, note 39.

⁶ *I. G.*, II², 1039, fragments *b' + c' + p*, lines 3-5; see Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 36, note 13.

and the inscription *I. G.*, II², 973.⁷ The archons Phaidrias and Aristophantos, displaced, may be dated in 153/2 and 152/1 respectively.

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ON VARRO, *DE LINGUA LATINA*, V, 15.

Varro, *L. L.*, V, 14: incipiam de locis ab ipsius loci origine. locus est ubi locatum quid esse potest, ut nunc dicunt, collocatum. ueteres id dicere solitos apparet apud Plautum: "filiam habeo grandem dote cassam atque inlocabilem neque eam quo locare cuiquam." apud Ennium: "o Terra Traeca, ubi Liberum fanum inclutum Maro locauit." 15: ubi quidque consistit, locus. ab eo praeco dicitur locare, quod usque idem it, quoad in aliquo constitit pretium. inde locarium quod datur in stabulo et in taberna, ubi consistent. sic loci muliebres, ubi nascendi initia consistunt.

14 ab *Scioppius*: sub *F* 15 idem it *Turnebus* probante *Kent*: id emit *F* demit *Madvig* an quid demit *dubitant* *Goetz* et *Schoell* idem uendit *L. Spengel* uendit *Reiter*

As it stands, 15 is pointless. Varro's contention that the root element in *locare*, *locarium*, and *loci* (*muliebres*) can be reduced to a common meaning, namely that of *consistere*, could serve only to make a preceding etymology plausible. Instead of such an etymology we read *ubi quidque consistit, locus*.¹

The difficulty disappears once *locus* is replaced by *stlocus*, the

⁷ It will be noted that Wilhelm identified the chairman of the proedroi 'Αθη[ν]ογ[έν]ης -- of *I. G.*, II², 973 with [Αθ]ηρογένης Εδνόμου Δευκοροεύς who appears as author of a decree in the year following the archonship of Metrophanes. This is the year 144/3 (cf. Pritchett and Meritt, *Chronology*, p. 130), and if the identification is correct would suit a date for Apollodoros in 151/0 practically as well as in 139/8.

¹ This first item in Varro's investigation seems also to be the only one for which he gives two etymologies (14 and 15, respectively), representing, perhaps, the different levels of explanation as defined in V, 7-9. The anomaly must be recognized, as there seems to be no way in which 15 could be subordinated to 14 on the theory that only 14 is an etymology.

old form of the word which is cited by Festus and Quintilian and written on two archaizing inscriptions.² The *st-* certainly makes *stlocus* and *consisto* (*constiti*) sufficiently similar to satisfy Varro's method and, incidentally, to put him on the right track even by modern standards of etymology.

The corruption, commonplace enough in a manuscript like *F*, was favored by the environment: *consISTITSTlocus*. It is true, on the other hand, that if the passage is amended to read *stlocus* the argument might seem rather abrupt. One misses an explanation to the effect that *locus* was formerly *stlocus*, along the lines of V, 91: *turma terima (e in u abiit)* or VI, 75: *canere . . . ex Camena permutato pro m n*. There is, however, a difference. Unlike *locus—stlocus*, examples thus explained are either made-up or unfamiliar³ items requiring justification. Where Varro deals with well-known archaisms he takes the identity of the obsolete and the current forms for granted, witness, apparently, V, 141: *oppida quod opere muniebant, moenia. quo moenitius esset quod exaggerabant, aggeres dicti, et qui aggerem contineret, moerus*, and, even more to the point, V, 70 *ignis a <g>nascendo, quod hic nascitur*, etc., if K. O. Müller's conjecture is accepted.⁴ And that *stlocus* was at all times a stock example is clear from the casual fashion in which our two grammatical informants quote it.⁵

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² *G. L.*, IV, 408-9, Quintilian, I, 4, 16; *C. I. L.*, V, 7381 (Tortona), *Not. Scav.*, 1900, p. 148 (Pompeii). On words common to Varro and Verrius (Festus), see R. Kriegshammer, *De Varronis et Verrii fontibus quaestiones selectae* (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 101-16.

³ A characteristic example is VI, 4: *D antiqui, non r in hoc (sc. meridies) dicebant, ut Praeneste incisum in solarario uidi*.

⁴ Under these circumstances it is of course difficult to determine just how far one should go in putting the archaism into the text. Kent, *Varro on the Latin Language* (Loeb Class. Library, 1938), in discussing V, 141, is inclined to restore *moe-* "possibly in all the words."

⁵ Cf. note 2 above.

REVIEWS.

WERNER JAEGER. *Paideia*, The Ideals of Greek Culture. Vol. I: Archaic Greece; The Mind of Athens (1939 and 1945), pp. xxix + 420. Vol. II: In Search of the Divine Centre (1943), pp. xv + 442. Vol. III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato (1944), pp. viii + 374. Translated by Gilbert Highet. Oxford Univ. Press.

To judge fairly a monumental work of scholarship like this, it is necessary to realize clearly the limits within which the work is conceived. Professor Jaeger himself gives us little help here; the Greek *paideia* includes, as he says, civilization, culture, tradition, literature, and education. His first preface defines it as "the shaping of the Greek character." He goes on to say later that he will describe the life of the Greek "through the creative literature which represents his ideals" and that "literature is the chief concern of this book." But even these boundaries are too wide, for, in literature, he restricts himself to conscious ideals and opinions. In any study of the Greek character one would have expected a good deal more attention to athletics, the gods, political developments, etc., as factors shaping the character of the people themselves, as it emerges even from their literature. Nowhere is there, for example, any adequate account of Athens' democratic ideals, or of the essential differences between the Athenian and the Spartan characters.

Actually, the work as a whole deals with *the origin and development of a conscious tradition of education in the great writers of Greece, and the kind of character they aimed thus to mould*. And in spite of repeated statements that this *paideia* must be seen against the social and political background of the times, references to such background are in fact very limited. The character and aspirations of the people—no doubt often hard to establish—receive comparatively little attention. Even so limited, however, the subject is still large, and still vitally important, but a clearer statement of aims by the author might have avoided misunderstanding.

Beginning with Homer, Jaeger ably discusses the aristocratic and external nature of the heroic *aretê*, its close connection with noble birth, physical strength, courage, and honour. But then, in spite of his own warnings, he gets involved in the Homeric question, and we get two Homeric strata: the later consisting of the *Odyssey*—the first book being later still—and some parts of the *Iliad* such as Phoenix' speech in IX, and Thersites. This later stratum is used as evidence for the culture of the early Greek aristocracy. There is then a conscious and deliberate educational purpose in this later stratum, very different from educational effects elsewhere. I find the arguments here summarized for this later stratum unconvincing¹

¹ The *Odyssey* "portrays a later stage of civilization" and is more influenced by the life of the aristocrats of its own day (p. 15), while the *Iliad* derives its material from the oldest heroic poetry which

and some of the resulting statements fanciful; also largely irrelevant, since the author dates the *Odyssey* before Hesiod. In fact, they obscure some very good discussion, on the place of women in Homer for example, and prevent fuller treatment of the heroic character which (whatever the dates) was clearly at the root of all Greek education, beyond the rather meagre "aristocratic" *aretê* above-mentioned. There is no adequate discussion of the gods, freedom and fate, *aidos* and *nemesis*, barely a passing mention. We miss the substance of these for the shadow of an early Greek aristocratic culture and of an even more ghostly deliberate educational purpose. This is not, unfortunately, the only time that we are side-tracked at the cost of essentials.

With Hesiod we are on common ground, and we can forget our aristocrats for a while. His didactic purpose is obvious to all. There is a good discussion of the ethical tone and intentions of the poet, his ideal of justice, his philosophical conception of Eros, his curious mixture of myth and reason, his gospel of hard work and his protreptic use of the myth. However, the Boeotians cannot claim Hesiod as all their own, for Jaeger puts great emphasis on the ancestral connection with Asia Minor. There is an interesting discussion of the extent to which *aretê* implies success in Hesiod, as in Homer, but we may doubt how far Hesiod "deliberately sets up against the aristocratic training of Homer's heroes a working class ideal of education based on the *aretê* of the ordinary man." The contrast is in any case obvious.

We then come to the city-state, and the oldest, Sparta—"the first deliberate educational effort"—which undoubtedly sought by conscious educational methods the complete subordination of the individual to the state. Was that uncompromising Spartan ideal "imperishable, because it is the expression of a fundamental human instinct"? Its fascination for many Greek thinkers is established, but not so its positive contribution to the main stream of Greek culture until "the two types (i. e. Dorian and Ionian) finally united in the Athens of the fifth and fourth century." Do we gain much by routing Homeric influence via Sparta? I should rather, with

glorified fighting and heroic prowess (p. 18). But the Thersites episode, a political innovation, such as is not found even in the *Odyssey*, shows later influence. In the later epic "every member of this society bears the stamp of decorum and good breeding in all situations"; and "education becomes culture for the first time" (p. 22); the intellectual and social virtues are exalted (p. 22, but cf. p. 8). The women of the *Odyssey* have a very different place (pp. 22-4, Andromache is not mentioned); its morality is universally on a higher plane; "everything low, contemptible and ugly is banished from the world of the epic" (p. 42); "the Zeus who presides over the heavenly Council in the *Odyssey* personifies a high philosophical conception of the world-conscience" (p. 54). As a corrective, I refer the reader to S. E. Bassett, *The Poetry of Homer* (1938) and J. A. Scott, *The Unity of Homer*. Nor can I understand why the use of example and the moral tale—which surely precede any educational tradition—is deemed so important, or the fact that such "examples" are found in direct speeches. Where else would one expect them, in Homer? For other important ethical concepts in Homer, see W. C. Greene, *Moirai* (Harvard Univ. Press, 1944), pp. 10-28.

Toynbee,² regard Sparta as an "arrested civilization," a dead end in the growth of culture, an extreme and self-destroying experiment in nationalism and militarism, that can be called "a sort of aristocracy" only by courtesy.

Jaeger traces hatred of Sparta to her behaviour after the Peloponnesian war, but surely the *Andromache* and much else prove it an older growth, for that war was ideological as well as imperial.

As a link to prove Spartan influence, Jaeger relies on the fame of Tyrtaeus. Direct references to him, however, date from the 4th century. Much is made of the reference in the *Laws* (628-30) though he is there admittedly criticized for the typical Spartan error of aiming only at bravery in the field. This does not justify the statement that "the place which Plato allotted to Tyrtaeus in his cultural system remained valid for the Greeks of all subsequent ages and was an indefeasible element in their culture" (p. 87). The Athenians did not need the Spartans of Tyrtaeus to teach them patriotism; and what else had the Spartans to teach?

Jaeger looks to Tyrtaeus as the exponent of a new conception: "the first author to describe this ideal of the citizen soldier," the apostle "of one standard of aretê, the common good of the polis."³ I find no evidence of this in the fragments. Rather does he glorify war, and little else. The *polis* was a fact when he wrote, and thus fighting is fighting for the city, but the references to it are secondary, scarcely different from Homer, though his glory in war is more brutal. If there is a certain change in background, there is no development. The Tyrtaeus who "opens a window on the development of the idea of aretê since Homer and on the crisis which confronted the old aristocratic ideal during the rise of the city state" seems a creature of fancy.

However, Sparta was not, fortunately, the only city-state. *Dikê* acquired new depth and new meaning, the concept of equality arose as other states developed, and the Ionians of Asia Minor contributed also a new freedom and respect for the individual, as Jaeger well points out (pp. 99-114), emphasizing the significance of the demand for written law, *Nomos* as the new ruler, and the growth of a morality rooted in the *polis*.

² A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1934), III, pp. 50-79.

³ The passage referred to is frag. 12 (Edmonds) οὐ γὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γίγνεται ἐν πολέμῳ | εἰ μὴ τετλαῖν μὲν ὁρῶν φόρον αἰματόεντα | καὶ δῆλῳ ὀρέγῃ· ἐγγυθεν ἰστάμενος· | ἥδ' ἀρετὴ, τόδ' ἀέθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἔριστον | κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ νέῳ· | ξυνὸν δ' ἔσθλον τοῦτο πόλῃ τε παντὶ τε δήμῳ, where ἥδ' ἀρετὴ clearly refers to bravery in battle and the last line simply means such virtue is good for the city and the people alike—an echo of

πατρὶ τε σὺ μέγα πῆμα πόλῃ τε παντὶ τε δήμῳ

in *Iliad*, III, 50. In another fragment there is a reference to the Heraclid kings of Sparta, the elders and the commons, mere statements of fact. The one passage that gives some colour to the *polis* ideal is frag. 10 on the sufferings of an exile, τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πόντος ἀγρούς | πτωχεύειν πάντων ἔστ' ἀνθρώπων which again leads to glory in battle with full and gory detail. Even there, however, the sentiment is not essentially different from the πτωχοὶ καὶ ἀλήμονες ἀνδρες of *Odyssey*, XIX, 74. And the fragment on Eunomia is made to carry a burden of philosophy out of all proportion to the text (pp. 94-5).

The author's definite time scheme leads him to speak too much in terms of linear succession instead of depicting these various periods as varying aspects of the forces at work everywhere. This shows also in his treatment of the lyric poets. Further, though rightly insisting that the Greek ethic is political, he is apt to over-emphasize this at times: "Greek expressions of personal emotions and thought have nothing purely subjective in them" (p. 116). Such a statement would, I imagine, have amused Archilochus and puzzled Sappho. In Archilochus we are to see "the completion of Homer's great educational mission: for now the epic is taking possession of individual personality and character, and the formative influence of Homer has contributed above all else to a higher stage of freedom in life and thought" (p. 118); "he drinks his wine and eats his bread in the pose of a Homeric hero." Does he look at his women in the same way? "It was a daring feat then to transform heroism into naturalism."⁴ I should say it was an impossibility. The pity of it is that such puzzling generalities obscure the contrast between Spartan and Ionian, Ionian and Homer, which—when he forgets his *post-hoc-propter-hoc* framework,—the author so excellently describes.

Even here, however, this new value put on the expression of personal emotions is not seen as a natural factor in the development of freedom which politically expressed itself in the fight against aristocratic oppression. Jaeger considers it a reaction against the tyranny of the *polis* (and presumably of the growing democracy) when he says (p. 128): "As the city-state tightened the chains of law on its citizens, they strove more and more eagerly to complement its political rigidity by liberty in their own private lives." It would certainly have surprised the champions of democracy to learn that the written laws they fought for were rigid chains—on anyone, that is, but their late arbitrary masters. And if rigidity leads to lyric poetry, the Spartans should have been the greatest lyrists in the world.

Yet the general conclusions on "the hedonist school of poetry" are right, fair and well put, in spite of excessive stress on the odd fragment, supposedly more significant.⁵

Jaeger is on more solid ground when he discusses Solon as one of

⁴ Jaeger builds an Archilochean philosophy of Tyche and Renunciation on frags. 25 and 66 (Edmonds), pp. 124-5. The former renounces all desire for wealth and power, the second exhorts his heart to bear triumph and disaster equably, and ends *γίγνωσκε δ' οἷος ῥυσμὸς ἀνθρώπων ἔχει*. Most of Archilochus' fragments have no social significance whatever. On the well known *Πάτερ Λυκάμβα, ποῖον ἐφράσω τόδε; | τίς σὰς παρήειρε φρένας | ἥς τὸ πρὶν ἠήρεισθα; νῦν δὲ πολλὸς | ἀστοῖσι φαίνεαι γέλως*, Jaeger says (p. 123): "Even in the story of his unsuccessful wooing of Neobule and his proud and passionate abuse of her father for rejecting him, it is clear that he thinks of the whole community as his witnesses, while he himself is plaintiff and judge. . . ."

⁵ Jaeger fastens on a fragment (14, Edmonds) which refers to bravery in battle to comment (p. 129) that Mimnermus "sometimes speaks with the voice of a statesman and a warrior, and the tense Homeric phrases of his poems vibrate with chivalrous ardour." The not remarkable lines seem to be put in the mouth of "my elders." The famous first fragments on old age are far more characteristic. See also Horace, *Epist.*, I, 6, 65.

the main architects of the Athenian equilibrium between the individual and the state. The attempt to reconstruct the philosophy behind the fragments is also more successful, because Solon was a statesman and a thinker as well as a poet: the growing belief in the responsibility of the citizen, the deeper significance of *Dikê*, and the concept of law. Worthwhile parallels emerge with the developing concepts of philosophy; the justice of Anaximander, the harmony of the Pythagoreans, the deeper consciousness of self that came with Orphism, the *φρόνησις* of Heraclitus, with the psyche sharing in *logos*.

Yet here and there Jaeger again overstates his case and overloads a fragmentary phrase with meaning, such as Heraclitus' *ἐδίκησάμην ἐμειωντόν* on which he comments, "he expressed the revolutionary tendency of his own philosophy in one pregnant saying: 'I sought for myself.' Humanization of philosophy could not be more trenchantly expressed" (p. 179). The well-known complaint of Xenophanes that the athletic victor receives more honour than he, the *σοφός*, becomes the symbol of: "the inevitable clash between two spiritual forces—the old aristocratic culture and the new philosophical ideal of humanity which now sought to eject it from its place of honour in the social order—that is the essence of the conflict" (p. 173). Yet *σοφός* almost certainly means poet, not philosopher.⁶ This is poor evidence for the picture of Xenophanes as a populariser of "intellectual virtue" or an opponent of the old aristocratic culture.

With Theognis and Pindar we return to the supposed development of the aristocratic culture in transition. No one denies that both of them reflect aristocratic views and prejudices; but to turn Theognis, that bitter oligarch, into the codifier of an aristocratic culture taxes even Jaeger's ingenuity. Didacticism is not always education. The narrowness of Theognis' partisan outlook is not in dispute. Of morals he had none. I do not refer to his Dorian Eros—on which pp. 194-6 are very good—but to his negative ethical outlook.⁷

The attempt to set up Pindar as an educational giant is no more successful. The singer of athletic victory seems to become so because athletics, originally aristocratic, were cheapened to "mere sport" by democracy (p. 207) and lost their place in Greek life! He is said to "give a new authority to the old aristocratic code." In

⁶ Cf. e.g. Solon, frag. 13, 52. See also p. 219.

⁷ One example must suffice. On the well-known lines (149-50)

Χρήματα μὲν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκῳ ἀνδρὶ δίδωσι,
Κύρπ' ἀρετῆς δ' ὀλίγοις ἀνδράσι μοῖρ' ἔπεται

we are told, "Theognis holds that *aretê* is the quality which characterizes the nobleman when the presence or absence of wealth is left out of account: *namely, the very rare quality of spiritual nobility*" (p. 203, my italics). The italicized words are nowhere in the Greek. Theognis speaks rather like a prince whose finery has been stolen and who should exclaim: "Clothes make not the man." Jaeger himself suggests this contempt for wealth is due to the loss of it! Even *ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῇ* does not mean much, for a codifier of morals. And many verses are quite unethical. See 173 on the horrors of poverty and 61-8 that you should never trust a friend, and *passim*.

spite of references to heredity, etc., I can find in Pindar no trace of "an entire philosophy, rich with deep meditations" on any subject whatever, or any "deep and spiritual kinship of this aristocratic ideal of *paideia* with the educational spirit of Plato's philosophy of ideas."⁸

The first book—Archaic Greece—ends with the cultural policy of the tyrants, and their contribution to culture as patrons of the arts and in other ways. But can it be seriously suggested that the Greek hatred of tyranny was derived from the aristocrats, as tyranny was "the bogey of the fallen aristocracy"? And I can see no basis whatever for the statement that "the Greeks always felt that the rule of one supremely able man was, in Aristotle's words,⁹ 'according to nature' and they tended to acquiesce in it when it appeared."

I have dealt with this first book at length, because it is the most original and controversial. Its main theme, of a conscious old Greek aristocratic culture and educational effort, as a basic element in Greek culture, with a great contribution to make, is not supported by the evidence.

The careful reader is driven to conclude that this view is due to *a priori* premises from which the author starts. Throughout, there are a number of very doubtful theoretical statements of social and political views, axiomatic in tone, which influence the handling of the evidence.

"The nobility is the prime mover in the forming of a nation's culture" (p. 4); "Culture is simply the aristocratic ideal of a nation, increasingly intellectualized" (p. 4); Tyrtæus, allegedly sent by Apollo, is "a striking expression of the strange truth that when a spiritual leader is needed, he always comes" (p. 89); of Archilochus: "a man who . . . has realized the baseness of the mass of mankind, has lost all trace of respect for the voice of the people" (p. 120); of Sappho: "Love is the whole of a woman's life . . ." (p. 134); "the ideal of universal political *aretê* is indispensable because it implies the constant creation and regeneration of a governing class; and without such a governing class no nation and no state, whatever its constitution, can long survive" (p. 114). "Whatever view we may hold of the descent of *aretê* through noble blood, we must acknowledge the gulf which Pindar points out between natural nobility born in its possessor, and the knowledge and powers which have been merely acquired by learning, for the difference between the two things is actual and right" (p. 220).¹⁰

⁸ Here again, one example: *Nem.*, III, 56, after singing the exploits of Achilles, points out that Chiron brought up Jason, Asclepius, Achilles—*ἐν ἀρμενοῖσι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὖξιν*. On this Jaeger: "Education cannot act unless there is an inborn *aretê* for it to act upon, as there was in Chiron's glorious pupils, whom he 'fostered, strengthening their hearts with seemly matters.' That pregnant phrase contains the fruits of long thought on the problem. It shows the deliberate resolve of the aristocracy to preserve its position at a time of crisis" (pp. 218-19, my italics). For a fuller discussion of Pindar's views see Gilbert Norwood's *Pindar* (Sather Lectures, 1945), third lecture.

⁹ Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 1288 a 28, but it is not so forthright, and tyranny is *οὐ κατὰ φύσιν*, 1287 b 40, as Jaeger himself notes.

¹⁰ See also p. 7 on "present day educational levellers," and pp. 57, 88

Such statements are here premises, not conclusions, and they dominate the discussions. Throughout the rest of the work, there are references to the old aristocratic ideal here supposedly established, though its content is left vague. These lead to strange comparisons at times, such as that of Aeschylus with Tyrtaeus in spirit and with Pindar in educational purpose. The civilization of fifth century Athens was formed, we are told, "not by its new constitution nor by its new right of suffrage, but by its victory" (p. 240) which is surely an oversimplification. This general view is also responsible for the picture of a fifth century degenerating as soon as it becomes democratic, though Sophocles provides a period of suspense in tragedy as Pericles does in politics. After them, everything is vulgarisation and mob rule. Even so, however, with specific exceptions, this prejudiced view does not affect the discussions of various authors as much as might have been feared.

It is recognized that the achievements were due to the whole people. Aeschylus was the poet of the men of Marathon. The *polis* is of supreme importance in his plays (p. 471). He is concerned to interpret the ways of the gods,¹¹ and this implies a deeper understanding of the responsibilities of man. Prometheus suffering "the agony of spiritual pioneers" (p. 262), the educational function of the Chorus (265), the mighty spiritual unity of suffering and knowledge, all this and much else make a very fine chapter on what Jaeger calls "the most powerful drama in the history of the world."

With Sophocles our author has less sympathy, and his appraisal of him is both more conventional and more repetitious. Sophocles' greatness is due to his character drawing, to a new interest "in the souls of tragic characters." At the same time he is compared to Phidias, the two being "the two imperishable monuments of the great age of the Athenian spirit"; "form and norm are unified in a special sense"; in Sophocles "form is the immediate and appropriate expression, in fact the full revelation of being, and its metaphysical manifestation"; while at the same time Sophocles "shifted the emphasis from universal to individual." The reader might have preferred a less abstract valuation. There are brief discussions of *Antigone*, *Electra*, *Oedipus*, but they are not so vigorous or effective as that of the *Prometheus*.

The treatment of the Sophists is illuminating and suggestive, though it roams backward and forward in time, discursively. The sophists were "the first to conceive the conscious ideal of culture" (p. 303); "The heirs to the educational tradition of the poets." The time-scheme, however, insufficiently allows for the simultaneous working of opposite forces, and the sophists should be more clearly distinguished. There are, here too, some doubtful generalities. Can we truly say of Athens then that (p. 292): "Ethical qualities now fell into the background"? "Then, for the first time, the intellectual side of man came to the fore . . .," but what of Heraclitus?

(the Spartan ideal), 138 (the superior intelligence of the upper classes), 186 (all higher culture arose from the aristocracy). In later books, p. 290 (the only problem of democracy was to find the right leader), etc., and all the contemptuous references to ever worse mob rule from the death of Pericles on.

¹¹ Jaeger says the ways of God. See below.

"σοφία endangered the aristocratic ideal" (p. 319). Was it not rather the spread of culture? These and other unqualified statements detract from an otherwise attractive chapter on the sophists, which rightly concludes: "Their strength lay in the brilliant new system of education they invented. Their weakness was in the intellectual and moral foundations of their system" (p. 331).

With Euripides, Jaeger has no sympathy at all, and, for that reason, less understanding of his positive contribution. The intellectual sensitiveness and restless curiosity of the times are to him only a sign of "the tragic ruin of a civilization" (p. 332). "The collapse of society was only the outward and visible sign of the collapse of individual character. Even the hardships and trials of war affect a spiritually healthy nation very differently from a nation whose values are rotten with individualism" (p. 336, my italics). Such a description certainly does not fit the Athens of Euripides.

The picture of Euripides is conventional, with an extra sting in it. His realism becomes "bourgeois" realism, and Medea the heroine of "a domestic drama of bourgeois life." The epithet bourgeois, applied to Euripides, seems meaningless. Jaeger states quite correctly that criticism of the gods is subordinate to the dramatic motive, and deals adequately with Euripides' mixture of styles, his argumentative eloquence, his rationalist tone, his deeper psychological insight—"he created the pathology of the mind." But this is not linked up with the main thesis, nor does the deep humanism of the poet receive mention. Euripides deserves far more positive a place in a study of Greek culture; the *Bacchantes* is not "a world without faith"; the *Trojan Women* is far more than "a powerful attack on the glory of the Greeks who conquered Troy"; the *Hippolytus*, than "the tragic working out of sexual desire unfulfilled."¹²

The treatment of Aristophanes, too, is scanty. The light which old comedy throws on the Athenian's love of laughter is brought out well, but the discussion of the comedies is restricted to the *Knights*, the *Clouds*, and the *Frogs*. Jaeger very obviously shares all Aristophanes' prejudices against Cleon. "His chorus of knights embodied the defensive alliance of nobility and intellect against the growing power of barbarism and political terror." The very fact of the performance disproves any real "political terror" and the intellect, if any, is well camouflaged! And Aristophanes' treatment of the new tragedy, as well as the new education, shows "dreadful anxiety for the future of Athens." Surely, there is much more in Aristophanes that requires discussion here: his comments on the Athenian love of litigation, his comedies on women—are not all these and much else relevant to a study of the shaping of the Athenian character?

The discussion on Thucydides starts very well. "The astonishing concentration of political thought and will revealed in the creation of the empire found full intellectual expression in the history of Thucydides." The political experience of Thucydides is rightly emphasized and the function of the speeches as "the medium through which he expresses his political ideas" explained—though a complication is introduced by considering some, notably the Funeral

¹² See my *The Drama of Euripides* (Methuen, 1941).

speech, to be free compositions embodying post-war reflections (pp. 395, 487).

Professor Jaeger belongs to the school that regards Thucydides as a "cold analyst," even in the Melian dialogue, where Thucydides, he says, is not taking sides. "He thinks only of power" (p. 386), and "By making the Athenians justify the right of the stronger through the law of nature, and transform God from the guardian of justice into the pattern of all earthly authority and force, Thucydides gave the realistic policy of Athens the depth and validity of a philosophical doctrine" (p. 401). To me, the Melian dialogue remains a bitter satire. The dramatic element in Thucydides cannot be thus dismissed, and no cold analyst has ever been a great political philosopher.

In any case, that philosophy should not be reduced to a simple belief in the Leader-principle. True, Thucydides venerated Pericles; he may even have thought that Pericles would have won the Sicilian expedition—though Jaeger conveniently dismisses Pericles' advice of no further conquests as probably not Periclean (p. 407). But he goes further: "According to Thucydides, it was because there was no other man who could eliminate the influence of the people and its mob instincts, surmount the democratic constitution and govern like a king, that the Sicilian expedition failed" (p. 406, my italics). And again: "Thucydides considers that Periclean Athens was a happy solution of a problem which was becoming acute under the complete mob rule of the decades following the death of Pericles—the problem of the relationship which ought to exist between a superior individual and the political community. History has shown that this solution depends on the appearance of a genius to lead the state . . ." (p. 409, my italics).¹³

If this were Thucydides' political philosophy, he would certainly not be expressing "the political thought and will" of Athens. The evidence nowhere supports such a view.

The second volume deals with Socrates and Plato (up to and including the *Republic*). It is very much less controversial than the first. The title—In Search of the Divine Centre—points to the one doubtful part, the gods; but in general it can be recommended as a sound, if somewhat lengthy and at times repetitious, study of Plato's theories of education, broadly understood.

We are now in the fourth century. The author draws a somewhat rigid line between the fifth century and the fourth—before and after defeat. But can Socrates, as well as the funeral speech of Pericles, be included in the fourth century? However difficult it may

¹³ The references for all this are to II, 65, where we have the famous λόγῳ μὲν δῆμοκρατία, ἐργῳ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή, and Thucydides goes on to blame the later disasters, including the failure in Sicily, on the rival ambitions of Pericles' successor. There is, of course, nothing in Thucydides corresponding to the words italicized. ἀρχή does not mean kingship. Pericles was re-elected year by year. Not a word in Thucydides against this or other features of the constitution. There is also a reference to II, 37, 1, where Pericles boasts of equality before the law and career open to talent. Jaeger comments: "Logically, that implies that if one man is supremely valuable, and important, he will be recognized as the ruler of the state."

be to recreate the historical Socrates (and that problem is here very sensibly reviewed), he is certainly a contemporary of Euripides, not of Plato, although there are obvious advantages in dealing with him in relation to Plato. They cannot be separated, but then the fifth century should not thus be cut off from the fourth.

The chapter on Socrates is very good. The picture of him as the teacher is well and vividly drawn. Stress is put on the influence of medical science, the vital and revolutionary Socratic emphasis on the psyche and the inner life, the Socratic *askêsis* aiming at "not the virtue of the monk but the virtue of the ruler," the definitions. A brief general discussion on Platonic *paideia* is followed by a chapter on the Socratic dialogues which are shown to centre round the problem of *aretê*. While maintaining the essential unity of Platonism, allowance is made for the development of Plato himself. The Seventh Letter is accepted as genuine and providing us with background for some of the earlier works.

For the rest of the book (pp. 107-370) the author adopts the method of summary interspersed with comments and so deals with *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*. The summaries are good, but the method has certain weaknesses. Comments of importance are thus embodied in a summary. The general reader cannot always be sure where Plato ends and Jaeger begins. The same subjects recur a number of times, with inevitable and avoidable repetition in general comments. The method does not always allow sufficient relief to the most significant passages; and passages equally important, in other than the selected work, receive insufficient notice.¹⁴

A curious feature is that Jaeger is apt to argue at length, as very controversial, certain points of view that have been generally accepted for a generation by most English-speaking scholars.¹⁵ This

¹⁴ The teachability of virtue in the *Meno*, for example, would gain if related to statements elsewhere on knowledge and utility (*Lysis*); the knowledge of knowledge (*Charmides*); the knowledge of self (*Hippias*), not to mention passages in the *Republic* which later receive separate discussion, and from later dialogues, which, except for the *Laws*, are not dealt with at all.

Passages insufficiently stressed are, for example, in *Rep.* I, the implied difficulty of equating virtue with technical knowledge; the just man will harm no one (335d); the impotence of injustice (352); the *ἐργον ψυχῆς* (333c) and later, the importance of public opinion, which the Sophist only obeys (492-3), the unusual apology for the many (449e), and the fact that the guardians do achieve virtues without knowledge, since they have only *δόξα* (412-3, 429-30). Generally, the psychology of the *Republic* does not receive adequate treatment.

¹⁵ One example is the relation between the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*. One remembers that the first volume was originally published in 1933, though some additions have been made to the notes. In this volume there are 25 references to British scholars, 16 of them to Burnet or Taylor. There are, in all three volumes, very numerous references to German scholarship for which all students will be grateful, but, in all, there are in the voluminous notes only 79 references to British works, 38 to American, but (omitting all cross references to *Paideia* itself) 141 references to the author's other works! The *Cambridge Ancient History* is never referred to. Cornford's work is not mentioned in

underlines the scantiness of references to British works, both in this and the other volumes. It is the more regrettable as British scholars have concerned themselves, particularly, with general syntheses of the kind aimed at in this work.

The paradox of the *Protagoras*, the search for a standard in the *Gorgias*, the new Socratic knowledge in the *Meno*, the "union of Eros and paideia" in the *Symposium*, all these are discussed with vigour and sympathetic imagination, and with many a vivid comment. One may regret that the *Symposium* is separated from the *Phaedrus*, later discussed largely from another point of view. So one regrets that the discussions of poetry in *Republic* III, and X, are separated by 128 pages of other matter, but that is inherent in the method the author has chosen. And through it all he very rightly insists that these different aspects of Platonic philosophy all bear a direct relation to Plato's philosophy of politics—that his *paideia* is intended for the individual-in-the-community.

It might have helped to give a clear summary of conclusions reached in all previous dialogues before tackling the *Republic*. This the general review at this point does not, and the reader is likely to get lost in this very long commentary (pp. 199-370) unless the different threads are kept clearly before him. In the early books, the author emphasizes the state's responsibility for the education of the "guards" as "a revolutionary reform of unimaginable historical consequences" (p. 210). There can be disagreement only on matters of detail¹⁶ as we follow the growth of the state, and Jaeger makes a very important distinction, too often ignored, when he says that, although Plato borrowed from Sparta, the inmost spiritual essence of his education "is absolutely un-Spartan" (p. 239). There is also a good discussion of "the organic cosmos of the soul" (p. 241).

Plato's eugenic principles are related to the studies of Greek physicians (p. 249) and the military regulations of V are rightly said to be "a new ethical code for war" with practical intent. In discussing the claim of the philosopher to rule, it is clearly stated: "Suppose we deprive the ruler of his absolute knowledge. According to Plato, we thereby destroy the foundation of his authority, for it does not depend on any mystic of personal leadership, but on the power of truth to convince" (p. 264). As the *Politicus* is nowhere discussed, this problem is dropped (see vol. III, p. 236). The section on Constitutions and Characters is especially well written and vivid (on VIII and IX). Finally, the free choice of lives in the myth of Er is rightly emphasized, but the contradictions on this point are not drawn to our attention.

relation to early philosophy, Thucydides, or Plato. And there are many similar omissions.

¹⁶ P. 221: "Plato has no quarrel with those who try to keep a place for aesthetic enjoyment . . ." Plato admits the existence of such enjoyment (387b) but does not leave a place for it, except for the doubtful *ὅτι μὴ παιδείας ἐνεκα* at 396e. See also p. 223. P. 224: "Sound and rhythm must be subordinate to language." But surely *logos* means content as well as language? P. 281: "detour" is an unfortunate translation for *περίοδος* in 504b; it rather means a longer prescribed course, cf. the use for map and orbit. It is not a pointless going around. P. 341: I doubt if *φίλοι* and *ὄφελει* are "obvious allusions to the method of medical and biological pathology." The words are very common.

There is, however, one central point that is highly controversial, the identification of the Good with "God" in the discussion of the simile of the Sun. This identification has been made by others, but never by Plato, as Jaeger admits (pp. 285 f.). This is an old controversy and I can only register disagreement.¹⁷ I believe the Ideas, the ultimate reality, always remained, in Plato, distinct from the gods who, at least in the later dialogues, are active souls. Very little is gained by speaking of Plato as "the founder of a new religion or theology," though we may well grant it, if theology is defined as "the study of the highest problems in the universe by means of philosophic reason"—"a higher and purer work of the intellect than any mere religion" (p. 298). That is of course the Aristotelian *θεολογική*, but today it is called metaphysics. The use of modern words such as God, theology, religion, add nothing for the scholar and tremendously confuse the general reader. The *Euthyphro* is mentioned in this connection, and rightly, but that little dialogue makes it quite clear that the Ideas are prior to the gods who love the right because it is right. This was not changed even by the *Epinomis* (see p. 297). And when we are told that "the Daimon mostly means God not in his absolute being but in his relation to man" (p. 345) confusion gets worse confounded.

That does not mean, of course, that the Good is not the model divine in the Greek or that *paideia* may not be called "conversion," provided again we clearly differentiate it from the modern Christian meaning of the word (p. 295) and, as Jaeger points out, it was certainly not a purely intellectual act, for it is closely linked with Plato's theories of Eros (pp. 295 ff.).

The third volume (Book Four) begins with a substantial and interesting essay on Greek medicine (pp. 3-46). After this—except for a chapter on Xenophon and a concluding one on Demosthenes—we are concerned only with Isocrates, and Plato in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*.

Jaeger puts very great emphasis on medicine as "a leading force in the life of the Greek people" and on its influence on Greek writers. He traces the kinship of ideas (of *φύσις*, for example) in medicine and early philosophy, the reaction against the philosophic outlook in the Hippocratean corpus, and a later coming together. He makes out an interesting case for a much deeper influence of the medical methods on Plato than is usually allowed—with an especially attractive discussion of the notorious passage in *Phaedrus* (270 c-d), and insists that the method of studying the forms of the soul is in fact Hippocratean. Aristotle's ethical vocabulary is also said to be medical, as is, of course, the insistence on balance and health of the soul in Plato.

All this is excellent, but we then get involved in a detailed dis-

¹⁷ See Jaeger's notes and references, pp. 414 ff. See also my *Plato's Thought* (Methuen, 1935), pp. 150-78 and references there. It should be added that even the words *ὁ θεός* do not mean God; e.g. in Book III, where Jaeger so translates, *ὁ θεός* no more implies the existence of one God than *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* the existence of only one man, e.g. *ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις* (395d). Both are generic, and throughout III Plato uses *θεός* and *θεοί* quite indiscriminately.

cussion of the treatise *On Diet* and the work of Diocles of Carystus which, though very interesting in itself, seems somewhat out of place, and due to the special interests of the author rather than the requirements of his subject. However, he has rendered a real service in thus putting Greek medicine squarely in the middle of a discussion of Greek culture and education—"the Greek ideal of culture was the ideal of Health."

Isocrates is an important figure in fourth century Athens, and well deserves the place here given to him. He "naturalized" the education of the Sophists though he disclaimed the title—and represents general education as against philosophy in the Platonic sense. Certainly, "sophistry" was still alive, and we agree that "Plato never argued against dead men." The contrast between the educational methods of Plato and Isocrates is therefore important and indeed perennial. It is the greater pity that this contrast—including a very different attitude towards politics—is here largely side-tracked into an argument about specific references to Plato in Isocrates. That question, though interesting to the specialist, is secondary. A greater pity that the evidence is definitely mishandled and that Jaeger, by summarizing in his own, sometimes in Platonic, language, gives the appearance of fact to his own inferences.¹⁸

By supposing Plato to be included under Eristics in *Against the Sophists*; classed with Antisthenes, but not with Eristics, in *Helen*; and more gently dealt with along with Eristics in *Antidosis*, Jaeger imagines an early hostility between the two men, and gradually a better understanding. There is no evidence for this.¹⁹

¹⁸ E. g. Isocrates is said to "make short work of dialectic: he couples it with eristic" (p. 56). There is no reference to dialectic in *Ag. the Soph.*; nor to "aesthetic sense," or "artistically disciplined form" (p. 60). A comparison of the short text of *Against the Sophists* with Jaeger's discussion will make this very clear (pp. 56-67). E. g. *ἰδιωτῶν τινες* becomes "the mob," p. 58.

¹⁹ *Against the Sophists*, 1-9, condemns a) the excessive promises of some teachers, b) "eristics" who profess to teach the truth but tell lies, c) those who claim knowledge of the future, d) those who tell young men that by frequenting them they will know how to act (cf. *Prot.* 318a), e) those who charge fees and distrust their pupils, f) those who watch for contradictions in words, not deeds. Here we are to see "all the features that make Platonism repulsive to ordinary common sense" (p. 57). Even charging fees is apparently aimed at Plato! Much is made of the use of *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*, which are here quite general; and the expression *ψυχῆς ἐπιμελεία* "above all" shows the attack to be against Plato and the Socratics. But that, too, in Isocrates, is used for education, even his own! See *Antidosis* 304. Actually the people attacked here are largely the eristics and sophists attacked also in Plato.

In *Helen*, 1, Isocrates attacks a) those who say *πενδῇ λέγειν* is impossible (Antisthenes?) b) others (*οἱ δέ*) who say different virtues are *μὴ ἐπιστήμη* c) others (*οἱ δέ*) the eristics. Plato can be only under (b). He goes on to apply 2-5 to (a), and 6-12 to (c).

That Isocrates takes a kinder tone towards other teachers generally at a later date is irrelevant (*To Nicocles* 50-3, *Antidosis* 259-87, where the eristics are distinguished from those who teach the mathematical sciences. In 271 he does use *δόξα*, *ἐπιστήμη* in a more Platonic sense, but we are now in 354 B. C. See also pp. 146-50).

Our general view of Isocrates is not made clearer by proceeding from speech to speech. There are too many contradictions. It is precisely because his "philosophy" has no philosophical basis that he shifts his ground according to circumstances or audience. Jaeger deals too kindly with him and attempts to endow him with a depth and consistency that were not his. The *Nicocles* and other Cyprean speeches evince a belief in kingship—directed by an educator—but *To Nicocles* is a very slight piece to carry any such heavy burden of systematized thought as is here laid upon it. The *logos* of Isocrates is but a brittle and almost empty vessel. If the *Areopagiticus* (which Jaeger attractively dates in 357, before the Social war) is rightly called a "wish fantasy" (p. 112) and also the program of a political group—it is in fact the old back-to-Solon cry—can we at the same time describe it as "a penetrating critique of democracy in its existing form—radical mob-rule" (p. 123)? Should we really seek the influence of Thucydides in one so careless of historical truth?

So with the *Antidosis*, the old man's defence. He did, undoubtedly, insist upon the great value of education to the state, but did he ever define it, beyond the capacity to speak well on great subjects? The apostle of general culture nowhere gives it adequate content. The creation of new intellectual élite (p. 153)? He never says so. We should not therefore speak of basic principles in his thought (p. 146) or describe his school as "a political research institute" (p. 154). Though critical in detail, Jaeger's lengthy valuation of Isocrates too often approaches Isocratean rhetoric itself.

On the other hand, the chapter on Xenophon has something of the straightforward crispness of Xenophon's writing. With all his limitations he certainly is "vivid and likable." As he is a simple person, Xenophon's prejudices are more obvious. Jaeger gives us a brief and businesslike description of his various works from which emerges the Xenophontic ideal of the gentleman-soldier. "What moves us most deeply is not the influence that Xenophon tries to exercise on us, but the lasting impression the strange foreign peoples make on him" (p. 160). That is very true, and this brief clear picture of the conscious uncomplicated *καλὸς κἀγαθός* is a welcome relief between the limpid complacency of Isocrates and the disenchanted power of Plato in his old age.

The *Phaedrus* is here classed as a work of that old age. The style would date it rather in the middle period, but the main argument is not affected thereby. In any case, the unusual naming of Isocrates at the end points to some relation to Isocrates.²⁰ The analysis of the two speeches on Eros is good, and the thesis of the second part clearly explained: a speech must be an organic whole, the orator must have philosophic knowledge, the knowledge of dialectic which he is to apply to the study of the soul.

²⁰ Jaeger makes much of the "eulogy" of Isocrates at *Phaedrus* 279a (pp. 184-5), but the later we date the dialogue, the less of a compliment it becomes for Socrates to say that Isocrates is a young man who may go far for he has something of philosophy in him. In the Platonic sense he obviously did not develop into a philosopher. Certainly, the irony is good-natured.

Very rightly, Jaeger insists on the importance of Plato's *Laws*, too often neglected, and shows that there is in that work an increasing emphasis upon the practical, which is illustrated by the passage on the slaves' doctor. Yet at times the contrast with the *Republic* is rather forced. Early education in the *Republic* was not "simply trying to start training the child's intellect young enough,"²¹ though undoubtedly there is greater emphasis on the training of emotion in the *Laws*. Indeed, this should have been linked up with the psychology of the *Timaeus*. Jaeger sees Plato as aiming at a synthesis of the Dorian and Athenian natures (p. 218) and he tends to overestimate the Spartan-Tyrtæan contribution, while he does not extract the full value of the contrast in the first book between the Spartan and the Athenian aims. The emphasis there placed on harmony, not victory, and the reasons given for the *προοίμια* show that Plato, aristocrat though he was, had yet grasped the fundamental democratic principle, reliance on persuasion rather than force.

Yet we have here, in spite of this, a very adequate account of the popular education of the *Laws*, the education by play, the surprising detail on the education of infants, the attempt to reform *μουσική* once more, the tremendous importance of all art, and the fact that the Ideas and the philosopher's education are still in the background.

One word of warning must be repeated against Jaeger's habit of translating *ὁ θεός*, *οἱ θεοί* and even *θεός τις* by "God," which is apt to confuse the general reader. At least we should have been warned that the meaning of *θεός* and that of "God" are very different. That Plato's ethic was based on a knowledge of the supreme realities and values, the Ideas, is self evident; that these are more than human and therefore, in a sense, divine, is also true. But we have seen that they should not be called gods, and certainly not God. The introduction of the terms of modern religion, the comparison of his state to a Church (p. 252) require careful qualification and explanation, of which there is none. Two or three passages of the *Laws* are referred to again and again. This points to a strange omission in this work. The gods are nowhere discussed. In view of the importance of this "knowledge of God," in Jaeger's final valuation of the Platonic ethic and *paideia*, such explanation and discussion were essential.

The last chapter, on Demosthenes, is vivid and lively. We are given a closer view of the orator's personality and he is himself kept close to the contemporary background. He is depicted as towering above all his contemporaries. Compared with him, Isocrates is now convicted of an unforgivable political blunder. And, in Demosthenes' youth, the perpetually worsening "mob rule" is allowed to lift for a moment and Athens to recover from the Peloponnesian war (p. 266). As we follow the unfolding political aims of Demosthenes, his mission to educate the Athenians is clear, but can he be called an educator and "essentially a teacher" in any sense approaching that used hitherto? Was his conception of politics "wholly an objective art" (pp. 281-5)? And the suggestion on the debate in his soul between "the practical politician and the idealistic statesman,"

²¹ See *Rep.* 377b, the whole discussion on poetry, and 401 b-d, 411 a-c, etc.

though attractive, is conjectural. In short this chapter, good as it is, is not worked into any direct relevance with the rest of the volume.

This review may appear to be a piecemeal valuation, but in this it reflects the impression left by the work itself. There is indeed a framework of very wide generalizations such as the identity of ethics and politics, the progressing importance of the individual in Greek thought. Within each section there are dominant ideas such as the conscious development of an aristocratic ideal in Archaic Greece, the divine centre in Plato. And valuable parallels are worked out, as between early political and philosophic thought, medical and philosophic methods. But the threads are not sufficiently drawn together, the particular sections not sufficiently clearly integrated in the general theme.

The neglect of the character and outlook of the Greek people themselves seems to originate from a belief that the élite of the few chosen spirits not only direct a people's culture, but *are* that culture. Even within the philosophic ideal, however, there are some gaps. The ill-fated desire for *ἀνταρκεία*, for example, receives little notice.

The book as a whole contains a great deal of valuable material and discussions, also a great deal of suggestive detail which cannot, in a review, be noted or criticized. All this is of great importance for the scholar and the research student. But, because of the dubious nature of some of its main contentions and general approach, its at times unnecessary length, its highly rhetorical style and repetitious methods, the whole work can be used, by and for the general reader and student-body, only with the greatest caution.

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EMMA J. and LUDWIG EDELSTEIN. *Asclepius*. Vol. I: Testimonies, pp. xvii + 470. Vol. II: Interpretations, pp. x + 277. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1945. \$7.50. (*Publications of the Institute of the History of Medicine, The Johns Hopkins University*, second series, Texts and Documents, Vol. II.)

After the monumental monograph on Zeus by Professor A. B. Cook, *Asclepius* is the second Greek god to be the object of a great monograph in a work honored by a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies. The first volume comprising the testimonies is much larger than the second which contains the interpretations, but this is due to the fact that all testimonies are translated. This is useful because the book will be of interest to other people too besides classical scholars. While Cook takes in everything that is in any way related to Zeus, the Edelsteins put strict limits to their work, perhaps with the understandable and praiseworthy purpose that it might not swell too much. It will not be unfair to the authors and may be useful to the reader to point to these limits.

First, the authors treat exclusively of *Asclepius*. The numerous

healing heroes with whom Greece abounded are mentioned only once in passing (p. 61), although they form the background. Secondly, while the literary testimonies, many of them insignificant, are collected in their entirety, a selection is made of the inscriptions (see the Preface of vol. I). I agree with the authors that it was superfluous to reproduce the many dedications giving only names, but there are more remarkable omissions. Of the famous Epidaurian miracle inscriptions only two slabs (*I. G.*, IV², 1, nos. 121 and 122) are reproduced, nos. 123 and 124 omitted with the remark that they are too badly damaged to yield reliable information. This is not perfectly true; in some cases the sense can be made out. And they add some interesting information, e. g. the popular anecdote of the fishmonger who did not pay the promised tithe to Asclepius, which is treated anew ingeniously by Herzog in *Archaiologike Ephemeris*, 1937, pp. 522 ff., and the folk-tale of the statue with the golden head, to which Blinkenberg adduced parallels from various ages and peoples in *Danske Studier*, 1928, pp. 97 ff. (in Danish); this folk-tale is especially interesting because, as the month-name Thargelion proves, it is taken over from an Ionian source and adapted to the Epidaurian propaganda. This omission is connected with the failure of the authors to discuss or appreciate the significance of the miracle tales as witnesses of the Epidaurian propaganda. Of the inscriptions from the Asclepius sanctuary at Lebena (*Inscriptiones Creticae*, I, xvii, 6-31) only one is adduced, without a warning that there are many more. The note (vol. II, p. 203, n. 19) on the copies of the Erythraean hymn, of which two are quoted in Testimonies 592 and 592a, would have been more in place there. To other hymns I shall return later.

The preponderance of literary evidence colours the exposition throughout. About the first third part of the Interpretations is devoted to lengthy mythological discussions of which I note the chief points only. They start with the origins. The authors reject, of course, the opinion that Asclepius and his sons were historical personages; they think that Podalirius is interpolated in the *Iliad*, that the myths of Asclepius were originally localized in Messenia as well as in Thessaly, that Asclepius and his sons were physicians upon whom epics imposed a heroic garb. Asclepius as father of Machaon and Podalirius is said to be invented by the epics, the Coronis—*Eoie* of Hesiod to be older than that of Arsinoe and to reflect not Delphic but Homeric spirit, though it fits in better with cyclic epics than with Homer. Asclepius is rightly represented as a physician, a craftsman, a culture hero. That Zeus slays him is strikingly compared with his slaying of another culture hero, Prometheus. Asclepius is said to have been in the beginning the patron of the wandering physicians. Finally it is shown how the myth was expurgated in order to be adapted to the god Asclepius. The old view that Asclepius was a chthonian god is rightly rejected.

The reasoning of the authors is sound and clarifying and they are fully aware of the fact that because of the fragmentary state of the evidence, the results in many respects are uncertain, and in this I agree with them. From my point of view the cult also ought to be taken into account in these problems. Asclepius is one of the healing heroes of whom Greece had an abundance; it follows that he was a

craftsman and was thought to be a man who once had lived and now was dead. The myth had to accept this fact and embroidered it. When it is said that Asclepius originally was nothing but the patron of the physicians, it may be asked why this rôle was attributed to him: clearly because he was concerned with the healing of diseases. I cannot avoid finding the origin therein. That Homer mentioned him contributed much to his popularity, for Homer had a great, though not always fully recognized, influence on the hero cults. The authors' opinion that Asclepius was elevated to godhead at a fairly late date and at Epidaurus seems to be reasonable, but I doubt that this was due to his connexion with Apollo Maleatas; gods are wont to subordinate heroes to themselves. The line between heroes and gods fluctuated in the cult, as is often mentioned in Pausanias and is especially apparent in regard to Heracles. When Apollo became too elevated and too busy with other more important things than the healing of diseases, Asclepius filled the empty place, although for long he kept his connexion with the god.

I subjoin two casual remarks. The importance of family tradition in Greece is certainly underrated (p. 58; cf. the families of artists). What is said of the importance of Asclepius in the house cult (p. 104) is not borne out by the evidence. Of the many house altars found in Thera and in Miletus not one is dedicated to Asclepius, a single one to Hygiea. There remains the inscription quoted in Test. no. 12. Many of these house altars, which belong to Hellenistic and Roman times, are dedicated to Zeus, contrary to the author's assertion.

The authors touch upon a much debated subject when they try to explain the rise and ascendancy of the Asclepius religion. They polemize vividly against the common opinion that it depended on superstition, deceit, and propaganda,—certainly justly, in part at least. They emphasize the new and important point of view that the rising appreciation of the boon of health in great measure was responsible for Asclepius' popularity; Asclepius was the god not only of the sick but of the healthy also, and this side is expressed by the most venerated of his daughters, Hygiea: she had a house altar. They set forth eloquently the ethical aspect of Asclepius. Sometimes they seem to go too far, e.g. when they accept the assertion of the emperor Julian that Asclepius did not expect any reward (p. 113); the inscriptions from Epidaurus tell another story. The close relations of Asclepius to the Eleusinian cult are ascribed to the fact that these were the only ancient cults characterized by an experience other than that of this world. This is overemphasized, for they were kindred in the gentleness and humanity of the deities and the close connexion came about in Late Antiquity because these two were the living religions in Greece at that time.

The authors oppose rightly a too crude judgment on the belief in Asclepius, but they fail to make a distinction between the belief of educated people and that of the masses. They use the Epidaurian accounts of miracle cures in a one-sided manner; they do not analyze them nor give an all-round exposition of their contents nor estimate them as means of propaganda. These accounts are filled with sheer unbelievable things and with folk-tales of which two examples were quoted above (cf. II, p. 168, n. 29 and p. 170, n. 35). One cannot

avoid the conclusion that the Epidaurian priests knew the way to impress the masses and acted and wrote accordingly. Another much debated question is how the temple cures were in reality performed; many people speak much of deceit and suggestion. The authors reject the theories which assume an interference on the part of men, be they physicians or priests, and they make a good case for the view that the ancients commonly knew more of contemporary medicine than we do and that the dreams were reflections of the patient's every-day experience or of tales which he had heard. Due account is taken to the spontaneous healing of nervous diseases and reference is made to some relevant but little observed facts,—that ancient physicians were reluctant to assume responsibility whenever they were not certain of their success, so that in desperate cases people went to Asclepius and sometimes were healed, and that some of the suppliants suffered from relatively slight disorders which were deemed to be serious. The authors have made important contributions to the debate but have not brought it to a conclusion. I cannot help thinking that a comparison with modern *Gnadenorte*, e.g. Lourdes, Tenos, etc. would be illuminating, at least psychologically, though the authors deprecate it (p. 162, n. 17). Finally it is correctly emphasized that illness was a much more serious thing in ancient times than now, socially as well as politically. The comparison between Christ and Asclepius in vol. II, chap. 7, is very interesting but overlooks the fact that Christ did not act as a healer in the church,—this power was delegated to the apostles and saints; nor is it mentioned that Asclepius was vanquished at last when the Christians found rivals to him in healing saints (see Mary Hamilton, *Incubation* [1906], part ii, and E. Lucius, *Die Anfänge des Heiligen-cults*, II, chap. 6).

The chapter on the cult is a good survey; a detailed account, which is not within the authors' scope, would have much more to say, e.g. on the administration and on the sacred treasures (II, p. 188, n. 18). The treasure chest in the temple of Cos has been found and from Ptolemais in Egypt has come a snake of granite with a small hole in its neck through which money could be inserted (C. C. Edgar, *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, XL [1902/3], pp. 140 ff.). From these snake-guarded treasures the folk-tale of the snake as guardian of a treasure is derived. It is a merit of the authors to have pointed to the fact that in Late Antiquity a daily divine service was performed in some temples of Asclepius (Epidaurus and Pergamum) and hymns were sung at various hours of the day, but they fail to remark that we possess two collections of such hymns inscribed on stone, one from Epidaurus (*I. G.*, IV², 1, 132-134, alluded to but not quoted, p. 194), and another from Athens (*I. G.*, II², 4533; the stone is at Cassel). This latter collection begins with the song urging Asclepius to awaken, which is quoted from Kaibel's *Epigrammata graeca*, Test. 598. The second hymn on this stone, to Asclepius, recurs in the Epidaurian collection and in Athenaeus, XV, p. 702 A, where it is ascribed to a certain Ariphron from Sicily.

The preponderance of literary evidence is especially apparent in the two last chapters on the images and temples of Asclepius which make only very slight use of the archaeological materials. There

may be a certain truth in the authors' assertion that great importance is to be attributed to the literary testimonies on the images of the god, because the monuments remain silent while the former speak clearly, for most of the extant images are second-rate. However, I should have liked a mention of the beautiful Scopadic torso in Athens, found in the temple of Asclepius at Munychia (*Athenische Mitteilungen*, XVII [1892], pl. iv). The features of the god seem to tremble with pain and it has been justly remarked that only he who himself has felt pain can have real compassion for suffering man.

In the chapter on the temples this neglect of archaeology is really glaring. The Coan temple is described after Herondas, that at Epidauros after Pausanias, with the barest mention of the magnificent extant remains. Regrettably there has been no comprehensive work on the excavations at Epidauros since the old book by Cavvadias (1900, in *New Greek*), but there are many reports and papers of which only two in *Archäologisches Jahrbuch* are quoted. The temple at Corinth is mentioned, with criticism of de Waele's dating in the second half of the sixth century B. C. (p. 246, n. 16) but without a hint of the numerous very interesting ex-votos found by the American excavators. The sacred precinct at the foot of the Acropolis of Athens with its wealth of beautiful reliefs is passed over, the magnificent buildings at Pergamum dismissed in two lines with a reference to Wiegand's report in a footnote. Certainly one does not attain a fair idea of the importance and the glory of the god without a knowledge of the great and extensive buildings which were erected to serve him and his suppliants.

Within the limits which the authors have set for themselves they have produced a scholarly and useful work which in certain respects makes considerable contributions to our knowledge and appreciation of Asclepius. The numerous footnotes are crammed with references, sometimes to recondite literature, which show an extensive reading. The volume of Testimonies has an *index locorum* and that of the Interpretations a useful index of the testimonies, adding the pages where they are treated, and another of ancient names, but no index of subjects.

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SAMUEL ELIOT BASSETT. *The Poetry of Homer*. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1938. Pp. 273. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, Vol. XV.)

As the preface tells us, these lectures were never delivered. A few days before he was to leave for the West Coast Professor Bassett passed on. The manuscript was in final draft, however, and the editors found it necessary to make only minor revisions.

Professor Bassett's attitude towards Homer and the problems of the so-called Higher Criticism is a transitional one. Although he derives directly from Scott and the other great Unitarians, he had perused all the newer theories of Homeric style and had wisely found much of value in them. That he rejected many of their conclusions,

implied and otherwise, was as much because their research was incomplete as it was because he was loath to abandon his own ideas of Homer and his art. Parry had established the oral character of Homer's style, and Professor Bassett had accepted it, but he could not agree with the implication that everything in Homer is traditional and that the Great Poet had altered the tradition in only minor respects which it would be impossible to determine. He lays the burden of the proof on those who would, as it were, detract from the greatness of Homer. So he conceived of a Homer who made use of the oral traditional material for oral presentation but who approached and treated that material in the manner of a conscious creative artist.

In his first lecture Professor Bassett, therefore, presents a new Homeric Problem, to determine "more exactly, with our new knowledge and our new methods, the universal and the particular poetic qualities" of Homer. The nineteenth century philologists had given all of their attention to explaining the origin of the poems, but with Drerup and Rothe the scholars of the present century have begun to change the focus of their studies from the antecedents of Homeric poetry to the poetry itself. He assumed, and this is fundamental to an understanding of his book, that one master poet was responsible for the poetic qualities of the Homeric poems. "The Separatist hypothesis is a holdover from the last century; its present strength is due to a time lag. The trend is also away from it. It seems not improbable that soon the hypothesis will be abandoned, or will sink into insignificance. The characteristic features of this genus of poetry are within our ken; the authorship of the poems is beyond it. But since all the greatest poetry whose authorship is known . . . bears witness to the singleness of great poetic power, it is reasonable that we should assume one great maker of the Homeric poems until we are confronted with unmistakable objective evidence to the contrary." This is, of course, still highly controversial, but Professor Bassett's second assumption, that Homer had no other purpose than "joy in the making, which . . . he shared with his audience," would probably be accepted by all. This is a pretty safe generalization, but when he continues by saying that "Homer's only poetic purpose was to make an imagined experience real" he has attributed to the poet a sophisticated approach which smacks more of later ages than of Homeric times. Like all great oral poets Homer has made an imagined experience real, but his purpose was the joy in sharing an interesting and lofty story with his audience.

When Professor Bassett reaches his third assumption, that Homer "came at the peak of the early Greek epic, and that his poems superseded all previous epics because they were both more complete and, in all respects, greater poetry," he prepares the way for a discussion of the originality of Homer. His statement that "to limit Homer too strictly to the imaginative material supplied by earlier bards is to deny his supremacy as an epic poet" is typical and significant, and leads to a discussion of the work of Parry, who "denied to Homer any individuality of style whatsoever." His (Parry's) inferences have greatly increased our understanding of an essential and distinctive feature of Homer's style, namely, its

oral character. But he carried these inferences so far beyond what the evidence seems to justify that his chief thesis awakens the gravest doubt. . . . He established more firmly and more clearly . . . the fundamental difference between the style of Homer and that of later poetry . . . In this, Parry seems . . . to have made one of the most important contributions of recent years to our understanding of Homer's poetry . . . Homer composed solely for oral recitation . . . Parry went much further and held that not only the style but also the language and the ideas of Homer were purely traditional."

It is difficult, if not impossible, twelve years after his death, to determine what Parry would have replied to this. But, as a close student of Parry's work who was privileged to be associated with him in his Yugoslav research, I would venture the following on my own responsibility, with the belief that Parry would have agreed. Death prevented him from ever presenting any of the results of his fifteen months in Yugoslavia. During that time his understanding of a purely oral poetry had increased enormously, and it is only natural to assume that his theories of Homeric style would have been tempered by that increased understanding. Because of the paucity of what has remained to us of early Greek poetry, we shall never be able to determine exactly the points in which Homer shows "originality." To do that we should have to know in detail the tradition in which he was steeped. We should need not two poems, whatever their length, but hundreds, both from the poet of the Homeric poems and from other singers whom he had heard. But we may be able to show from a study of the Yugoslav material, hundreds of poems from many different poets, to what extent an oral poet can be "original." This is clear now, that the oral poet is not interested in "originality" as it is used by literary criticism today. He is interested in singing new songs on occasion, though he loves the old songs best, and the good singer takes pride in a distinctive manner of singing, which, however, he considers more in the light of the perfection of the proper manner than as anything "original." But further discussion of Homer's originality will have to wait until we know more about the epic technique of oral verse-making. The whole question seems to be one of emphasis.

Professor Bassett's final postulate is that "Homer is 'The Poet' because he possessed the 'divine' vision to see the grandeur of human existence, and because . . . he breathed the breath of life into the image which he had made."

The second and the third lectures discuss the manner in which Homer created the "epic illusion." He does this by the creation of three minor illusions: (1) the Illusion of Historicity, (2) the Illusion of Vitality, and (3) the Illusion of Personality. The Muse in Homer does not inspire with a frenzy, but does furnish the facts about the Heroes, and vouches for the historicity of the story. The Illusion of Vitality is concerned with the manifestations of the progressiveness, continuity, and movement of all life as it is represented in Homer, and is related to the categories of time and place. These categories are fluid as applied to the Homeric poems, and one does violence to the poetic art of Homer if one attempts to analyze them too pragmatically. But the most important of the constituents of the

Epic Illusion is the Illusion of Personality. The use of direct speech is the greatest contributor to this Illusion, and to prove that Homer's use of it is not only more extensive but also more dramatic than that of any other epic poet Professor Bassett compares Homer's dialogues with those of Attic tragedy. This comparison with Attic Tragedy is used again in the last chapter of the book when the poet is considered as realist and idealist. Comparing two differing types of composition would seem to be of doubtful value, fascinating as the comparison may be.

Thus far Professor Bassett has been analyzing the creation of the Epic Illusion. With the fourth lecture he turns to the breaking of that illusion. About one-fifth of the poems is impersonal narrative, the account of action objectively presented. The speeches take up three-fifths of the poems, and "the direct personal utterance of the poet, or his interpretation or explanation which the objective narrative cannot give, one-fifth." Throughout the poems are references to the poet's own day. The best examples are found in the similes, where the poet makes use of the present tense and addresses his audience. Description also has the effect of breaking the illusion, and the vignettes of minor heroes contribute to the same cause. All of these interpositions tend to act as a "tonic to the attention" of the audience.

There is much that is of great value in all of this, which I have perforce sketched only briefly. The characteristics are those of oral epic. The oral poet does create these illusions, albeit unconsciously, and he does break them in the manner which Professor Bassett has so eloquently described. But Homer himself would be baffled by the literary terminology. His comment would very likely be the same as that of the Yugoslav singers: "That's the way I heard it, and that's the way I sing it."

Space does not permit a more detailed review of the last four lectures of the book, which deal respectively with "The Poet and His Audience," "The Poet as Singer," "Homer the Poetic Demiurge, Plot and Characters," and "The Poet as Realist and Idealist." Of these, lectures five and six are the most rewarding.

Professor Bassett had gone part of the way toward a reconciliation between the concept of Homer as an oral poet, one composing in an oral tradition and all that that implies, and the concept of Homer as a conscious artist as we use the term today. He went as far as his knowledge of such an oral tradition allowed. He has presented many of the facts, together with much extraneous material, especially in his last two lectures, but the interpretation of those facts seems out of focus. Who knows but that the correcting of the focus may reveal "Homer, the Oral Poet" as a greater figure than even Professor Bassett's "Homer, The Poet"!

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SOME WAR-TIME PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING PLATO.

II.

The long awaited edition of the *Philebus* in the "Budé Plato" was finally published in 1941 and so too late to be made available to scholars in this country for four years more.⁴⁵ Now that it has become available, it furnishes further evidence, if any of little faith required it, that the scholarship of France was no more impaired than was the spirit of France poisoned by the black cloud under which the oppressor tried clumsily to stifle her. With the publication of the *Philebus* Professor Auguste Diès has completed the series of so-called "metaphysical" dialogues which the Budé Association happily commissioned him to do for its edition of the Platonic Corpus. The organization of this volume is the same as that of the others in this series: the Greek text with *apparatus criticus* and a French translation with a few necessary exegetical notes on alternate pages are preceded by an introduction, which here as in the other volumes done by Professor Diès amounts in itself to a substantial monograph.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome IX, 2me Partie: *Philèbe*, Texte établi et traduit par A. Diès (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1941), pp. cxv + 94 double pages. Whether this edition was available to R. Hackforth before he published his translation and commentary entitled *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (Cambridge University Press; Macmillan Co., 1945) I do not know, for Mr. Hackforth's book was out of print before I could obtain a copy of it and my knowledge of its contents derives only from the reviews of it by Professor Morrow (*C. W.*, XXXIX [1945], pp. 62-3) and Professor Post (*A. J. P.*, LXVII [1946], pp. 378-80).

⁴⁶ A general introduction to the metaphysical dialogues was prefixed

A reviewer need hardly report that the translation in this volume is generally correct. At times, however, it is so "free" that while the sense of the argument is faithfully rendered—perhaps with the greater clarity for a reader who does not use the translation as a commentary on the Greek text—it is difficult to determine in detail how the contorted Greek has been construed. In a few passages the interpretation of an important point is questionable. "Cette identité de l'un et du multiple manifestée par le discours" is at least misleading as a translation of 15 D 4-5,⁴⁷ which means that in discussion of anything we always find the same thing being talked of as both one thing and many things. Diès translates 17 C 1-2, where like Bury he omits *καὶ τὸ* before *κατ'*, "Dans cet art aussi et pour autant qu'il en relève, le son est un"; but his text means "Sound, I presume, is one in it (*scil.* music) just as in the former art (*scil.* grammar)." In 20 C 4 τῶν . . . εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς κτλ. cannot mean "nous n'aurons plus alors besoin des espèces du plaisir pour notre division." The position of *εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν* forbids this; *εἰδῶν* must depend upon *διαίρεσιν*, and the meaning must be "the questions pertaining to the division of the kinds of pleasure." Diès appears to have taken *ἐν τῇ συνστάσει* in 29 A 11 to refer to the universe, translating "les composants . . . entrent aussi dans la constitution de l'univers." There is nothing for "aussi" in the Greek, and not until B 9 does the parallel with the universe begin. This passage says only "with respect to the nature of all living bodies we observe fire, water, air, and earth . . . in their constitution." In 34 B 7 ὅτι μάλιστα means not "aussi fermement que possible" but "de son mieux"; the same slip occurs in 34 C 6-7. In 35 A 6 ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος is translated "lorsqu'on serait vide pour la première fois"; but surely the sense required of *τὸ πρῶτον* is "to begin with," not "for the first time." "Le principe moteur de tout animal" is at least "overtranslation" of *τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντός* in 35 D 3; the phrase means "the sovereignty of all the living being," i. e. of

by Professor Diès to his special introduction to the *Parmenides* (Platon, Oeuvres Complètes, Tome VIII, Ire Partie: *Parménide*, pp. v-xix). Cf. also chapter III of the same author's book, *Autour de Platon*, pp. 300-51.

⁴⁷Since the lines of the Budé edition are not numbered, I add to the Stephanus pagination in my references the numbers of the lines in Burnet's text.

the whole creature, not "of every animal." The famous phrase, *δεινὸς λεγόμενος τὰ περὶ φύσιν*, in 44 B 9 is rendered "réputés pour très habiles dans la connaissance de la nature." This is the conventional interpretation which has played such a large part in the controversy over the identification of these "real enemies of Philebus." Yet for the sense which this interpretation puts upon "nature" one should expect *περὶ φύσεως*, not *περὶ φύσιν* (cf. *Phaedo* 96 A: *ἣν δὲ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν*, and *Philebus* 59 A 2); and the *δυσχερεῖα φύσεως* of these same people in 44 C 6 *infra* suggests that *τὰ περὶ φύσιν* here means "their nature" in the same way as *τὰ τῆς φύσεως* does in *Phaedrus* 279 A (*δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείνων . . . τὰ τῆς φύσεως*). In 51 E 4 *τοῦτ' ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν* is translated "marque pour moi un genre tout entier opposé à celui que nous venons de voir." "Analogous" or "corresponding," however, is the meaning of *ἀντίστροφον*, as it is correctly interpreted in 40 D 5 and 57 A 10; and Socrates here means that odors in respect of this characteristic are the counterpart of the objects of pure pleasures treated above. In 63 B 7-8 the Greek must mean not "rester seul, isolé, inassocié, ce n'est pour aucun genre ni possible . . . etc." but "rester seul et isolé, ce n'est pour aucun genre pur ni possible . . . etc."

The text which Professor Diès here publishes is based upon his own collation of the photographs of B and T, the MSS on which Burnet's text is chiefly based,⁴⁸ and of W, which Burnet did not collate. To the establishment of this text, therefore, has gone material which Burnet did not have at his disposal. Were I now simply to add, however, that I have counted 65 passages⁴⁹ in which the *Philebus* according to Diès differs from the *Philebus* according to Burnet, I should give a false impression of what may be called the degree of established difference between the two texts. There are on the one hand about a dozen readings adopted by Burnet either from inferior MSS or critical conjectures which now appear in Diès' text on the authority of W.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ In more than a dozen places Diès' report of these MSS differs from that of Burnet.

⁴⁹ I say "passages," not "readings," for sometimes more than a single word is involved. E. g. in the sentence 46 D 7-47 A 1 Diès differs from Burnet in four places and from Bury in two, agreeing with Bury against Burnet in the former readings and with Burnet against Bury in the latter.

⁵⁰ E. g. 33 C 1: *ἐπισκεψόμεθα*, 52 A 5: *πληρωθεῖσιν*.

On the other hand, of the 65 places in which Diès differs from Burnet the text which he prints is in 21 cases that printed by Bury, while in 28 of the cases in which he differs from both Burnet and Bury his text is either a MS reading rejected by them or an emendation of some earlier critic which they had already recorded.⁵¹ There remain 16 cases of difference from both Burnet and Bury, of which 8 are Diès' own conjectures and 8 are new readings provided by W. It is interesting to observe that of this last group 4 had already been proposed as emendations, 2 by Badham, 1 by Jackson, and 1 by Liebhold. They are as follows: 26 D 9: ἀπειργασμένην,⁵² 47 D 3: γιγνομένη,⁵³ 51 C 6: πον,⁵³ 57 D 4: ἀποκρινόμεθα,⁵⁴ 58 D 4: ἀλλ' ἢ τις,⁵⁵ 60 D 8: ἦν,⁵⁶ 64 E 1: συμπεφυρμένην,⁵⁷ 66 A 8: τινὰ ἥδιον ἡρῆσθαι.⁵⁸ So much for the "new" readings adopted from W; let us turn now to Diès'

⁵¹ Two of these are suggestions which Bury made but refrained from printing in his text (34 C 10: τινὰ for τήν and 56 A 3: transposition of μουσική and αὐτῆς αὐλητική). Seven of them, a quarter of all these cases, are Badham's conjectures.

⁵² Proposed by Jackson, the conjecture was hesitatingly approved by Bury. Proclus can be cited in support of this reading: . . . τὴν ὅλην ἀπειρίαν μετὰ τῶν τοῦ πέρατος μέτρων γένεσιν ἀπειργασμένην (*In Timaeum* 53 E-54 A [I, p. 174, Diehl]).

⁵³ Proposed by Badham.

⁵⁴ Bury's *apparatus* records this as the reading of Γ (Coislinianus), but neither Burnet nor Diès mentions the variant.

⁵⁵ Bury's *apparatus* records "ἀλλ' ἢ τις Ξ w," but neither Burnet nor Diès mentions this variant.

⁵⁶ Burnet and Bury both report ἦν as the reading of T, but Diès gives it as ἦν. At any rate his adoption of ἦν here seems to be a case of over-enthusiasm for W. ἦν . . . δοξάζοι will not do; the case is not parallel to σκοπῶν εἰ τις . . . δέξαιτ' ἄν two lines above, and ἦν is both necessary and right.

⁵⁷ Proposed by Liebhold.

⁵⁸ Adopting this reading from the margin of W, Diès reads in the preceding line τοιαῦτα χρῆ with T and Stobaeus instead of the χρῆ τοιαῦτα of B and Eusebius which Burnet and Bury print. Diès defended this correction of W as the true text in a communication to the International Congress of Historical Sciences at Brussels in 1923 (printed in his *Autour de Platon*, pp. 385-99), and he upholds it here, pp. lxxviii f., against more recent "emendations" of this notorious crux, also pointing out on p. 92, n. 1 that the corruption is a case parallel to that in *Politicus* 305 D where B has τὴν αἰδίαν in place of τινὰ ἰδίαν. Certainly Diès' reading has more authority and makes better sense than any of the many emendations so far proposed.

own emendations. In 30 E 1 for γενοῦσθης of all the tradition save B, which has γένους τῆς (adopted by Burnet), Diès writes γένους τις, comparing τοῦ γένους . . . τις εἰς of *Sophist* 235 B 5-6. This emendation is better than even Diès himself appears to have recognized, for he explains Socrates' reference to his answer as παιδιά (30 E 7) by the rather vague note, "La surprise et la badinage sont probablement dans le tour inattendu de cette conclusion plaisamment différée," whereas, if the emendation is correct, Protarchus might well say καίτοι με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες since νοῦς ἐστὶ γένους τις could have been understood as νοῦς ἐστὶ γε νοῦς τις. One consideration, however, suggests caution: what looks like this same troublesome τῆς appears again in 32 A 9 and 52 C 6, where in the former case Diès adopts Ast's improbable substitution, τε, and in the latter Stallbaum's brackets. The second emendation consists in writing <εἶδеси> after ἀμείκτους in 32 C 8, apparently in order to make it clear that "il n'est pas encore question ici du mélange plaisir-douleur," an interpretation which is correct but which is equally well assured by placing a comma after ἀμείκτους and removing the one after ἡδονῆς. In 34 C 1 for the καὶ μνήμας, which Burnet follows Gloël in bracketing, Diès writes οὐ μνήμας. In 34 D 5 Diès writes ὥς for the καὶ of the MSS, which Burnet follows Badham in excising, and in the next line adopts Badham's ἀ for the ὀ of the MSS. Here, I think, no change is needed, either Diès' or Badham's, save for a period or dash after ζητοῦμεν: "Ah, but we shall lose, and that too in having found what we are now seeking—we shall lose our perplexity about these very things." The δεύτερος in 59 C 4, which Bury and Burnet bracket after Hermann, Diès emends to περὶ ὅσ', adopting in the following line Badham's συγγενῇ for συγγενές of the MSS.⁵⁰ In 62 B 1 Diès prints ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἄλλοις instead of καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. I should suggest καὶ τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς as a more plausible correction; cf. τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος in Socrates' next remarks (B 5). For μανικὰς ἡδονάς in 63 D 6 Diès writes μανικὰς ὠδίνας, for which he refers to *Timaeus* 86 C; this, I think, is the best of the many conjectures that have been proposed for this passage. In 66 B 8 Diès changes τέταρτα to τεκμαρτά, where Bury adopted Jackson's οὐδ' for the preceding οὐ on the hypothesis that τέταρτα had arisen from the Δ of this word.

⁵⁰ Bury had suggested that δεύτερος arose from the compendium β which may have been corrupted from an abbreviated περὶ.

This is the sum of Diès' emendations, but a few of the readings which he has chosen demand notice. In the last sentence mentioned above he retains η in 66 C 2; both Bury and Burnet had followed Stallbaum in bracketing it. With either reading, however, the conditional clause begs the question, and what is really wanted is $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\rho$ τοῦ νοῦ γέ ἐστι μᾶλλον η τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῆ. Since attempts are still being made to "emend" 15 A 6-7,⁶⁰ it is proper to call attention to the fact that Diès retains the reading of the MSS and translates it correctly. His treatment of the following passage, the notorious 15 B 2-8, is not so happy, however, for, though he rightly removes Burnet's mark of interrogation after ταύτην (15 B 4),⁶¹ he adopts for $\delta\mu\omega\varsigma$ in the same line the $\delta\lambda\omega\varsigma$ which Badham once suggested but later abandoned; the text of this passage, in which all the MSS agree, is perfectly sound, however.⁶² In 25 D-E Diès rejects the transposition which Bury adopted from Jackson and for $\delta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\iota$ of the MSS in D 7 reads Badham's $\delta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\sigma\iota$; but this is hardly satisfactory, nor can the translation given be readily got from the text that is printed.⁶³ In 39 A 4 Diès returns to the text which Bury printed but did not approve; Diès in his note successfully explains and defends the reading. In 52 D 6-8 he retains καὶ τὸ ἰκανόν but, following Jackson, transposes it to the position after εἰλικρινές. He translates τί ποτε χρὴ . . . εἶναι as "Que devons nous regarder

⁶⁰ Most recently by L. A. Post in his review of Hackforth's *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (*A. J. P.*, LXVII [1946], p. 380). He wants to insert $\tau\epsilon$ after $\mu\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}$ and to understand $\delta\iota\alpha\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ as "division into parties" or "sects" rather than logical analysis! For the "historical" situation concerning diaeresis and the theory of ideas which Plato's sentence reflects cf. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 39 ff.

⁶¹ Diès prints a comma here; but no punctuation at all would be preferable, for $\epsilon\iota\lambda\alpha\iota$ in line 4 and $\gamma\acute{\iota}\gamma\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ in line 8 are parallel ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\epsilon$ $\delta\iota\epsilon\sigma\pi\alpha\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\eta\eta$. . . $\phi\alpha\iota\lambda\omicron\iota\nu\alpha\iota'$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ being a single parenthesis), both depending upon $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ $\eta\pi\omicron\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\eta\eta$ to be supplied after $\pi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ in B 2.

⁶² The position of $\delta\mu\omega\varsigma$ is certainly to be explained as hyperbaton; cf. *Philebus* 12 B 5-6 and especially *Phaedo* 91 C 8 f. and *Theaetetus* 145 D 5-7 (on which cf. Riddell, *Digest*, § 300 [p. 233]).

⁶³ If τούτων ἀμφοτέρων (25 D 8) means $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$ and $\acute{\alpha}\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ and $\sigma\upsilon\nu\alpha\gamma\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu$ here means the same as does this verb in the preceding sentence, $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\kappa\epsilon\lambda\eta$ must mean τὸ $\mu\epsilon\iota\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ (25 B 5); but Protarchus' $\pi\omicron\lambda\alpha\nu$ must refer to $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\epsilon\lambda\eta$, though Socrates' answer to it is a description of $\pi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\varsigma$. This is the very situation that made transposition appear necessary; and, though I agree in rejecting the transposition that Bury printed, I think that in Diès' text the contradiction remains unresolved.

comme plus voisin de la vérité?" but *πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι* can mean only "to be in relation to truth," and the simplest way to make sense of the passage is to read lines 6-8 as a single question. Although there are many other passages that invite discussion, it suffices here to say that none of them affects to any important degree the meaning of the dialogue and that on the whole the text here printed is rather more satisfactory than Burnet's.

The introduction to the dialogue is divided into four sections. By far the longest of these is the third, a detailed analysis in 72 pages of "the stages of the discussion." This is preceded by two succinct sections, one on the "external characteristics" of the dialogue and another dealing with its logical continuity. In the first of these Diès emphasizes the preponderance of space devoted to the analysis of pleasures (1024 lines out of a total of 2369), an observation to which he returns in the fourth section on "the import of the *Philebus*," where he concludes that all the themes of the dialogue are arranged about the central theme, which is a moral one, the search for the good of man, and that the very proportions of the different parts justify the traditional subtitle, "concerning pleasure." Closing the first section with the pertinent remark that, despite the scholastic character of the discussion, the characteristics of Socrates here remain what they were in the earlier dialogues, Diès proceeds in the second section to demonstrate that the apparent digressions and ornaments are essential to the central theme and that the logical continuity of the dialogue was purposely obscured by Plato's intention to maintain at all costs the illusion of untrammelled conversation. In the excellent analysis of the dialogue which constitutes the third section a few salient points deserve special mention. It is shown that the two passages on the one and the many and on the limited and the unlimited have not only a methodological or general metaphysical importance but have to do with the very heart of the subject of the *Philebus* and that in the treatment of this subject the only novelty vis à vis the *Phaedrus*, *Sophist*, or *Politicus* is the collection under the term *ἄπειρον* of individual diversity to oppose it to the unity of the kind. There is a good discussion of the notorious *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν* of 26 D, showing that this represents no departure of Plato from his constant doc-

trine;⁶⁴ and it is shown that the demonstration of the possible falsity of pleasures integrates all the themes of the analysis of pleasure that we know from the *Republic* or the *Gorgias* but with an extension and new depth adapted to the dimensions of the *Philebus*.

Eighteen pages of the third section are devoted to the possible adversaries against whom the doctrine of pleasure in the *Philebus* is formulated. Diès contends that in opposing the thesis that pleasure is the highest good the *Philebus* is not directed specifically against Eudoxus⁶⁵ any more than it is against Aristippus, and he argues strongly against the hypothesis that the occasion of the dialogue was a controversy between Eudoxus and Speusippus. As to the thesis that the so-called pleasures are simply cessation of pain Diès, though not denying that Speusippus may have maintained it, objects to understanding its use in the *Philebus* as a specific reference to Speusippus and to ascribing the course of the argument in 44 D ff., even the first argument, to the anti-hedonistic group. He contends that it is quite unnatural to take μάλα δεινὸς λεγομένου τὰ περὶ φύσιν in 44 B as a reference to Speusippus on the strength of his Ὁμοία⁶⁶ and that the δυσχέρεια and δυσχεράσματα of 44 C-D accord less with the tradition of Speusippus than with that of Xenocrates. Moreover, Socrates' reference to these anti-hedonists as μάντεις whose inspiration he will use (44 C) shows, he maintains, that what follows cannot be regarded as their own arguments but only as an exegesis of Plato's.⁶⁷ Finally, he quite rightly asserts that 53 C 4-7 itself shows that by the κομψοί who define pleasure as γένησις Socrates cannot mean the same people as those referred to

⁶⁴ In this connection Diès might well have mentioned *Symposium* 205 B 8 ff. which corresponds exactly to *Sophist* 219 B 4-6, in which the "new" attitude of the *Philebus* is often supposed to be expressed.

⁶⁵ Cf. also H. Karpf, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie des Eudoxos von Knidos*, pp. 23-7, where the hypothesis of any specific relation between Eudoxus and the *Philebus* is also opposed.

⁶⁶ If the suggestion as to the meaning of this phrase on page 227 *supra* is correct, "interest in natural science" is not to be considered a factor in the identification.

⁶⁷ There is an unfortunate error in note 1 on p. lx where Diès cites in support, besides 44 C, a second passage, 51 A: μάντεις καταχρῶμαι. In his text, however, he, like Burnet, prints without variant in this passage μάντεις καταχρῶμαι.

in 44 B-D and 51 A. Such an identification has been made only because Aristotle in criticizing the anti-hedonists criticizes among their arguments the one which defines pleasure as genesis; but it is natural for Aristotle, Diès believes, in order to refute this definition to attack the *Philebus* and those who drew their arguments from it,⁶⁸ since the *Philebus* adopts this definition with gratitude and employs it to destroy the hedonistic thesis. *Eth. Nic.* 1153 A 12-17 proves that the identification of pleasure and γένεσις was made by hedonists, and Diès concludes that the formula of which the *Philebus* makes use was furnished by the partisans of pleasure and that the gratitude which Plato expresses for it (54 D 6) is a characteristic bit of irony.⁶⁹

In the fourth section of the introduction Diès argues that all of the four "kinds," πέρας, ἄπειρον, μεικτόν, and αἰτία, are meant to be ideas. With regard to the μεικτόν he admits that what is produced or engendered is not an intelligible entity, but he insists that the μεικτόν qua class is so. This notion, which was held by C. Ritter (*Platon*, II, p. 183) and M. Gentile (*La dottrina platonica delle idee-numeri e Aristotele*, p. 39) also, seems to me to be quite mistaken. As Grube has said (*Plato's Thought*, p. 303), there is not a shadow of a hint that μεικτόν anywhere in the *Philebus* refers to anything but the world of phenomena; and it would, moreover, be very strange for Plato, if he did think of μεικτόν itself as an idea, to call the ideas ἀμείκτοτα ἔχοντα as he does in 59 C.⁷⁰ It is still less credible that he meant ἄπειρον to be an idea, for indeterminateness is the very negation of the ideas and in 16 D-E where he uses the oxymoron,

⁶⁸ Diès points out the confusion involved in Taylor's notion that the *Philebus* aims at Speusippus and his group, on the one hand, and that, on the other hand, Aristotle in *Eth. Nic.* VII and X is criticizing not the *Philebus* but the use made of it by the anti-hedonists of the Academy.

⁶⁹ This is the interpretation of Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, p. 334 and Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, I, pp. 176-7. Diès conclusively refutes the thesis revived by Mauersberger, according to which the κομφοί of the *Philebus* are Megarians and identical with the εἰδῶν φίλοι of the *Sophist*.

⁷⁰ One might object that Plato certainly held to an "intercommunion" of ideas and that in the *Sophist* he refers to this intercommunion by the terms μείζυς and μεικτόν (*Sophist* 253 B-C, 254 D); but this very fact proves that when in the *Philebus* he used the term μεικτόν he could not have been thinking of an ideal relation or entity, for otherwise he could not have called the ideas ἀμείκτοτα ἔχοντα.

τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου ιδέαν, he represents τὸ ἀπείρον as the indeterminateness of particularity at the opposite pole to the unity of each idea. As pleasure is called ἀμεικτος because it has no πέρας but admits τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον (27 E), so when the ideas are called ἀμεικτοτα ἔχοντα it must be because they admit no ἀπείρον, no indeterminateness of any kind.⁷¹ At any rate Diès properly stresses the fact that the immediate purpose of the fourfold classification is to explain the production of sensible realities; one should perhaps say rather "phenomenal objects and events," since the mixed *life* belongs to the third class (27 D).

The introduction is concluded with an excellent essay in which it is shown that, whatever the external occasion of the composition of the *Philebus* may have been,⁷² the subject itself and its treatment—even to the preponderant place given to the analysis of pleasure—grow out of the inner necessity of Plato's thought, are foreshadowed in the *Republic*, and are parallel to the treatment of other problems in the *Sophist*, the *Politicus*, and the *Timaeus*. Here Professor Diès demonstrates not only the fundamental unity of Plato's psychophysiology of pleasure in the *Republic*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*; he demonstrates his own sensitivity to the much more delicate constancy of the rhythm of Platonic ethics.⁷³

⁷¹ In 15 B 5 ἀπειρα is linked with γιγνόμενα, in 24 B 8 with ἀτελῆ; in 31 A 9-10 the γένος of the ἀπείρον is the class that in and of itself has not and never will have beginning, middle, or end. These characteristics are the very contradictories of the ideas. Cf. further *Aristotle on Plato* (see note 8 *supra*), p. 169, n. 172, n. 192 (on p. 287).

⁷² Diès does not engage in the futile pretense of fixing an exact date for the composition of the *Philebus*. He inclines to the belief that *Timaeus* 64 D-65 B is a later résumé of the exposition in the *Philebus* to which 65 A adds a more precise explanation, a point already made, however, in *Republic* 584 B; but he leaves open the possibility that Plato may have worked on the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* simultaneously.

⁷³ Most of the few typographical errors that have escaped correction can be easily set right by the reader. In n. 1 on p. 24, however, 72 C should be 12 C; and in n. 1 on p. 89 the references 54 A and 54 C in the first line should be 64 A and 64 C respectively, while "cinq fois" should presumably be "quatre fois." In n. 1 on p. 28 Diès, by a slip which is reminiscent of one made by Aristotle, calls the interlocutor of Theaetetus in the *Sophist* Socrates instead of the Eleatic Stranger.

To the vitality of Platonic scholarship in Holland also during the occupation witness is borne by the dissertation of Willem Van der Wielen on the idea-numbers.⁷⁴ The last chapter of this book is a concise résumé and critique of the most important earlier attempts to explain the nature of the idea-numbers, which on the strength of Aristotle's criticism and certain fragments of later evidence have by most modern scholars come to be regarded as Plato's "later theory of ideas." Van der Wielen's own conclusion⁷⁵ is that Plato never fully worked out a "doctrine of idea-numbers" but simply established certain fundamental propositions and by means of several examples indicated their possible application. These propositions were that the ideas of sensible objects are numbers, between which and the sensibles there exist separate mathematical numbers, and that as ideas the idea-numbers do not consist of units and are not quantities but are each unique and have each a fixed position in the number-series. To elucidate these propositions Plato described a generation of the idea-numbers in which he assumed two principles, "the one" and "the great-and-small," the latter being an *ἀπειρον* such as is described in the *Philebus* and the former being closely related to the *πέρας* in that dialogue (pp. 195-6). As examples of the application of these propositions he suggested—once more merely for the sake of elucidation—the derivation of the line, plane, and solid from the idea-numbers 2, 3, and 4, with which and with "the one" he also connected the psychical functions. These suggested applications as well as the limitation of the number-series to the "perfect number," 10, were given, Van der Wielen conjectures, in the latter part of the lecture "On the Good" which Plato cast into the form of a "myth" and possibly put into the mouth of an imaginary Pythagorean after he had completed the rigorously logical part of the lecture which dealt exclusively with the nature of the idea-numbers (pp. 194, 168, 157-8).

This suggestion concerning the scope and form of the lecture

⁷⁴ Willem Van der Wielen, *De Ideegetallen van Plato* (Academisch Proefschrift ter Verkrijging van den Graad van Doctor in de Letteren en Wijsbegeerte aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam [Amsterdam, D. B. Centen's Uitgevers-Maatschappij N. V., 1941]), pp. xii + 270.

⁷⁵ An epitome in Latin embodying the author's conclusions is printed on pp. 256-8.

"On the Good"⁷⁶ is avowedly an hypothesis set up to account for certain apparent inconsistencies in Aristotle's testimony, some of which, however, with the consequent difficulties for the reconstruction of Plato's meaning are chargeable neither to Plato nor to Aristotle but are simply the result of mistaking the intention of Aristotle's references. For example, much of Chapters IX-XI, which deal with Plato's supposed derivation of the line, plane, and solid from the idea-numbers 2, 3, and 4 and with his connection of νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and αἴσθησις with these idea-numbers and "the one," depends upon the assumption that *De Anima* 404 B 18-27 is a circumstantial report of Plato's doctrine, whereas this passage was certainly meant to refer not to Plato at all but to Xenocrates.⁷⁷ Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* 6 A 23-

⁷⁶ Van der Wielen (p. 2) is right in taking τὴν περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν of Aristoxenus' *Harmonica*, II, 30 to mean that it was a single lecture. Morrow (*Philosophical Review*, LV [1946], p. 191) strangely argues that the word ἀκρόασις "certainly suggests more than a single lecture" because Aristotle's *Physics*, the Greek title of which is φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις, could not conceivably have been delivered as one lecture; but this title was given to the *Physics* long after the time of Aristotle, whose use of the word in *Poetics* 1459 B 21-22 (τραγῳδιῶν τῶν εἰς μίαν ἀκρόασιν ριθεμένων) proves that for him and his contemporaries it meant something that can be heard at a single sitting. That Alexander refers several times to the second book of Aristotle's publication does not argue for more than one lecture, for we do not know what the length of the books or the length of the lecture may have been (*Metaphysics* Z, H, and Θ together are much shorter than Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* and not nearly three-quarters of the length of Demosthenes' *On the Crown*) or whether Aristotle in his publication may not have included comments of his own besides the mere report of the lecture. Van der Wielen (p. 8) speaks of "the three books περὶ τὰγαθοῦ," apparently adopting the notice in the list of Diogenes Laertius (V, 22) in preference to the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ α of Hesychius and the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ ε of Ptolemaeus (cf. Rose, *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, p. 11, # 20 and p. 20, # 8); but the discrepancy in the three lists deprives all of them of authority in this matter. In any case, the remarks of Aristoxenus certainly imply that the lecture "On the Good" was a single one and moreover that it was a "public lecture."

⁷⁷ For demonstration of this cf. *Aristotle on Plato* (see note 8 *supra*), pp. 565-79. Van der Wielen is aware (p. 8) that Simplicius' and Philoponus speak without knowledge when they refer to περὶ τὰγαθοῦ the phrase, ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις (*De Anima* 404 B 19); but he takes these words to refer to "Plato's own lectures to which the lecture 'On the Good' must also have belonged" (pp. 152, 160), and he never

B 5 too, which is treated by Van der Wielen as an almost equally important source in this section of his work (pp. 139-42, 160, 177-8, 184-7) and which he says (pp. 140-1) certainly refers to Plato because it is not clear who else could be meant, since Speusippus and Xenocrates are in 6 B 6-7 distinguished by name from the philosophers of 6 A 23-B 5, is by the same token certainly not a specific reference to Plato and his doctrine, for in 6 B 11-15 Plato is by name distinguished from the persons meant in 6 A 23-B 5 just exactly as much as Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Hestiaeus are in 6 B 5-10 distinguished from them.⁷⁸

Van der Wielen would probably not be displeased to find that there is no evidence at all to justify the ascription to Plato of any of the content that he has assigned to his hypothetical

mentions the possibility that they mean Aristotle's own dialogue *περὶ φιλοσοφίας* or the fact that they were so understood by Themistius (*De An.*, p. 11, 18) or Themistius' statement (*De An.*, pp. 11, 37-12, 1) that the doctrine of 404 B 18-21 was to be found in the *περὶ φύσεως* of Xenocrates. This doctrine coincides with that which is reported in *Metaphysics* 1090 B 20-32; but Van der Wielen, though admitting (p. 151) that the latter refers to Xenocrates, says that the use of the numbers as there reported may have been Plato's theory as well, a gratuitous assumption which is forbidden by the clear distinction made between this and the passage on Plato which follows it (1090 B 32-1091 A 3). The same distinction, though Van der Wielen does not mention it in his treatment of *Metaphysics* 1001 B 19-25 (p. 150), occurs in 1001 B 24-25, where as an alternative to *ἐξ ἐνός καὶ ταύτης*, which certainly refers to Plato (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 480), is given *ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ τινός καὶ ταύτης*, which agreeing with 1090 B 20-32 must be a reference to Xenocrates.

⁷⁸ Speusippus in fact is distinguished from them in name only, for he and *οἱ ἄλλοι* of 6 B 6 are said to have proceeded in the way just described in 6 A 23-B 5. To all these "others" Xenocrates, Hestiaeus, and Plato are named as the only exceptions, and the *οἱ δέ* (6 B 15) named by way of contrast once more after the sentence concerning Plato must be identified with these "others" (cf. *οὐχ ὥσπερ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν πρώτων μόνον* in 6 B 10-11 distinguishing the procedure of Hestiaeus from theirs). W. D. Ross (Ross and Fobes, *Theophrastus: Metaphysics*, p. 54) also says nothing of all this and because of the distinction of Speusippus and Xenocrates in 6 B 6-7 assumes that the preceding lines refer to "Plato and his orthodox followers." Ross further compares this passage of Theophrastus with *Metaphysics* 1084 A 32-36, and Van der Wielen contends (pp. 177-8) that the two passages agree and complement each other; but there is strong independent evidence that 1084 A 32-37 was not meant to refer to Plato either (see note 86 *infra*).

"myth" in the lecture "On the Good," for his own opinion of these speculations after he has "reconstructed" them is that, had not such an authority as Aristotle unmistakably ascribed them to Plato, one would be inclined to think them wanton extensions of some Platonist who had understood very little of his master (pp. 167-8). Even in assuming that they are Plato's, he cannot believe that Plato attached any great importance to them; and his own really serious concern is with what he considers to have been the serious part of Plato's lecture, the nature of the idea-numbers themselves and their "derivation from the principles." This is the subject of the first eight chapters of the book.

He begins his investigation with a study of the meaning of the word ἀριθμός in the time of Plato and Aristotle. This in current mathematical usage was "natural number greater than one" (p. 17); and to Aristotle the word had this meaning also, his theory of abstraction, which Van der Wielen thinks he erroneously extended from the facts of arithmetic to those of geometry (pp. 38-40), allowing him to assume that the only kind of number necessary is denominative number so that μοναδικὸς ἀριθμός for him is always ἀριθμὸς μονάδων, a sum of perceptible objects simply regarded as indivisible units (pp. 40-1). In Plato's dialogues, however, Van der Wielen finds, besides a) "sensible numbers," b) numbers which are assumed to exist entirely apart from perceptible objects and to consist of units which are eternal, indivisible, and exactly like one another (pp. 20-30)⁷⁹ and c) in *Phaedo* 96 D-97 B and 101 B-C ideas of

⁷⁹ For this second kind of number he cites *Philebus* 56 D-57 A where Socrates distinguishes the ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων from that of the generality by the fact that the former assumes μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσιν (56 E 1-3), *Republic* 525 C-526 B where αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ that can be grasped only by thought as distinguished from ὁρατὰ ἢ ἅπαντα σώματα ἔχοντες ἀριθμοὶ involve units exactly alike and indivisible, and *Theaetetus* 195 E-196 B, 198 A-199 C where Socrates discusses with Theaetetus the possibility of mistaking the αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτα which are in the mind for eleven instead of twelve. These passages of the *Theaetetus*, however, are hypotheses in which the "numbers" concerned are μνημεῖα in the mind (196 A 3) exactly parallel to the "letters" in the mind of the literate reader (199 A 1-2), and the hypotheses are set up in a discussion from which all mention of the ideas is purposely excluded and are finally rejected as failing to account for knowledge and error; consequently one cannot

numbers which are above both a) and b), being the ultimate cause of the existence of both of these kinds of number, and which, since they are *ideas*, must each be eternal, immutable, and without parts, i. e. not consisting of units in any sense (pp. 30-3). With b), the second class above, he identifies the "inter-

assume that the elements of these hypotheses represent Plato's conception of number and certainly cannot conclude from them, as Van der Wielen does (p. 30), that Plato assumed the existence of ἀριθμοὶ αὐτοὶ each consisting of indivisible and identical units, these units of two ἀριθμοὶ αὐτοὶ being added together to produce as their sum another ἀριθμός αὐτός. Moreover, in these passages of the *Theaetetus* nothing is said of constituent units of numbers or their addition or combination; in 198 C the process by which one discovers "how much a number is" is called "counting" (ἀριθμεῖν), which may be a hint that what is ordinarily called "the addition of 5 to 7" is really just the process of counting to the fifth place after the seventh place in the number-series. In any case, there is even less reason to take the process described in the *Theaetetus* as evidence for a separate kind of Platonic "mathematical number" than there is to draw the same inference for Aristotle from his distinction of ἀριθμός ὅς ἀριθμοῦμεν (*Physics* 219 B 6-7) which Van der Wielen (p. 42) will not allow to indicate another kind of number distinct from the denominative. In this connection Van der Wielen might well have noticed the reference of Alexander (*Metaph.*, p. 78, 16-17) to an Academic argument that the correlate of ἀριθμός must be real and therefore must be *ideas* (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 497).

In the passage of the *Republic* the phrases αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ and αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν (525 D 6-E 1) should indicate that the numbers referred to are ideas of number; but just as Adam sought to avoid this interpretation (cf. against him Shorey, *Class. Phil.*, XXII [1927], pp. 213-18 and R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, p. 204 [see page 145 and note 44 *supra*]) so Van der Wielen does also, his argument being that Plato is here talking of logistic which deals with numbers that have quantity, i. e. have parts, and so cannot be ideas. This argument is not supported by the text, however, where the procedure of which αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ are said to be the object is διαλέγεσθαι (525 B 6-7) and where nothing is said about constituent units of these numbers, 526 A 1-7 being rather a reference to the unity of each ideal number (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, p. 518). The passage of the *Philebus*, which Van der Wielen seeks to explain by the passage of the *Republic*, proves conclusively against him that Plato is speaking of ideas of number and not of another class different from these and from "concrete" numbers, for the ἀριθμητικὴ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων is linked with ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία, both being distinguished from λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν (*Philebus* 56 E 7-57 A 1) and the objects of this philosophical mensuration or geometry are, even by Van der Wielen's admission in another context (p. 144), just ideas (*Philebus* 62 A-B). The close con-

mediate mathematical" which Aristotle ascribes to Plato (e. g. *Metaphysics* 987 B 14-18), although he stops short of asserting that this intermediate existence of mathematical objects appears anywhere in the dialogues, admitting that in *Republic* 509 D-511 E it is merely the *method* of mathematics that is placed between νοῦς and δόξα (p. 50). What Aristotle calls εἰδητικός ἀριθμός (e. g. *Metaphysics* 1090 B 32-36) is c), the third class above (p. 51); and from Aristotle's remarks Van der Wielen concludes that Plato made all ideas numbers (pp. 53-7), that is that he assimilated all the ideas to this third class of numbers which in the dialogues are just the ideas of numbers (pp. 58-9). These idea-numbers,⁸⁰ Van der Wielen then explains (p. 60), are *qua* ideas separate from sensible objects and do not consist of units; and from Aristotle's direct statements it appears that they are ἀσύμβλητοι or incomparable with one another, a characteristic which follows from their being ideas (cf. p. 65), that they stand to one another as prior and posterior, i. e. each has a fixed position in an ordered series (cf. pp. 69-70), and that they have the natural order 2, 3, 4, etc., each being a unit and not the sum of the number before it plus one (pp. 71-3).

It was, Van der Wielen believes (pp. 96-7), to make credible

nection of the philosophical treatment of measures and numbers (57 C 10-57 D 2) and the repeated statement that there are *two* kinds of arithmetic and mensuration (57 D 6-8, cf. 57 A 3-4) make it certain that so far as the *Philebus* is concerned there are only "perceptible" or "concrete" numbers and ideas of number and that the latter of these two kinds are the objects of "theoretical mathematics." Neither did the author of the *Epinomis* recognize any kind of number besides αὐτοὶ ἀριθμοὶ and ἀριθμοὶ σώματα ἔχοντες (990 C 6) nor the author of the *Seventh Epistle* any mathematical entities besides ideas and their perceptible εἶδωλα (342 A-D).

⁸⁰ This is the modern conventional term (Van der Wielen's "Ideegetallen") for the ideas of the so-called "later" theory, all of which are identified with numbers. In contrast thereto "ideal numbers" means the ideas of number which in the theory of the Platonic dialogues are simply ideas like the ideas of anything else. According to Van der Wielen (p. 240) of all the terms used by Aristotle εἰδητικός ἀριθμός agrees best with "idea-number" (ideegetal) in the sense above; but on the contrary it could of itself equally well mean "ideal number," and in the three passages in which it occurs (*Metaphysics* 1086 A 5, 1088 B 34, 1090 B 35) there is nothing to indicate that it means anything else (cf. J. Cook Wilson, *O. R.*, XVIII [1904], p. 257; Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, II, p. 459 *ad* 1086 A 4).

the existence and to show the structure of these numbers, so different from anything currently understood as "number," that Plato, in the same way as mathematicians "construct" a figure in order to show its nature, gave his audience a graphic representation of what Aristotle refers to as the generation of the idea-numbers from "the one" or "the equal" as form and "the great and small" or "the unequal" as matter; and this graphic representation Van der Wielen tries to reconstruct, taking his inspiration from a fragment of Porphyry's commentary on the *Philebus* which is quoted by Simplicius⁸¹ and from Aristotle's *Physics* 206 B 3-29, in which passages he professes to detect a vestige of Plato's "figure" (pp. 120-3). He supposes (pp. 127-30) that Plato set out a line $\Gamma\Delta$,⁸² along which moves a point Π_n . As Π_n changes, the ratio $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_n\Delta$ in its constant change represents the *ἄπειρον*, which as long as $\Gamma\Pi_n$ and $\Pi_n\Delta$ are changing and unequal can also be called *τὸ ἀνίσον* or *τὰ ἀνίστα*. When the point divides $\Gamma\Delta$ in half at Π_1 , the unequals are equalized, a *πέρας* has been imposed upon the *ἄπειρον*, and $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_1\Delta = 2 \cdot 1$ which represents the idea-number 2. If now $\Pi_1\Delta$, regarded as the *ἄπειρον*, be similarly divided in half at Π_2 , the ratio $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_2\Delta = 4 \cdot 1$, the idea-number 4; and, when the *ἄπειρον* $\Pi_2\Delta$ is divided at the mid-point Π_3 , the ratio $\Gamma\Delta \cdot \Pi_3\Delta = 8 \cdot 1$, the idea-number 8. In this way all the powers of 2 can be produced, but *only* the powers of 2; this limitation does not, however, affect the universality of the material factor in which every number is in principle included, but it is the necessary result of the choice of the form "one," i. e. the ratio 1·1 (pp. 129-30).

This limitation, Van der Wielen argues (pp. 130-1, cf. p. 120), is in agreement with what Aristotle says of the generation of idea-numbers in *Metaphysics* 987 B 33-988 A 1, 1091 A 9-12,

⁸¹ Simplicius, *Phys.*, pp. 453, 31-454, 16. Of this passage Van der Wielen uses only pp. 453, 31-454, 7; the subsequent lines he omits, saying that it is not clear whether they give part of an old tradition that goes back to Plato or an interpretation of Plato that was given by Aristotle or someone else (p. 121). There is no justification in the text for such a distinction; Simplicius gives the whole passage as a continuous quotation from the commentary on the *Philebus*, repeating at the end (p. 454, 17-19) what he had said at the beginning (p. 453, 30-31), that Porphyry had written this professing to interpret the enigmatic statements of the *περὶ τὰ γὰρ θοῦ*.

⁸² Γ

Π_1

Π_2

Π_3

Δ

1091 A 23-25. In the third of these passages Aristotle does state that "they say that there is no generation of odd number"; but one cannot simply identify the subject of *φασιν* in line 23 with the *τινες* of line 24 which refers to Plato,⁸³ and moreover to *τινες* is ascribed the construction of "even number" by "equalization" of "the great and small," not just of the powers of 2. In 1091 A 10-12 he does say that "the great and the small" cannot generate any number save that which arises from the continuous duplication of one, but that this is his own conclusion *against* the Platonists is proved by 1091 A 9-10 which implies that they did try to derive by "torture" of this principle the other numbers also. The evidence of the first of the three passages depends upon the correct interpretation of the notorious phrase *διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἕξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυνῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι* (987 B 33-34). Van der Wielen has to assume that this denies any attempt to generate the *πρώτοι*, whereas it naturally implies rather that they were generated though not *εὐφυνῶς* from the dyad. He rightly adopts "prime numbers" as the only admissible interpretation for *πρώτοι* here; but, in order to interpret the exception as adequate to the generation of the powers of 2 which he has reconstructed, he argues that for anyone who knows this method of generation the statement that the prime numbers are not generated implies at once that neither is any number that has a prime number as a factor. The possible objection that "except the prime numbers" ought also to include the number 2, which Aristotle regarded as prime, causes him to assume further that *ἕξω τῶν πρώτων* is Platonic terminology and that Plato may not have regarded 2 as prime. This assumption, however, is without support of evidence, improbable, and unnecessary.⁸⁴

⁸³ That *τινες* in 1091 A 24 is meant to refer to Plato, at least among others, is proved by 1081 A 23-25, as Van der Wielen says (p. 92); but Van der Wielen also has recognized (pp. 92-96) that 1091 A 23-29 as a whole is Aristotle's attempt to refute Xenocrates' objection to the literal interpretation of the "generation" of number.

⁸⁴ The fact that Nicomachus regarded prime number as a class of odd number is hardly a reason for imputing this notion to Plato as Van der Wielen does (p. 131); it would have been more pertinent to observe that Speusippus (*frag.* 4, lines 25-27, Lang) as well as Aristotle takes it for granted that 2 is prime. Nor to judge by the context of *Topics* 157 A 39-B 1 would Aristotle have considered it legitimate to object, to his *ἕξω τῶν πρώτων* as a general limitation because there is one, though only one, prime number that is generated *εὐφυνῶς*.

The whole of 987 B 29-988 A 1 is Aristotle's interpretation of the motivation of Platonic theory (cf. διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις . . . σκέψιν in lines 30-31 with διὰ τὸ . . . γεννάσθαι), and ἕξω τῶν πρώτων is therefore most probably his own limitation of what he considers to be the capabilities of the dyad; if this were not so but the limitation were Plato's own, the words would be still more embarrassing for Van der Wielen's hypothesis, according to which it is not the nature of the dyad but only the form "one" (1.1) that limits to 2 and its powers the numbers generated (pp. 129-30). There is a still more important reason for questioning Van der Wielen's compound assumption. Had ἕξω τῶν πρώτων been technical terminology in the Platonic theory of numbers, it should have appeared in the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ⁸⁵ in this connection, and in its context there its meaning would probably have been clearer than it is in this passage of the *Metaphysics*. Now, of all the ancient commentators the only one who probably saw the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ is Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, note 77). Alexander in commenting on 987 B 34 gives no such interpretation as that of Van der Wielen but finds himself constrained to say that Aristotle here uses πρώτων for περιττῶν (*Metaph.*, p. 57, 12-16 and 22-28) and that too although he has just cited the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ (p. 56, 35); and his expression would indicate that he did not find ἕξω τῶν πρώτων used even in this sense in the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ (cf. p. 57, 14-15: νῦν μὲν οὖν and p. 57, 22: νῦν μέντοι).

What is still more important, Alexander where he cites the περὶ τὰγαθοῦ for the Platonic principles of number never mentions such a scheme or figure as that which in the fragment of Porphyry has inspired Van der Wielen's hypothesis. Inasmuch as the rest of Porphyry's fragment, which is omitted by Van der Wielen (Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 454, 8-16; see note 81 *supra*), reads like a résumé of Alexander's interpretation of the dyad in the passage which follows (Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 454, 28 ff.; cf.

⁸⁵ Van der Wielen (pp. 2-3) calls A, chap. 6 (987 A 29-988 A 17) the only inviolate, continuous report of the doctrine that Plato set forth in his lecture, "On the Good." Some of the chapter, of course, cannot have anything to do with the lecture or Aristotle's report of it, e.g. 987 A 29-B 10; but Van der Wielen does not consider the questions in which the whole chapter is involved by the relation of this first part to 1078 B 9-32 and 1086 A 37-B 10 (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 189-98).

also p. 453, 33-35 [Porphyry] and p. 455, 1-2 [Alexander]), a passage which purports to be based upon the *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* and in which there is no suggestion of Porphyry's figure, Porphyry's use of this figure cannot be taken as evidence of its appearance in the *περὶ τὰγαθοῦ* but is more probably his own adaptation of the passage in Aristotle's *Physics* (206 B 3-29). Aristotle there employs a similar figure to explain his own doctrine of the potentially infinite by division and concomitantly infinite by addition and at the end says that Plato also made the infinities two (i. e. τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, cf. 203 A 15-16) for the reason that both increasing and diminishing progressions appear to have no limit. This interpretation of "the great and small" is for the particular purposes of his own argument here, just as in 187 A 16-20 and 189 A 8 he insists that it is a pair of contraries but in 192 A 6-12 and *Metaphysics* 1087 B 9-12 that it is a unity; but, the validity of this *ad hoc* interpretation aside, it is not with "the great and small" but with the exposition of his own doctrine that his use of the figure is connected. Nor can he be said to connect either the figure or this interpretation of "the great and small" with Platonic number-theory, for he objects (206 B 30-33) that Plato made no use of the two infinities, since in numbers he made the unit the minimum and ten the maximum. This last is probably a false combination of Aristotle's; but, if we are to suppose that it does refer to idea-numbers and is a correct report,⁸⁶ it involves Van der Wielen's

⁸⁶ Van der Wielen assumes that idea-numbers are meant (p. 127) and takes the statement seriously enough to use it as proof that Plato must be among those referred to by *ὅτε δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὀρισμένων* in *Metaphysics* 1073 A 18-21. (pp. 55-6) and those who in 1084 A 32-37 are said to generate the void, proportion, the odd, etc. within the decad (pp. 177-8). He finally (pp. 193-5) attempts to account for the assumed limitation on the ground that 10 is just the sum of the one and the ideas 2, 3, and 4, which in *De Anima* 404 B 18-27 are said to constitute *αὐτὸ τὸ ζῶον* (by Van der Wielen [pp. 161-3] mistakenly identified with the model *ζῶον* of the *Timaeus* and interpreted as the complete system of all the ideas [cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 575-8]); but, recognizing that this is contrary to the essential character of idea-numbers as *ἀσύμβλητοι*, he supposes that it was all part of the myth which he imagines Plato at the end of the lecture put into the mouth of a Pythagorean to whom the tetraktys would be appropriate.

De Anima 404 B 18-27, however, refers not to Plato but to Xenocrates (see note 77 *supra*). Moreover, there is a passage of Aëtius (I, 3, 8 =

hypothesis in further difficulty since 10, not being a power of 2, could not have been generated according to his scheme.

Moreover, in commenting on "the generation of the numbers from the dyad" in 987 B 33-988 A 1 Alexander says (*Metaph.*, p. 57, 4-11) that 2 was generated from the dyad and one, 4 from

Dox. Graeci, pp. 280-3) in which are combined and ascribed to Pythagoras the doctrines of the monad and indefinite dyad, of the limitation of number to 10, of the tetraktys, and of the identification of the monad, 2, 3, and 4 with νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, and αἴσθησις; since peculiarly Xenocratean doctrine is elsewhere in Aëtius (IV, 2, 3 and 4) ascribed to Pythagoras as well as to Xenocrates, it is probable that this passage derives ultimately from a book of Xenocrates. Speusippus also (*frag.* 4) considered 10, the sum of 1, 2, 3, and 4, to be the perfect number and the πρῶτη of all later numbers. It is possible therefore that Aristotle when he refers to those who limit number to the decad may have in mind Xenocrates or Speusippus or other Platonists rather than Plato himself or may be combining in his critique elements of several different Platonistic theories. That some such combination is involved appears from *Metaphysics* 1073 A 14-22 where he complains that the theory of ideas contains no special observation concerning the number of real entities. His supporting remark that those who say that the ideas are numbers speak of numbers sometimes as infinite and sometimes as limited to the decad refers not, as Van der Wielen assumes, to two distinct theories but to all these people as a single group and to their different statements about numbers (not about idea-numbers as such) in different contexts and at different times. Van der Wielen neglects to mention that earlier in this same book (1070 A 18-19) Aristotle ascribes to Plato the doctrine that there are as many ideas as there are natural classes. After having argued in 1084 A 2-10 that separately existing number cannot be infinite, Aristotle undertakes to prove that it cannot be finite either (1084 A 10-B 2) and for this purpose assumes that number extends only to the decad "as some say" (1084 A 12-13). Even if he intends to include Plato among these "some," it would not follow that all or any of the specific doctrines referred to in the subsequent argument must have been his. That of 1084 A 32-37 certainly should not be assigned to him—and least of all by Van der Wielen, for it generated odd number within the decad and identified the odd and one. This treatment of the odd is that which is mentioned in 1083 B 28-30, a passage which Van der Wielen insists (p. 134) cannot refer to Plato, who according to his hypothesis did not try to generate the odd numbers. This hypothesis aside, however, the treatment of the one described in these passages is, as Ross has said (*Metaphysics*, I, p. lxiii), typical of Xenocrates' confusion of ideal and mathematical number; and the assignment of the doctrine to Xenocrates is supported by the fact that he is known to have called the monad περιττόν (*frag.* 15). Moreover, 1084 A 32-37 is a continuation of 1084 A 29-32, lines

the dyad and 2, 6 from the dyad and 3, and so on. This is the procedure that Aristotle describes in *Metaphysics* 1081 B 21-22, 1082 A 13-15, and 1082 A 28-36 where he says that the numbers 4 and 8 are produced by the indefinite dyad and the numbers 2 and 4 respectively. Van der Wielen, recognizing that this evidence of Aristotle's, if admitted, would be fatal for his hypothesis (pp. 132-3), insists that this method of generation cannot have been Plato's but must have originated with Aristotle himself or some other Platonist. His only serious argument to support this contention is that in chapter 6 of Book A the one is said to have been the form of the idea-numbers generally. In the same chapter, however, Aristotle also objects (988 A 2-4) that in this theory "the form generates once only." This criticism, Van der Wielen says, is a misinterpretation of Plato's meaning. It is, nevertheless, an interpretation which agrees perfectly with the characteristics of the method described in the

which Van der Wielen does not discuss although they contain decisive information about the doctrine with which this passage is concerned, for Aristotle there contends that in it, while 10 was generated as a unit, still number up to 10 was treated as if it were more of an entity and idea than 10 itself. The passage has troubled all commentators, and many have tried to "emend" it; Ross (*Metaphysics*, II, pp. 449-50 ad 1084 A 30) correctly explains the text but says that we do not know what "certain Platonists" may have said to justify this account of Aristotle's. What they must have said, however, may be read in [Iamblichus], *Theologumena Arithmetica*, pp. 76, 6-77, 3 (De Falco), the book in which is also preserved our longest fragment of Speusippus. There it is said that 9 is a *péras ánnépβλητον* (p. 76, 7) and that number admits nothing above 9 but 9 *ἀνακυκλεῖ πάντα ἐντὸς ἑαυτῆς . . . μέχρι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς φυσικὴ πρόβασις, μετὰ δ' αὐτὴν παλιμπετής* (p. 76, 16-18). What Platonist said this one may gather from a statement of Joannes Laurentius Lydus: *οὗτος γὰρ (scil. ὁ ἐννέα ἀριθμός) ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ κατὰ Ξενοκράτην· δόριστος γὰρ ἡ ἄχρις ἐννεάδος πρόβασις καὶ πλήθει σύνοικος* (*De Mensibus*, p. 48, 21-23, Wunsch = Xenocrates, *frag.* 58). There can therefore no longer be any doubt that the doctrine to which Aristotle refers in 1084 A 29-37 is that of Xenocrates.

None of these passages then gives any further information concerning what is reported of Plato in *Physics* 206 B 27-33. It may well be that *μέχρι γὰρ δεκάδος ποιεῖ τὸν ἀριθμόν* there refers, as Ross has suggested (*Physics*, pp. 557-8), only to some passing remark of Plato's concerning the decimal system quite unconnected with his theory of ideas, or it may be that in explaining the series of ideal numbers he stopped at 10 for practical purposes without intending thereby to limit the series to the decad.

passages of M 7 just mentioned,⁸⁷ so that, if it is a misinterpretation of Plato, they also refer to Plato and cannot be eliminated from consideration in Van der Wielen's fashion. Moreover, merely to label them misinterpretations of Plato's theory is not enough; it is necessary to show how with some plausibility Aristotle could have formulated such a misinterpretation. Such an explanation of the criticism in 988 A 2-4 is offered by Van der Wielen's hypothesis, though he seems to be unaware of it. He assumes that the form which operates to produce 2, 4, and 8 is in each case "one" because it is in the several operations $\Gamma\Pi_1 \cdot \Pi_1\Delta$, $\Pi_1\Pi_2 \cdot \Pi_2\Delta$, $\Pi_2\Pi_3 \cdot \Pi_3\Delta$, all of which are $1 \cdot 1$ (see note 82 *supra*). Yet a critic could plausibly object that according to the figure the forms are in fact $\Gamma\Pi_1 \cdot \Pi_1\Delta$, $\Gamma\Pi_2 \cdot \Pi_2\Delta$, $\Gamma\Pi_3 \cdot \Pi_3\Delta$, for the number produced in each case is the ratio of the whole line $\Gamma\Delta$ to $\Pi_n\Delta$, that of these forms only the first, $\Gamma\Pi_1 \cdot \Pi_1\Delta = 1 \cdot 1$, and that therefore the form "one" generates once only. Since, however, $\Gamma\Pi_2 \cdot \Pi_2\Delta = 3 \cdot 1$ and $\Gamma\Pi_3 \cdot \Pi_3\Delta = 7 \cdot 1$, the figure viewed in this fashion makes the form 3 generate the number 4 and the form 7 generate the number 8; and this is not in accord with the method described in the passages of M 7, which seems to be implied by the criticism of 988 A 2-4, or with the characterization of the indeterminate dyad as *δυοποιός* (1083 B 35-36), which implies this method (1082 A 13-15) and is reflected in the commentary of Alexander (*Metaph.*, p. 57, 4-11) mentioned above. No manipulation of Van der Wielen's figure, so far as I can at present see, will account for this interpretation or misinterpretation of Aristotle's. If, on the other hand, one accepts the assumption that the passages of M 7 refer to a method which was not Plato's, then, since 988 A 2-4 refers to this same method, one must admit that A, chap. 6 is not the exact and uncontaminated report of Plato's own doctrine that Van der Wielen takes it to be.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Cf. Ross, *Metaphysics*, I, pp. lxii-lxiii. Van der Wielen misinterprets 988 A 2-4 himself (p. 133). He thinks that Aristotle means that by a single application of the form "one" to the matter all the idea-numbers are produced *at once*. Had Aristotle so understood the process, he could not have objected to it and especially not with the biological instance which he uses (988 A 4-7), since he himself says elsewhere that *ἀφ' ἐνὸς σπέρματος ἐνδέχεται πολλά γίνεσθαι ζῶα* (*De Gen. Animal.* 729 A 1-14).

⁸⁸ Ross, *Metaphysics*, I, pp. lxii-lxiii, takes 988 A 2-4 along with these

What casts the greatest doubt of all on Van der Wielen's hypothesis is that, while he recognizes fixed position in a serial order to be the sole "numerical" aspect of the idea-numbers and supposes Plato to have set up his figure for the purpose of explaining the nature of such "numbers," the figure of his hypothesis, as he admits himself (p. 137), could not show on what the natural order of the numbers depends or even what the natural order is. It is surely difficult to believe that Plato chose to explain the nature of these numbers by means of an illustration which could not represent their distinctive characteristic of "priority and posteriority" to one another (cf. *Metaphysics* 1080 B 11-14); it is impossible to believe it in the face of Aristotle's statement that the order of the numbers derived from the one and the indefinite dyad was the succession 2, 3, 4 (1081 A 21-23).

Even if Van der Wielen's hypothetical figure were adequate to illustrate what he describes as the essential characteristics of Plato's εἰδητικός ἀριθμός, these characteristics are those of ideal number and in no way involve the identification of all ideas with numbers, the distinctive characteristic of the so-called doctrine of idea-numbers. Van der Wielen recognizes that the Platonic dialogues refer to ideal number (though he mistakenly allows them but a single reference to it⁸⁹) and that they take no cognizance of idea-numbers (p. 144 on *Philebus* 62 A-B and *Epistle* VII, 342 B-343 B); but he fails to observe that *Metaphysics* 1079 A 15-16 (= 990 B 19-20) is evidence that the characteristics which he ascribes to idea-numbers belonged in fact to the ideal numbers of the "earlier theory" (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 300-305 and 515-522). He expressly refrains from considering why Plato may have identified all ideas with ideal number (p. 2); but he believes that a list of passages in which Aristotle seems to assert the identification makes the fact itself

passages in M to reflect "the presumably Xenocratean account." Notice the form, οἱ μὲν . . . ποιοῦν, in 988 A 2 and cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 194-5.

⁸⁹ *Phaedo* 101 B-C (Van der Wielen, pp. 33 and 50); but *Philebus* 56 D-57 A and *Republic* 525 C-526 B also refer to ideal number, not "mathematical numbers" as Van der Wielen believes (see note 79 *supra*). Van der Wielen also fails to observe that *Cratylus* 432 A-D has important bearing upon Plato's consideration of the nature of ideal number (cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, p. 34).

certain (p. 54). Not all of these passages, however, really make the assertion;⁹⁰ and Van der Wielen fails to mention others which state or imply the opposite⁹¹ as well as the possibility that where Aristotle does ascribe this identification to Plato he may be doing so for the dialectical purposes of his own argument. He recognizes (n. 82) that *Metaphysics* 1081 A 5-17 undertakes to prove that the ideas *must* be the numbers derived from the one and the indefinite dyad; but he fails to observe that this passage at once guarantees the text of 987 B 21-22 against the "emendation" to which he, like most commentators, subjects it and indicates that in both places Aristotle's ascription of idea-numbers to Plato is the result of his own logical construction.⁹²

The one piece of evidence against Plato's identification of ideas and numbers to which Van der Wielen devotes much attention is the passage of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* (6 B 11-15) in which Plato seems to be represented as having made the numbers superior to the ideas. This passage, which Robin accepted in correction of Aristotle's statements (*La Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres*, p. 458), Van der Wielen (p. 153) seeks to reconcile with them by supposing "numbers" here to mean the idea-numbers in the strictest sense and "ideas" the ideas of geometricals to which Aristotle sometimes refers as "the things after the numbers." Without pretending here to analyze fully

⁹⁰ *De Anima* 404 B 24-25 and *Metaphysics* 1084 A 29-31 certainly do not refer to Plato; 1073 A 18-21 does not refer to him specifically (see note 86 *supra*), and it is uncertain whether he is meant to be included among those referred to in 1090 A 16-20. *Metaphysics* 1086 A 11-13 does refer to him but means only that he distinguished ideas and mathematical (cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, p. 47, n. 83). *Metaphysics* 1080 B 11-14 says only that certain numbers are ideas, not that all ideas are numbers; and this is also true of 1092 A 8 and is the assumption of 1084 A 7-9 and 1090 A 4-7.

⁹¹ E.g. *Metaphysics* 997 B 5-12, 1040 B 30-1041 A 3, 1059 A 10-14; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 A 34-B 5; *Physics* 193 B 35-194 A 7 (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 200-5).

⁹² Van der Wielen excises τὰ εἶδη instead of τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς in 987 B 22 just because he is convinced that Plato identified the ideas with numbers (p. 54); but the continuity of the passage requires that *both* be retained. On the text, the relation of 1081 A 5-17 to it, and the implications cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, note 104 and page 197, and *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, pp. 58-9. Incidentally, Van der Wielen's paraphrase of 1081 A 12-17 on p. 81 is inaccurate and misleading.

the Aristotelian passages from which Van der Wielen attempts (pp. 142-54) to establish such a "fourth class" for Plato—to which extent he is in agreement with Robin and Ross—and at the same time to vindicate the supposed Theophrastean use of "ideas" for this class despite its distinction from the idea-numbers, one may say that many of these passages, like *De Anima* 404 B 18-27 (see note 77 *supra*), demonstrably do not refer to Plato⁹³ and that *Metaphysics* 1028 B 19-21 and 1059 B 2-9, instead of proving, as Van der Wielen thinks (pp. 153-4), that *idéai* could be used to refer specifically to "the things after the numbers" as well as to the idea-numbers, indicate that Aristotle never seriously ascribed any such "fourth class" to Plato at all. It is peculiarly improbable that in the latter passage, *τὰ εἶδη* should have been used "less exactly for the idea-numbers along with *τὰ μετὰ τὰς idéας*," for there Aristotle, summing up the number of classes, says that *τὰ εἶδη* constitute one of Plato's three kinds of entities (ideas, mathematical, and sensibles) and, contrasting the doctrines of Speusippus (1028

⁹³ *Metaphysics* 1090 B 32-1091 A 5 does refer to Plato; but, as 1001 B 19-24 shows, the text of lines 36 f. should read *ἐξ ἄλλου δὲ τίνος . . . τὰ μεγέθη ποιεῖ*; (*Aristotle on Plato*, p. 483) and so does not ascribe to Plato a "different material principle" for magnitudes. It does not then refer to the theory reported in 1085 A 7-12; moreover 1085 A 7-12, since it does give the same theory as 992 A 10-18, is with it differentiated by the statement of 1087 B 12-21 from the doctrine ascribed to Plato, as 1089 B 9-15 is also (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 481-3). *Metaphysics* 992 B 13-18, if it did refer to the same theory as 992 A 10-18, could not refer to Plato; in fact it refers in part to that and in part to the doctrine of Xenocrates (cf. 1090 B 20-26), for it is one of those arguments by which Aristotle believes that he refutes several Platonistic theories at once. The "fourth class" here named is an absurd consequence which he believes his criticism forces upon his opponents, exactly like the *σώφρονος* that he deduces in 1076 B 11-39; it is not evidence that anyone did posit such a separate class. Moreover, anyone who deliberately identified all ideas with numbers could then have posited such a class of "non-numerical ideas" only if he did not know what he was doing in the first place. This Van der Wielen apparently suspects (p. 143); but he then supposes that Plato did just this as a hesitant compromise with his "older theory." He tries to find in 1036 B 13-17 support for this hypothesis (pp. 144-6); but, though he identifies the reference to Plato in this passage differently from Ross, his interpretation depends upon the same impossible translation of the passage (cf. *Aristotle on Plato*, pp. 567-8) and is therefore entirely without foundation.

B 21-24) and Xenocrates (1028 B 24-27), especially mentions magnitudes as another class of entity for the former and lines and planes as things that come after the idea-numbers of the latter.⁹⁴ It is not even implied here that Plato's ideas were identified with numbers (cf. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*, p. 47); and the former passage (1059 B 2-9) distinctly implies that they were not, for if the idea of man were a number it would be absurd for Aristotle to say as he does that there are mathematical intermediate between the ideas of number and sensibles but nothing intermediate between the idea of man and particular men.

Van der Wielen's book is a serious study of an exasperatingly difficult but ever fascinating topic; and, lest I seem to have scrutinized it too pedantically or disagreed too captiously with its conclusions, I am eager to say that I have treated it as I have because I feel that it deserves the careful attention of all who are concerned with this most baffling aspect of the Platonic tradition.

The theory of idea-numbers ascribed to Plato by Aristotle has been the subject of much speculation, controversy, and fanciful hypothesis; but it cannot in this respect compete with the subject of Dr. Gegenschatz's dissertation,⁹⁵ the island that Plato conjured up from the outer ocean and straightway made to disappear again in a day and a night of cataclysm and earthquake. In 1926 a bibliographer could cite 1700 books and articles that had been written about Atlantis; and the titles of what has been published on the subject since that date would make a sturdy supplement.⁹⁶ All this is no doubt a tribute to the potency of

⁹⁴ *Metaphysics* 1080 B 24-25, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ μαθηματικά καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας*, though referring to Plato, is also thus expressed from the point of view of Xenocrates' doctrine which Aristotle had just mentioned in 1080 B 22-23 and to which he returns in 1080 B 28-30. That is, the ideal magnitudes which in Xenocrates' theory came after the ideas and were identified by him with mathematical magnitudes were by Plato distinguished from the latter.

⁹⁵ Ernst Gegenschatz, *Platons Atlantis* (Zürich, Ernst Lang, 1943), pp. 63.

⁹⁶ Cf. J. Gattefossé et C. Roux, *Bibliographie de l'Atlantide* (Lyon, 1926). Some of the later literature is mentioned by Leisegang, *Die*

Plato's literary magic; but much of it is also evidence of the obtuse literalism of his readers or, if you please, another proof that it is easier to conjure the djin out of the bottle than to get him back into it again. Would Plato be amazed or only amused to know that what his fancy had created not even his fancy could destroy and that in the twenty-third century after he had put aside the uncompleted *Critias* scholars and enthusiasts are still trying to discover the city which he fondly imagined removed by earthquake and flood from all temptation of research or, if not to find the island itself, at least to discover the "real" land or city which his fancy transformed and transported beyond the pillars of Heracles and sank into the sea?

To Dr. Gegenschatz's credit be it said that he is aware of the absurdity of the former search and the dangers of the latter (pp. 4-5). He knows that Plato to embellish his imagining could have used whatever bits of material he found at hand and that the woven web would remain none the less the web of his imagination; that, if in Atlantis there be found reminiscences of Ecbatana and Syracuse, Atlantis is not therefore the idealized Orient or Sicily but Atlantis still (pp. 23-5). So he proposes to discover the meaning of Atlantis from Plato himself by interpretation of its context within Plato's thought (pp. 6 and 25), an admirable proposal, even if it is not so novel as Dr. Gegenschatz appears to believe.

That the story of Critias is an εἰκὼς λόγος ought to be obvious, especially since Critias comes as near to saying so as he reasonably can without depriving the story of all verisimilitude at the outset.⁹⁷ Gegenschatz elaborates a long argument to prove it

Platondeutung der Gegenwart (1929), pp. 157 ff., Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (1933), p. 620, and Gegenschatz himself, who does not attempt to give a full bibliography even of recent works, however. The most recent article on the subject known to me is R. Hackforth's "The Story of Atlantis: Its Purpose and Moral" in *C. R.*, LVIII (1944), pp. 7-9.

⁹⁷ It is implied by Critias' comparison of the discourse that he is about to give with that which Timaeus has just finished (*Critias* 106 B 8-108 A 4). *Critias* 106 B 8-C 2 refers directly to *Timaeus* 29 C 7-D 3 as does *Critias* 107 B 5-7, where *παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν* means, of course, *ἀνθρώπων ὄντων*, "since we are men"; in 107 E 2-3 Critias indicates again that his discourse will be an *ἀνεικασία*. With respect to the whole "Egyptian tradition" one should remember *Phaedrus* 275 B: ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὁποδαποῦς ἀν' ἐθέλης λόγους ποιεῖς.

(pp. 6-19), in the course of which he commits himself to such theses as that Plato never meant to write a *Hermocrates* and that *Timaeus* 17 C-19 A refers to the *Republic* but pretends to refer to some other conversation in order to prevent the reader from connecting the *Republic* with the *Timaeus* and *Critias* to form a trilogy. The first of these theses is, of course, not susceptible of proof or refutation; but certainly as late as *Critias* 108 A-B Socrates believes that Hermocrates is going to speak after Critias has finished, and Critias (108 C 5-7) confirms this belief. As for the second thesis, since Plato took pains to distinguish the reported conversation from the *Republic*, the only reasonable conclusion is that he meant it not to be a reference to the *Republic* at all. Gegenschatz holds, however, that this "recapitulation of the *Republic*" without the philosophers is indicative of Plato's late philosophy (p. 29), in the context of which must be found the meaning of the *eikōs λόγος* of Atlantis. The sketch of this epoch of Plato's thought (pp. 25-33) represents it as the result of his disappointment in Sicily which broke his belief in the state, "that had served as the basis of his metaphysical discovery," and so caused the doctrine of ideas to become a problem to him. The *Parmenides*, of course, is cited as evidence of this "crisis." Plato did not abandon the doctrine of ideas, we are assured, but no longer concerned himself with it in detail; disappointment "drove him into the arms of *γένεσις*," for the ideas no longer satisfied his metaphysical longing, and he now sought to mitigate the imperfection of Becoming by finding harmony in the world of Becoming itself. In this late period, consequently, Plato's thought is said (pp. 33-9) to have changed from the static pattern of a "conceptual pyramid" to the dynamic pattern of the cycle;⁸⁸ he applied to everything the metaphor of the organism and with this connected the notion of deterioration; and by means of this theory of deterioration the doctrine of ideas was temporalized, the ideal state becoming the original state in time.

So Gegenschatz, having proposed to interpret Atlantis from its context in Plato's thought, interprets the context of his thought from external events, the relation of which to his writ-

⁸⁸ Gegenschatz has borrowed this terminology from the work of H. Leisegang, *Denkformen* (Berlin, 1928).

ings is quite unknown.⁹⁹ The question of method apart, however, the text of Plato proves that this interpretation of his "late period" is quite unfounded. After the *Parmenides* the *Sophist* certainly concerns itself with the ideas in detail (e.g. 253 B-259 D), the *Politicus*, in which according to Gegenschatz (p. 30) the vision of the ideas as the fulfillment of dialectical exercise is missing, states that the apprehension of the ideas is the purpose of dialectic (*Politicus* 285 E-286 A), and the *Philebus*, which refers to the ideas again and again (15 A-B, 57 E-59 D, 61 E-62 B), refutes Gegenschatz's statement that in it "Becoming itself acquires through number the ideative appearance of Being" (p. 32) by distinguishing Becoming from Being as sharply and uncompromisingly as any of the earlier dialogues (cf. 59 A-C).¹⁰⁰ So, of course, does the *Timaeus* (cf. especially 51-52), of which dialogue there could be no more perversely erroneous interpretation than the statement (pp. 30-1) that "because the ideas had lost their force Plato has been turned aside to the terrestrial and no longer regards the *ἰδέα*, though he assumes it, but *γένησις*." Most amazing of all is the assertion (p. 29) that the ideas and philosophers are absent from the résumé of the best state in *Laws* 739 A-E, for this is not a résumé of the best state but an explanation of the reason for the subsequent deviations from the state of the *Republic*, which even here is said still to be the best (cf. England's notes *ad loc.*, especially on 739 C 1); and when at the end of the *Laws* Plato comes to the true guardians (961 A ff.) the theory of ideas and its importance for the state are asserted once more in emphatic language (962 D-966 A, especially 965 B-D). Nor can the notion of deterioration be taken as an indication of an alternative to the original theory of ideas. Gegenschatz himself remembers that the conception of the deterioration of the state is developed in the *Republic* (546-580); but he makes no attempt to reconcile this with his interpretation beyond calling this long passage a "Fremdkörper" (p. 38), though he does not say whether by that he means that it was not composed in the same period of

⁹⁹ Cf. Morrow's criticism of Hackforth's attempt to date the *Philebus* by Plato's "disillusionment" with respect to Sicily (*C. W.*, XXXIX [1945], p. 63).

¹⁰⁰ Gegenschatz supports his contention by citing the notorious *γένησις εἰς οὐρανὸν* of *Philebus* 26 D 8-9 on which see note 64 *supra*.

Plato's thought as the rest of the *Republic*. In fact, however, the law of deterioration is a corollary of the theory of ideas, for all materialization however "perfect" is a derogation of the ideas and is for that very reason subject to progressive deterioration (cf. *Republic* 546 A 2-3 and *Politicus* 269 D 9 ff.). No more can the "realization of the ideal state in time" be interpreted as a change in Plato's philosophical attitude. Just as *Republic* 472 B-E and 592 A-B show that Plato was not likely to alter his metaphysics because of any subsequent failure to realize the ideal state in Sicily, so at the same time *Republic* 499 C-D asserts stoutly the possibility of such a realization of it sometime in the past or future or even in the present "in some barbaric region far from our ken."¹⁰¹

The ancient Athens of Critias' story as the "temporalization of the ideal state" has none of the philosophical implications, then, of Gegenschatz's interpretation. So temporalized, it is, of course, in the world of change; but its war with Atlantis need not be interpreted as symbolical of this, as a literal application of Heraclitus' figure, πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων.¹⁰² Even in the *Republic* Plato considers war as a fact to be provided for in the ideal state, and his reason is not to be sought in any symbolism. If in the world there were only perfect states, there would no doubt be no occasion for war; but so long as there is *one* imperfect state it will make war, and the perfect states cannot avoid involvement. In *Republic* 373 D-E the origin of war is discovered in men's abandonment of themselves to the unlimited acquisition of property when they exceed the boundary of necessary wants (cf. *Phaedo* 66 C); and so it is that the war between Atlantis and Athens is represented as the result of the insolent desire of the former to enslave all the world (*Timaeus* 24 E 2-3, 25 B 2-5), a desire which was the outgrowth of its *πλεονεξία ἄδικος* (*Critias* 121 B 6). Such a war is a trial in which the good state should display in action the value of the education

¹⁰¹ This incidentally refutes Gegenschatz's statement (p. 40) that even in the *Republic* Plato could imagine only Greek circumstances as the condition for his ideal state.

¹⁰² Gegenschatz (p. 44) appeals for this interpretation to Proclus, *In Timaeum* 24 B (I, p. 76, 20 [Diehl]), who gives it as the interpretation of those who took the whole story of Atlantis as a symbol of the contrarieties in the universe.

and nurture that have made it what it is, and at the beginning of the *Timaeus* (19 C, 20 B) just this exhibition and this purpose are given as the motivation of the whole account. Such a trial requires a "worthy" opponent, and Gegenschatz is right in asserting that the need for such an opponent is the sole reason for the creation of Atlantis. His attempt to make it simply a doublet of Athens, however, and to find between the two a perfect parallelism (pp. 44-8) is quite mistaken. Atlantis and Athens are not "the ideal state pluralized in Becoming"; if they were, there would have been no aggression and no war. Though many of the details in the description of Atlantis may be merely magnifications of things familiar to the Athenians, Plato makes it clear that as in government and military organization so even in the superiority of size and wealth and physical power Atlantis is barbaric in the inward sense.

Gegenschatz's assertion of the "ideality" of Atlantis is motivated by his desire (pp. 48-57) to identify as the origin of Atlantis the "true earth" of the *Phaedo*, which he takes to be the "ideal world." He has already explained (p. 41) the ancient Attica of Critias' story as this "ideal land" of the *Phaedo* reduced to historical dimensions. Atlantis too now becomes this "ideal land" transposed from the vertical plane to the horizontal and simply placed in another "hollow" of the earth's surface described in the *Phaedo*.¹⁰³ So the "ideal land" of the *Phaedo* transposed in time is ancient Athens and transposed in space is Atlantis (cf. p. 59).

Of course, if Atlantis and Athens are not "doublets of the ideal state," Gegenschatz's explanation is an impossible combination. In any case, in the myth of the *Phaedo* itself, the "true earth" is not and does not even "symbolize" the ideal world, as *Phaedo* 114 C plainly shows; and so, even if Atlantis were this "true earth" transposed to the outer ocean, that still would not

¹⁰³ Gegenschatz (note 128) argues that Friedländer (*Platon*, I, pp. 257 ff.) is mistaken in supposing that there is no communication between the "hollows" in the *Phaedo*. Quite apart from the question of a "geographical development" from the *Phaedo* to the *Timaeus*, Friedländer is right in this, for the "true earth" consists of the summits of the land that must therefore cut off the various "hollows" from one another (cf. *Phaedo* 110 C 6 ff., 111 A 3 ff.).

render it "ideenhaft."¹⁰⁴ Dr. Gegenschatz's search for the source of Atlantis in some other figure of Plato's does not really differ from those attempts, which he rejects, to find that source outside. It proceeds from the silent assumption, which is not in itself necessary, that Atlantis could not have been a fresh invention of Plato's fancy but only a refashioning of some older invention; and in the process it does more violence to the significant thought of Plato than do the wildest archaeological and geological theories of Plato's inspiration.

That the wealth and vividness of Plato's imagination were not diminished even in his latest years is easily confirmed by a glance at Pierre Louis's study of Plato's metaphors.¹⁰⁵ Plato himself mocks his own custom of resorting to "images" (*Republic* 487 E-488 A) and once at least expressly gives warning that "likenesses are a most slippery tribe" (*Sophist*, 231 A); but from first to last his pages are full of these "images" expressed as similes, metaphors, analogies, or fully developed myths. To Professor Robinson this aspect of Plato's method appeared to be inconsistent with his methodology (see pages 145-6 *supra*). In Dr. Louis's opinion, on the contrary, Plato's images make it possible for him to indicate the analogy between realities on different levels, and, by addressing themselves to the imagination, they awaken reflection better than a long demonstration would; his images are veritable arguments, and the frequent use of a multiplicity of images to illustrate the same notion gives vivid expression to the impossibility of confining that notion in a unique formula and to the necessity of rising to the truth by successive steps (pp. 180-2).

Dr. Louis's book does not pretend to be a study of Plato's method, however, but rather an exhaustive collection of the metaphors which are used in the Platonic corpus. After a brief

¹⁰⁴ Gegenschatz uses his misinterpretation of the *Phaedo* to interpret τὸν ἀληθινὸν πόντον and ἀληθῶς ἡπειρος in *Timaeus* 25 C as "sea of the idea" and "ideative continent"; this would be utterly impossible, no matter what the *Phaedo* meant.

¹⁰⁵ Pierre Louis, *Les Métaphores de Platon* (Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1945 [Collection d'Études Anciennes publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé]), pp. xxii + 269.

introduction in which he discusses the nature of metaphor as distinguished from simile and as the germ of Platonic myth and in which he gives a few general indications of the kinds of metaphor favored by Plato, Dr. Louis arranges the metaphors of the corpus according to the notions which they express, describing the most striking examples of each in his text and giving in footnotes references to all the other occurrences of each kind with some parallels to similar metaphors in earlier and contemporary Greek literature. This, the body of the book, is divided into nine chapters: Intellectual Activity, Dialectic, Discourse, Man, the Soul, the Theory of Knowledge, Morality, Social Life, God and the Universe. There is a succinct conclusion, and then follows a long appendix in which both metaphors and similes are classified more compactly according to the spheres from which Plato took them. There are full indices of passages and authors cited and of Greek words studied.

The task of compilation would have been a trying one in the best of circumstances, and Dr. Louis has well earned the gratitude of all who are seriously interested in Plato's thought and his expression of it. Mere classification, of course, implies interpretation; and with many of the implied interpretations here scholars will disagree, but in so doing they will remain in Dr. Louis's debt for much material. Moreover, in a field so vast there will be gleaning still to be done even after this harvest. For example, I miss a reference to the striking figure of the soul's "feasting on earth" (*Republic* 612 A 1) which explains the incrustations that obscure its true nature; this should be cited in contrast to the metaphor of knowledge as the nourishment of the soul. The complicated figure of *Philebus* 38 E-39 C is not really considered at all, 38 E-39 A being simply cited in comparison with *Timaeus* 26 C, which gives a false impression. The brief treatment of the metaphors used of the ideas (pp. 143-6) is not a safe guide to the philosophical implications of Plato's language.

Dr. Louis says something of the relevance of Plato's metaphors (pp. 177-8); but both space and the scope of his book perhaps precluded a detailed treatment of this most interesting and important aspect of the subject. Still, a word here and there might have been spared to call attention to the distinctive relevance of specific passages, as for example to the peculiar

fitness in calling Polemarchus the κληρόνομος of the argument in *Republic* 331 D ¹⁰⁶ or to the pathos of *Phaedo* 89 B 9 ff. . . . ἐάνπερ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι put into Socrates' mouth at this point in the dialogue when the arguments for immortality appear to have failed and the fate of Socrates is thus identified with the fate of the λόγος.

Much remains to be said of Plato's metaphors, but Dr. Louis's book will give substantial help to anyone who undertakes to say it.

Aristotle said that all metaphorical expression is obscure (*Topics* 139 B 34-35) and more than once dismissed important Platonic doctrines on the ground that they are mere metaphors (cf. *Eth. Nic.* 1138 B 5-13, *Metaphysics* 991 A 20-22). Certainly Plato's extensive use of metaphor has provided such a banquet for his interpreters that it would seem to be unnecessary if not impossible to ascribe to him a significant metaphor that he had not employed in some connection. This Professor Wild has done, however, in a book described by its publisher as the only work which attempts to explain Plato's theory of human inversions or sophistry in an exhaustive manner.¹⁰⁷ Since Wild in the beginning disclaims any intention of giving an "historic" exposition of Plato's philosophy and states that his purpose is "not so much to reveal the thought of Plato as to reveal the nature of human culture and its inversion, using Plato, the philosopher, as a guide" (p. 1), one's first inclination is to disregard the advertisement and not to compare the exposition too closely with the text of Plato. Yet the title of the book and the whole of its presentation and argument leave no room for

¹⁰⁶ It is a mistake to suppose (p. 68) that παῖδες ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός applied to Glaucon and Adeimantus in 368 A is the same figure, for ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀνδρός does not refer to Thrasymachus (cf. Shorey, *Gloss. Phil.*, XII [1917], p. 436). On page 113 Louis says "Socrate affirme dans le *Timée* 34 C"; this is the same sort of slip as that which Diès made (see note 73 *supra*)—and Aristotle!

¹⁰⁷ John Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1946), pp. x + 320. Chapter II of this book appeared as an article entitled "Plato's Theory of TEXNH: A Phenomenological Interpretation" in the *Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, I, no. 3 (March, 1941).

doubt that the author intends his readers to believe that they are being presented with an accurate interpretation of Plato's theory of man. Execrating the "modern" philosophy of Descartes and all its descendants legitimate, illegitimate, and supposititious, he wishes to exorcize the whole tribe by formulating a philosophy of human culture to complement the metaphysics of Neo-Thomism; but, instead of merely showing that this anthropology of his is compatible with that metaphysics, he assumes that the latter is genuine Aristotelianism and the former genuine Platonism and argues that the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle themselves were complementary and not opposed to each other in any essential detail.¹⁰⁸ The basic metaphor of this anthropology, the "inversion" of an hierarchical structure of human culture, he ascribes to Plato (pp. 34-43); and at the end of his first chapter he states (p. 43) that his task in the rest of the book is "to follow Plato in his account of all the *necessary* levels of the practical hierarchy" and at the same time "to follow him in attempting to show at *every level* the possibility of an inverted or anatomic art, an anatomic society," etc. Conformably with this program chapter II deals with the human arts and their inversion, chapters III and IV with social and individual life respectively, chapter V with the image of the cave, chapter VI with being and its inversion, which is an interpretation of the *Parmenides*, chapter VII with the inversion of the apprehensive faculties (the *Theaetetus*), and chapter VIII with the *Sophist* as a definition and description of the "anatomic" man who bears within himself the seeds of cultural inversion and decay.

"According to Plato," Wild says (p. 36), "anatomic, or inversion, is defined as the miscarriage of human action involving misapprehension of the hierarchical structure of means and

¹⁰⁸ Wild appears to think (pp. 12-22) that this is proved by Jaeger's theory of Aristotle's development and by the eclectic tendencies of some Middle Platonists and Neo-Platonists. Even if Jaeger's theory were established, it would still not diminish the opposition of Aristotle's developed doctrine to Plato's. The attitude of the eclectic harmonizers gives no more reason for "reconciling" Plato and Aristotle than it does for "reconciling" them and Stoicism. In any case, the important fact is Aristotle's own belief that he is opposed to Plato's doctrines, an opposition that was recognized by Atticus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Syrianus, and Proclus; the childish method of explaining it away that was adopted by Simplicius and Asclepius is taken seriously by no-one.

ends." He does not say where Plato gives this definition but says that in *Laws* 640 E "he explains the general sense in which he uses this ubiquitous word by asking the following question: 'do you not know that when the pilot becomes stupefied, every ruler of whatever enterprise overturns (*ἀνατρέπει*) whatever is piloted by him whether it be ship or chariot or army?'" The "ubiquitous word" apparently is *ἀνατρέπειν*, Wild having just said that "Plato uses the expressive noun *ἀνατροπή* (inversion) or the corresponding verb *ἀνατρέπω* (to invert) for this complex, *dynamic* confusion which lies at the root of moral evil and sin." The fact is that Plato uses the noun *ἀνατροπή* just once, and that in a speech of Protagoras (*Protagoras* 325 C) where it means the overthrow, i. e. the destruction of houses. The verb according to Ast's *Lexicon* occurs 20 times in the whole Platonic corpus, two of these occurrences being in *Epistle* VII; it occurs thrice in the *Republic*, once in the *Sophist* and not at all in the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*, the dialogues of which Wild makes so much. Such is the "ubiquity" of the word. It always means capsize, upset, overthrow, ruin, or refute and never "invert" in the sense given it by Wild, whose definition of *anatrope* is nowhere even remotely suggested by Plato. *Laws* 640 E, which he so strangely translates in explanation of this general sense, occurs in a discussion of drinking and means: "do you not understand that a pilot or any commander of anything who is drunk overturns everything whether ships or chariots or army or whatever he might be piloting?" When he says (p. 38) that "Plato generally uses the verb *invert* (*ἀνατρέπω*) of this living death," i. e. of the soul's burying itself in a corporeal tomb, he gives no examples; and he could not give any, for Plato never uses the verb in this connection. Where the word does occur, Wild mistranslates, misinterprets, and conflates passages in order to put his metaphor and his theory into Plato's mouth. "As 'irrational force' gets into the saddle it *inverts* many things one by one, but finally, as its authority is extended, 'it will invert the whole life of everybody'," he says (p. 38), citing *Laws* 863 B 4 for the first clause and *Republic* 442 B 3 for the last. The passage of the *Laws* says that passion or anger (*θυμός*), a contentious and unconquerable thing innate in the soul, by brute force works much destruction; the subject of the clause from the *Republic* is not *θυμός* at all but τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the appetitive

part of the soul, which the λογιστικόν and the θυμοειδές are here said to watch over lest it overturn the entire life of all the parts of the soul. Nevertheless, despite the multifarious misinterpretation, the word ἀνατρέπειν at least does occur here. At the very beginning of this section, however, Wild shows that he does not require even so much external aid to read his anatrofé into Plato's text. "As Plato himself carefully explains in the *Phaedo*," he says (p. 35), "'opposite things come to be out of opposites' and 'in all cases, between the two opposites there are two opposed processes,—from the positive down to the negative, and from the negative up again to the positive'." For this last quotation—and he sets it off by quotation-marks—he cites *Phaedo* 71 A 13-B 2; but there is not in this passage any word for "up" or "down" or "positive" or "negative" or any indication that any such notion is involved in Socrates' argument.

This section which introduces "Plato's Conception of Anatrofé" is a fair example of the whole book. Almost every page contains irrelevant citations, by which I mean references to Platonic passages which are presumably meant to substantiate the statements in Wild's text but which when examined prove to have no relation to them. For example, a reference to *Republic* 549 C 2 is given in a footnote appended to the statement, "the pursuit of philosophy cannot long be maintained 'in an ill-governed city'" (p. 160); but, while the phrase ἐν πόλει . . . οὐκ εἰς πολιτευομένη does occur in *Republic* 549 C, it occurs not in any such context as that into which Wild puts it but in a sentence which says that the timocratic youth is often the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and who avoids honors, offices, litigation, etc. Frequently there is not even so much as this, the presence in the original of a similar word or phrase, to justify the reference, as when *Republic* 595 C ff. is cited in a footnote to the pronouncement, "Thus philosophy, becoming isolated from theology, and losing its organizing principle, gives way to science" . . . (p. 78). How little the context of a word, phrase, or argument means to Wild may be seen from the fact that he quotes as Plato's opinion (p. 90) *Charmides* 163 E 8-11, a statement made not by Socrates but by Critias, indirectly attacked by Socrates, and subsequently withdrawn by Critias. What Professor Robinson calls "mosaic interpretation" luxuriates. Thus Wild pieces together from the

"divisions" of the *Sophist* and *Politicus* and from occasional remarks in other dialogues a classification of the true and spurious arts (pp. 59 ff.) and even introduces as underlying all the other branches of acquisitive art an art which he admits Plato nowhere included in any classification but which according to him "like so many other important details is left to the reader" (p. 61, n. 46). He confuses the "auxiliaries" and the "true guardians" of the *Republic* (p. 102) and applies to the latter what Plato says of the former (429 C and D; contrast 429 B and 428 E). He goes far beyond such conflation, however, and documents his statements of Plato's opinion with references to those of Aristotle. Sometimes he does this without more ado, presumably because he believes that Aristotle's philosophy and Plato's are equal to the same thing and therefore are equal to each other. Once, however, he undertakes to argue that his attribution of a certain distinction to Plato "is clearly borne out by Aristotle who takes the distinction between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* from the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, p. 1140 A 2; i.e. Aristotle's early literary works. Jaeger . . . has shown that Aristotle's early ethics on the whole was developed along thoroughly Platonic lines" (p. 91, n. 14). Of course, even if one were to grant both the meaning here assumed for *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* and Jaeger's theory of Aristotle's early ethics, neither of which is granted by all competent critics, it still would not follow that therefore this distinction between *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* was Plato's.¹⁰⁹ Yet such is the logic used by Wild, when he uses any at all, to justify documenting his interpretation of Plato with Aristotelian passages.

The naïf philologist is astounded by much simpler matters in this book, however. When I see *ὑβρις* interpreted as "insolent assertiveness of transitory conjecture" (p. 165), *θυμός* called "imaginative aspiration" (p. 97), or *αἰρετικὸς καὶ εὐλαβητικὸς ὥν* *χρῆ* (*Definitions* 412 A 1-2) translated "ready to choose and to receive whatever is rightly demanded of it" (p. 103), I know how Alice must have been affected by Humpty-Dumpty's "mastery" of English words, and I can only say that Wild's interpretation of *ὑβρις* is a perfect description of his own treat-

¹⁰⁹ It is, of course, *not* the distinction among *ποιεῖν*, *πράττειν*, and *ἐργάζεσθαι* that Critias draws in the *Charmides* (163 C 3-4; cf. Moreau, *La Construction de l'Idéalisme Platonicien*, pp. 116-17).

ment of Plato's vocabulary and syntax. By mere ignorance of the Greek idiom in τῷ ὃ ἦρχεν τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελεν (*Republic* 442 C 5-6; cf. Goodwin and Gulick, *Greek Grammar*, § 1027 or Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, II, § 529) he elaborates a "six-fold psychology" which he declares is really contained within "the tripartite psychology of Book IV" of the *Republic* (pp. 152 ff.); and his neglect of the difference between ἔστι and ἐστὶ would make even the least philosophical student of Greek suspicious of his fantastic interpretation of the *Parmenides*.¹¹⁰ He disregards the possibility that in different contexts the same word may have different meanings. For example, we are told (p. 299) that according to Plato discourse must be *about* something and that Plato calls this *relational* aspect of discourse a quality. For this Wild cites *Sophist* 262 E 5-6 and 262 E 8 and then solemnly explains that "strictly speaking it is not a quality but a *relation*." Had he read on to *Sophist* 263 A 11-B 3 (cf. *Philebus* 37 B-C), he should have seen that οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι εἰδὲ at 262 E 8 does not repeat 262 E 5-6 but means that in addition a statement must be true or false.

Insensitivity to Greek and to the context of Plato's thought at once are evinced by such notions as the identification of philosophy and τέχνη εἰκαστική (pp. 63-4, 281-4);¹¹¹ but one

¹¹⁰ For example in n. 46 on p. 223 Wild objects to Cornford's interpretation of the "first hypothesis" and says: "The phrase ἐν ἐν at 142 C 2 is not 'a more accurate expression than εἰ ἐν ἔστιν for what *was* our supposition in Hyp. I'." Now, in the original formula (137 C 4) the verb is not ἔστι but ἐστὶ; and Cornford in his note (*Plato and Parmenides*, p. 136, n. 1) equates εἰ ἐν ἐν not with εἰ ἐν ἔστιν as Wild says but with εἰ ἐν ἐστὶν. Moreover Cornford's equation here must be correct since Plato at the beginning of the second hypothesis says that it is: . . . ὁμοιον ἂν ἦν λέγειν ἐν τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν ἐν. νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἐν ἐν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐν ἔστιν. However you translate εἰ ἐν ἔστιν in 137 C 4, you *cannot* translate it as Wild does (p. 220): "if One itself is"; and Wild's argument that the first hypothesis cannot be εἰ ἐν ἐν, because "if so, it would have been utilized there" (n. 46), is simply answered by the fact that it is so utilized there: 137 D 3, 138 B 4-5, 138 C 1-2, 139 B 5-6, 139 C 1, 139 E 2, 140 A 1-2, 140 D 1. It would be amusing to know what Wild can make of 141 E 12 f.: τὸ ἐν οὔτε ἐν ἔστιν οὔτε ἔστιν, εἰ δεῖ τῷ τοιῷδε λόγῳ πιστεύειν.

¹¹¹ Of this Wild makes τέχνη φανταστική, which he identifies with sophistry, the "perversion" (p. 284); but Plato says that both are parts of εἰδωλοποιική (*Sophist* 236 C 6-7) and puts εἰκῶν, εἰδωλον, and

cannot help suspecting something worse than mere insensitivity when one reads such statements as that (p. 107) in the *Republic* "all phases or parts of the state are ruled by wisdom which belongs to no special individual or group," for even Wild must know that Plato emphatically asserts the very opposite (*Republic* 428 E-429 A).

Wild's notions of Plato's doctrine derive in part from his attempt to sterilize Plato, in part from his attempt to force all of Plato's variety and profundity into the formula of a single metaphor, but chiefly from his fertile misunderstanding of the Greek language and his arbitrary mishandling of the text of his author. "Anatropism" has little or nothing to do with Plato, but it is an appropriate metaphor to describe Wild's method of interpretation.

The best and the worst of books about Plato have this good feature in common, that they awaken in the serious reader the desire to return with greater attention and thoughtfulness to the writings of Plato. The most foolish and arrogant interpreter cannot expect that his interpretation will supersede the original; the wisest has no higher hope or desire than to help men read that original with more care and insight. All the books that I have here discussed have sent me back again and again to Plato's words, and for this above all I am grateful to their authors; I hope that those who read my discussion of these books may derive like benefit from it.

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φάντασμα all, as being ψεύδος, on the same level (264 C 12 f.). Wild's notion that the φαντάσματα αὐτοφύη of *Sophist* 266 B 9-10 are the "true likenesses in the soul according to nature," from which he builds up the theory that the εἰκόνες of the "divided line" are the images of sensible things "produced in human sensation, the supreme mimetic medium of nature" (pp. 177 and 280-1) is particularly inexcusable in view of Plato's explicit statement that they are shadows and reflections in smooth surfaces (*Sophist* 266 B 10 ff.) and his similar catalogue of the εἰκόνες (*Republic* 509 E 1 ff., cf. 532 C 1 ff.). There is, of course, not a word or a hint in *Sophist* 266 C, as Wild, p. 280, n. 34, implies that there is, that man is the maker "of imitations, first in the imagination itself."

THE NEGRO IN CLASSICAL ITALY.

Until the study of Mrs. Beardsley¹ appeared about fifteen years ago, no detailed study of the Negro in Greek and Roman civilization had been published. Mrs. Beardsley's study, however, confined treatment of the Negro in Roman civilization to nineteen pages, of which thirteen were devoted to a description of the Negro in Roman art. The other six pages constituted a chapter entitled "The Ethiopian in Roman Literature," in which scant use was made of the ancient literary references to the Negroid type in Roman civilization. The purpose of the present study has been to collect and to interpret the scattered references to the Negro in Latin authors, and, wherever possible, to supplement this material with archaeological evidence and interpretation in the light of modern anthropological and sociological research.

I. DESCRIPTION OF NEGROES IN ROMAN AUTHORS.

According to modern scientific standards, certain Roman writers would be rated as competent anthropologists in respect to their observations on the Negro. Except for the omission of anthropometric data, certain Roman descriptions of the Negro agree with those of the most careful of modern scientists.

Classifications of the Negroid type are found in three Roman sources. Since a consideration of these passages is important for a justification of the words Ethiopian, Negro, and Negroid as used in this paper, it is essential to cite the passages and to discuss certain key words appearing in them.

erat unica custos
Afra genus, tota patriam testante figura,
torta comam labroque tumens et fusca colore,
pectore lata, iacens mammis, compressor alvo,
cruribus exilis, spatiosa prodiga planta.²

¹ G. H. Beardsley, *The Negro in Greek and Roman Civilization: A Study of the Ethiopian Type* (Baltimore, 1929).

² *Moretum*, 31-35. This description bears striking resemblance to the following passage from a modern anthropologist:

"Narrow heads and wide noses, thick lips and thin legs, protruding jaws and receding chins, integument rich in pigment but poor in hairy growth, flat feet and round foreheads, tiny curls and big

"Eumolpus tanquam litterarum studiosus utique atramentum habet. hoc ergo remedio mutemus colores a capillis usque ad ungues. ita tanquam servi Aethiopes et praesto tibi erimus . . . et permutato colore imponemus inimicis." "quidni?" inquit Giton ". . . tanquam hic solus color figuram possit pervertere et non multa una oporteat consentiant [et non] ratione, ut mendacium constet. puta infectam medicamine faciem diutius durare posse . . . age, numquid et labra possumus tumore taeterrimo implere? numquid et crines calamistro convertere?"³

Contexenda sunt his caelestibus nexa, causis namque et Aethiopas vicini sideris vapore torreri adustisque similis gigni barba et capillo vibrato non est dubium, et adversa plaga mundi candida atque glaciali cute esse gentes flavis promissis crinibus, trucis vero ex caeli rigore has, illas mobilitate sapientes. . . .⁴

All three passages have in common the fact that they call attention to the color of the skin and to the form of the hair. It is fortunate for our purposes of identification that the writers have mentioned these characteristics, which are two of the most important used by modern anthropologists in their classifications of the Negro. Furthermore, two of the observers refer to the thick lips characteristic of the race.

Since the racial features noted by these writers form the basis for a discussion of the Negro among the Romans, it is necessary

smiles—these are outstanding features of the ancient and specialized Negro division of mankind" (E. A. Hooton, *Up From The Ape* [New York, 1931], pp. 540-541).

³ Petronius, *Sat.*, 102.

⁴ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189. This passage from Pliny probably reflects Greek views of the effects of climate and geography on the human physique and the formation of racial characteristics (cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios* [Munich, 1921], pp. 67 ff.). I include it, however, because Pliny, like other Romans (cf. Ovid, *Met.*, II, 235-236, Lucretius, VI, 722, 1109), apparently accepted Greek scientific theory as an explanation for the racial characteristics of the Negroes whom he mentions elsewhere (cf. *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51; VIII, 131; X, 122). The passage, however, does not provide any evidence for the presence of Negroes on Roman soil; nevertheless, it is important in a discussion of the terms which the Romans used to describe the Negro. Although Vitruvius (VI, 1, 3), in a similar contrast of racial types, does not use the word *Aethiopes*, it is highly probable that he is referring to Ethiopians in the same way as Pliny (II, 189) and Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2, both of whom make specific mention of the Ethiopians. The resemblances between the Vitruvius and the Ptolemy passages are striking.

to examine the use of certain terms appearing in these and other Roman authors. In this way alone is it possible to interpret adequately the evidence in the literary and archaeological sources.

A. The Use of *Aethiops*, *Afer*, *Maurus*, and *Indus* as
Designations for Negroes

Aethiops

Aethiops, the most common generic word used by the Romans to designate a Negro or a Negroid type, came to the Romans from the Greeks. An examination, therefore, of the Greek usage of *Aithiops* is valuable for the light it throws on the meaning of the word borrowed by the Romans. Although there are many problems connected with Greek views on the exact location of regions in Africa inhabited by the *Aithiopes*,⁵ the nature of this study requires only an investigation to determine the extent to which the Greeks used the word as a designation for the Negroid type. In general, the Ethiopians of early Greek writers are rather vague and shadowy individuals.⁶ Beginning with Herodotus, however, Greek knowledge of the Ethiopian type becomes more accurate. Herodotus differentiates between the woolly-haired and the straight-haired Ethiopians, dwelling respectively to the West and to the East.⁷

⁵ For a detailed study of the Greek views in regard to the territory occupied by the Ethiopians, see S. Gsell, *Histoire Ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, I^o [1921]), pp. 295-304. Cf. also Gsell, *op. cit.*, p. 299: "Il [le mot *Aithiopes*] s'appliquait aux véritables nègres. Il a pu désigner aussi des hommes dont la peau, sans être absolument noire, était naturellement très foncée."

⁶ Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 6: "The Ethiopians of the poets—Homer, Hesiod, Mimnermus, Aeschylus, Euripides, Apollonius—are mythical or partly mythical creatures, while the writers of prose—Herodotus, Strabo, Pliny, Heliodorus—dealt with African reality."

⁷ VII, 70. The western Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (VII, 69-70) are those "from the region above Egypt" or "from Libya." Although ethnologists are in doubt about the exact location of the eastern Ethiopians, it is generally assumed that the Eastern branch lived in Southeastern Baluchistan. Cf. R. W. Macan, *Herodotus* (London, 1908), I, part I, p. 94; A. D. Fraser, "The Panoply of the Ethiopian Warrior," *A. J. A.*, XXXIX (1935), pp. 43-44; and C. F. Smith and A. G. Laird, *Herodotus: Books VII and VIII* (New York, 1908), p. 157, "A remnant of the Eastern or Asiatic Ethiopians is to be

What a Greek who had definite knowledge of the Negroid type meant by the word *Aiθioψ* can be judged by a consideration of the following data:

1. *Aiθioψ* associated with black skin, woolly hair, and flat nose
 - a. Arrian, *Indica*, 6, 9
 - b. Diodorus Siculus, III, 8, 2
2. *Aiθioψ* associated with black skin and woolly hair
 - a. Strabo, XV, 1, 24
 - b. Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2
3. *Aiθioψ* associated with black skin and flat nose
 - a. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Ethicos*, 43
 - b. Xenophanes, Frag. 14 (Diehl)
4. *Aiθioψ* associated with woolly hair
 - a. Herodotus, VII, 70
 - b. Aristotle, *Physiognomonica*, 812 b.
 - c. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium*, V, 3
5. *Aiθioψ* associated with black or dark skin
 - a. Theocritus, XVII, 89
 - b. Aristotle, *Physiognomonica*, 812 a
 - c. Aristotle, *Problemata*, X, 66
 - d. Lucian, *Bis Accusatus*, 6
 - e. Lucian, *Adversus Indoctum*, 28
 - f. Achilles Tatius, IV, 5
 - g. Quintus Smyrnaeus, II, 101
 - h. Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Physicos*, I, 247, 249
 - i. Arrian, *Anabasis*, V, 4, 4.

found in the black Brahûi of Beloochistan." The Ethiopians on a series of "Negro alabastra" (Beardsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50) have been identified by Fraser (*loc. cit.*, pp. 41-44) as belonging to the Asiatic rather than the African division of the Ethiopians. Fraser's identification is based largely on the apparent similarity of the costumes of the alabastra Ethiopians to the cotton dress of the Indians. Since the equipment of the Eastern Ethiopians, according to Herodotus (VII, 70) was in most points like that of the Indians with whom they fought, Fraser concludes that there is a strong probability that the vase painters were depicting the Eastern Ethiopians of Baluchistan. The view that the Ethiopians on the alabastra represented the Western branch seems to Graindor more reasonable for the following reasons: (1) Herodotus' description of the Asiatic Ethiopians bears no resemblance to the alabastra Negroes; (2) in the absence of other evidence, there is no reason to doubt that the alabastra depict the Ethiopians of the Sudan, since Egypt at the time of the Persian Wars was under Persian domination. Cf. P. Graindor, "Mélanges d'Archéologie," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts* (Cairo), III (1936), part II, p. 110.

References in the extant literature indicate clearly that the Greeks used the word *Aiθίovς* of a racial type which is designated today as Negroid. Although the flat nose and woolly hair were regarded as distinctive features of the Negro, it was the color of the skin which was apparently uppermost in the mind of the Greek. This awareness of a difference in skin-color probably accounts for the fact that the Greeks not only referred often to the effect of the sun upon the Ethiopian's skin⁸ but also described his skin as the blackest in the world.⁹ Apparently the color of the skin was sufficient to identify an Ethiopian. The evidence also seems to indicate that by the use of the word *Aiθίovς* the Greeks, unless special note was made, were referring to the African rather than to the Eastern Ethiopians mentioned by Herodotus.¹⁰

Following the practice of the Greek from whom he adopted the word, the Roman by his use of the word *Aethiops* meant, in most instances, either the full-blooded Negro or a Negroid type.¹¹ *Aethiops* had definitely for the Roman the connotation of a black or dark color (usually *niger* or *fuscus*) and of kinky or frizzly hair,¹² generally associated with the Negro. Important passages which indicate this meaning appear below:

1. *Aethiops* and the Ethiopian type associated with *niger*
 - a. Ovid, *Met.*, II, 235-236
 - b. Claudian, *Carm. Min.*, XXVIII, 16
 - c. Macrobius, *Somn. Scip.*, II, 10, 11
 - d. *Corp. Gloss. Lat.*, IV, 65, 47; 511, 39; V, 262, 71; 291, 6
 - e. Boethius, *Comm. in Libr. Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, II, 7
 - f. Lucretius, VI, 722, 1109
2. Ethiopian type associated with *fuscus*
 - a. *Moretum*, 33
 - b. Propertius, IV, 6, 78

⁸ Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2; Theodectas, cited by Strabo, XV, 1, 24; Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Physicos*, I, 247, 249.

⁹ Arrian, *Anabasis*, V, 404; Aristotle, *Problemata*, X, 66.

¹⁰ VII, 70.

¹¹ *Aethiops* is used poetically by Horace (*Carm.*, III, 6, 14) for *Aegyptius*. For an example of the more normal usage, see *per Aegyptios et Aethiops* (Suetonius, *Cal.*, 57, 4).

¹² *Infra*, pp. 281-2. One characteristic of the Negro—the flat nose—noted by the Greeks does not appear in Roman descriptions of the type.

3. *Aethiops* associated with color (but uncertain from context whether *fuscus* or *niger* was intended)
 - a. Varro, *L. L.*, VIII, 38; 41; IX, 42 (*albus* and *Aethiops* contrasted)
 - b. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189; XXII, 2
 - c. Seneca, *De Ira*, III, 26, 3
 - d. Petronius, *Sat.*, 102
 - e. Juvenal, II, 23; VIII, 33 (*Aethiops* and *cycnus* contrasted)
 - f. Boethius, *Comm. in Libr. Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, II, 6 (*Aethiops* and *albus* contrasted); III, 9 (*Aethiops* and *candidus* contrasted)
 - g. Isidore, *Orig.*, XIV, 5, 14
 - h. Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, LXV, cols. 378-379 (letter of Fer-
randus to Fulgentius and Fulgentius' reply)

Afer

The *Moretum* passage, which contains the most detailed description of a Negro in Roman literature, uses *Afra* of a woman about whose racial identity there can be no doubt.¹³ This usage of *Afra* is evidence that *Afer*, which generally indicates African or Libyan origin,¹⁴ may refer also to a racial type that is unquestionably Negroid.¹⁵ The Roman application of *Afra* to a Negroid type raises the question of the extent to which Negro extraction is indicated by the cognomen *Afer*. In the light of the *Moretum* passage, it is not unlikely that *Afer* as a cognomen was used at times¹⁶ in the sense of Negro or Negroid.

The present study has little to add to the views which have been expressed concerning Terence's race.¹⁷ It seems to me, how-

¹³ 32.

¹⁴ Cf. S. Gsell, *Hist. Anc. de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, VII [1928]), pp. 2-8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7: "Le nom d'*Afri* fut quelquefois aussi attribué à tous les habitants du continent, Noirs comme Blancs, extension que n'avait pas reçue le terme *Afres*."

¹⁶ Apparently on the basis of such an interpretation, Della Corte describes *Helpis Afra* (*C.I.L.*, IV, 2993zy) as follows: "una donna, greca anche essa di nome, *Helpis*, ma negra di colore, se nel cognomen *Afer*, che ella reca, ne era consecrata, come io credo, la patria d'origine." Cf. M. Della Corte, "Case ed Abitanti a Pompei," *Riv. Indo-Greco-Italica*, VII (1923), p. 85). *Domitius Afer et al.*, however, are proof that the cognomen *Afer* by no means implies Negroid extraction.

¹⁷ M. Schanz and C. Hosius, *Gesch. d. röm. Lit.*, 1⁴ (1927), p. 103: "doch war er, nach dem Beinamen zu schliessen, kein Punier, sondern

ever, that earlier studies have not given sufficient emphasis to two points. Both *Afer* and *fuscus*, which appear in Suetonius' description of Terence,¹⁸ have an important anthropological significance when they are considered in the light of the *Moretum* passage. Particularly worthy of note is the fact that two words found in the key *Moretum* passage are applied to Terence. This combination of two words of anthropological significance should not be overlooked, especially when one of the words—*fuscus*—describes a feature which the Romans regarded as one of the Negro's most distinctive characteristics and used as an easy mark of identification.¹⁹ Since the Negroid type was rather well established in Carthage,²⁰ the possibility of Negro extraction cannot be excluded from a consideration of the question of Terence's race. Unless archaeology brings to light more ex-

gehörte einem afrischen (libyschen) Stamme an"; G. Norwood, *Plautus and Terence* (New York, 1932), p. 100: "He was a native of Africa (as his cognomen proves) and apparently a mulatto or a quadroon"; J. W. Duff, *A Literary History of Rome* (New York, 1932), p. 203: "His cognomen 'Afer' rather suggests that he belonged to some native tribe conquered by the Carthaginians"; T. Frank, "On Suetonius' Life of Terence," *A. J. P.*, LIV (1933), pp. 272-273: "it is not improbable that his mother was one of Hannibal's Italian captives . . . She may have been an Italic Greek, a Lucanian, a Campanian, or of some other Italic tribe . . . It is even possible that he was born of free Punic parents and kidnapped for the market"; E. K. Rand, *The Building of Eternal Rome* (Cambridge, 1943), p. 100: "His name, Publius Terentius Afer, suggests that he might have been of negro extraction. If so—it is not at all certain—he was a worthy predecessor of Alexander Dumas fils."

¹⁸ J. C. Rolfe (Loeb), II, pp. 452-463.

¹⁹ *Infra*, pp. 277-9.

²⁰ On Negro skulls in Carthaginian cemeteries, see M. Bertholon, "La Population et les Races en Tunisie," *Revue Générale des Sciences Pures et Appliquées*, VII (1896), pp. 972, 974; A. L. Delattre, "La Nécropole Punique de Douimes," *Le Cosmos*, XXXVI (1897), pp. 754-755. This evidence, together with North African mosaics representing Negroes (A. Ballu, "Fouilles Archéologiques d'Algérie en 1905," *Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques*, XXIV [1906], p. 209; F. G. Pachtere, "Les Nouvelles Fouilles d'Hippone," *Mélanges d'Archéologie et de l'École Française de Rome*, XXXI [1911], pp. 334-354), is sufficient evidence against Prescott's view (review of Norwood's *Plautus and Terence* in *C. J.*, XXVIII [1932], p. 215) that the races of Northern Africa were totally distinct from the Negroes of Central Africa.

amples of *Afer* associated either with the racial features described in the *Moretum* or with *fuscus* applied to a type unquestionably Negroid, nothing more definite can be said in this connection about Terence's race than that Terence might have been of Negroid extraction.²¹

Maurus and Indus

Vergil's reference²² to the Nile *usque coloratis amnis deveexus ab Indis* may attest merely the common ancient confusion between East and South,²³ and so there is no clear evidence that African Negroes were called by the Roman poets *Indi*, who, of course, were also of dark skin. On the other hand, the term *Maurus* occasionally does seem to be a poetical equivalent. Juvenal's phrase *nigri Mauri*²⁴ appears in a passage which alludes to the belief that the color of the Negro's skin was ominous.²⁵ Martial mentions a *retorto crine Maurus*.²⁶ The phrase *retorto crine* suggests the kinky or frizzly hair associated with the Negro. That the word *Maurus* by itself implies here the Negro or Negroid is perhaps not a necessary conclusion²⁷ but quite possible.

B. Skin-Color

The Romans, like many moderns, naturally used the color of the skin as an easy mark of identification for the Negroid type. This character was apparently uppermost in the Roman's mind as one of the distinctive features of the Negro, for, as Seneca²⁸ observed:

Non est Aethiopsis inter suos insignitus color . . .

The Roman's association of skin-color with the Negro is seen also in Ovid:²⁹

²¹ Cf. E. K. Rand, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

²² *Georgics*, IV, 293.

²³ See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hellenistische Litteratur im Zeitalter von Kallimachos* (Berlin, 1924), II, p. 70. *Niger Indus* (Martial, VII, 30, 4) has been interpreted as referring to Ethiopians. Cf. L. Friedlaender, *M. Valeri Martialis Epigrammaton Libri*, I (Leipzig, 1886), p. 489: "Hier wohl in dem weiteren Sinne zu verstehen, in welchem es auch Nubier und Aethiopier bezeichnet."

²⁴ V, 53-54.

²⁵ VI, 39, 6.

²⁶ *Infra*, p. 288.

²⁷ *Infra*, p. 282.

²⁸ *De Ira*, III, 26, 3.

²⁹ *Met.*, II, 235-236. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51; Petronius, *Sat.*,

Sanguine tum credunt in corpora summa vocato
Aethiopum populos nigrum traxisse colorem.

It is not surprising to find that the Romans employed a variety of expressions to denote the color of the Negro's skin, because the color of African Negroes varies widely and ranges from an intense black to a light yellow.³⁰ An examination of the Roman use of *niger*, *perniger*, *nigerrimus*, *fuscus*, *decolor*, and *rubens* reveals an accuracy based on keen observation and on an awareness of the same difficulties recognized by modern scientists. The various usages of these terms will now be critically examined.

Niger and Fuscus

The uses of *niger* and *fuscus* cited above prove that both these adjectives were used by the Romans to describe the skin-color of the *Aethiops*.³¹ That the Romans, however, did not always mean a Negro by the use of these adjectives is clear from the frequent use of *niger* and *fuscus* to describe peoples of various racial origins who were dark-complexioned.³² These two adjectives

102; and Lucretius, who, in two instances (VI, 722 and 1109), referred to *Aethiopes* as follows: . . . *nigra virum percuncto saecula colore*; Manilius, IV, 758-759; Apuleius, *Met.*, XI, 5; Isidore, *Orig.*, XIV, 5, 14; Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, LXV, cols. 378-379 (letter of Ferrandus to Fulgentius and Fulgentius' reply).

³⁰ J. H. Lewis, *The Biology of the Negro* (Chicago, 1942), p. 27.

³¹ This application of *niger* and *fuscus* has been noted by early students of the subject. Cf. T. R. Price, "The Color-System of Vergil," *A. J. P.*, IV (1883), p. 16; and H. Blümner, *Die Farbenbezeichnungen bei den römischen Dichtern* (*Berliner Studien für klassische Philologie und Archäologie*, XIII [1892], Heft 3), pp. 55-56, 98.

³² The uses of *niger* and *fuscus* to describe non-Negro people may be summarized as follows: (1) to designate the brown or blackish skin of non-European peoples; (2) to describe members of the white race whose skin, for any reason, becomes brown or darkish; cf. Blümner, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 98.

Niger

- (a) Sidonius, *Carm.*, V, 346—*bracchia Massylus iactaret nigra natator*
- (b) Ammianus, XXI, 16, 19—*subniger* [Constantius]
- (c) Ammianus, XXIII, 6, 75—*subnigri* [Persians]

Fuscus

- (a) Propertius, II, 33, 15—*fuscis Aegyptus alumnis*
- (b) Tibullus, II, 3, 55—*comites fusci quos India torret*
- (c) Ovid, *Fast.*, III, 493—*fuscae mihi* [Ariadne]
- (d) S. H. A., *Tyranni Triginta*, 30—*fusci coloris* [Zenobia]
- (e) Ammianus, XXII, 16, 23—*subfusculi* [Egyptians]

tives, therefore, were used by the Romans to designate not only the skin-color of the *Aethiopes* but also the dark complexion of various non-Negro people. It is also necessary, however, to determine to what extent *niger* and *fuscus*, when used alone, i. e., without *Aethiops*, designated the Negroid type.

1. *Niger* as the Equivalent of *Aethiops*

a. Memnon, legendary king of the Ethiopians, is referred to as *Memnonis Aethiopsis* in Catullus³³ and as *nigri Memnonis* in Ovid³⁴ and Vergil.³⁵ In other words, Ovid and Vergil use *niger* to describe a person regarded by the Romans as *Aethiops*. In the light of this evidence, there is little doubt that Ethiopians are described in the following:

nigra coloratus produceret agmina Memnon.³⁶

b. Lucretius is unquestionably writing of Ethiopians in these lines:

inter nigra virum percoccto saecula colore³⁷

and

usque ad nigra virum percoccto saecula colore.³⁸

c. Again, in the line:

Nigris Meroe fecunda colonis,³⁹

³³ 66, 52.

³⁴ *Am.*, I, 8, 3-4. Cf. Ovid, *Pont.*, III, 3, 96-97:

Memnonio cyncos esse colore putem
sed neque mutatur nigra pice lacteus humor,

and *Am.*, I, 13, 33-34:

. . . Quod erat tibi filius ater
materni fuerat pectoris ille color.

In support of the view that Memnon was sired by a Negro lover of Aurora, Fränkel cites Ovid, *Am.*, I, 13, 33-36 and III, 5, 43-44; cf. H. Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet between Two Worlds* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 14 and 178.

³⁵ *Aen.*, I, 489. Cf. Manilius, *Astron.*, I, 767: *Auroraeque nigrum partum*; Corippus, *Iohan.*, I, 186: *niger Memnon*. See also Blümner, *op. cit.*, pp. 43 and 55-56; and Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 7, "The practical Romans finally made Memnon an outright Ethiopian."

³⁶ Claudian, *De Cons. Stil.*, I, 265; cf. Claudian, *Carm. Min.*, XXVIII, 16.

³⁷ VI, 722; cf. Silius, III, 265.

³⁸ VI, 1109.

³⁹ Lucretius, X, 303. Cf. Propertius, IV, 6, 78: *Cepheam hic Meroen fuscaque regna canat*. See also Ausonius, XIX, 41, 9-19:

nigris is used in the sense of *Aethiopes* if we accept the opinion of scholars who hold that a strong Negroid element was present in the population of Meroe.⁴⁰

d. The use of *niger* to designate the Negroid type is found also in the following:

Rector Libyci niger caballi.⁴¹

e. A stone⁴² discovered at Rusicade (modern Philippeville) preserves the bust of a woman described by Bertrand as follows: "un buste de femme aux cheveux crépus, au nez épaté, aux lèvres épaisses, aux oreilles larges et écartées,⁴³ dont la tête, en un mot, accuse bien le type nègre." If Bertrand's interpretation⁴⁴ of the woman's name, i. e., Julia Nigra, is correct, this evidence is significant, because *Nigra* in this instance would certainly denote Ethiopian extraction.

et tu sic Meroe, non quod sis atra colore
ut quae Niliaca nascitur in Meroe.

There are only a few examples of *ater* as an epithet for Egyptians, Indians, and Negroes. *Niger* and *fuscus* are the more usual words; cf. Blümner, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁴⁰ For the presence of Negro blood in the Meroites, see C. T. Seltman, "Two Heads of Negresses," *A. J. A.*, XXIV (1920), pp. 21-22, "The indigenous population of the country was largely negroid and upon this was imposed in the reign of Psammetichus I a ruling caste of Egyptian warriors." Reliefs from Meroitic temples are proof to Seltman that Negroid characteristics were not rare among the inhabitants of Meroe. See also E. A. W. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1907), I, pp. 407, 411 and II, p. 135 for evidence of Negroid characteristics among the Meroitic rulers. Sayce, however, believes that certain monuments found at Meroe prove that the Ethiopians had no Negro blood in their veins (J. Garstang, A. H. Sayce, and F. Ll. Griffith, *Meroe: The City of the Ethiopians* [Oxford, 1911], p. 4).

⁴¹ Martial, XII, 24, 6; cf. Sidonius, *Carm.*, V, 53-54. See also Blümner, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁴² *C. I. L.*, VIII, 19888.

⁴³ M. L. Bertrand, *Bulletin de l'Académie d'Hippone: Comptes-Rendus des Réunions* (Bone, Algeria, 1892), p. L.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; R. Cagnat, however, says in his report (*Bulletin Archéologique du Comité des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques* [Paris, 1892], p. 495) that the end of the second line of the inscription is mutilated and suggests the reading: NICRO[SA].

f. The intense black, mentioned by Lewis,⁴⁵ was what Plautus and Frontinus were referring to in the former's description of a child's nurse (*ore et oculis pernigris*)⁴⁶ and in the latter's account of the black soldiers (*nigerrimi*)⁴⁷ who fought with the Carthaginians against Gelon of Syracuse.⁴⁸

2. *Fuscus* as the Equivalent of *Aethiops*

Fuscus, it is clear, usually indicated to the Roman a lighter hue than *niger*. Sidonius⁴⁹ observed

. . . sicuti, si vestiatur albo fuscus quisque fit nigrior . . .

Ovid⁵⁰ offers the following advice to lovers:

Nominibus mollire licet mala: fusca vocetur,
Nigrior Illyrica cui pice sanguis erit.

Although *fuscus*, as indicated above, is used to describe dark complexioned persons of varied racial origins, it was also applied by the Romans to persons of unquestionable Ethiopian extraction.

⁴⁵ J. H. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 27. See note 9 above for intense black associated by the Greek with the Ethiopian.

⁴⁶ *Poen.*, 1114. Blümner, *op. cit.*, p. 56 points out that in all cases *niger*, when used alone, refers only to the color of the skin and not to the hair. *Niger*, therefore, differs from adjectives such as *flavus*, *canus*, *rufus*, etc. in that it must be accompanied by *coma*, *crinis*, and the like if the color of the hair is to be indicated.

⁴⁷ *Strat.*, I, 11, 18. Cf. . . . *gens nigerrimae cutis de terra Aethiopiae, diota vulgariter Azopart*, from the *Historia Hierosolymitana* of Albertus Aquensis, VI, 41, in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux* (Paris, 1879), IV, 490. Perhaps in this same class of intense black belong the woman described by Martial in I, 115, 4-5 and the *Aegyptini* in Plautus, *Poen.*, 1291. (*Aegyptini* in *Poen.*, 1291 has been interpreted as the equivalent of *Aethiopes*; cf. Paulus ex Fest. [K. O. Müller's edition], p. 28; P. Nixon, *Plautus*, Loeb, IV, p. 131; G. E. Duckworth, *The Complete Roman Drama* [New York, 1942], I, p. 777.)

⁴⁸ The presence of Negroes in Sicily is also attested by the discovery of an archaic mask, portraying vividly the thick lips, flat nose, and short curly hair of a Negro; cf. *Illustrated London News*, CLXXVIII (1931), p. 959 for photographs and descriptions of this mask.

⁴⁹ *Ep.*, II, 10, 4.

⁵⁰ *A. A.*, II, 657-658. Cf. *Rem. Am.*, 327; Martial, IV, 62; VII, 13; Lucretius, IV, 1160.

Fuscus is applied in the *Moretum*⁵¹ to the skin of Scybale, about whose racial identity there can be no doubt, because mention is also made of her kinky hair, thick lips, etc. *Fuscus* was also applied to *Aethiopes* in the following:

Cepheam hic Meroen fuscaque regna canat.⁵²

3. Summary of the Uses of *Niger* and *Fuscus* in the Sense of *Aethiops*

An examination of the usages of *niger* and *fuscus*, therefore, reveals that both of these adjectives, even in the absence of *Aethiops*, were used at times by the Romans to denote the Ethiopian type. In all of the cases cited above, it is certain that Ethiopians were meant, because such an interpretation was supported either by the context or by archaeological evidence.

The Roman usage of *fuscus*, *niger*, *perniger*, and *nigerrimus*, together with *decolor* and *rubens*,⁵³ is in keeping with the practices of modern anthropologists. According to modern descriptions, the color of the True Negro's skin is very black; the Bantu's varies from black to yellowish-brown, the prevalent color being a dark chocolate with a basic reddish tint; the Pygmy's is reddish, yellow-brown, or very dark.⁵⁴ Also, there is no inconsistency in the fact that these adjectives were used to describe the skin-color of both Negroes and non-Negroes, for the skin-color of certain Negroes and Mediterraneans is often of approximately the same hue. Further, if modern scientists experience difficulty in describing accurately the color of the skin, allowance must be made in considering Roman usage.⁵⁵

⁵¹ 33.

⁵² Propertius, IV, 6, 78.

⁵³ *Infra*, pp. 280-1.

⁵⁴ Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21. Cf. T. R. Price, *loc. cit.*, p. 16, who, on the basis of an examination of Vergil's color-system, states that *fuscus* indicates a blackness approached through red and brown, with the Negro's complexion as the physical standard. Similarly, he refers to *niger* as "blackness approached through red (negro)."

⁵⁵ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 29. "Anthropologists experience difficulty in accurately describing the various colors met with in human skins." The Roman attempt to differentiate at times more precisely between the skin-

These additional conclusions may also be drawn from the evidence: (a) Whenever *niger* and *fuscus* are accompanied by other significant data, especially anthropological details cited in the passages quoted above, there is little doubt that the Romans were referring to the Negroid type; (b) since these adjectives, especially *niger*, are the adjectives most commonly used to describe the skin-color of the *Aethiopes*, it may with some confidence be claimed that *niger* and *fuscus*, even in the absence of other evidence, at times indicate Ethiopian extraction.⁵⁶

The following inscription from a Pompeian *lupanar* should be examined in this connection:

candida me docuit nigras odisse puellas
odero si potero, sed non invitus amabo.⁵⁷

Candidus is frequently used in Latin literature to denote fair complexion or beauty and, of course, might be used in such a sense in this passage. In one of the important anthropological descriptions cited above, however, the scientist Pliny, after describing the skin of the Ethiopian burnt by the sun and his frizzly hair, contrasts him with the Northerners whose skin he refers to as *candida atque glaciali cute*.⁵⁸ Therefore, although *candida* might mean "fair" and *niger* "dark" in the Pompeian inscription, the fact that the Roman scientist contrasted the terms *candidus* and *Aethiops* admits the possibility that *nigras*

color of Negroes and non-Negroes is seen in the following instances: Ammianus, XXII, 16, 23, *subfusculi* of Egyptians and XXIII, 6, 75, *subnigri* of Persians.

⁵⁶ This is not a rash assumption in the light of the evidence which indicates that the color of the Negro's skin was regarded by both the Greek and the Roman as a simple means of identification. See *supra*, pp. 273 ff. and the following medieval usage of *niger* to indicate the Ethiopians in the army of Saladin: *gens . . . nigro colore*. Cf. *Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, edited by W. Stubbs (London, 1864), I, p. 83 and P. Meyer, "Les Achoparts," *Romania*, VII (1878), p. 440.

⁵⁷ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1520; E. Breton, *Pompeia Décrite et Dessinée* (Paris, 1855), p. 286; P. Gusman, *Pompei, la Ville, les Mœurs, les Arts* (Paris, 1900), p. 56. For other examples of Negroes in Pompeii, see references cited on p. 286 under Actor, Balneator, Charioteer, etc. Cf. also R. S. Lull, *Organic Evolution* (New York), p. 413.

⁵⁸ Blümner, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

designates *Aethiopes* in this case.⁵⁹ In fact, Gusman translates *nigras* as *noires*.⁶⁰

In the light of the evidence above, it is possible that Negroes were described in at least some of the following instances:

- a. et Maecenati, Maro cum cantaret Alexin
nota tamen Marsi fusca Melaenis erat⁶¹

The combination of *fusca* and *Melaenis* is particularly significant.

- b. nigra melichrus est . . .⁶²
- c. sic quae nigrior est cadente moro
cerussata sibi placet Lycoris⁶³
- d. Digna tuo cur sis indignaque nomine dicam
frigida es et nigra es: non es et es Chione⁶⁴

Decolor

Decolor, a word used to describe the skin-color of the people of India and Mauretania, was also applied by the Romans to the offspring of an Ethiopian father and a white mother. Juvenal speaks of a *decolor heres*,⁶⁵ who is the child of such a union.

⁵⁹ *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189; cf. Boethius, *Comm. in Libro Aristotelis περὶ ἐμπυελas*, II, 7 (*Gallus* . . . *candidus* and *Aethiops nigerrimus*), and III, 9. See also S. Gsell, *op. cit.*, I³, p. 299, note 5: "L'antithèse entre 'blancs' et 'Éthiopiens' est classique." Cf. also the contrast in Claudius Ptolemy, *Tetrabiblos*, II, 2: μέλας τὰ σώματα . . . λευκοί τε τὰ χρώματα . . . , as well as the numerous Janiform objects which contrasted white and Negroid types, Beardsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-30, especially p. 31, "All the vases show a desire for effective contrast. The hair was left dull in order to emphasize the shiny black skin. On the Janiform vases the severe white face is introduced for sharp contrast."

⁶⁰ P. Gusman, *op. cit.*, p. 67: "une blanche jeune fille m'a appris à détester les noires." *Niger* and *candidus* in Vergil, *Ecl.*, II, 16 have been interpreted as "dark" and "fair." Cf. Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 118 and E. L. Highbarger, "Notes on Vergil's *Bucolics*," *Class. Phil.*, XL (1945), p. 45. However, there is considerable evidence for the presence of the *Aethiops* in Campania, which, of course, was well known to Vergil.

⁶¹ Martial, VII, 29, 7-8.

⁶² Lucretius, IV, 1160; W. H. D. Rouse translates this "The black girl is a nut-brown maid . . ." (Loeb, p. 331); cf. Ovid, *A. A.*, II, 657-658; *Rem. Am.*, 327.

⁶³ Martial, I, 72, 5-6.

⁶⁴ *Id.*, III, 34.

⁶⁵ VI, 600.

A similar use of the word *discolor* is found in Claudian.⁶⁶ The Roman usage of this word indicates that a child born of Ethiopian and white parents resembles in color the people of India and Mauretania to whom *decolor* is generally applied.⁶⁷ In other words, such a Black-White cross is neither *niger* nor *fuscus* but *decolor*. Mulatto might be a good word to use in translating *decolor* in instances where it refers to Black-White crosses.⁶⁸

Rubens

Though I found only one instance of *rubens*⁶⁹ applied to Ethiopians, I include it because it reveals the accuracy of the Roman's knowledge of the Ethiopian type. Negroes of a red, copper-colored complexion are known among African tribes.⁷⁰

C. The Form of the Hair

The form of the hair is regarded by anthropologists as a very important characteristic in the classification of the Negroid type. The ancient descriptions of the Negroid hair correspond very remarkably to the modern terms "kinky" or "frizzly." The following instances should be noted:

- a. *torta comam* (kinky)⁷¹
- b. *torta caput* (kinky)⁷²
- c. *capillo vibrato* (frizzly)⁷³
- d. *tortis crinibus* (kinky)⁷⁴
- e. *Aethiopes capillati* (long-haired)⁷⁵
- f. *retorto crine* (kinky)⁷⁶

⁶⁶ *Bell. Gild.*, I, 192-193, *discolor infans*.

⁶⁷ Ovid, *Trist.*, V, 324, *decolor Indus*; *Met.*, IV, 21, *decolor . . . India*; Propertius, IV, 3, 10, *decolor Indus*; Lucan, IV, 678-679, *tum concolor Indo Maurus*.

⁶⁸ Mrs. Beardsley (*op. cit.*, p. 118), in my judgment, is wrong in regarding *decolor* as synonymous with *Aethiops*. Cf. L. Friedlaender, *D. Junii Juvenalis Saturarum Libri V* (Leipzig, 1895), p. 356.

⁶⁹ Statius, *Theb.*, V, 427.

⁷⁰ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 27. To the Romans, *rubens* indicated the color of the crab when cooked. Cf. Vergil, *Georg.*, IV, 47-48: . . . *neve rubentis ure foco caneros . . .*

⁷¹ *Moretum*, 33.

⁷⁴ Martial, *De Spect.*, 3, 10.

⁷² Lucan, X, 132.

⁷⁵ Petronius, 34.

⁷³ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189.

⁷⁶ Martial, VI, 39, 6.

In the first four cases, the references are clearly to the full-blooded Negro, whose woolly or frizzly hair often evoked comment among the Romans.⁷⁷ The other two instances, however, may be explained in several ways. For the phrase *Aethiopes capillati* (long-haired) some commentators have excogitated fanciful explanations.⁷⁸ Since Petronius mentions *Aethiopes* without the qualifying adjective *capillati* in a passage where full-blooded Negroes are meant, an attempt must be made to explain the word *capillati* as applying in this instance to Negroes. Since a late writer like Petronius would hardly be referring to the eastern "Ethiopian" whose hair was straight,⁷⁹ Waters⁸⁰ was probably near the truth in regarding the term *capillati* as indicating that these servants were not full-blooded Africans. That is, they were Negroes with hair not generally associated with the Negro, and, consequently, worthy of note.⁸¹ Conversely Martial mentions a *retorto crine Maurus*.⁸² If in this case Martial is not using the word *Maurus* loosely, the phrase *retorto crine Maurus* may indicate the descendant of a Negro-White cross, i. e., one with the skin-color of a *Maurus* and the hair of an *Aethiops*.

II. PROVENIENCE OF NEGRO SLAVES IN ITALY.

That most of the Negroes arrived in Italy as slaves is evident from the literary references to Ethiopian servants. The existence of well-established commercial relations between Italy and Africa would naturally point to certain African cities as the sources from which the Romans imported Negro slaves.⁸³ The most

⁷⁷ Cf. Petronius, 102: *Numquid et crines calamistro convertere?*

⁷⁸ E. g., W. B. Sedgwick, *The Cena Trimalchionis of Petronius* (Oxford, 1939), p. 94. "Ethiopians never have long hair; so these must be ordinary slaves, dressed as Negroes."

⁷⁹ Herodotus, VII, 70.

⁸⁰ W. E. Waters, *Cena Trimalchionis* (Boston, 1902), p. 70.

⁸¹ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 62 "... it is commonly observed that descendants of Negro-White crosses may be dark and yet have the straight hair of the white"

⁸² VI, 39, 6.

⁸³ For discussions of this point, see M. Bang, "Die Herkunft der römischen Sklaven," *Röm. Mitt.*, XXV (1910), p. 248; L. C. West, "Phases of Commercial Life in Roman Egypt," *J. R. S.*, VII (1917), p. 54; Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 116; W. L. Westermann, "Sklaverei," Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, Supplementband VI (1935), cols. 1004-1005.

likely sources were Egypt and North African cities situated near the terminals of important caravan routes. The Negro had long been a familiar type in Egypt, whither he had been brought from the South by way of the Red Sea or the Nile River. Even Negroes identical with types found in central Africa appeared in Alexandria.⁸⁴ Carthage, where, too, the Negro was known in classical times, was apparently supplied with slaves brought from inner Africa along caravan routes.⁸⁵ It is also possible that the Roman campaign against the Ethiopians in 23 B. C. provided the Romans with immediate opportunities to traffic in Negro slaves.⁸⁶

III. THE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN CLASSICAL ITALY.

The earliest mention of the Negroid type in Roman literature occurs in Plautus' description of a nurse.⁸⁷ In the *Eunuchus* of Terence an Ethiopian slave girl is one of two valuable gifts which Parmeno has brought Thais.⁸⁸ One hundred Negro hunts-

⁸⁴ I. Noshy, *The Arts in Ptolemaic Egypt* (London, 1937), p. 98.

⁸⁵ For Negro element in the population of Carthage, see S. Gsell, *op. cit.*, I², p. 302; cf. O. Bates, *The Eastern Libyans* (London, 1914), pp. 44-45 for Negroid traits in African peoples. Kairwan, not far from Carthage and Tunis, is an important caravan terminus; cf. E. W. Bovill, *Caravans of the Old Sahara* (Oxford University Press, 1933), map opposite pp. 246-247; cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), p. 66 (= Italian edition, p. 74).

⁸⁶ To check the Ethiopians, who under the leadership of the queen of Ethiopia had advanced into Egypt as far as Elephantine, Gaius Petronius, praefect of Egypt, marched south in 23 B. C., wrested from the Ethiopians Pselchis, an Egyptian town that had fallen into their hands, captured several Ethiopian towns, and destroyed Napata, the second city of the Ethiopian kingdom; cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VI, 181; Cassius Dio, LIV, 5, 4; Strabo, XVII, 1, 54. Neugebauer argues that this campaign inspired the bronze of a Negro in Berlin. Cf. K. A. Neugebauer, "Aus der Werkstatt eines griechischen Toreuten in Ägypten," in *Schumacher-Festschrift* (Römisch-Germanischen Zentral-Museums in Mainz, 1930), p. 236 and plate 23. For the relations between Rome and the Meroitic kingdom see M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Storia economica e sociale dell' impero Romano* (Florence, 1933), pp. 351-360 and the literature there cited.

⁸⁷ *Poen.*, 1114, *ore et oculis pernigris*. The Negroid type was well known in Carthage; cf. note 20, *supra*.

⁸⁸ *Eun.*, 165-167. Since these comedies were based on Greek originals, these two references (*Poen.*, 1114 and *Eun.*, 165-167) are not in themselves evidence that Plautus and Terence were referring to Negroes on

men, together with the same number of Numidian bears, were presented in the Circus by Domitius Ahenobarbus as curule aedile in 61 B. C.⁸⁰ To the Republican period also belongs the servant described as *Aethiops qui ad balneas veniet*.⁹⁰

The Negro appears more frequently in the literature of the Empire than in Republican literature. This is not surprising in the light of increased Roman activity in the North African provinces during the Empire.

Scybale, whose racial features are so realistically described, was without doubt a type with which the author of the *Moretum*⁹¹ was well acquainted. Increased interest in the Negro, possibly because he was beginning to appear in Italy in greater numbers, may account for the fact that the most detailed anthropological descriptions of the Negro date from the early Empire, i. e., *Moretum*, Pliny the Elder, and Petronius. Seneca⁹² tells us that among his own people the Negro's color is not noticeable. Ethiopian servants are mentioned twice in Petronius.⁹³ During the principate of Tiberius two Ethiopians carried the draped bier of a famed talking raven.⁹⁴ Ethiopians were among those

Italian soil. It is not unlikely, however, that Negroes were present in Italy at the time Plautus and Terence wrote their comedies. The Roman contact with the Carthaginians during and after the Hannibalic war may have resulted in the introduction of some Negroes into Italy. It is interesting in this connection to note the bronze coins with the head of a Negro, and one of Hannibal's elephants on the reverse. (For Negroes as drivers of elephants, see the terracotta from Pompeii, *Röm. Mitt.*, XIII [1898], pp. 19-20; Achilles Tatius, IV, 4, 6, and Juvenal, X, 150. For Negroes as elephant-fighters and elephant-hunters, see Diodorus, III, 26-27.) C. T. Seltman (*Greek Coins: A History of Metallic Currency and Coinage Down to the Fall of the Hellenistic Kingdoms* [London, 1933], p. 250) suggests that these bronze coins, minted in Etruria, may have been among the coins which were supplied by Hannibal's allies in Italy. These coins, when considered in the light of the use made of Negro auxiliaries in the Mediterranean (cf. note 102, *infra*), may be evidence that Hannibal's forces included some Negroes. After the war, the Romans no doubt imported slaves from Carthage. Terence himself had been a slave from Carthage.

⁸⁰ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VIII, 131. Mrs. Beardsley's statement (*op. cit.*, p. 120) that Pliny the Elder mentions no Ethiopians at Rome overlooks this reference, as well as X, 122.

⁹⁰ *Ad Her.*, IV, 50, 63.

⁹¹ 31-35.

⁹² *De Ira*, III, 26, 3.

⁹³ *Sat.*, 35 and 102.

⁹⁴ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, X, 122.

who enacted scenes from the lower world at nocturnal performances under Caligula.⁹⁵ During a gladiatorial exhibition which Nero gave to entertain Tiridates, only Ethiopians—men, women, and children—entered the theater at Puteoli.⁹⁶ Negro dancers are known also from a figure found in Campania.⁹⁷ To approximately the same period belong the Negro participants in the worship of Isis.⁹⁸

Juvenal writes of Negroes several times;⁹⁹ likewise his contemporary Martial. Since Martial was a rather accurate observer of the passing scene, we may safely assume that Negroes were not uncommon in the Empire. *Tortis crinibus Aethiopes* were present at the opening of the Colosseum in sufficient numbers to have attracted the attention of the poet.¹⁰⁰ In addition to the references cited elsewhere in this paper, Martial mentions also a *tristi Aethiope*.¹⁰¹ A Negro soldier, renowned for his wit, was among the troops of Septimius Severus in Britain.¹⁰² Elagabalus' friends were forced to spend the night *cum Aethiopibus aniculis*.¹⁰³

Although statistics are not available, the frequent mention of Negroes by Martial in his panoramic view of the Empire, together with the other evidence presented in this paper, suggests that the Negroid element in the Roman population may have

⁹⁵ Suetonius, *Cal.*, 57, 4.

⁹⁶ Cassius Dio, *Epit.*, LXII, 3, 1.

⁹⁷ H. Roux and M. L. Barré, *Herculanum et Pompéi, Recueil Général des Peintures, Bronzes, etc.*, VI (Paris, 1870), pl. 104.

⁹⁸ *Infra*, pp. 286-7.

⁹⁹ II, 23; VI, 600; VIII, 33.

¹⁰⁰ Martial, *De Spect.*, 3, 10.

¹⁰¹ VII, 87, 2.

¹⁰² S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5. Negroes had been used as auxiliaries by the Minoans and Persians; cf. A. Evans, *The Palace of Minos* (London, 1921), I, p. 302; II (1928), part II, pp. 755-757 and plate XIII; Herodotus, VII, 69-70. The use of Negroes as soldiers by other Mediterranean peoples is seen also in Ammianus, XXIX, 5, 37 and in Frontinus, *Strat.*, I, 11, 18. A terracotta figurine of a Negro or Negroid warrior (date uncertain) appears in M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic Empire*, II (Oxford, 1941), plate CI and commentary on page 900. On the equipment of the Negro Soldier, see A. D. Fraser, "The Panoply of the Ethiopian Warrior," *A. J. A.*, XXXIX (1935), pp. 35-45 and plates VII-XI.

¹⁰³ S. H. A., *Elagabalus*, 32, 5, 6.

been larger than is generally recognized.¹⁰⁴ At any rate, it is reasonable to assume that Negroes were more common on the streets of Rome and in Italy during the Empire than they had been in Republican Rome.

The rôle the Negro played in the daily life of the Romans is indicated by the following activities in which he engaged.

ACTOR, DANCER, AND ACROBAT—Suetonius, *Cal.*, 57, 4; H. Roux and M. L. Barré, *Herculanum et Pompéi, Recueil Général des Peintures, Bronzes, Mosaïques, etc.*, VI (Paris, 1870), pl. 104, and pp. 199-200

BALNEATOR—*Ad Her.*, IV, 50, 63; Martial, VII, 35; A. Maiuri, *La Casa del Menandro e Il suo Tesoro di Argenteria* (Rome, La Libreria dello Stato, I, 1933), pp. 146-148 and p. 224; S. Reinach, *Répertoire des Peintures Grecques et Romaines* (Paris, 1922), p. 250, no. 11

BOOTBLACK—S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la Statuaire Grecque et Romaine* (Paris, 1904), III, p. 158, no. 3

CHARIOTEER—F. and F. Niccolini, *Le Case ed i Monumenti di Pompei* (Naples, 1896), IV, p. 1 and pl. III; *Anthol. Lat.* (A. Reise's edition), no. 293

COOK—Scybalæ, *Moretum*, 31. See also Martial (ed. Lindsay), VI, 39, 6, where *co<c>i Santrae* is a simple and convincing emendation

DIVER—S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la Statuaire Grecque et Romaine* (Paris, 1904), III, p. 158, no. 6; H. B. Walters, *Catalogue of the Bronzes, Greek, Roman, and Etruscan in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities* (London, 1899), p. 269, nos. 1674, 1675; cf. Beardsley, *op. cit.*, nos. 269-273

PUGILIST—Nicaeus, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51

SERVANTS OF VARIOUS SORTS—Terence, *Eun.*, 165-167; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, X, 122; Petronius, *Sat.*, 35

SOLDIER—S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5; cf. *supra*

VENATOR—Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VIII, 131

IV. THE RELIGION OF THE NEGRO.

In Italy Negroes participated in the worship of Isis. A wall-painting¹⁰⁵ from Herculaneum shows a Negro among the

¹⁰⁴ E. g., R. H. Barrow, *Slavery in the Roman Empire* (New York, 1928), pp. 15-21, 208-229; A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1928), pp. 1-11.

¹⁰⁵ P. Gusman, *Pompeii: The City, Its Life and Art*, translated by

devotees of Isis. The dancing of the Negro suggests in many ways certain dances of native African tribes. The blacks represented in another part of the ceremony have been identified as attendants of the priests.¹⁰⁶ These attendants apparently belonged to the same class of *linigeri calvi* as the mulatto priest of Isis from Athens, who, according to Poulsen, represented an inferior priestly order which wore linen robes extending from the armpits to the feet.¹⁰⁷ At least three of the blacks in the Herculaneum fresco are dressed in this type of garment which distinguishes them clearly from the other priests whose robes extend from the shoulders to the feet. Since many Negroes in Africa were followers of the Isis-cult,¹⁰⁸ it is probable that some of the Negro worshippers were initiated into the cult in their native country and continued their associations with the goddess after they had been transported to Italy.

V. THE ROMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEGRO.

The Negro in ancient Rome, it would appear, fared no differently from slaves of other racial origins. A black soldier who served in the Roman army had a wide reputation for his wit—*celebratorum semper iocorum*.¹⁰⁹ The black man made his contribution to the entertainment of the ancient world, as actor, acrobat, boxer, charioteer, or *venator*. The one hundred *venatores*

F. Simonds and M. Jourdain (London, 1900), p. 79; A. Mau, *Pompeii: Its Life and Art*, translated by F. W. Kelsey (New York, 1907), pp. 177-179.

¹⁰⁶ M. Rostovtzeff, *A History of the Ancient World*, II (Rome) (Oxford, reprint 1938), plate XC, no. 2, and commentary on p. 342.

¹⁰⁷ F. Poulsen, "Tête de Prêtre d'Isis Trouvée à Athènes," *Mélanges Holleaux* (Paris, 1913), plate VI and 221.

¹⁰⁸ Apuleius, *Met.*, XI, 5; Diodorus Siculus, III, 9, 2. Cf. Juvenal, VI, 526-529. Cf. A. Erman, *A Handbook of Egyptian Religion*, translated by A. S. Griffith (London, 1907), p. 201. According to Erman, Isis and Osiris attained the highest rank among the Nubians, who preferred to continue the worship of Isis long after the Christian religion had triumphed in Egypt. Two great columnar statues of an Ethiopian queen were found in a temple of Isis at Meroe; cf. C. T. Seltman, *A. J. A.*, XXIV (1920), p. 23; E. A. W. Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan*, I, p. 407, for a king of distinctly Negroid characteristics, behind whom is a figure of Isis.

¹⁰⁹ S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5.

imported by Domitius Ahenobarbus, no doubt, won the plaudits of those present at the circus.¹¹⁰ One charioteer was preserved in marble.¹¹¹ The boxer Nicaeus was described as *nobilis pycta*.¹¹² The devoted Scybale and others of her sort probably won the affection of their masters.¹¹³

There was a belief in certain circles among the Romans that the color of the Negro's skin was ominous. Roman historians, in recounting the omens presaging disaster, observed that ill-starred individuals were known to have seen a Negro just before their misfortune.¹¹⁴ The existence of this superstition, however, apparently did not prevent certain Romans from association with persons whose skin was dark or black.¹¹⁵

There was no color bar. The Roman, scientist and layman alike, thought in no terms of contempt or of "racial purity" in his observations on the Negro. Like the Syrian, the Greek, and others of slave origin, the Negro was brought to Rome; he worked in the household, or in the *thermae*, or for the municipality; he provided entertainment for the populace;¹¹⁶ he worshipped the same gods, at the same place of worship, together with the other slaves and freedmen;¹¹⁷ his blood was interfused with that of other peoples.¹¹⁸ Among the Romans as among the Greeks,¹¹⁹ there was apparently no trace of "color-prejudice."¹²⁰

¹¹⁰ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VIII, 131.

¹¹¹ F. and F. Niccolini, *op. cit.*, p. 1 and pl. III.

¹¹² Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51.

¹¹³ *Moretum*, 31.

¹¹⁴ Appian, *B. C.*, IV, 134; Florus, II, 17, 7-8; Plutarch, *Brut.*, 48 (all three of these refer to the same incident); S. H. A., *Septimius Severus*, 22, 4-5; and perhaps Juvenal, V, 53-54, if Juvenal is using *nigri Mauri* to designate an *Aethiops*. Line 54 may be evidence, however, that the skin-color not only of *Aethiopes* but also of *Mauri* was considered ominous.

¹¹⁵ *Supra*, pp. 283-7 and *infra*, pp. 290-2.

¹¹⁶ *Supra*, p. 286. It is interesting to note references in medieval French literature to the entertainment provided by Negro acrobats, tumblers, leapers, etc.; cf. E. C. Armstrong, "Old-French *Açopart*, 'Ethiopian,'" *Modern Philology*, XXXVIII (1941), pp. 246-250.

¹¹⁷ *Supra*, pp. 286-7.

¹¹⁸ *Infra*, pp. 290-2.

¹¹⁹ Cf. A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth* (ed. 5, Oxford, 1931), p. 323, "The Greeks thought negroes very interesting looking people and were amused at their wooly hair, but they show no trace of 'color-prejudice'." See also W. L. Westermann, "Slavery and the Elements of Freedom," *Quarterly Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, I (1943), p. 346.

¹²⁰ Mrs. Beardsley (*op. cit.*, pp. 119-120), in my judgment, is wrong in

'Herodes Atticus, although Greek, was a most influential member of the international aristocracy of the second century after Christ, a *consularis* and a relative of a great Italian family.

her conclusion that the Roman attitude toward the Negro crystallized into racial feeling. In support of her view that the Romans referred to the Ethiopians at Rome in a superior and contemptuous tone, Mrs. Beardsley includes the following passages: (1) Cicero, *Red. in Sen.*, 6, 14 (cited incorrectly as *De Sen.*, 6); (2) Martial, VI, 39, 6; (3) Juvenal, II, 23. Cicero, *Red. in Sen.*, 6, 14: . . . *cum hoc homine an stipite Aethiope* . . . , as Mrs. Beardsley admits, does not appear in all the manuscripts and is omitted in the best established texts. A consideration of the context leads me to believe that the editors (Oxford, Teubner, Loeb) are right in rejecting *Aethiope* or *stipite Aethiope* and in reading *stipite*. Nevertheless, the appearance of the variant indicates that the author of the reading used *Aethiopé* in a derogatory sense. (It is possible that the pejorative meaning of *aethiops* was a medieval development. Cf. E. C. Armstrong, *loc. cit.*, p. 244, note 7.) An entirely different view of the race, however, is found in one of the detailed anthropological descriptions in which Ethiopians are referred to as "sapientes" (Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, II, 189). In this passage Pliny is no doubt recording the view of the Ethiopians found in several Greek authors, e. g. Diodorus, III, 2, 1-4, who speaks highly of the civilized Ethiopians who inhabited Meroe and the land adjoining Egypt, and Lucian, *De Astrologia*, 3. I can see no "unmistakable contempt of the woolly hair" (Beardsley, *op. cit.*, p. 119) in Martial, VI, 39, 6. The poet's *retorto crine Maurus* merely describes a racial type as does his *tortis crinibus Aethiopes* (*De Spect.*, 3, 10). Juvenal in his second satire is talking about moralists without morals. After illustrating his point by saying that those who denounce evil then practice vice, he continues:

loripedem rectus derideat, Aethiopem albus,
quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione queres?

I doubt whether the context justifies Mrs. Beardsley's conclusion (*op. cit.*, p. 120) that in these words—*derideat Aethiopem albus*—Juvenal sums up the racial feeling in Rome. Juvenal's attitude toward Greeks and Orientals certainly suggests that the poet, had he been disposed, would have spoken against Negroes more caustically and explicitly than he does here or elsewhere. The attitude of the Romans towards persons described by the adjectives *fuscus* or *niger* (whether persons so described were Negroid or not) apparently varied with the individual. Ovid (*A. A.*, III, 269-270) has some advice on this matter for the ladies:

Pallida purpureis spargat sua corpora virgis,
Nigrior ad Pharii confuge piscis opem.

A.

Passages which suggest the desirability of a "candidus" type:

Among the three students whom he treated as sons¹²¹ was the Ethiopian called Memnon.¹²²

VI. RACE MIXTURE OF WHITES AND BLACKS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

Roman authors tell us that race mixture in the Roman Empire was not uncommon, a view that has found acceptance among scholars.¹²³ It is worth examining the evidence to determine to what extent the Negroes of the Empire were involved in this mingling of peoples. Crossings between the Mediterranean races and Negroes have been long recognized.¹²⁴ Further, as to the question of Negroid strains in Europe, Hooton¹²⁵ states that there is no evidence for "the presence of any considerable number of pure Negroes in Europe either in prehistoric or in historic times, although there is no question of minor Negroid strains being present in many of the Mediterranean race peoples." The amount of mixture between Blacks and Whites in Roman Italy can be estimated to some degree by a consideration of the literary and archaeological evidence.

No color bar existed in the Roman Empire and no laws prohibited unions of Blacks and Whites. Crossings between Whites and Blacks were evidently frequent enough in the Empire for the satirists to find in references to them a source of amuse-

(a) Lucretius, IV, 1160

(b) Ovid, *A. A.*, II, 657-658; *Rem. Am.*, 327; Martial, I, 72, 5-6; IV, 62; VII, 13

B.

Passages which suggest the desirability of a "niger" or "fuscus" type

(a) Vergil, *Ecl.*, II, 16-18; X, 38-39

(b) Martial, I, 115, 4-5; VII, 29, 7-8.

¹²¹ Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.*, II, 1, 10.

¹²² See P. Graindor, *Un milliardaire antique Hérode Atticus et sa famille* (Cairo, 1930), pp. 114-116 (= *Université Egyptienne, Recueil de Travaux publiés par la Faculté des Lettres*, V).

¹²³ T. Frank, "Race Mixture in the Roman Empire," *A. H. R.*, XXI (1915), pp. 689-708.

¹²⁴ Hooton, *op. cit.*, p. 524.

¹²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 542.

ment for the Roman public.¹²⁶ Martial¹²⁷ in an epigram on adultery mentions black children among the offspring. Juvenal¹²⁸ implies that mulattoes would be more common were it not for the practice of abortion. *Aethiopes capillati* and *retorto crine Maurus*¹²⁹ have been mentioned in another connection. Additional proof for the existence of intermixture between Blacks and Whites is found in Calpurnius Flaccus,¹³⁰ a *rhetor* of the Empire, whose *declamatio*, "Natus Aethiopus," considers this question: Is a white mother to whom a black child is born guilty of adultery? St. Jerome states that Quintilian had defended a matron, charged with adultery for having given birth to an Ethiopian, on the basis of maternal impression.¹³¹ The mulatto offspring, therefore, was a subject for comment and discussion not only among the satirists. Pliny the Elder illustrates the transmission of physical characteristics by the following observation on the skin-color of descendants of Black-White crosses:

indubitatum exemplum est Nicaei nobilis pyctae Byzanti geniti qui adulterio Aethiopis nata matre nihil a ceteris colore differente ipse avum regeneravit Aethiopem.¹³²

An examination of the evidence which points to a not infrequent intermixture of Blacks and Whites reveals none of the modern strictures on such racial crossings. Martial and Juvenal

¹²⁶ The representations of Negroes as ithyphallic should be noted in this connection. Cf. A. Maiuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-148 and S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la Statuaire Grecque et Romaine* (Paris, 1898), II, part 2, p. 563, no. 6. It is interesting to note a similar view of the Negro male in the United States; cf. J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, 1937), pp. 160-161.

¹²⁷ VI, 39, 6-7, and 18. Mrs. Beardsley (*op. cit.*, p. 120) considers this and the following reference as "probably the exaggeration of isolated incidents into an accusation against the times after the manner of the satirist." Satirists, however, properly handled, may be used as valuable sources of information on *mores*. Further, although Juvenal tended to exaggerate, Martial as a general rule saw things as they were.

¹²⁸ VI, 595-601.

¹²⁹ *Supra*, pp. 281-2.

¹³⁰ *Decl.*, 2.

¹³¹ *Liber Hebraicarum Questionum in Genesin*, Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, XXIII, p. 985.

¹³² *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51 (see also nos. 261, 283 in Beardsley and L. D. Caskey, *Catalogue of Greek and Roman Sculpture* [Cambridge, 1925], no. 127 and pp. 215-216, for busts which suggest Black-White crosses).

condemn adultery when a mulatto child is evidence of such illicit relations but say nothing of racial purity. The Roman scientist Pliny,¹³³ like Aristotle¹³⁴ and Plutarch,¹³⁵ comments on the racial characteristics of second and third generation Black-White crosses as a scientist and gives no indication of modern concepts of "racial purity."

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¹³³ *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 51.

¹³⁴ *De Gen. Animal.*, I, 18.

¹³⁵ *De Sera Numinis Vindicta*, 21. Similarly, if Fränkel's conjecture (*op. cit.*, pp. 14 and 178) is correct, Ovid, too, says that the black child is evidence of adultery but says nothing of racial purity.

NOTES ON SALLUST'S *HISTORIAE*.

I, 4¹: Romani generis disertissimus paucis absolvit.

Besides testimonia cited by Kritz, Dietsch, Maurenbrecher, and others add Pompeius, *Comm. Art. Don.* (Keil, *G. L.*, V, 158): *in historiis invenimus Romani generis disertissimus*.

I, 8: nam a principio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum.

A fragment quoted in its completest form by Servius, *ad Aen.*, I, 30: *a principio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum* and by Priscian (*G. L.*, III, 188): *nam a primordio urbis ad bellum Persi Macedonicum*. Maurenbrecher, taking *nam* from Priscian,² combined it with Servius to get the above reading. Kritz and Dietsch more consistently adopted Priscian's quotation as it stands. Certainly *primordio* is the preferable word here in view of Livy, *Praef.*, 1: *si a primordio urbis* (cf. also *Epit.*, XVI, 1) and Tacitus, *Hist.*, III, 34: *hic exitus Cremonae anno ducentesimo octogesimo sexto a primordio sui*. And too, *principium urbis* seems to be without parallel, an added reason for believing Priscian right. In Servius virtual synonyms, like *principio* for *primordio*, have now and again displaced the original text of a quotation. So in the excerpts from Sallust, for example, *coegit* (*ad Georg.*, I, 463) appears instead of *subegit* (*Cat.*, 10, 5) and *senecta iam aetate* (*ad Aen.*, XI, 165) for *acta iam aetate* (*Hist.*, II, 47, 2).

I, 20: citra Padum omnibus lex Licinia <in> grata fuit.

Maurenbrecher's emendation here is one of several; for the fragment as it is preserved in Cledonius (*G. L.*, V, 76) is badly corrupt: *citra Padum omnibus lex Lucania fratra fuit*. A cer-

¹ The numbering is that established by B. Maurenbrecher, and lemmata are cited in the following pages as they appear in his edition (Berlin, 1891). To locate the same fragments, except Inc. 12, in the editions of F. Kritz (Leipzig, 1853; 2nd ed., 1856) and R. Dietsch (Leipzig, 1859) Maurenbrecher's *Tabula fragmentorum* should be consulted (pp. 233 f.).

² *Nam* was added in the hand of a "vetus corrector" to the Fulda MS of Servius (C²; see Thilo-Hagen, I, p. xcvi), but this correction, probably based on Priscian's reading, has not been taken into the text of Servius.

tain Casselius, in 1853, communicated a skillful restoration to Kritz for use in the latter's edition (pp. 273 f.). Casselius emended *Lucania* to *Licinia*—i. e. the Licinio-Mucian law of 95 B. C., which excluded Italians from the citizenship franchise—and conjectured *fraudi* for the corrupt *fratra*. But despite Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, VII, 26, 2: *lex sumptuaria . . . mihi fraudi fuit*, later scholars have ignored or discarded his restoration. J. A. Mähly³ conjectured instead *frustra*. Dietsch emended to *taetra*, objecting to *fraudi fuit* on the grounds that the law was indisputably legal. The point, however, is not how modern historians have valued the law, but what Sallust, who strongly favored a wide franchise (cf. *Ep. ad Caes.*, II, 5, 7), would have thought about it. G. Landgraf's⁴ *parata* is weak; and Maurenbrecher's *<in>grata* seems a peculiarly lackluster characterization of a statute that alienated most of Italy and supplied, as Asconius remarks (*In Cornel.*, I, 67; Stangl), the "maxima causa" of the Social War.

The reading *fraudi fuit* is at all odds the best of those proposed, and most probably right. Sallust and Roman historians generally, when dealing with matters of a judicial nature, borrowed from the terminology of the jurisconsults.⁵ Phrases like

³ Flückeisen, *Jahrb.*, LXXXVII (1853), p. 79. All references to Mähly are to this note.

⁴ *Blätter für das Bayr. Gymn.*, XXXI (1895), p. 133; criticized by Maurenbrecher in the *Jahresb.*, CXIII (1902), p. 267.

⁵ No thorough treatment of legal language in Sallust has yet been written, but I give here a few examples to support my statement. *Cat.*, 18, 3: *Post paulo Catilina pecuniarum repetundarum reus prohibitus erat consulatum petere, quod intra legitimos dies profiteri nequiverat*. For a minute treatment of the legal terminology and its meaning see C. John, "Sallustius über Catilinas Candidatur in Jahre 688," *Rh. Mus.*, XXXI (1876), pp. 401-31. The technical phrase *intra legitimos dies* is particularly interesting, inasmuch as it appears to be duplicated in the *Cod. Just.*, VII, 67, 2, 1 (362 A. D.). *Jug.*, 9, 3: *eum (Jugurtha) adoptavit et testamento pariter cum filiis heredem instituit* (Micipsa); 65, 1: *erat . . . Numida quidam nomine Gauda . . . quem Micipsa testamento secundum heredem scripserat*. Both *heredem instituere* and *heredem scribere* are stereotyped legal formulae to describe the institution of an heir, the chief object of a Roman *testamentum*. For a discussion of the legal language and significance of these passages see G. Lafaye, "L'adoption de Jugurthe dans Salluste," *Mélanges Boissier*.

ne . . . fraudi sit, fraudi fuit, fraudi esto, etc., are common in Roman legal language from the earliest times. How natural then for Sallust here to fall back on a familiar legalistic formula: *lex Licinia . . . fraudi fuit*.

II, 90: *ad hoc pauca piratica, actuaria navigia*.

So reads the fragment as adopted in Lindsay's edition of Nonius Marcellus (p. 857) and *cum commate* by Maurenbrecher. The codd. of Nonius have either *piratice* or *piraticae*, which was emended to *piratica* by Junius (Antwerp, 1565) and has since gone unchallenged. Still several scholars, dissatisfied with such a reading (and others like it in Sallust), have tried improving it. Mähly, for example, interjected an *et* after *piratica*. This conjecture is plausible—assuming *piraticae*<*t*> in transcription—but, like others of the same sort, quite unnecessary. Mähly happened, with a nicer ear than Sallust's, to object to the four homoeoteleuta:⁶ "Die Homoeoteleuta sind unerträglich . . ."; and Dietsch, translating and endorsing Mähly's remark, wrote: "Homoeoteleuta ferri non posse . . . perspexit Mähly." But compare *Jug.*, 89, 5: *nam praeter oppido propinqua alia omnia vasta inculta egentia aquae*; *Ep. ad Caes.*, I, 6; 1: *ne ista egregia tua fama . . . concidet*; and *Cat.*, 52, 13; 54, 4; *Hist.*, II, 70, 4; IV, 69, 13. *Actuarium* joined to *navigium* appears elsewhere only in Caesar's *Bell. Civ.*, I, 27, 6 and the *Bell. Alex.*, 9, 4—works composed within a very few years of Sallust's *Historiae*.

(Paris, 1903), pp. 315-17. The term *secundus heres* is also exclusively legal, designating one to whom a bequest falls when the nearest heirs (*primi heredes*) do not take it. *Hist.*, II, 21: *nam Sullam consulem de reditu eius legem ferentem ex composito tribunus plebis C. Herennius prohibuerat. Legem ferre de aliquo* is, of course, the technical expression for moving a law, but here it is rather a statement by Aulus Gellius that furnishes insight into Sallust's habitual carefulness with terminology. Gellius (X, 20), observing that Sallust is really discussing a *privilegium* and not a *lex*, thinks it worth a special note to explain why this more precise term is not used: *Sallustius quoque, proprietatem in verbis retentissimus, consuetudini* (i.e. of loosely referring to *plebiscita* and *privilegia* as *leges*) *concessit, et privilegium quod de On. Pompeii reditu ferebatur, legem appellavit*.

⁶ Much has been written on asyndeton in Sallust, e.g., A. W. Ahlberg, *Prolegomena in Sallustium*, pp. 173-82, but apparently not in relation to homoeoteleuton.

IV, 4: *turmam equitum castra regis succedere et prope rationem explorare iubet.*

Properationem, not *prope rationem*, stands in the MSS of Arusianus Messius (*G. L.*, VII, 507), the source of this fragment. The incident, according to most scholars, squares with what is known about the tactics of the Roman army before Cabira, a city in Pontus, during the third Mithradatic War. The *rex* mentioned is, of course, Mithradates VI.

The problem which the fragment poses, however, is not historical; it is rather that of doing something about the reading *properationem explorare*, which makes no sense. From at least the middle of the last century scholars have thought *properationem* corrupt and have attempted emending it. Dietsch wrote: "*Properationem* nullo modo ferri potest, nec satis placet quod proposuit Mähly . . . *prope nationem*," and suggested instead *proeli rationem*. But his conjecture, though better than most,⁷ has found no acceptance. Kritz refrained, perhaps wisely, from either emendation or explanation. Maurenbrecher, on the lead of Keil (*G. L.*, VII, 507), neatly partitioned *properationem* into *prope rationem*, but fancied that this should mean "*ratio locorum, qui prope sunt*."⁸ Here it is not Maurenbrecher's handling of *properationem* as *prope rationem*—a slight and common enough change in the MSS—that offends, but his improbable exegesis of it. I suggest that Sallust wrote *prope rationem* and that it means simply "according to plan," a usage of *prope* not explicitly cited in the lexica.

The root idea of *prope*, as of its synonym *iuxta*, is that of real proximity to something. *Iuxta*, of course, gradually broadened

⁷ Better, for example, than Bondam's *prope stationem* (*ap. Maurenbrecher*, p. 160), Keil's earlier *prope munitionem* (*Quaest. Gramm.*, VI [Halle, 1879], p. x), or Landgraf's *propere regionem*. A perhaps sounder emendation of *properationem*—should one yet prove necessary—would be *properatim*, an archaic *-tim* adverb of a type frequent in Sisenna and, probably by way of imitation, in Sallust (see G. Brünner, *De Sallustio Imitatore Catonis Sisennae* . . . [Jena, 1873], pp. 24-5). *Properatim* occurred in Sisenna, on the witness of Aulus Gellius, XII, 15. A collocation elsewhere in Sallust of *-tim* adverb, infinitive, and finite verb-form analogous to *turmam equitum . . . properatim explorare iubet* would be *Cat.*, 60, 1: *cohortis paulatim incedere iubet*.

⁸ Maurenbrecher, like Keil, assumed that *locorum* or something similar had dropped out, but this is not likely.

in scope until, toward the close of the first century B. C., it could apparently be used with the sense of accordance; e. g., Vitruvius, I, 1, 17: *iuxta necessitatem*. By the Augustan period, if not before, *prope* had undergone a similar progression from the idea of real to abstract proximity; cf. Livy, I, 25, 13: *prope metum*. The notion of accordance in *prope*, then (if it is ἀπαξ λεγόμενον), would amount only to a slight expansion of a tendency already marked in the use of the word. But such an interpretation need not remain entirely hypothetical, for the superlative of *prope* appears as a preposition in Livy, XXIV, 48, 11: *ordinatos(que) proxime morem Romanum instruendo et decurrendo signa sequi et servare ordines docuit*. An inquiry into sense and context here will show that *proxime* can have only one meaning: that of *iuxta* or *secundum*, "according to the Roman custom."

IV, 51: Crassus obtreptans potius collegae quam boni aut mali publici gnavos aestimator.

A fragment from *Sal. Hist. VIII* according to Arusianus Messius (*G. L.*, VII, 496). Although the MSS read either *gravis exactor* or *gravis exactor*, scholars for the last hundred years or more have departed from them to go their own way. Kritz suggested *auctor* for *exactor*. Later Dietsch announced that Kritz's conjecture was not "veri similis" and himself conjectured *existumator* or *aestumator*. Keil, followed by E. Marmorale (Naples, 1939, p. 67), more cautiously read *gnavus exactor*. Finally, Maurenbrecher modified the earlier conjectures of Dietsch and Keil to *gnavos aestimator*, for which, however, he offered an apology of sorts: "Locum nondum sanatum putaverim."⁹

Those for whom textual criticism is something more than a clever game of wits against text require an honest, objective reason—or a parallel passage or two—for any real deviation from the MSS. Here reasons and parallels have played no part, because there are none. *Gravis exactor* with the genitive makes, as a phrase, good Latin and, in context, good sense. Sallust flatly asserts that Crassus, while consul, concerned himself more with carping at his colleague Pompey than with rigorously superintending the welfare of the republic. For verbal parallels

⁹ But see his criticism of Landgraf's *gnarus* in the *Jahresb.*, CXIII (1902), p. 272.

to *gravis exactor*, which Dietsch termed a "pervorsa sententia," see Seneca, *De Ben.*, I, 1, 4: *graves . . . exactores (que) sumus*; Suetonius, *Jul.*, 65: *exactor gravissimus disciplinae*; Lampridius, *Alex. Sev.*, 40, 6: *purpureae . . . gravissimus exactor*.

It is true that *gnavus exactor*, the reading of Keil and Marmorale, has some claim to consideration, for the better MSS of Arusianus have *gravus* (N¹N²) instead of *gravis* (G; see Marmorale's sigla, p. xiv, opp.). Still, apart from the reading of the less good MS, there are at least two sound reasons for preferring *gravis*: (1) while parallels exist for *gravis exactor*, apparently none do for *gnavus exactor*; and (2) elsewhere Sallust uses *gravis*, but never *gnavus*.

IV, 62: in nuda, in tecta corpora.

A fragment preserved in Diomedes (*G. L.*, I, 447), but only in the cod. Monacensis, as *in nuda intectato pora*. Kritz, citing L. Carrio,¹⁰ read *iniecta corpora* and supplied for reference an imaginary *tela*, i. e. <tela> *in nuda iniecta corpora*. This is as twisted as it is arbitrary. Maurenbrecher, after Keil and others, restored the fragment as quoted above and guessed that it meant naphtha-throwing "in nudos et armatos hostes." But, however likely this interpretation of the fragment may be, Maurenbrecher's (and Keil's) reading of it is quite the opposite.

First of all, though *nudus* occasionally signifies *inermis* (e. g. *Jug.*, 107, 1), *tectus* unmodified scarcely equals *armatus*; it has rather some such meaning as "hidden" or "concealed," in a literal or metaphorical sense. And further, each of the three examples of the perfect passive participle of *tego* in Sallust is modified somehow: *Jug.*, 18, 8, and *Hist.*, III, 59 by ablatives, and *Jug.*, 97, 5 by a prepositional phrase. *Intectus*, on the other hand, often appears without qualification, and in one other instance (*Hist.*, III, 104) Sallust applies it to *corpus*, as does also Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 46, 2; 77, 2. Therefore, as several earlier editors saw, the fragment should read *in nuda intecta corpora*, which gains further support from the fact that Diomedes quotes this bit of Sallust as an example of homoeoteleuton. Kritz in rejecting this reading vilified it as a "putidissima

¹⁰ Carrio edited Sallust at Antwerp in 1579, but according to Keil's sigla for Diomedes (*G. L.*, I, 298) this reading appeared in editions earlier in the sixteenth century.

tautologia"; and perhaps it is, but compare Apuleius, *Met.*, X, 31: *nudo et intecto corpore*.

Inc. 2: in secunda cohortis festinas composuerat.

I suggest that the right interpretation of this troublesome fragment is that noted in Dietsch's index (s. v. "secundus") and Harper's *Dictionary* (s. v. "componere" II C 2), though quite overlooked by Maurenbrecher and apparently nowhere discussed: that the implied reference of *in secunda* is *acie*. *Secunda acies* figures frequently in tactical descriptions of battles among the Roman historians (see *Thesaurus*, I, 402, 81 f.). Yet presumably Servius quoted correctly, and so *acie* need not be put into the fragment but merely understood. Sallust, in distinguishing an *acies prima*, *secunda*, *tertia*, etc., of course did not repeat the noun with each ordinal; cf. Caesar, *Bell. Gall.*, I, 25, 7: *prima et secunda acies, ut victis resisteret, tertia, ut venientes sustineret*, and Livy, XXX, 34, 13: *prima acie pulsa in secundam*.

Trying to place this fragment historically would lead to the blindest sort of guesswork. Similarly it is hard to imagine what a *festina cohors* might be. The phrase is not, however, as Dietsch thought, ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; cf. Statius, *Theb.*, VII, 100: *nunc festina cohors*. . . .

Inc. 12: et parvis modo velorum alis demissis.

A fragment from Servius *ad Aen.*, III, 520 edited only by Maurenbrecher, who changes the MS reading *remissis* to *demissis* and remarks: "correxī cum remittere vela ineptum sit." One need not search far to discover that this confident assertion is mistaken. Lucretius, in part contemporary with Sallust, depicts the abrupt fate of birds over the poisonous region of Lake Avernus in a series of graphic nautical metaphors (VI, 743-44): *remigi oblitaē pennarum vela remittunt/ praecipitesque cadunt*. . . . On the analogy of similar expressions in Aeschylus, *Ag.*, 52: πτερύγων ἐρετμοῖσιν; Euripides, *Iph. Taur.*, 289: πτεροῖς ἐρέσσει; Vergil, *Aen.*, I, 301: *remigio alarum*; Ovid, *A. A.*, II, 45: *remigium volucrum, disponit in ordine pinnae, pennarum* here must go with *remigi* rather than *vela*. Thus *vela remittunt*, the phrase in question, is set off, and for it there are no variants.

To find such an expression in Lucretius is hardly surprising.

Scholars have often called him a "poet of the sea," and most likely *vela remittere* taken literally, as it must be in Sallust, had some basis in the seafaring language and practice of the time. Perhaps the phrase suggests the slackening of tension when the sails of a vessel are lowered. At any rate, *remittere vela* or *velorum alas*, a poetic periphrasis for *vela*, is not "in-eptum" and should be left as Servius has it.

Addendum.

I, 11:

This is a longer fragment and has a peculiar interest: it is one of the few places in the *Historiae* where two quotations from different authors can be joined with some certainty. The fragment comprises a brief sketch of political and moral decay at Rome following the Punic Wars. The first part is from Victorinus, *In Rhet. Cic.*,¹ the latter part from Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, II, 18; a parallel arrangement will make their relationship clear.

Victorinus

Res Romana plurimum imperio
valuit Servio Sulpicio et Marco
Marcello consulibus omni Gallia
eis Rhenum atque inter mare nos-
trum et Oceanum . . . perdomita.
Optimis autem moribus et maxima
concordia egit inter secundum
atque postremum bellum Cartha-
giniense.

Augustine

Nam cum optimis moribus et
maxima concordia populum Ro-
manum inter secundum et post-
remum bellum Carthaginiense com-
memorasset egisse causamque huius
boni non amorem iustitiae, sed
stante Carthagine metum pacis in-
fidae fuisse dixisset . . .² continuo
subiecit idem Sallustius et ait: At
discordia et avaritia, etc.

It is fairly obvious that Augustine paraphrases more than the last sentence of Victorinus; so Maurenbrecher, assuming that several phrases had intervened, attempted to restore what

¹ C. Halm, *Rhet. Lat. Min.* (Leipzig, 1863), p. 158.

² Here Augustine adds a parenthetical remark of his own; it does not concern the parallel.

Sallust probably wrote: *causaque . . . non amor iustitiae, sed stante Carthagine metus pacis infidae fuit*. Evidence that at least two of the phrases in his restoration are Sallust's own may be drawn from Velleius Paterculus (I, 12, 6), who often imitates Sallust verbally.³

Augustine

. . . causamque huius boni non amorem iustitiae, sed *stante Carthagine* metum *pacis infidae* fuisse dixisset . . .

Paterculus

Ita per annos † CXV aut bellum inter eos populos aut belli praeparatio aut *infida pax* fuit. Neque se Roma . . . securam speravit fore, si nomen usquam *stantis* maneret *Carthaginis*.

Although Kaiser missed this correspondence, his brief critique of Paterculus' method pertains: "Sed in eis scriptoribus, quos certe legit, Sallustio et Cicerone, docili versatus est animo. Multos eorum locos memoria tenet atque inserit historiae suae, sed numquam ita, ut nihil commutat."⁴

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³ As he does elsewhere in this same chapter; see P. Kaiser, *De Fontibus Vellei Paterculi* (Berlin, 1884), p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

THE DRAGON ON THE TREASURE.

Some readers may have been surprised by my blunt statement in my review of the Edelsteins' *Asclepius* in this Journal (LXVIII, pp. 215-219) that the folk tale of the dragon on the treasure originated in the cult of Asclepius. With the kind permission of the editor I shall try to present the evidence, hoping that it will be convincing.

The dragon appears in three motives, the biblical dragon, the dragon slain by a god, a hero, a saint, e. g. Apollo or St. George, and the dragon as a guardian of a treasure. Here we are concerned with this third motive.

The word is Greek, *δράκων*, and was borrowed by Latin, *draco*. In Greek as well as in Latin the word is used of a living animal, a real snake, but also of mythical snakes. The Teutonic languages took over the word at latest in the very beginning of the Middle Ages, for in German it has undergone the second *Lautverschiebung* by which *k* was changed to *ch*, which took place in the sixth and seventh centuries A. D. The German form is *Drache*, but in Swedish which did not partake of this phonetic change the form is *drake*. While the word in Greek and Latin signifies a real snake, it is in the Teutonic languages used solely with reference to a fabulous monster.¹ This shows that the word was taken over together with the fables in order to denote the fabulous monster. The dragon on the treasure looms large in the old Teutonic tale of Sigurd who killed Fafne who in the shape of a dragon guarded the treasure taken from Regin. This tale is told in two poems of the Icelandic Edda and depicted on Swedish rock carvings with runic inscriptions from the beginning of the eleventh century, of which the best is found on the mountain of Ramsund in the province of Södermanland.

¹ See *Ordbok över svenska språket*, utgiven av Svenska Akademien; K. F. Söderwall, *Ordbok över svenska medeltidsspråket*; J. und W. Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. The great *Oxford Dictionary* gives these meanings of the English word *dragon*: 1. A huge serpent or snake; a python, 2. a mythical monster; and adds that it is difficult to separate these senses in early instances. This does not touch our reasoning because the English form being borrowed from French has another provenance.

Having established that the word and the fable were borrowed by the Teutons at a very early date, we proceed to show that the dragon as a guardian of a treasure was known in ancient times. Not very much earlier than the presumable date of the borrowing is Macrobius, who lived about 400 A. D. He says that the guardianship of temples, sanctuaries, oracles, and treasures is assigned to the dragon because of his very acute sight and his wakeful nature.² Next comes Artemidorus from Daldis who wrote a book on the interpretation of dreams in the second century of our era. His brief words are so important that they must be quoted in Greek: καὶ (ὁ δράκων σημαίνει) πλοῦτον καὶ χρήματα διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ θησαυροῦς ἰδρύνεσθαι.³ ἰδρύνειν signifies "settle," "set up," "erect" a temple, a statue; θησαυρός "treasure," "treasure chest," "treasure box," "treasure house." We translate: "a dream of a snake signifies wealth and property (or money) because the snake is erected on treasure chests." The justification of this translation will be given below. In the beginning of the second century the poet Martial says of a miser that he broods on his treasure like a big dragon which according to the poets guarded the Scythian grove,⁴ and Phaedrus, who in the reign of Tiberius put Aesopean fables into verses, describes how a fox, digging subterranean passages, came to the cave of a dragon which guarded hidden treasures;⁵ we may pass over the subsequent moralizing dialogue. The earliest example is dated precisely to March 20, 43 B. C., when Cicero delivered his thirteenth speech against Antony. He says of a man who was once the slave of Pompey that he must give back to Pompey's son the heritage of his master round which he has coiled himself just as a snake round a treasure.⁶ Certain editors cancel the word *thesaurum*, which is wanting in one of the four best manu-

² Macrobius, *Sat.*, I, 20, 3; *nam ferunt hunc serpentem (draconem) acie acutissima et pervigili naturam sideris huius (solis) imitari atque ideo aedium adytorum oraculorum thesaurorum custodiam draconibus adsignari.*

³ Artemidorus, *Oneirocritica*, II, 13.

⁴ Martial, XII, 53, 3, *incubasque gazae ut magnus draco, quem canunt poetae custodem Scythicae fuisse luci.*

⁵ Phaedrus, IV, 20.

⁶ Cicero, *Phil.*, XIII, 12, *an is non reddet qui domini patrimonium circumplexus quasi thesaurum draco, Pompeii servus, libertus Caesaris, agri Lucani possessiones occupavit?*

scripts,—wrongly: they did not consider or know the concrete background of the words.

We have followed the dragon on the treasure back to the first century B. C.; it remains to show that he has his origin in the cult of Asclepius. In the middle of the third century B. C. the poet Herondas, whose poems have been recovered in a papyrus, depicted scenes from the life of simple people. In his fourth mimiamb he describes the visit of two women to the famous temple of Asclepius on the island of Cos in order to offer the sacrifice of a cock. After much chattering one of them exhorts the other to cut off the leg of the cock and to give it to the custodian of the temple and piously to put down a *pelanos* in the hole of the snake.⁷ *τρώγλη* is a small hole, a hole made by a mouse; *πέλανος* is, as Professor Herzog proved in a paper which is important for our subject, in this time not a sacrificial cake but a due paid in addition to the sacrifice or for an oracle,—a small coin.⁸ The treasure chest of Asclepius has been found beneath the floor of his temple. It is built of big marble slabs and has as a lid a big marble plaque, 2^m 15 × 1^m 35, with a hole in its middle.⁹ This lid is so heavy that two men are needed to lift it with the aid of levers. Such treasure chests were common in the Greek temples of this age,¹⁰ and not only sacrificial gifts but also other revenues of the temple were put down in them. A decree of the people of Cos ordains the building of a treasure chest in the temple of Asclepius and prescribes strict rules for its use.¹¹ It was opened once every half year, the money was

⁷ Herondas, IV, 88, ἔς τε τὴν τρώγλην τὸν πέλανον ἔνθεσ τοῦ δράκοντος εὐφήμως.

⁸ R. Herzog, "Der πέλανος als Sportel," *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, X (1907), p. 205. I refer to this paper, p. 209, for the evidence.

⁹ P. Schazmann, "Das Asklepieion," *Kos*, I (1932), p. 36; see also Herzog, *loc. cit.*, p. 207.

¹⁰ See the article *Θησαυρός* by L. Ziehen in *R.-E.* Since this article was written, new finds have been made. H. N. Couch, *The Treasuries of the Greeks and the Romans* (Diss., Baltimore, 1929), takes little notice of the evidence discussed here; cf. p. 89. After this paper was sent to the printer an important article came into my hands, R. Martin, "Un nouveau règlement de culte thasien," *B. C. H.*, LXIV-LXV (1940-1941), pp. 163 ff.

¹¹ The inscription which is mentioned by Herzog, *loc. cit.*, p. 208, is published by him, "Heilige Gesetze von Kos," *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1928, No. 6, p. 37, No. 14.

counted under strict control, deposited in a bank, and used for the special ends to which it was destined.

We have almost forgotten the snake for the treasure chest. His rôle in the mimiamb is explained by a find in another temple of Asclepius and Hygiea at Ptolemais in Egypt.¹² It is described thus: "It is a heavy lid of black granite, cut away round the base so as to fit into the top of a large round receptacle. The upper part of it is in the form of a great serpent with erected head, and in the middle of the coils is a narrow, well-worn slit large enough to admit a coin of at least 4 cm diameter. Round the side of the lid are four small holes in which are traces of iron rods embedded in lead soldering: the purpose of these is not clear, but it seems to me the most probable that they represent the inner ends of four projecting handles, for it would be difficult to raise so massive a lid without some such aid." This snake was erected on the treasure chest of Asclepius which he guarded, and the coins were put into it through his body.

The snake as a guardian of the temple treasure was certainly an idea imported into Egypt from Greece, for more examples are forthcoming from this country. There were smaller treasure boxes made of a hollowed out marble block. Professor Herzog supposes that a cylindrical block with an opening in the middle from Melos with a dedication of a Roman to Asclepius and Hygiea was a lid of such a thesaurus and once carried a snake.¹³ A certain example is found in the Sarapeum on the island of Delos. It is described thus: ¹⁴ a round thesaurus of white marble imposed on a quadrangular base, diam. 0^m 55; height 0^m 57;

¹² C. C. Edgar, "A Thésaurus in the Museum of Cairo," *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, XL (1902/3), p. 140 with a figure, also given by Herzog, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, X (1907), pl. I, 3. Edgar refers to Hero, *Pneumatica*, II, 32, p. 298 Schmidt: *θησαυροῦ κατασκευὴ τρόχον ἔχοντος στρεφόμενον χάλκεον, ὃς καλεῖται ἀγνιστήριον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐλώθασιν οἱ εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ εἰσιόντες στρέφειν*. This was evidently an apparatus for distributing holy water (cf. Hero, I, 32, p. 148); when a coin was put in, the coins fell down into a collection box.

¹³ Herzog, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, X (1907), p. 213; *Thera*, herausgeg. von F. Hiller von Gaertringen, I (1899), p. 162, n. 12; *I. G.*, XII, 3, 1085; cf. H. Graeven, *Jahrb.*, XVI (1901), p. 162, n. 12. Unhappily the stone is lost. It was found in a cave together with a head of Asclepius, statuettes of Hygiea, and votive tablets.

¹⁴ *I. G.*, XI, 4, 1247.

height of the base 0^m 19. The inscription is incised on its middle part and above it is a slit suited for putting in coins; it had once a bronze ornament attached to it. Good letters from the end of the third or the beginning of the second century B. C. According to the inscription this collection box was dedicated to Sarapis, Isis, and Anubis by Ctesias from Tenos on the order of the god, viz. Sarapis. Beneath the dedication we read these verses:

Μήτι με θαμβήσεις ἐσιδών, ξένε, γοργὸν ἔόντα
 τόνδε γὰρ ἡμέριος καὶ πάννυχος ἀμφιβεβηκώς
 θησαυρὸν φρουρῶ θεῖον, ἄπνους ἔών.
 ἀλλὰ χαρεῖς ἐνβαλλεῖς ὃ τί σοι φίλον ἐστὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ
 εἰς ἐμὸν εὐδεκτον σῶμα διὰ στόματος.

"Be not astonished, stranger, when you see me being so fierce, for by day and by night I guard sleepless this divine thesaurus, protecting it. But put with joy what you like through my mouth into my body which receives it well." This description depicts a snake admirably and M. Roussel says in his note justly that the epigram was related to a figure, attached to the slit, which probably was that of a snake. This treasure box belonged to Sarapis, not to Asclepius, but Sarapis rivalled Asclepius as a healing god and took over from him the snake as a guardian of his temple treasure.¹⁵

The snake as a guardian of a collection box was popular in other cults, too, on Delos. Before the porticus of Philippus another small treasure box of the same form was found, dedicated by C. Varius about 100 B. C., to which god is not said.¹⁶ On the convex upper side two snakes are sculptured, a bronze ornament in the form of a caduceus is attached to the slit between them. A third example was found in the temple of the Dioscuri-Cabiri, dedicated by an Athenian.¹⁷ On the side of the cylinder a bourrelet of marble seems to represent the head and body of a snake; beneath there are two small quadrangular and one round

¹⁵ Another thesaurus dedicated to the same gods was found in the sanctuary of the Egyptian gods on the island of Thera, *Thera*, I, p. 260; *I. G.*, XII, 3, 443.

¹⁶ *B. C. H.*, XXXVI (1912), p. 201; R. Vallois, "Le portique de Philippe," *Exploration archéologique de Délos*, VII, 1 (1923), p. 119.

¹⁷ F. Chapouthier, "Le sanctuaire des dieux de Samothrace," *op. cit.*, XVI (1935), p. 73.

hole, on the upper side a mortise and traces of lead; probably a statuette was posed on it, says the editor.

It was quite natural that the snake became the guardian of the temple treasures of Asclepius. The snake was the holy animal of Asclepius: it was wound round the staff of the god, and the staff wound round by a snake is still the symbol of medicine. Coins from Cos, the site of his famous temple, have on one side the head of Asclepius and on the other a coiled snake raising its head. Snakes lived in the sanctuaries of Asclepius and sometimes they cured sick persons.¹⁸ This is told in Late Antiquity of the philosopher Proclus.¹⁹ In the transfer legends the god appears in the shape of a snake or is represented by a snake. This is told in the miracle inscriptions concerning the introduction of the cult of Asclepius to the town of Halieis in Argolis: ²⁰ the snake coiled round the axle of the car, left its place after the arrival, and healed the sick driver. Pausanias tells that a snake was brought from Epidaurus to Epidaurus Limera in Laconia where altars were erected to Asclepius, and that the god was carried from Epidaurus to Sicyon in the shape of a snake with a team of mules.²¹ The introduction of Asclepius to Rome is embellished by legends told by many authors.²² It will be sufficient to quote the summary of the lost eleventh book of Livy: "As the state suffered from pestilence, envoys were sent in order to transfer the statue of Asclepius from Epidaurus to Rome;

¹⁸ The miracle inscriptions from Epidaurus *I. G.*, IV, 1², 121, 122; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 1168, line 113; 1169, line 69; Aristophanes, *Plut.*, 727. O. Weinreich, "Antike Wunderheilungen," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, VIII, 1 (1909), p. 93: Cf. R. Herzog, "Die Wunderheilungen von Epidaurus," *Philol.*, Suppl. XXII, 3 (1931), especially his commentary on a relief from the Amphiareum at Oropus, published in *Eph. Arch.*, 1916, p. 120 and *op. cit.* as frontispiece. See also my explanation of a relief in Copenhagen, "En gäta och en gissning," *Fra Ny Carlsbergs Glyptoteks Samlinger*, 1922, p. 81. A similar interpretation in Herzog, *loc. cit.*, p. 79, n. 27. The relief is No. 233a in the *Katalog over antike Skulpturer* (in Ny Carlsbergs Glyptotek), 1940, with bibliography.

¹⁹ Marinus, *Vita Procli*, 30.

²⁰ *I. G.*, IV, 1², 122; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 1169, line 69.

²¹ Pausanias, III, 24, 7, and II, 10, 3 respectively.

²² References in G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (2nd ed., 1912), p. 307; discussion in E. Schmidt, "Kultübertragungen," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, VIII, 2 (1910), p. 31.

they brought with them a snake which had repaired to their ship and in which the god himself was incarnate (*in quo ipsum numen esse constabat*) and as it went ashore on the Tiber Island, a temple of Asclepius was erected on this place."

The snake personified the god himself or represented him. When putting their small offerings in the mouth of the snake the pious would think that they gave them to the god himself. It was quite natural that the snake was placed on his collection boxes and treasure chests and received the offerings of the worshippers. And this usage spread to other cults.

Certain myths and cults may have contributed to producing this idea. In myths the snake appears as a guardian, not of treasures but of the golden fleece in Colchis, of the apples of the Hesperides, of the temple of Chryse on Lemnos, where Philoctetes was bitten and poisoned by it,²³ and especially of wells. Pytho guarded the well at Delphi; another snake which Cadmus killed guarded a well at Thebes; Archemoros or Opheltes, in whose honor the Nemean games were celebrated, was killed by a snake, when his nurse fetched water from the well. How firmly this idea was established is nicely proved by a vase painting of the Hesperides, where a well is at the root of the tree which the snake encircles.²⁴ The god who guarded the store chamber, Zeus Ktesios, appears in the shape of a snake, and offerings were brought to him in clay vessels. Likewise the sons of Zeus, the Dioscuri, who also were house gods, are pictured as snakes and received offerings of the same kind.²⁵

These myths and cults may have contributed to making the snake a guardian of the temple treasures but the chief incitement was the fact that the snake was preëminently the holy animal of Asclepius, that it represented the god, and that the god was even incarnate in the snake. He guarded his treasures himself. The cult of Asclepius was the one most cherished by the people, it offered a more tenacious and prolonged resistance to Christianity than any other Greek cult. A great many miracle stories were told of the god and his healing power and into them folk tales

²³ Sophocles, *Phil.*, 265 and 1328.

²⁴ S. Reinach, *Répertoire des vases peints*, I, p. 492, also in J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, fig. 130, p. 431.

²⁵ See my *Geschichte der griechischen Religion*, I (1941), p. 378.

were incorporated.²⁶ It is not remarkable that the snake as a guardian of the treasures of Asclepius took hold on the fancy of the people, but it is unique that we are able to follow a folk tale motive back to its origin in the old Greek cult.

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NOTE ON THE CLOSING SECTIONS OF PSEUDO-XENOPHON'S *CONSTITUTION OF THE ATHENIANS*.

Definitions are of two kinds. A term may be circumscribed in order to indicate what everybody has in mind when using it; in this case, the definition and the word so defined can be substituted for each other in any context without change in meaning. The second sort of definition aims at establishing the true content of the notion represented by a certain word, and it may then become apparent that people at large, when applying the word, do not know what they are talking about. The same term covers one thing for the naive and another for the enlightened. Thus, a startling twist is involved when Thrasymachus, in the first book of Plato's *Republic* (338 ff.), defines *δικαιοσύνη* as the advantage of the stronger, that is of the ruling man, group or class. As he sees it, Justice is a mere sham because the only legitimate motivation for a person's actions is self-interest; but the realist will avail himself of the specious term to dupe and exploit the idealist. Here, then, the term and its definition are not readily interchangeable. It is only in a text steeped in a similar sardonic spirit that we may expect the word *δικαιον* actually used to describe a way of action as promoting the interests of those in power.

Hartvig Frisch, in his admirable book on Ps.-Xenophon's *Constitution of the Athenians*,¹ has a chapter entitled "Sophis-

²⁶ I pointed to two such fables in my review of the Edelsteins' *Asclepius*, in this Journal, p. 216, *supra*; see also Herzog's admirable "Wunderheilungen."

¹ "The Constitution of the Athenians," *A Philological-Historical Analysis of Pseudo-Xenophon's Treatise "de re publica Atheniensium"* (Copenhagen, 1942).

'tics and Sociology," in which he calls attention to the fact that in I, 2 the author twice uses the word *δίκαιος* "in its relative sense" (p. 109). The terms *δίκαιος* and *ἀδίκος* recur no less than seven times within the last nine lines of the treatise. These two concluding sections (III, 12-13) have baffled interpreters. The condition of the text, if poor, is no worse here than in the rest of the booklet; and there must be some special reason for the unusual obscurity of this particular passage. The present note was written to suggest that the clue to a satisfactory explanation may be found in the author's peculiar use of the words *δίκαιος* and *ἀδίκος*, which here stand for "advantageous" and "harmful," respectively, "for the lower class."² It is precisely the thesis which the treatise tries to establish that Athenian institutions and practices, although based on the wrong principle of providing a better life for the "bad" than for the "good" people, yet are not due to waywardness but rather to a judicious choice of suitable devices for perpetuating proletarian rule. In consequence, the Athenian ways can be styled *δίκαια* in the sense of Thrasymachus, or in the sense discussed in Plato's *Laws*, IV, 714 C:

Ἦτις ἂν καθεστηκῦα ἡ πολιτεία, ταύτη ἰδεῖν (scil. δεῖν τινές φασιν) τὸ συμφέρον ὅπως ἄρξει τε ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ καταλυθῇσεται, καὶ τὸν φύσει ὄρον τοῦ δικαίου λέγεσθαι κάλλισθ' οὕτω . . . ὅτι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ἐστίν.

Little more need be said for clarification. Let us now examine the passage in the light of our surmise on the meaning of the crucial terms. This is the text of the two sections, as edited by Frisch:

Ὑπολάβοι δέ τις ἂν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄρα ἀδίκως ἡτίμωται Ἀθήνησιν· ἐγὼ δέ φημί τινας εἶναι οἱ ἀδίκως ἡτίμωνται, ὀλίγοι μὲντοι τινές· ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀλίγων δεῖ τῶν ἐπιτησομένων τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐπεὶ τοι

² Apart from the two passages mentioned, I, 2' and III, 12-13, the word *δίκαιος* occurs in I, 13: ἐν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῦ δικαίου αὐτοῖς μάλλον μέλει ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον, which seems to mean, in its context: "In the selection of judges they have less the dispensation of justice in mind than their personal advantage (with great numbers of low-class people enjoying the stipends paid to the jury)." It cannot be made out for certain here whether true justice or political expediency is meant, but the former is more probable. The words *ἀδικεῖν* and *ἀδικία* are used four times (II, 17 and 20; III, 6; I, 5) in the normal sense.

καὶ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδὲν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἀνθρώπους οἷτινες δικαίως ἡτίμωνται, ἀλλ' εἰ τινες ἀδίκως· πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀδίκως οἷοιτό τις ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἡτίμωσθαι Ἀθήνησιν, ὅπου ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ ἄρχων τὰς ἀρχάς; ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ δικαίως ἄρχειν μὴδὲ λέγειν τὰ δίκαια <μὴδὲ> πράττειν, ἐκ τοιούτων ἀτιμοὶ εἰσιν Ἀθήνησι. ταῦτα χρὴ λογιζόμενον μὴ νομίζειν εἶναι τι δεῖν ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀτίμων Ἀθήνησιν.

The passage can be freely paraphrased to this effect:

"(If, as indicated in III, 10-11, it is good policy for the Athenians to support the lower class everywhere and to put down the good people, for instance by trumped-up charges that lead to ἀτιμία³), then one might conclude (ἄρα) that the numerous cases of disfranchisement in Athens are all justified, that is, all for the best of democracy (οὐδεὶς ἀδίκως ἡτίμωται). I would not go so far; some mistakes (ἀδίκως) are being made; but they are too few⁴ to be considered as dangerous for the preservation of the regime. For this is the situation: one must not mind⁵ instances of disfranchisement that are justified from the democratic point of view (δικαίως) but only those, if any, that are not (ἀδίκως); and the majority of instances of disfranchisement will

³ The first difficulty we encounter is the apparent lack of connection between III, 12-13 and the preceding sections. Now the author had previously, in I, 14, vindicated the Athenian practice of siding with the "bad" people in the allied communities and disfranchising, or otherwise neutralizing, the "good." As the word *συκοφαντεῖν* implies, false charges were used to take away from the "good" people franchise, property, right of residence, or life, and thus to bar the entire class from political influence (cf. also I, 16: *τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀπολλύουσιν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις*). In III, 10-11 the writer returns to the subject of Athenian partiality for the lower class in the allied communities and explains the underlying principle. Although he does not again mention ἀτιμία, this handy expedient for controlling unreliable elements may very well be present to his mind; and from there the transition is easy to the dispensation of ἀτιμία at home, in Athens.

⁴ Cf. III, 8-9: "There is room for certain minor improvements, but on the whole Athenian democracy is well organized for keeping itself in power."

⁵ Perhaps οὐ δεῖ (or: οὐδὲν δεῖ) ἐνθυμεῖσθαι. For ἐνθυμεῖσθαι with accus. see Thucydides, V, 32, 1 and VII, 18, 2. The previous interpreters saw in ἀνθρώπους not, as here suggested, the object of ἐνθυμεῖσθαι but rather its subject, with the consequence that the verb "has caused great difficulties" (Frisch) and that some scholars, including Frisch, tried to read into ἐνθυμεῖσθαι the notion of "plotting" against the Athenian state.

naturally be good democratic policy (πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀδίκως;) because it is the demos that is in charge of everything, and the demos will disfranchise men that speak and act against the interests of democracy (μὴ δικάως, μηδὲ τὰ δίκαια). From these considerations it follows that there is no danger⁶ from those disfranchised."

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AN ATHENIAN TREATY WITH AN UNKNOWN STATE.

The inscription now published as *I. G.*, I², 53 has been thought since the time of its discovery to embody a treaty of alliance between Athens and Philip, the treaty being one which Thucydides mentions (I, 57) and which must be dated earlier than 432 B. C.¹ The stone on which the inscription is preserved was first published by Wilhelm Bauer,² whose restorations have been taken over by Hiller in *I. G.*, I², 53 with additions in lines 4 and 5 which do nothing to change the interpretation of the document. It was assumed that the invocation [θ] ε ο [ι] came near the center of the stele in line 1, and Bauer believed that he had seen part of the epsilon as well as the evident omicron. In this he was mistaken, and the letter has been omitted from Schweigert's later publication in 1939.³ The connection of the

⁶ The author appears to be refuting the charge that the Athenian system is unsound, if for no other reason, because of the scandalous practice of mass disfranchisement; for, with the number of victims soaring from year to year, the opposition would be strengthened to the point of jeopardy for the regime. Against this view the two final sections argue that the terror, although exercised on a large scale, is far from indiscriminate; it falls in the main on the enemies of democracy and works to keep them in check.

¹ A. W. Gomme, *Commentary on Thucydides*, I (1945), p. 203, suggests a probable date between ca. 440 and 430, but the latter date is evidently too low for the treaty mentioned by the historian. I am indebted to Gomme for discussing this text with me, and also to Meiggs and Raubitschek. M. N. Tod has been, as always, most helpful. But I wish to acknowledge at once that any rash statements are my own.

² *Klio*, XV (1917/18), pp. 193-195, with a photograph taken from a squeeze on page 193.

³ Eugene Schweigert, *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), pp. 170-171, with a photograph of the stone on page 170.

stone with Philip has been assumed from the context of line 4: ἐπὶ τ]ἐγ γέν Φι[λίππο. Bauer suggested that this was part of the provision by which the Athenians promised to come to the aid of Philip if an enemy marched against his territory and he thought he could determine a length of line of forty-four letters by restoring lines 3 and 4 as follows:

[κατὰ τὰδε χουμμαχίαν εἶ]ναι Ἀθεν[αίοις καὶ Φιλίπποι· ἐ]
[ἀν πολέμοι ἴοσιν ἐπὶ τ]ἐγ γέν Φι[λίππο ----]

There are two principal objections to this interpretation, one of which was recognized by Bauer and the other of which was first commented upon by Schweigert. Bauer noted that the proper phraseology for the description of Philip's territory should have been ἐπὶ τ]ἐγ γέν τὸν Φι[λίππο;⁴ but he assumed that in this instance the definite article before the name of Philip had been accidentally omitted. In our opinion the investigation should have proceeded from this point along other lines to see whether some explanation could be found that would permit the retention of idiomatic Greek, even at the expense of sacrificing the name of Philip. A grammatical anomaly just at the place where the letters phi iota give the only reason to believe that Philip is in any way concerned with the inscription is a warning that perhaps the entire interpretation is wrong. The second objection, observed by Schweigert, is that the lines are best restored with a length of twenty-five letters. The commitment for refusing to entertain guerrillas and for not themselves engaging in guerrilla warfare, which both Bauer and Schweigert applied to the Athenians, comes in lines 7 ff. and follows a well-known pattern for which the best example is now *I. G.*, I², 87.⁵ Schweigert was thus enabled to space the letters of the invocation [θ ε] ο [ι] evenly across the top of the stele, each letter falling at an interval of eight spaces from its neighbor as the spaces were numbered in

⁴ ἐπὶ γέν τὸν Φιλίππο or ἐπὶ τὸν Φιλίππο γέν would be equally idiomatic Greek.

⁵ See the text in *Hesperia*, XIV (1945), p. 102, lines 7-11, which I would change slightly to read as follows:

--- λ[ειστὰς μὲ ἠυποδέχεσθαι μεδ' α]ὐτ[ὸς λ]έιξε[σ]
θαί μεδὲ χσ[υστρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν πολ]εμίον ἐπ' ['Ἀθε]
ναίος μεδὲ [στρατιὰν ὀφελῆν τῶν πολεμ]ίον μεδὲ χρ[έμ]
ατα παρέχε[ιν τοῖς πολεμίοις μεδ' ἐς τὰ τ]είχε ἠυποδέχ
εσθαι φρ[ορὰν τῶν πολεμίον μεδεμίαν· ----]

the lines below, and the framework of the restoration was thus determined by the new and shorter length of line. But Schweigert still felt that the second line must have been a kind of heading. This is a relic of Bauer's interpretation, for there is nothing to distinguish line 2 in character from the lines that follow or to prevent its interpretation as the first clause of the inscription proper. In order to make it so, one should return to Bauer's restoration [εἰ] *vai* (or [ἐ] *vai*) in line 3 instead of reading [ὁμνῶ] *vai* as suggested by Schweigert. Indeed, the restoration [ὁμνῶ] *vai* is not in any case permissible because the text which follows is not an oath. Characteristics of an oath are the use of the first person and of the negative οὐ. On the contrary, the text which follows line 3 has been restored in the third person and the negatives are invariably μή. Moreover, the prohibition of guerrilla warfare may be referred with more propriety to the second contracting party than to the Athenians, and inasmuch as these (the second party) appear in the plural in line 8 it is clear that they were not Philip. Whatever one's interpretation of the inscription may be, it seems best to abandon this hazardous suggestion, which was put forth only tentatively by Bauer but which has become in some measure confirmed by tradition.⁶ I wish to suggest that the proposition for an agreement is stated in lines 2 and 3 in an infinitive clause ending with [---] *vai* in line 3 (though I have no explanation for the absence of the usual introductory formulae); that the obligation of the Athenians begins in the middle of line 3, is very briefly stated, and comes to its conclusion after the word γέν in line 4; and that the provision for which the other contracting party is responsible begins in line 4 with the letters phi iota, which do not refer to Philip, and continues through the rest of the preserved text. Having just indicated how hazardous it is to attempt an identification of this second contracting party on the basis of two preserved letters, I hesitate now to suggest an identification based upon no letters at all but merely upon the succinct statement of lines 3-4 that "the Athenians" are to do something to "the land." It looks indeed as if the Athenians promised almost nothing, and this would imply that they were under no obligation

⁶ It passed unchallenged by Wilhelm in his study of the document in 1939. Cf. A. Wilhelm, *Attische Urkunden*, IV, p. 34 (*Wien. Sitzb.*, CCXVII [5], 1939).

to the other contracting party except for what they themselves wished to assume. This looks like terms of harsh settlement after the subjugation of a rebellious ally. A tentative skeleton restoration follows:

	ca. 430 B. C.	ΣΤΟΙΧ. 25
	[θ	ε] ο [ι]
	[χσυνθέκας 'Αθ]εναίων [καὶ .. ⁵ ...]	
	[.. ⁵ ... τάσδε ἔ]ναι· 'Αθε[ναίος μὲν]	
	[... ⁹ ... τ]ῆς γέν· φι[λῖος δὲ ἔχ]	
5	[εν ... ⁷ ...]ίος 'Αθena[ίους καὶ τ]	
	[οἷς χσυνμμά]χοις, καὶ εὖ [ποῦν 'Αθε]	
	[ναίος καὶ λ]ειστὰς μετ' ἡ[υποδέχε]	
	[σθαι μεδὲ αὐ]τὸς λείξε[σθαι μεδ']	
	[ἐπιστρατεύεσ]θαι μετ[ὰ τὸν πολ]	
10	[εμίον ἐπ' 'Αθenaίος] μεδ[ε ... ⁶ ...]	
	[-----] ⁷	

This restoration is very tentative indeed. My main purpose has been to show that the inscription probably does not have anything to do with Philip of Macedon and that it does not contain an oath.⁸

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ON DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, AD AMMAEUM, 4.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his letter to Ammaeus, chap. 4 (I, p. 261, 3, ed. Usener-Radermacher) writes as follows: μετὰ δὲ Θούδημον ἔστιν Ἀριστόδημος ἄρχων, ἐφ' οὗ τῶν κατὰ Φιλίππου

⁷ On the analogy of the text quoted above in note 5, the continuation might read μεδ[ε στρατιάν ὀφελὲν τὸν πολεμίον μεδὲ —], not subject at any rate to Gomme's justifiable criticism of Schweigert's text (*op. cit.*, p. 202). For lines 6/7 Wilhelm suggested ε[λάν τις ἡν-][ποπέμπει λ]ειστὰς.

⁸ So far as space is concerned, one might supply by way of example [καὶ Μυτιλεναίων τάσδ' ἔ]ναι in lines 2/3 and φι[λῖος δὲ ἔ]ναι Μυτιλεναίος in lines 4/5. But there is nothing in the text to suggest any connection with Mytilene.

δημηγοριῶν ἤρξατο, καὶ λόγον ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διέθετο περὶ τῆς ἀποστολῆς τοῦ ξενικοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ τῶν δέκα φυγαδικῶν τριήρων εἰς Μακεδονίαν. The word φυγαδικῶν which Usener and Radermacher have admitted to their text has the authority only of the manuscripts MBO (γαδικῶν Ps). That it is corrupt was recognized long ago. Boehneke (*Forschungen*, p. 227) conjectured ταχικῶν, for Demosthenes (*Phil.*, I, 22) asks for ταχείας τριήρεις δέκα. Morellus had conjectured ταχειῶν even before Boehneke (cf. Usener-Radermacher, app. *ad loc.*). Boehneke, in writing ταχικῶν instead of φυγαδικῶν or γαδικῶν, was making a merely idle attempt to make the word resemble somewhat more closely the letters which we find in our manuscripts; for ταχικός is a poetic word that does not fit into the careful prose style of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

Demosthenes points in the right direction, since he adds to the words ταχείας τριήρεις δέκα the *purpose* for which these ten warships should be added to the cavalry transport ships: δεῖ γάρ, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου (scil. Φιλίππου) ναυτικόν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριήρων ἡμῖν, ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ δύναμις πλέῃ. The ten warships are to *protect* the convoy. Consequently an adjective derived from φυλάττειν is required instead of φυγαδικῶν, in order to characterize the ten warships as a protective force. I once conjectured φυλακικῶν (this adjective occurs in Plato's *Republic*), but the technical word to be found in Polybius and other Hellenistic authors is φυλακίδων, which could easily be corrupted into φυγαδικῶν, Λ and ^ being very similar. The feminine φυλακίς is especially used in connection with ναῦς (φυλακίς ναῦς, like Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις) in the military language of the Hellenistic period.

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REVIEWS.

A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE. *Épicure et ses Dieux*. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1946. Pp. xv + 134. 75 fr.

Since Epicurus rates low in our bibliographies a special welcome is due this neat little study by an able scholar; nor need it surprise anyone that it comes from France, because both France and Italy have been doing more in this field than Britain or America. It is gratifying also that the tone is sympathetic, a good example set by Bailey and Bignone.

The scope of the study is limited by its inclusion in a series on Myths and Religions and the slant of the treatment by the author's proficiency in the fields of Greek religion and Platonism. The state of religion in the time of Epicurus is handled with clarity and freshness. New light is brought to bear upon the celebration of the twentieth of each month as instituted by the founder (p. 33 and note 1), though the rest of the biographical sketch is perfunctory. It is only with the third chapter, on friendship, that the author really falls into his stride; the distinction made between Platonic and Epicurean love (pp. 42-43) is both timely and enlightening. The chapter on religion will be welcome for the abundant documentation, especially from the side of Philodemus. New clarity is achieved in the last chapter, which sets forth the opposition of Epicurus to the astral religion of Plato. The rivalry with Stoicism, posthumous to the founders of both sects, is wisely ignored.

The learning and acumen of the author, however, have not saved him from errors in this less familiar field. The statement that Epicurus studied with Nausiphanes from the age of fourteen to seventeen (p. 26) is a far-fetched inference and open to cogent objections. The duration of the cadetship at Athens is said to have been one year but Aristotle says two (*Athen. Const.*, 42). Menander, moreover, is named as a classmate (p. 26) and, since by all accounts he was at least one year older than Epicurus, the two can have been classmates most easily on the assumption that the duration of the cadetship was two years. Again, is it possible to be sure that the teaching of Pamphilus and the interval of the cadetship exerted no influence on the intellectual development of Epicurus (p. 26 and note 1)? If Epicurus ever heard lectures of Xenocrates, as Laertius states (IX, 43), it must have been in this interval, because the death of Xenocrates occurred in 314, eight years before the return of Epicurus to Athens in 306. The ephebes in the first year of their training were stationed around the Peiraeus (Aristotle, *ibid.*, 42) and could easily have attended public lectures in the city during intervals of leave. Lastly, is it justifiable to stress the years of residence in Colophon as exile (pp. 27 and 62) and must we interpret literally the unkind report that Epicurus vomited twice daily (p. 27)?

On some points the author is too trustful of tradition and of editors. It is a good plan to scan all evidence afresh. Did Epicurus really urge his pupils to flee "from every form of culture" (p. 51)?

Was it not rather "the whole programme of education"? To ascribe scorn of all culture to the sect is surely going too far. Again, must we emend the text in order to call wisdom "a mortal good" (p. 56) even though the gods delight in it? The MS reads *νοητόν*, from which we gather that wisdom is "a comprehensible good" while love or friendship is divine, that is, "it passes understanding," a better antithesis. Once more, the author, like Bailey, finds that *παρὰ-κινδυνεύσαι χάριν* "cannot mean anything" (p. 59, note 3). Why should it not mean "risk an act of kindness for the sake of gaining a friendship"? This is the meaning required. In another passage (p. 113, note 2) there is no need to emend. Usener, Bignone, and Bailey all overlook the fact that *φαντασίαν* = *ἐνάργεια*, as Sextus Empiricus tells us (Usener, frag. 247, lines 20-21); the meaning is "scorning those who concede clear vision from distances." It is a mere oversight, however, to adopt a reading in one place (p. 110) that he rejects elsewhere (p. 84 and note).

Through following tradition the author falls into the error of regarding Epicurus as "the most prolific of all writers" (p. 50). It is remarkable that this story has so long escaped scrutiny. A very little figuring reveals its absurdity. Epicurus is credited with more than three hundred rolls but the letter to Menoeceus and the *Authorized Doctrines* run to only five pages each. The letter to Pythocles is a paltry twelve. Even the longest extant, the letter to Herodotus, amounts to only twenty-five pages. Multiply by three hundred and the total is not astonishing. The Roman Varro has been credited with 620 rolls and the average of his books now extant is more than double the longest of Epicurus. The truth is that Epicurus made a fetish of brevity. What else can be the meaning of *Sententia Vaticana* 26? "We must discern that the long discourse and short one aim at the same objective." Lucretius follows the master's example: IV, 115, 176, and especially 890: *suavidicis potius quam multis versibus*.

More serious is the author's separation of the doctrine of the gods from the *Canon* and the *Physics*. It is from the *Canon* that the first logical evidence concerning the gods is to be deduced, as Cicero makes plain (*N. D.*, I, 16, 43). This evidence consists in the presence of a prolepsis or anticipation of the divine nature in the minds of all mankind. Clarification of this principle will be most speedily achieved if first we consider the prolepsis of justice, mentioned in *Authorized Doctrine*, 38. Aristotle had called man a political animal. How better could we paraphrase this than by saying with Epicurus that man is born with a prolepsis of justice? Do not both statements mean that man is predisposed by nature to follow a certain pattern of life and of conduct? If, on the contrary, we agree with the editors and our author (p. 85), who follow Laertius (X, 33) in basing the prolepsis on sensation, we are necessarily placing the abstract notion of justice on a level with the general concept of a horse. Let us now consider the gods. The prolepsis of the divine nature will also rest on the same level as the general concept of a horse, not to say a kangaroo. Surely this is absurd. Cicero rightly hammered heavily on the innateness of the prolepsis (*ibid.*, I, 16-17, 43-45).

Our author rightly discerns an affinity between Epicurus and Plato

(p. 95). With Aristotle there is a similar affinity at times. He describes with unique pleasure the network of veins "faintly sketched" in the embryo of mammals at an early stage. Nature is compared to an artist doing a mural; just as the artist's outlines are done in advance of the coloring and shading, so nature's network of veins in the embryo precedes the whole organism of flesh, organs, and bones that will be built around them (*De Gen. Animal.*, 740a, 743a). Our author and the editors are astray in rendering *ὑπεργράφη* by "engraved" (p. 85). Both the lexicon and Aristotle are against them. There can be no question of "engraving" in the case of the embryo or the artist. What Epicurus has done is to transfer the Aristotelian principle from physiology to psychology along with the telltale item of the preliminary outline. He might very well have said that the adult man's conception of the divine nature exists potentially in the newborn infant just as Aristotle declares the physical creature to exist potentially (*δυνάμει*) in the embryo (*De Gen. Animal.*, 740a, near end). If Bailey had chanced upon this line of thought he might not have been so sure that the notion of innate ideas was "wholly repugnant to Epicureanism" (*Greek Atomists*, p. 557). In reality it is fundamental to the system.

The second proof of the existence of gods is to be found in the *Physics*. It is a logical deduction from the doctrine of the infinity of the universe and Cicero points this out with a fair degree of explicitness (*N. D.*, I, 19, 50). This principle of infinitude is not confined to space and matter; it applies also in the sphere of values. If imperfection prevailed in all parts, then the universe would not be infinite. Since human beings are imperfect there must exist elsewhere a number no smaller of perfect beings and that too in an environment where the forces of conservation always prevail over the forces of destruction. The term for this principle is *isonomia*, a precious concept in Greek history. It is not "equal distribution," as Bailey turns it (*Greek Atomists*, p. 461) but "equitable division," as Cicero reads it (*N. D.*, I, 19, 50). So far is it from having anything to do with the geographical distribution of animals, such as elephants, that it represents a sort of "cosmic justice." It means that when the overall balance is struck in the operations of the universe the good and not the evil prevails. Man is imperfect but there are perfect beings for him to imitate, contemplate and adore. This may be a grim, materialistic creed but it undoubtedly embodies a sort of justice.

The failure to recognize the chief evidences for the existence of gods in the *Canon* and the *Physics* has the effect of confining proof to the data of "clear vision," a theory which Bailey has amplified and our author adopts (p. 86, note 2). This means "clear vision" of what is invisible except to the mind and under exceptional circumstances. Unhappily the evidences cited in support of this theory (*Greek Atomists*, pp. 438-440, notes) prove nothing of the kind but only afford grounds for believing that the gods are anthropomorphic. The passage of Lucretius (V, 1161-1182), in particular, was written to account for the superstitious fears of men. Moreover, the gods are there represented as performing feats that no good Epicurean could ascribe to them. Finally, even as an evidence of anthropomorphic form only minor importance is allowed the

divine visitations by Cicero (*N. D.*, I, 18, 46). The major evidence was logical, not visual.

In spite of these errors this book possesses substantial value. It can hardly be said to break new ground but it does consolidate the advance made by Bignone in his *Aristotele Perduto* (Florence, 1936). It was the special service of Bignone to set the teachings of Epicurus in opposition to those of Plato and Aristotle, which were holding the field in his day. On the side of religion our author has assembled the amplest documentation yet made available and his book abounds in judicious observations. Those scholars who still believe that Epicurus and Lucretius were tilting against windmills may profit by scanning his citations from Theophrastus, *On the Superstitious Man* (p. 72) and Plutarch, *On Superstition* (p. 77), which was written with Epicureans in mind. The mistakes of our author have arisen through following tradition and the editors. Wherever he is working out his own judgments the reader recognizes keen discernment and abundant learning. The style is clear and attractive and whoever reads part of the book will be tempted to read the whole of it.

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Philodemus: On Methods of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism. Edited with translation and commentary by PHILLIP HOWARD DELACY and ESTELLE ALLEN DELACY. Published by the American Philological Association, Philadelphia, Pa., 1941. (Philological Monographs, X.)

According to a still widely held opinion, which is propagated even by Bertrand Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy* (1945), Aristotle's logic, although quite an achievement in its time, failed to initiate a continual progress towards the "discoveries of modern logic" and was "followed by over two thousand years of stagnation" (Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 195). The adherents of this simplified view of the history of logic still believe in the necessity of fighting Aristotle's doctrine of the syllogism (*ibid.*); and, since through Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrh. Hyp.*, II, 195-197) we know of the arguments that were used by critics of Aristotle's logic in later antiquity, one may say that at least a stagnation of the views of Aristotle's opponents in this field for, cautiously speaking, over 1800 years can be taken for granted. The example for the alleged main function of the Aristotelian syllogism is still an allegedly deductive inference from what is true of "all men" (e. g., "all men are mortal") to a human individual ("Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal"); and it is still pointed out reprovingly that our belief in Socrates' mortality is not strictly and in a merely deductive way derived from a major premise that would include every single actual case (which Aristotle never asserted); and furthermore it is still emphasized that we believe in this general proposition "on the basis

of induction" (as if such premises were objectionable). At the same time Russell states that the question of our knowledge of general propositions is a very difficult one and that there are different types (according to him merely verbal ones and those based on induction). This is indeed beyond the reach of Sextus Empiricus' mind, as his examples indicate. But one can hardly say that Aristotle himself was not aware of such differences and that he was generally not able to see the difficulties of the question of the *katholou*. Many of the inadequacies of ancient and modern criticisms of Aristotle's syllogistic derive, in the opinion of this reviewer, from the constant and almost exclusive use of the example of the mortal Socrates or Cajus or "Mr. Smith" (Russell). It might well be worth while to ask why Aristotle himself never discussed the problems that even in the dumbest mind arise immediately whenever *this* example, which never occurs in Aristotle's writings, is used as if it were a typical Aristotelian syllogism.

But however this may be, it should come as a pleasant surprise to many critics of Aristotle's logic when, in the publication under review, they find documentary evidence that in later antiquity the waters of logic were stirred a little and that at least after Aristotle's time the issue of the mortality of "all men" and similar problems were indeed discussed at length and along lines that are not far removed from modern expectations. "And further"—this is the argument of an Epicurean philosopher of probably the first century B. C. in the editor's translation (pp. 101 ff.)—"the Stoics err in so far as they have not taken the trouble to understand the right method of analogical inference. Whenever we say,

Since things in our experience are of such a nature,
Unperceived objects are also of this nature *in so far as* things
in our experience are of this nature,

we judge that there is a necessary connection between an unperceived object and the objects of our experience. For example,

Since men in our experience *as men* are mortal,
If there are men anywhere,
They are mortal.

"There are four things that the words 'as such,' 'according as,' and 'in so far as,' signify:

"First . . . Second . . . Third . . . Fourth . . .

" . . . But those who attack the inference from analogy do not indicate the distinctions just mentioned, namely, how we are to take the 'according as,' as in the statement, for example,

Man as man is mortal.

"Hence they say that if the 'according as' is omitted, the argument will be inconclusive; if it is admitted, the method of contraposition is used. But we Epicureans take this to be necessarily connected with that from the fact that this has been observed to be a property of that in all cases that we have come upon, and because we have observed many varied living creatures of the same genus who have

differences in all other respects from each other, but who all share in certain common qualities (e.g., mortality). According to this method we say that man according as and in so far as he is man is mortal, on the ground that we have examined systematically many diverse men, and have found no variation in respect to this characteristic and no evidence to the contrary . . ."

I have had to quote at least part of one of many most interesting passages from the remnants of Philodemus' best preserved book on a subject of logic (Herculean papyrus No. 1065). For this should make it clear at once that if we still busy ourselves with turning over and over the notorious syllogism concerning the mortal individual we are dealing with problems that have had the full interest of Stoic and Epicurean logicians, but, for some reason, were not the problems of Aristotle's logic. Under present conditions, that is, so long as the history of ancient logic has not been rewritten, the new editors of these remnants, which are the basis of their "study in ancient empiricism," cannot be blamed for extolling the importance of their subject, not even when they quit the solid ground of the evidence in venturing a guess like: "Had the Epicurean method had more influence on subsequent philosophy, the progress of empirical method in both philosophy and science might have been much accelerated" (Foreword, p. viii).

The pitifully short story of modern research concerning this most illuminating, though difficult, ancient document of non-Aristotelian logic is adequately told by the editors in the following few lines (p. 10): "The Greek text was published by Th. Gomperz in 1865, and subsequently improved in many passages by R. Philippson. It has been the subject of two German dissertations, and it has received passing notice in a few works of a more general nature. On the whole, however, it has remained practically unknown, especially in America."¹ For many reasons, which will be fully realized only after a study of the whole book (and which, incidentally, caused this reviewer to delay his promised review almost beyond excuse), the task of getting acquainted with these Stoic-Epicurean controversies is hard indeed. But the authors have done everything in their power to provide their readers with badly needed help. In addition to the Greek text there are two introductory chapters; the authors' translation and their commentary (III); three "supplementary essays": The Sources of Epicurean Empiricism (IV); The Development of Epicurean Logic and Methodology (V); The Logical Controversies of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (VI); and a valuable Bibliography and two Indices. If this document of ancient logic should now actually reach more of those whose interests are concerned, the credit will have to go to the authors of the present new edition.

Of course, there are limitations. The presentation of the Greek text could not be final, since a reëxamination of the papyrus was, in

¹ Perhaps the interesting article "Epicurean Induction" by J. L. Stocks (*Mind*, XXXIV [1925], pp. 185-203) should be mentioned in particular, because the author states: "My treatment can claim no special novelty; it is in the main only an attempt to show that the tract deserves much more attention than it has hitherto received from students of ancient philosophy."

1941, only a hope for the future. This could not be helped and we should be glad that it has not led to an indefinite postponement of a publication of so much actual interest. But, though it may seem ungrateful, one thing must be mentioned here. The philologically trained reader cannot help feeling very uneasy, where dotted letters (*q*) occur. In this edition the dots mark "letters whose reading is uncertain." But one look at R. Philippson's article in *Rh. Mus.*, LXIV (1910), pp. 1-38, shows that, used this way, the dots cover uncertainties of very different degrees. In a case like p. 28, Col. III, line 8 even the understanding of the authors' own critical apparatus is made extremely difficult by this usage of the dot. On p. vii of the "Foreword" the authors remark: "The obscure and technical language of Philodemus' treatise has required a rather lengthy commentary." In order to avoid disappointment, the philological reader must be warned not to expect any kind of grammatical or syntactical explanation of the given Greek text beyond what may be implied in the translation and the generously repeated paraphrases. He will understand that the authors' reticence in this respect was due to regard for the largest part of the hoped-for audience, and he will resignedly suspend judgment in many actually or seemingly desperate cases, unless he has access to the older publications.

The English translation and the corresponding paraphrases and explanatory notes seem to me very readable, but the danger is, naturally, the necessary use of many traditional or modern philosophical technical terms. Epicurus' important Greek term *ἐπιλογισμός* (see Kurt v. Fritz, *Gnomon*, VIII [1932], pp. 71 ff.) should not have been translated by "inductive inference." An *ἐπιλογισμός* is preceded by an inference (or somebody else's "opinion"); but, as the authors state correctly on p. 141, "inferences concerning that which is not directly or completely experienced may be true or false." Therefore a methodical verification is required in order to decide definitely whether the preliminary inference (or given "opinion") can be established as true or not. Clearly *ἐπιλογισμός* is the mental activity that is concerned with checking up on an "inductive inference," and in so far it may be called an indispensable *part* of a "scientific" induction; but it is not itself an inductive inference, it comes "after" or "in addition to" it. The *ἐπι-* is identical with the *ἐπι-* in *ἐπιμαρτύρησις*, but has nothing to do with the *ἐπ-* in *ἐπαγωγή*. Worse, though less important, is the translation of *ἀναλογισάμενος* (Col. XXVI, 23) by "using analogies" and of *ἀναλογιζόμενος* (Col. XXVI, 39) by "forming the analogy." Though *ἀναλογία*, *ἀναλογέω* go back to *ἀνὰ λόγον*, the verb *ἀναλογίζεσθαι* does not. It means simply "to reckon up, sum up" or "to calculate, consider," as the dictionary says.

The most questionable part of the authors' achievement is their attempt to present their practically new logical material "historically." It could hardly have been otherwise; for in this field the ground is simply not yet prepared for more than provisional constructions. According to their preface, which presumably represents a last stage of their reflections on the subject, they have chosen the terms "empirical" and "rational" in order to determine the "Epicurean position advanced by Philodemus," though, as they cautiously remark, these terms "name procedures which need not be

opposed or completely distinct." On the one side there would have been "the absolutism of Plato and Aristotle," on the other side the "rampant individualism and scepticism of the Sophists and Pyrrhonists." But they believe they have discovered in the remnants of later Epicurean epistemology ("together with the critical additions of the Empirical Sceptics") at least an implicit recognition of a *via media*, on which "truth is neither necessary and absolute once and for all, nor is it wholly unattainable." This attempt to bring Epicurean methodology close to the views of "modern empiricists" seems to me to be in no way substantiated by Philodemus' treatise. Throughout all its now available sections we see the Epicurean logicians striving to prove against their Stoic opponents that their own favored method of analogical inference grants *necessary* conclusions; and has there ever been an orthodox member of the Epicurean school who would have conceded to anyone that the truth reached by Epicurus was *not* "absolute once and for all"?

The authors believe in the possibility of presenting their material "historically" while strictly claiming: "No attempt is made to give a critical evaluation of the philosophical issues involved" (p. vii). To this reviewer it seems, on the one hand, that their presentation of the material is strongly influenced by a certain (perhaps not critical) predilection for a certain kind of "empiricism"; and on the other hand it is his conviction that in the field of philosophy a definite advance towards historical understanding will be possible only when those who have access to the primary sources abandon their strange reluctance to face with their own mind the "philosophical issues involved." For instance, one might say that the Epicurean logicians were rather good in dealing with the problem of the mortality of "all men" (though exaggerating the "necessity" in such cases), but that they were not so good when they tried to reduce the necessity in a case like *εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν* to their favored epistemological principle and obscured the issue by a clever use of the equivalent term "inconceivability." Then, of course, one would ask why Epicureans were so intolerant of rational necessity, and why, on the other hand, the Stoic logicians felt bound to attack the respectable part of Epicurean logic, the existence of which obviously cannot be denied any longer. Or, considering what is characteristic of both Stoic and Epicurean logic, namely "the common view that appearances are the signs of the unperceived,"² one would ask, who it was who for the first time saw the logic of the syllogism, Aristotle's invention, onesidedly from this angle, and in what connection he thus originated the belief that a syllogism to be useful must reveal in its conclusion something unperceived or unknown before. In later antiquity this belief invaded even the interpretation of Aristotle's logic (Pauly-Kroll-Mittelhaus, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Syllogistik," IV A, cols. 1065 f.), but Aristotle was not responsible for this. Was it Nausiphanes? Or a Stoic philosopher? And what was the part of Diodorus Cronos? When Anaxagoras coined his famous *ὅψις τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα*, he did so, in my opinion, in sharp reply to some stupidly sceptical remark against trying to know the imperceptible, and it was this that impressed Democritus (*Gnomon*, XII

² Bromios in Philodemus' book, Col. XXVII, 30 f.: τὸ κοινὸν ὅτι τὰ φανερὰ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεῖα.

[1936], pp. 167 f.). But even if both men wanted only to express the modest belief that "appearances may be used as indications of the imperceptible" (the De Lacys, p. 124), it is still a long way from there to "the real issue between the Stoics and Epicureans," namely "the validity of inference from appearances to the unperceived," which is ably presented by the authors in their last chapter (pp. 157 ff., the quotation from pp. 160 f.). The numerous questions that here arise for us are undeniably relevant to a historical understanding, but they cannot even be asked without some attempt at "critical evaluation of the philosophical issues involved." And, in conclusion, I might add to my already lengthy comment, I doubt whether this complex of problems can be discussed adequately in terms of "empirical," "rational," and "*via media*."

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HAROLD CHERNISS. *The Riddle of the Early Academy*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1945. Pp. 104.

The main doctrine of these three lectures is that Plato taught practically nothing except what is in his dialogues. He did not teach that the Ideas were Numbers, nor that these Idea-Numbers could be analysed into a formal element consisting of the One and a material element consisting of the Indefinite Dyad of the Great-and-Small. He did not teach that between Ideas and Things there is an intermediate realm of Mathematics. The complicated and dreary "unwritten doctrines" attributed to Plato by many scholars, and most monumentally by Léon Robin, never were believed by anyone.

The original reasons for the belief in these unwritten doctrines were some very strange statements about Plato by Aristotle. But, says Professor Cherniss, the theory has now been elaborated so that it is not even what Aristotle says. And what Aristotle does say should be rejected because (1) there are inconsistencies in his accounts of Plato's views, (2) there are statements of his about Plato's dialogues which we can know to be false by reading the dialogues, and (3) we can often see in Aristotle's text the fallacious and unhistorical modes of reasoning by which he metamorphosed some doctrine of Plato's dialogues into a monster. "Aristotle is one of those who cannot be refuted by an author's words because he is sure that the author was unable to say what he really thought."

Aristotle identified Plato's Ideas with numbers by the following reasoning:

Because he believed that the essence of one is to be a principle of number and because he took diaeresis to be meant as a universal ontological scheme in which the more specific ideas are derived from the more general, he felt it to be a necessary inference that, since the One is a principle of all ideas, all the ideas must be numbers.

Plato's ideal numbers [however] are just what mathematicians call the series of natural numbers. The *Phaedo* and the *Republic*

show that this conception was the consequence of applying to numbers the general principle according to which a unique idea was posited for every phenomenal multiplicity and that it could not have depended upon any notion that all ideas are numbers which are generated or derived from certain ultimate principles.

Cherniss confirms his view that Plato never believed in Ideal Numbers by a reconstruction of Speusippus' reason for abandoning the Ideas. Speusippus rejected the Ideas, he finds, because he thought them incompatible with the method of diaeresis and preferred to retain the latter. But the Ideas that were incompatible with diaeresis were not Ideal Numbers; they were the Ideas of animal and man and ox, the Ideas of the dialogues. Similarly, a study of Xenocrates' theory leads Cherniss to conclude that Xenocrates too knew of no Platonic doctrine of Ideas other than that in the dialogues.

Plato could not make the One the highest principle and derive all other Ideas from it, for he made Being and Identity and Difference just as extensive as the One. The view that he did arises from Aristotle's identifying the One with Being. "Yet Aristotle reveals that this identification is an inference of his own—an inference, moreover, which is based upon his own [non-Platonic] assumption that the ideas must be related as genera and species."

In the third lecture Cherniss asks what happened in Plato's Academy. We have very little evidence, he finds. The fragment from Epicrates is partly "a patent imitation of a similar scene in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes." But Plato appears to have influenced astronomers and mathematicians in the Academy, not as a mathematician himself, but as an intelligent critic of method. His criticism was guided by his desire to make mathematics serve as a preparation for philosophy. If we regard the *Republic* as evidence, we must infer that mathematics and dialectic were the only subjects studied in the Academy, and that dialectic was not studied by persons under thirty. "It is well to recall that, when Plato died, Aristotle was only thirty-seven years old!" No physics or natural science was studied. Aristotle's language shows that he knew of no Platonic physics except the *Timaeus*, and that Plato had given him no explanation of that dialogue. No orthodox metaphysics was taught in the Academy, and the members were not expected to subscribe to the theory of Ideas. Speusippus, who disbelieved it, was made Plato's successor. There were perhaps two doctrines that Plato did try to inculcate, however, for:

There are two things in which Plato is more interested than in the theory of ideas itself, for that theory is, after all, only his way of satisfying these two requirements: first, that there is such a thing as mind which can apprehend reality, and second, that this reality which is the object of knowledge has absolute and unqualified existence.

These and many other interesting suggestions are set out by Cherniss, with immense learning of the subject, in a style stuffed with references and inferences and unfortunately but little easier to follow than his two published volumes on Aristotle's criticism.

The method of exposition adopted leaves too small a space for the fundamental means of supporting Cherniss' hypotheses, which is to show as far as possible just how Aristotle got from Plato's dialogues to his own version of Plato's views. I heartily welcome his conclusions, and hope they are true, as will many other lovers of Plato. (I wish I could estimate the force of his argument that *De Anima* 404 b 19-27 does not refer to Plato but to Xenocrates.) But I confess to thinking that Cherniss' conclusions could be recommended in a way that would be much less fatiguing and more persuasive. The mass of erudition intimidates but does not convince. While it is very probable that Aristotle often made mistaken inferences and abstractions from what he read in Plato's dialogues, the reader hesitates to commit himself to Cherniss' conclusions out of an uneasy fear that Cherniss too is making erroneous or at least overconfident abstractions and inferences from the dialogues. The account of Communion in the *Sophist*, for example: are we so sure that this is an account of a relation among ideas? It does not seem evident to me that Plato there "makes it clear that the participation of one idea in another is entirely different from the participation of particular men, for example, in the idea of man," or that he intended the relations there discussed to be understood as "being really those of implication and compatibility."

Cherniss would be more convincing if he were less positive and more conciliatory, if "undoubtedly" were changed to "probably" and phrases like "the madness born of stubborn insolence" were considerably softened. His manner towards other scholars is approaching Housman's magisterial contempt. His immense and exact knowledge is also reminiscent of Housman. In style, however, there is no resemblance.

The printing is very pleasant and clean, except for the few words of Greek. The Greek type is sloping, vacillating in value, and uncertain in alignment.

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KARL KERÉNYI. *Hermes der Seelenführer: Das Mythologem vom männlichen Lebensursprung*. Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1944. Pp. 111. Fr. 6.50. (*Albae Vigiliae*, Neue Folge, Heft 1.)

This monograph opens a new series not only of the *Albae Vigiliae* but also of studies by Professor Kerényi who in the years 1939-1941 devoted himself to the development of a philological, psychological, and philosophical method of contemplating ancient divinities, a mythological method in place of that which is truly theological and which therefore leaves the concept of the gods of the Greek world always somewhat limited. The new mythological method would render the ancient gods free of contradictions and titanic elements, reveal them in their essential natures, and so bring them before us more nearly in the meaning which they held for the Greeks.

With this object Kerényi begins his discussion by asking "Was

erschien den Griechen als Hermes," a question which he finds answered only partially in the description of Hermes by Walter F. Otto in his study *Die Götter Griechenlands*. Although Otto recognizes that there must be a world in which Hermes is the ruling spirit, a world which is the source of the divinity which Homer knew and later Greeks and Romans continued to worship as Hermes-Mercury, Kerényi finds that Otto has not presented to us the moving spirit of this world in his highly personal totality. Only such a presentation would supply the unquestionable answer to Kerényi's question.

To recover the idea of Hermes in its entirety Kerényi first studies the Hermes of the classical tradition, as presented to us in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*. The heroic world of the *Iliad*, heavy with the goal of a death which is born with each hero, unavoidable, conclusive, is characterized by Achilles. Life is individual and conforms with the one in whom it is inherent. When Hermes appears in the *Iliad* he comes forward as a god of fruitfulness and growth, of gentleness and friendliness, who gladly accompanies someone, hears someone, or makes one unseen, and who is above all the master thief. The travel-world of the *Odyssey*, being a world in which life is not brought into sharp contrast with a single, unavoidable death, but rather a world of lives which are filled with ever-present death and so an in-between world, is more comparable to the world of Hermes, and more congenial to him. Thus here we find Hermes the messenger, and Hermes the conductor of souls, as well as Hermes the friend and rescuer of heroes. Odysseus, the *πολύτροπος* man who characterizes the world of the *Odyssey*, is by nature hermetic and indeed through his grandfather Autolycus is descended from the cunning, resourceful god. But in the classical tradition the work in which the world of Hermes is most clearly seen is the *Hymn to Hermes*, because here the god himself is hero. Yet Kerényi finds here also not so much a new aspect of the god as a deepening of that already perceived. In a section by section study of the *Hymn* Kerényi considers how Hermes' nature—and hence the world of Hermes—is revealed by the stolen loves of Zeus and Maia in the night time, by the epithets given to the new-born child, by the early deeds of the god himself, and finally by the recognition of Hermes among the Olympians. The reconciliation of Hermes and Apollo he finds highly significant, especially in the problematical reference of the latter to Hermes as οἶον δ' εἰς Ἀἶδην τετελεσμένον ἄγγελον εἶναι which on the basis of τετελεσμένον Kerényi interprets as clearly referring to Hermes' appointment as messenger and guide to Hades by virtue of a process of selection or initiation. This passage, Kerényi believes, points beyond the classical to an equally old mystery tradition.

In connection with the literary picture of Hermes Kerényi considers his association with Night which that tradition knows—Hermes is the Companion of Night (*Hymn* 290)—and which arises from recognition of the many traits and qualities which the two divinities have in common. Yet in the world of Night all the aspects of Hermes cannot be discovered and the passive nature of Night separates it essentially from the active world of Hermes.

From the classical tradition therefore a true, yet not complete, understanding of Hermes is derived: the essence is still lacking, and

the principle which unites the whole hermetic range of activity from phallic shamelessness to the gentle guide of both the living and the dead into one world is yet to be determined. To discover this principle Kerényi turns to those aspects of antiquity which show Hermes in closest relation to the sources of life and death.

Of these the first is Hermes' relation to Eros who shares in many of his activities and who according to one tradition was a son of the Olympian. As a freer of the spirit Eros is more limited; yet there is a suggestion for the understanding of the idea of Hermes in the fact that Eros in his nature includes both the phallic and the spiritual. In his relationship with the goddesses—the nymphs, Artemis, Aphrodite, Brimo, Hecate—the idea of Hermes becomes even more clear: as these in their varying forms represent the eternal feminine, so he represents the eternal masculine. And Hermes as the male source of life is found in the Samothracian mysteries, of which the holy story, as Herodotus says (II, 51), explains the familiar ithyphallic representation of the god. As the eternal male, the source of life, contents the eternal female with itself and the continuation of itself, the child, it is a duality, at once father and son; so it is that in the Samothracian mysteries we have two Hermes-Cabiri, the begetter and the begot. So too if the male is the source of life, the seed is the soul, and immortality is looked upon as the male. Thus from Hermes the pre-Greek Cabiric mystery god, at once the source of soul and the possessor of soul, comes Hermes the psychopompos and messenger, the mediator between the realms of the living and the dead.

The eternal male, at once phallic and spiritual, is therefore the principle that unites all the varying aspects of the world of Hermes, and Kerényi concludes his investigations by considering how the depths in Hermes' nature are revealed in ancient practices and monuments. Of the festivals of Hermes little is known, for he was venerated as the secret source of human existence: there were few temples to Hermes, for he was worshipped above all where men lived and died. The Cretan festival at which the masters served the slaves (Athenaeus, VI, 263 F and XIV, 639 B) expressed the serving spirit which is hermetic: the ritual of the Kriophoros at Tanagra, a highly significant form, recalled the pre-historic concept of Hermes the ram-god, begetter of the holy child of the mysteries, to which Pausanias refers (II, 3, 4). In art in the common association of Hermes with Silenus and the Sileni Kerényi finds the most harmonious expression of the two sides of Hermes' character; for if, as well they may, the Sileni simply express the open, freely-giving source of life, are not Hermes and Silenus one and the same? Both in their own ways are bringers forth of life from the dark.

Any study which brings ancient thought into clearer understanding is always welcome and valuable. Whether Kerényi's provocative study simplifies the complexity of the nature of the god Hermes, however, remains in doubt. He has properly drawn the material for his analysis from all aspects of ancient culture so to give a better rounded treatment of the whole. Yet often his carefully ordered reasoning seems tenuous, and many of his conclusions are based on earlier suggestions which may not meet with general agreement; so his treatment of Hermes as a mystery-god, as the father-son Cabir.

Certainly Hermes was worshipped in the inner circle of the Samothracian mysteries as Hermes Cadmilos, yet always fourth to the other Cabirs.¹ Again at times Kerényi seems to seek and find in his witnesses evidence for his thesis, as, for example, his interpretation of the Homeric epithets Argeiphontes, ἀράκτητα, and ἐπιούριος, all words of wholly unknown meaning, as pointing to a mild, swift god of death. Other times his preoccupation leads him to neglect the more obvious. Is not Farnell right in interpreting the Cretan festival as celebrating a worship which belonged originally to a primitive population who were conquered by later immigrants,² and the practice of the masters serving the slaves as arising from a hesitation on the part of the invaders to offend a powerful local deity?

In format the book is attractive and remarkably free from misprints, of which there seems to be only one, on page 86 where Lysadra should read Lysandra. The quotations of passages from the *Odyssey* and the *Hymn to Hermes* in German verse translation is apparently in conformity with the desire of the editors to make the series *Albae Vigiliae* useful to anyone interested in the study of humanities as well as to specialists. Yet might it not have been helpful at least to have made the Greek texts which Kerényi uses (for the *Hymn* he uses the Sikes and Allen edition of 1904 rather than the revised Allen, Halliday and Sikes edition of 1936) easily available? The numerous references to the author's previous publications are notable.

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FRANZ STOESSL. *Der Tod des Herakles: Arbeitsweise und Formen der antiken Sagendichtung.* Zürich, Rhein-Verlag, 1945. Pp. 128.

This book investigates the literary life of a folk-tale. An author who retells a folk-tale does not have perfect freedom; his imagination must work within the limits set by the traditional material. He may add or remove minor characters, and alter motives, but the main facts of the story must not be changed.

In this case the unalterable fact is the death of Heracles on the pyre on Mt. Oeta. Stoessl traces the development of the story from a form which may be pre-Homeric through Archilochus, Panyassis, Sophocles, Bacchylides, Ovid, and Seneca, not to mention lesser writers. In the discussion of the varied forms of the story he makes many interesting observations, e.g. the way in which Sophocles makes Deianeira the center of interest, while in Seneca the central figure is Hercules.

Unfortunately the usefulness of the book is lessened by the extravagance of unsupported conjecture which marred his earlier works, *Die Trilogie des Aischylos* (see *A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], p. 122) and

¹ F. Lenormant in Daremberg et Saglio, I, p. 759; L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States*, V, p. 16.

² Farnell, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 8-9.

Apollonios Rhodios: Interpretationen zur Erzählungskunst und Quellenverwertung (see *A. J. P.*, LXIV [1943], p. 467). His chief "discovery" is that there was a pre-Sophoclean version in which Heracles won Deianeira from Achelous against her will. She always disliked Heracles and gave herself willingly to Nessus. From Nessus she received the poisoned blood, and knew that it was poison and not a love-charm. The "envenom'd robe" was intended to kill Heracles. In this version Heracles had his revenge by killing Deianeira. This story is derived by Stoessl from Dio Chrysostomus, 60, 1, who raises the query why Archilochus in his narrative of Deianeira and Nessus made Deianeira sing a long solo (*παρῳδοῦσαν*). According to Stoessl this was to lull the suspicions of Heracles. To be sure Dio says that Deianeira was "forced" (*βιάζεσθαι*) by Nessus. This difficulty is avoided by Stoessl in a sentence which is worth quoting verbatim: "... *βιάζεσθαι* scheint kaum mehr zu bedeuten als *βιβεῖν* der att. Komödie." This is an interpretation sufficiently startling to require some evidence. None is given.

Stoessl thinks that he finds many traces of this older version in the *Trachiniae* of Sophocles. One will suffice to illustrate the method. In lines 1107-1111 Heracles expresses a desire to kill Deianeira; it is a passage quite in character and appropriate to the situation. To Stoessl this is an indication that Sophocles could not get out of his mind the older version in which Heracles did kill Deianeira. Such a statement imputes to Sophocles an intellectual clumsiness which is utterly alien to him. As a piece of literary criticism or Quellenforschung it borders on arrant nonsense.

Another consequence of the assumption of a pre-Sophoclean form of the story is the dating of Bacchylides, 16. In this dithyramb the poet alludes to the Sophoclean story of Heracles and treats it so sketchily that the poem would be unintelligible to an audience unacquainted with the *Trachiniae*. It follows that the *Trachiniae* must have been presented before Bacchylides wrote his poem. Stoessl places them both in the middle forties of the fifth century. There is little difficulty in placing Bacchylides as late as this; in fact, Eusebius might have been quoted in support of an even later date; but the *Trachiniae* has been regarded as a late play on stylistic grounds, and to make it the earliest extant play of Sophocles requires a great deal of demonstration. Of course none is needed if we reject Stoessl's imaginary early version of the Heracles myth.

The later chapters of the book dealing with Ovid and Seneca are much more satisfactory. Here Stoessl assumes that the Sophoclean version had become standard, and devotes himself to analyzing the changes brought about by adapting the story to the form of the erotic epistle and of rhetorical tragedy. There is a full and satisfying chapter on Seneca who Stoessl says with some justification is almost forgotten.

Stoessl is learned and ingenious. It is, therefore, a pity that his learning and ingenuity have produced so little that is good and so much that is bad.

H. M. HUBBELL.

GILBERT NORWOOD. Pindar. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1945. Pp. 302; 2 plates; 1 text fig. \$2.50. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, XIX.)

In this, the nineteenth volume of the Sather lectures delivered at the University of California, are eight lectures: I. "The Approach to Pindar"; II. "His Subjects; His Vision of the World"; III. "Views on the Life of Man"; IV. "Technique in Construction and Narrative"; V. "Diction; Symbolism"; VI. "Symbolism (Continued)"; VII. "Symbolism (Concluded)"; VIII. "Pindar on the Art of Poetry." Appendices on "Symbolism in the Second Pythian," "The Fifth Isthmian," and "Metre and Rhythm" are added. There are abundant notes for scholars at the back of the book and a good bibliography (to which add R. Lattimore, *Some Odes of Pindar in New English Versions* [Norfolk, Conn., 1942], and I. Silver, *The Pindaric Odes of Ronsard* [Paris, 1937], and magazine articles by Silver).

This treatise takes its place with the best publications on Pindar. Professor Norwood, one of the greatest living Hellenists, gives a precise, lucid, and attractive account of Pindar's poetical qualities and draws comparisons with other poets, Greek, Roman, English, German, French, and Italian. The general reader will receive a definite knowledge and appreciation of Pindar; there are some good analyses of the odes such as that of the First Pythian (pp. 101 ff.) and that of the Eleventh Pythian (pp. 119 ff.). But the book is hardly one for the general public. It is an important original contribution to Pindaric studies, especially in the emphasis on the doctrine of symbolism. This, however, is said to be Norwood's own discovery, although Verrall, Gildersleeve, and Robinson, who (*A. J. A.*, XXXVIII [1934], p. 505; *Pindar*, p. 51) pointed out that Pindar was the first to use the symbolism of the Wheel of Fortune, have recognized symbolism in Pindar.

In the Second Olympian Norwood believes (p. 132) that the Wheel of Fortune is "pictured for us in Thero's own name, the initial letter being written \oplus , a picture of the ancient four-spoked wheel." The four-spoked wheel is Attic, but there are plenty of examples of six-spoked wheels on non-Attic vases. It is inaccurate to say (p. 255) that "the scholium . . . which states that among men wheels have six spokes . . . is accordingly inaccurate for Pindar's time, at least with respect to earthly wheels." Nor was the cross-barred theta "down to the close of the fifth century . . . frequent all over the Greek world" (p. 255), and Roberts' book, now much out of date, does not say so. Both cross-barred and dotted thetas occur on ostraca of Themistocles, but after 490 the dotted theta is almost universal, and even on the cited François vase there are only three cross-barred thetas, and the usual form is the dotted theta (as early as 575-550 B. C.). The serpent column (479 B. C.), to be sure, has the cross-barred theta as Norwood says, but that is in the early Spartan alphabet. In the famous fragment of Euripides' *Theseus* (385, Nauck) the form of theta is dotted. But even so Professor Norwood is probably right on the letter being the symbol of Thero. In a mosaic at Olynthus (*A. J. A.*, XXXVIII [1934], p. 504, Fig. 2

right, pp. 505-6) alpha is used symbolically, and its symbolism for an only child is seen in a Sardis epitaph (Robinson, *Anatolian Studies Presented to Sir William Ramsay*, pp. 346-350). A letter stands for a name in Athenaeus, X, 453 ff., and in *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 429. The letter A stands for Queen Anne in Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*, I, stanza 25, and in *Canterbury Tales*, Prologue, line 161.

The book is poorly illustrated, and even on the two plates there are mistakes. The wheels on the vase in Munich (Pl. II, p. 146) are not Wheels of Fortune but racking wheels for punishment of sinners, like Ixion's wheel. Aeschylus' *Persae* (472 B. C.) is erroneously dated on p. 13 nine years instead of eight after the battle of Salamis. It is not certain that Aeschylus wrote the *Prometheus* in Sicily.

In discussing the symbolism of light, φέγγος (p. 159), where Norwood compares Matthew Arnold's *Westminster Abbey* as the one modern poem which exhibits the genuine Pindaric technique, use might have been made of L. Lyde's book *Contexts in Pindar with Reference to the Meaning of φέγγος* (Manchester, 1935), where Lyde compares Omar Khayyam's "Shaft of Light."

Norwood disagrees with most scholars that Pindar has ideas and (p. 220) singles out "if not for apology, yet for regretful mention, Professor D. M. Robinson, because strongly as I disagree with his belief that Pindar was 'a poet of eternal ideas' I owe much to the learned and vivacious book so entitled," and (p. 262) "I find myself compelled to differ from him on Pindar's ideas. But that, of course, is not to say that I fail to admire his immense learning and his fine gusto for literature." Neither Robinson nor other scholars have meant to say that Pindar was a philosopher, though Werner Jaeger does discover "a whole system of philosophy" in Pindar's discussion of ancestry and the changes of fortune in the noble families. Pindar may have little importance "in the history of human thought and civilization," but Pindar, while not a scientist, knew more than a savage about solar eclipses and is the only great poet who ever wrote a really great poem about a total eclipse (the Ninth Paean, a hyporcheme). Here is the first personification of a sunbeam. Pindar here is more realistic and faithful to fact even than Vergil, and this is a great ethical poem full of thoughts such as no savage could have, though it has all the awe and thrill of primitivism. We do not expect a scientific description. Poetry is greater and more interpretative of human thoughts and emotions than science. Such statements as (p. 46) Pindar "did not know how to think," or (p. 222) "Tupper is a more important educator than Pindar" cannot be accepted. Pindar was the first literary critic, the first to develop the dream symbol of Paris and many literary characters such as the mad priestess Cassandra and the dreaming Hecuba. He was the first to argue for the divine origin and immortality of the soul and to put forward the dictum of *σῶμα* = *σῆμα*, that the soul is the psychic double in men. He was the first to make great use of symbolism. Pindar is full of terrific thoughts and emotion (cf. the noble First Pythian, which, as Norwood himself [p. 17] says "blazes with a glory of language and sovereign imagination that . . . brings before our eyes the soul of Greek civilization and the processes of the Universe").

Pindar gives good advice about the use of wealth, about the good life, about politics, about grandeur chastened by caution, about being human. He is something more than "triumphant illumination" (p. 1). Even Norwood (p. 18) calls him "a great gentleman and a consummate man of the world." He is not "practically valueless" as Norwood (p. 1) says, but is full of moral reflections and originated many succinct ideas which have become part of the stock in trade today. Where can one get even today a better understanding of life and its purposes, a better collection of inspiring and ethical *sententiae*? Pindar speaks without fear or favor, even on politics and the need of freedom for the Greeks.

Careful reading of Robinson's *Pindar*, especially pp. 25-28, and 68, ought to refute Norwood's statement (p. 161) that "nowhere in Milton, . . . nowhere in Goethe . . . can Pindar's influence be discerned." The actual copy of Pindar used by Milton, who annotated it with copious notes, is at Harvard University, and Goethe says that Pindar's words "sind mir wie Schwerter durch die Seele gegangen." His *Wandrer's Sturmlied* surely shows Pindar's influence.

The veterans of today will agree with Pindar that

γλυκὺ δὲ πόλεμος ἀπειράτοισιν, ἐμπείρων δέ τις
ταρβεί προσιόντα νῦν
καρδίᾳ περισσῶς.

There are many other eternal maxims in Pindar which I have discussed in my *Pindar, A Poet of Eternal Ideas*. Of these many are still applicable to modern times. It is good to live with Pindar. "Who could ever count up all the joys that he hath given to others?" As Farnell says, "One's soul is brightened and strengthened by the intercourse."

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JAN ROS, S. J. De Beteekenis van de Rhetorica in de Oudheid. Nijmegen, Dekker & Van de Vegt N. V., 1945. Pp. 19.

In his inaugural address delivered at the University of Nijmegen six months after the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, Professor Ros develops many aspects of the importance of rhetoric in antiquity, but the purpose of his lecture is twofold: not only does he discuss the significance of rhetoric among the Greeks and the Romans, but he seeks also to account for the unfavorable attitude towards rhetoric which prevails today and which makes it difficult to appreciate the full meaning and value of ancient rhetoric. Ros maintains rightly that in modern times there is an unfortunate distinction between the art of speaking and the art of writing—a distinction unknown to the ancient Greeks. For them oral delivery, recitation, was the normal form of publication, for poetry as for prose, and they were not readers in our sense. As Professor Stauffer has recently stated,

modern readers have "had little practice in taking in through the ear esthetically ordered words. The eye has displaced the ear as the instrument for literary communication."¹ In ancient times the ear was all-important; it was, as Ros says, more sensitive and more receptive to artistic features. A literary work, to be enjoyed, had to be heard; "men schrijft niet, zooals wij, om gelezen, maar om gehoord te worden, en daarom schrijft men zoo kunstvol mogelijk" (p. 7).

The oral nature of Greek literature and the close relationship between ancient literature and rhetoric lead Ros to a brief survey of the use of rhetoric by the dramatists and historians. He points out that no literary work in the fourth or even the fifth century can be fully understood unless one considers the influence of τέχνη ῥητορική (p. 9). The importance of rhetoric for the training of the young, for παιδεία, is treated at some length. Beginning with the sophists, the art of speaking becomes the means of training and disciplining the spirit.² Ros summarizes the work of Protagoras and Gorgias, and justly devotes more space to Isocrates, "de uitvinder van het schoolopstel en de declamatie" (p. 13), for whom τὸ εὖ λέγειν, correct speech, must be accompanied by correct thought and action.³ The influence of rhetorical studies is traced through the Roman period, and Ros shows that Cicero, combining philosophy and rhetoric, placed rhetoric above all other branches of knowledge.

Ros admits that there is little originality in much that he says; he presents, however, certain conclusions which he feels should be stressed: 1) the ancients did not distinguish between a Greek and a Roman rhetoric, and 2) theory and practice likewise should not be separated; the Greeks by ῥήτωρ meant practical orator as well as theoretical;⁴ 3) rhetoric was not a fixed system but a phenomenon which changed and developed through the centuries. Above all, in antiquity, "rhetoric was no mere literary form, but a way of life with a very great influence upon statesmanship, literature, and education" (p. 17). Ros points out, somewhat bitterly, that modern technique has made it possible for the spoken word to lead and mislead an entire nation, and, stressing the love of liberty among the Greeks and Romans, concludes with an impassioned plea for freedom of speech and freedom of thought.

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¹ D. A. Stauffer, *The Nature of Poetry* (New York, 1946), p. 13. Stauffer adds, "it is quite possible that the radio, some day in the future, may help to restore the enjoyment of poetry as a verbal pattern of meaningful sounds."

² Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, I (New York, 1945), p. 317: "Today, the Greek system of higher education, as built up by the sophists, dominates the entire civilized world."

³ See C. T. Murphy, "Isocrates and Education for Political Leadership," *Class. Bull.*, XXI (1944-45), pp. 54 ff.

⁴ The Romans distinguished between *rhetor* and *orator*; Demosthenes, the ῥήτωρ κατ' ἐξοχὴν, was for the Romans an *orator* (p. 17).

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HORACE'S FIRST ROMAN ODE.

If anyone were to wonder whether the first six odes of Book III were regarded as a unit by the poet himself his doubts would be dispelled by the four opening lines of the first ode which clearly introduce not this poem only but a series of poems: *carmina non prius audita*. The plural must be taken literally. Throughout the whole group of poems we are listening to the solemn and inspiring message of the *Musarum sacerdos* aiming to fill Rome's youth with a new pride and a new consciousness of its mission and obligations. That the cycle of "Roman Odes" was written at the suggestion of Augustus is a gratuitous assumption but that these poems have sprung from the poet's deep and serious concern over the political prospects of his country—*nunc desiderium curaue non levis*—is a fact too obvious to need proof or discussion. Curiously, the only poem of the group whose political character and purpose may be questioned is the first—the same that opens with the stanza announcing *carmina non prius audita*. In contrast to the others, *Ode* III, 1 is "philosophical" rather than political: while the others relate the moral issues with which they deal to the state this one remains definitely within the sphere of "private ethics." It is built around the realization that wealth and ambitions contribute nothing to a man's peace of mind, that a modest style of life and contentment with little are a much surer way to happiness, and if any ideas in Horace's *Odes* can be regarded as a true expression of the poet's own approach to life and the goal of life these are certainly among them. These are the ideas which enabled Horace to find his own self in the *Satires*, which accompany him from the *Satires* into the *Odes* and which finally reappear in many of

his *Epistles* where as a matter of fact they show but few traces of having passed through a much nobler poetic genre.¹

Aspirations—also political aspiration—are futile, distinctions illusory because Death changes inequalities to equality.² This thought is familiar to us from many other odes in which Horace is speaking as a pupil of Hellenistic philosophers and moralists, not at all as *vates* of the Augustan Empire.³ We need only look at the next ode (III, 2) to realize that the “patriotic” approach to Death is quite different.⁴ And does not the reference at the end of *Ode* III, 1 to the *vallis Sabina*⁵ remove the last doubt that this time too Horace is expounding his private philosophy of life? He seems to be urging the young Romans to strive for their individual happiness—in the same way in which he himself has found his—rather than helping them to become devoted citizens of the new Rome which Augustus is anxious to build up.

It is probably this unique quality of *Ode* III, 1⁶ which has given rise to some theories. I do not know whether Warde Fowler felt a discrepancy between the proem and the content of this ode. Noticing that the first stanza is meant to be an introduction to the whole group and that there is nothing in the body of the poem that echoes, or in any way refers to, this stanza he threw out the suggestion that “this curious little preface was placed where it is when the six odes were collected” and proceeded to assert that “the first ode might begin quite naturally and after Horace’s familiar manner with the fifth line.”⁷

¹ *Epist.*, I, 7, 27, *ire tamen restat Numa quo devenit et Ancus* may be mentioned although the closest parallel to it is found in *Odes*, IV, 7 (15), a poem which is likely to be later than the epistle. Eduard Fraenkel, *Sitzb. Heidelb. Akad.*, 1933, p. 5, n. 3, compares *Epist.*, I, 1, 68 ff., 11, 22 ff. and a few other passages with *Odes*, III, 29, 44 ff.

² Lines 9-15.

³ See below, p. 347.

⁴ *Dulce et decorum*, etc. (III, 2, 13 ff.). Cf. also III, 5, 13 ff., IV, 9, 51 f.

⁵ To be sure, Horace speaks of himself also in the fourth “Roman Ode” (lines 5 ff.), yet in spite of “biographical” details the Horace of that ode is very different from the man of whom the last stanza of our poem gives us a glimpse. He is identical with the Horace of our first stanza. Cf. Giorgio Pasquali, *Orazio Lirico* (Bari, 1920), p. 667.

⁶ Cf. Richard Heinze, *Vom Geiste des Römertums* (Leipzig, 1936), p. 226.

⁷ *Roman Essays and Interpretations* (Oxford, 1920), p. 211. See also

Evidently if Warde Fowler is right the poem need not have been written as one of the "Roman Odes"; it might be a "private" poem comparable to, say, *Nullus argento color est* or *Otium divos rogat*. To be sure, III, 1 has no individual addressee and it would be awkward to suppose that the Horatian vocative was excised when Horace decided to use the ode for a grander purpose and that the gap was somehow covered up. Fortunately we need not enter upon such speculations, for Warde Fowler's theory cannot survive a serious examination. According to him, line 5 "would be a beginning" in "Horace's familiar manner." Yet, where, it may be asked, does one find in the corpus of Horace's poetry an ode recommending moderation of man's desires that begins with verses comparable to

Regum timendorum in proprios greges
Reges in ipsos imperium est Jovis
Clari giganteo triumpho
Cuncta supercilio moventis.

Clearly, the poetic diction has here been raised to a *ῥῆσος* practically unparalleled in the first three books of *Odes*—except for the group of poems of which we are speaking. The monumental quality of the diction is in keeping with the announcement of *carmina non prius audita* as well as with Horace's self-introduction as *Musarum sacerdos*. Warde Fowler's fundamental mistake was to neglect the evidence afforded by the style—the "form"—of the poem. The same poetic mood and the same confident and exalted feeling that inform the first stanza also inspire the others; all bear witness to the poet's disdain for fashions and fads, and their solemn wording keeps up the *Pathos der Distanz*—to use a Nietzschean phrase—which the first stanza creates by its use of awe-inspiring religious language.⁸

This means that whatever view one may take of the origin of the other "Roman Odes" and of the growth of the series as

Willy Theiler, *Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswiss. Kl.*, XII (1935-36), pp. 276 f., who plays with the idea that this ode originally had a different poem.

⁸ On the style of the ode see further pp. 350 ff. below. It seems arguable that Horace tones down his diction somewhat where he speaks of the *somnus agrestium lenis virorum* (lines 21 ff.), making it—in conformity with the subject—more *lene*, less *δαιμόν*, as Greek writers on style might say.

such⁹ the first must have been conceived as the poem that was to head the series since its first lines which are an organic part of it actually open and announce the series. The plea for a moderation of man's worldly ambitions was to be the first part of Horace's grand message to the nation.

It is probable that the reader of Horace who approaches these odes naively and without knowledge of the scholarly controversies feels, more or less vaguely, the significance of this arrangement. What we shall try to do on the following pages is to bring the rational approach into harmony with the instinctive responses. If rightly interpreted, the ode should help not a little towards a better understanding of Horace's personality,—one might almost say, of his dual personality inasmuch as some of our contemporaries appear to know two different Horaces, almost at war with each other: on the one side the Horace of the Sabine farm, a confirmed individualist spending most of his time in self-education, on the other the *vates*—or propagandist—of the Augustan Empire.¹⁰ Before the question "which is the true Horace?" becomes an obsession with us it may be well to consider what kind of clue our ode offers to the intrinsic connection and relationship between the two sides of his personality which modern criticism has done its best to split apart.

To see *Ode* III, 1 against the right background and in the right perspective, certain facts concerning the relation between Horace's poetry and philosophy should be borne in mind. It has already been said that the idea of being satisfied with little and renouncing the unreasonable ambitions to which most men are slaves forms the core of Horace's personal philosophy. It is this idea which, adapted to a variety of situations and settings, provides time and again the theme for his satires.¹¹ When

⁹ Cf. the judicious discussion of the problem by R. Heinze, *op. cit.*, pp. 213 ff. Heinze also gives a brief history of the question, p. 215.

¹⁰ See for the latest statement of an opinion L. P. Wilkinson's attractive book *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1945), pp. 64 ff., 82 ff. Opposite sides on the question are taken by L. Dalmaso, *L'Opera di Augusto e la posizione artistica di Orazio* (Turin, 1934) and E. Turolla, *Orazio* (Florence, 1931; see p. 6, n. 1 for references to some other appraisals and to a divergence of opinions). See also for an extreme position (Horace as *vates*) A. Y. Campbell, *Horace, A New Interpretation* (London, 1924), pp. 26 ff., 56 ff., 101 ff., and *passim*.

¹¹ *Sat.*, I, 1; 4; 6; II, 2; 3; 5; 6; 7. A subject closely related to ours,

Horace began to write odes Moderation was one of the subjects for which he could find little or no precedent in Alcaeus, Sappho, and Anacreon. The tradition of Greek lyrics, however, determines the form and style even of those poems whose topics are not legitimized by the authority of these great names but reflect an essential phase of Horace's own *βίος*.¹² Technical jargon being unsuited and the illustrations used by the diatribe not dignified enough, Horace had to create a language which should be concrete and vigorous and at the same time adequate to the ethical doctrine. The drastic illustrations, the humorous bon-hommie, and the colloquial idiom of the *Satires* had to give way to impressive symbols, to grave and solemn stateliness, to majestic and sonorous diction. In the *Odes*, there is no *ingens frumenti acervus*, no *stragula vestis*, *tinearum et blatearum epula*, no *uncta satis pingui . . . oluscula lardo*.¹³ The whole array of homely *suppelles* which a satire enumerates¹⁴ is in *Ode* II, 16, 13 f. represented by the *paternum salinum*. A passage like *Sat.* I, 6,

"Horace and the Doctrine of the Mean," has been treated by Whitney J. Oates in *Classical Studies Presented to Edward Capps* (Princeton, 1936), pp. 260 ff.

¹² Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin, 1913), p. 313. More than any other Roman author Horace thinks of his life as having a characteristic "form" and pattern. When he describes himself as poet or as lover he is apt to think in terms of certain symbols and ideologies which by tradition belonged to these types of life, yet when he really speaks of himself—not as poet, lover, farmer, philosopher, but simply as Quintus Horatius Flaccus—he gives us no ideology nor a mere *vita*, *Lucili ritu* (cf. *Sat.*, II, 1, 32 ff.) but a *βίος*, i. e. the account of a life organized and consistently lived in agreement with certain basic valuations. Nothing is more characteristic of the extremely strong hold which Greek ways of thinking had acquired over his mind.

¹³ *Sat.*, II, 3, 111 and 118; 6, 64. However, *ingentes acervi*—without *frumenti*—occurs at *Odes*, II, 2, 23 f. where these words are separated by a new coinage (*oculo inretorto*) *Graeco de fonte* (*ἀμείδιον περρος*) which is meant to ennoble the diction, although J. Wight Duff, *A Literary History of Rome to the Close of the Golden Age*, p. 538, calls it a "lapse." The passage is clearly an echo of the *Satires*.

¹⁴ *Sat.*, I, 6, 116 ff. Contrast also I, 6, 114 ff. There is no parallel in the *Satires* to the passage (*Odes*, III, 29, 33 ff.) *cetera fluminis ritu feruntur*, etc. In the *Epistles*, style, tone and *ἦθος* are again different. In *Epist.*, I, 1 the desire for gain is actually described as a trait of the Roman national character (cf. lines 42 ff. and especially lines 53 ff., 70 ff.; see also *Epist.*, II, 3, 323 ff.).

68 ff.: *si neque avaritiam neque sordis nec mala lustra obiciet vere quisquam mihi, purus et insons . . . si et vivo carus amicis* has its more august analogue in *Ode* III, 29, 54 ff.: *mea virtute me involvo probamque pauperiem sine dote quaero*. Some of the topics which had figured in the *Satires*, e.g. the *cura* of the wealthy miser or the *frumenti quantum metit Africa*¹⁵ could with slight modifications be admitted into the *Odes*¹⁶ but the modifications even if purely stylistic usually have the effect of investing the motif with greater dignity, of rendering the accents firmer and severer, and of transfiguring factual elements into symbols—for it is by symbolism more than by any other device that Horace succeeds in securing for his abstract subject matter something of the vividness and reality in which his models have excelled.¹⁷ In the *Odes* “familiar” detail and features of day-to-day life are kept at a minimum; instead, Life is seen in its entirety and not infrequently against the background of Death, who in the *Satires* never appears but whose *Necessitas* may at any moment be conjured up in the *Odes*.

For our purpose, however, it is not sufficient to realize that the theme of Moderation and Contentment with Little was remoulded in accordance with the character of the *Odes*. We must go a step further. The circumstances of the time and the nature of the new genre which Horace had chosen might easily prompt him to give his subject a new turn and see it in relation to a new sphere, the Roman state, instead of always referring it to the question of private happiness. For a return to a simple style of life and the avoidance of extravagant luxury were ideas which had the backing of the *princeps*; they were in unison with the political currents and tendencies of the time, to some extent even with the official policy.¹⁸ The ode, moreover, by its nature and

¹⁵ See especially *Sat.*, I, 1, 70 ff. and 76 ff.; II, 3, 87.

¹⁶ For *cura* see III, 1, 38 ff.; II, 16, 21 ff. (for the genuineness of the latter passage cf. Kurt Latte, *Philologus*, XC [1935], p. 298). As regards the other motif, *quidquid de Libycis verritur areis* (*Odes*, I, 1, 10) comes to mind (see also III, 16, 26) but in the *Odes* large possessions are also characterized in sentences of this type: *si Mygdoniis regnum Alyattei campis continuem* (III, 16, 41); *si Libyam remotis Gadibus iungas*, etc. (II, 2, 10).

¹⁷ Horace's erotic odes offer particularly interesting material for a study of his symbols and his peculiar artistic habits in employing them.

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. F. E. Adcock in *C.A.H.*, X, p. 586; John Buchan, *Augustus* (Boston, 1937), pp. 98 f.

tradition, could well embody appeals and messages to the entire community. Following in the footsteps of Alcaeus, Horace had from the beginning used it as a vehicle for his hopes and fears regarding the prospects of the Roman commonwealth.¹⁹ Thus, it is worth investigating how and to what extent Horace availed himself in the *Odes* of the possibility of bringing out the political significance of his favorite subject.

Ode III, 24, because of its closeness to the *Epodes* in style, temperament, and to some extent also in content, has been declared one of Horace's earlier odes.²⁰ Approaching the ode from our present point of view, we notice that it too denounces people's attachment to wealth, the insane luxury and the never satisfied desire to acquire more and more. We shall presently see that Horace has this time given the theme a turn towards the political sphere, yet this orientation is hardly noticeable at the beginning where he speaks of the mania for large buildings and of the type of men who not content with the land on which they might erect their houses trespass into the *mare publicum*.²¹ Here we recognize—and are of course not the first to recognize²²—the same topic as in III, 1. The habit of building into the sea had evidently struck Horace's imagination as a particularly drastic symptom of the prevailing luxury and moral degeneracy and with the characteristic tendency of the *Odes* to keep to symbols once coined and to give them new turns Horace employs this motif here as well as in III, 1—also as a matter of fact in II, 18.²³ In a later passage of III, 24 the *pravus cupido* is

¹⁹ It will suffice to mention I, 14 and I, 37. I, 2 is not considered quite so early. Cf. W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Augustan Age. Horace and the Elegiacs* (Oxford, 1892), p. 151.

²⁰ See in particular Heinze's introduction to the poem in *Q. Horatius Flaccus, Erster Teil: Oden und Epoden erklärt von Adolf Kiessling und Richard Heinze* (7th ed., Berlin, 1930); also *op. cit.* (note 6), p. 222. Cf. also Warde Fowler, *op. cit.* (note 7), p. 227 and for a fruitful new approach (which confirms the early date of the poem) Karl Buchner, *Sitzb. Leipz. Akad.*, 1939, Heft 2, p. 38. Note also the reference to *rabies civica* at line 26.

²¹ III, 24, 3. In line 4 I read like Heinze, Klingner, and other editors *terrenum* at the beginning and *publicum* at the end. It is almost certain that Porphyrio read *terrenum*, not *Tyrrhenum* in his text.

²² Wickham and Heinze draw repeatedly on III, 1; II, 15; and II, 18 for parallels and explanations.

²³ III, 1, 33 ff.; II, 18, 20 ff.; Notice *caementa* at III, 1, 35 as well as

stigmatized as one of the basic political ills which should be eradicated—ruthlessly—if the citizenry is ever to recover its health. Luxuries are the *summi materies mali*; the minds of the Roman youth ought to be turned in a radically different direction.²⁴ *Quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt* if people continue to go to every length—in Horace's concrete language, to brave every danger—in their unbridled desire to gain more and more wealth. In this context, Horace refers to the voyages of the merchant to every part of the world and at every time of the year, however unseasonable.²⁵ This is another of those specific illustrations or "symbols" which he likes to work into this context; the merchant is in Horace's mind also in a passage of III, 1.²⁶ In III, 24 Horace actually calls for a man energetic enough to curb the *indomita licentia* (lines 25 ff.). It would of course have to be a political leader and there can be no doubt whom he had in mind. We should also notice his suggestion—just as specific and as utopian as certain suggestions in the *Epodes*²⁷—that the citizens carry their *gemmas et lapides aurum et inutile* to the Capital *quo clamor vocat et turba faventium*.²⁸

Thus, Horace has in this poem unquestionably brought out the relation between a moderate way of life—his favorite personal theme, we remember—and the desperate condition of the Roman commonwealth. Ethics shows us two different faces. On the one hand, it is a man's private concern, and this approach which was very common in the Hellenistic centuries was Horace's approach too. On the other hand, the thoughtful Roman of Augustus' time was aware of an intimate connection between ethics and politics. So had Cicero been,²⁹ to say nothing about the Greeks

24, 3. These parallels are recorded by F. Plessis, P. Lejay, and E. Galletier, *Les Oeuvres d'Horace* (Paris, 1924), *ad loc.* See also *Epist.*, I, 1, 83 ff.; Tibullus, II, 3, 45 f.

²⁴ Lines 51 ff., 45 ff.

²⁵ Lines 35 ff.

²⁶ III, 1, 25 ff.; cf. e.g. I, 1, 15 ff.; 31, 10 ff.; III, 29, 57 ff. The *mercator* as illustration of the insatiable desire for gain can be traced back to the *Satires* (especially I, 4, 29).

²⁷ Wickham compares *Epod.* 16, 17 ff. Cf. also Th. Zielinski, *Horace et la Société Romaine des Temps d'Auguste* (Paris, 1938), p. 99.

²⁸ Lines 45-50. The commentators point out that Augustus may by that time already have set an example for the carrying of *gemmae* and *aurum* to the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol (Suetonius, *Aug.* 30).

²⁹ See especially *De Re Publ.*, IV, V. Cicero sometimes brings the

of the classical period with whose ideas Horace was familiar. Sure enough, if a Roman author comes to discuss the ethical foundations of political life, it will not be long before he sighs for the good old days of Cincinnatus or Fabricius but in point of truth the heritage of Greek thought had had a much more determining influence in shaping the educated Roman's outlook in such matters than the idealized picture of old Roman simplicity; in fact, this picture itself owed its existence in no small measure to the teachings of Greek philosophers.³⁰

It is, however, not enough if we recognize that in *Ode* III, 24 Horace has related the theme of Moderation and Contentment with Little to the fate of the Roman state. The state of sexual morality in Rome is likewise a matter for alarm and in need of reform. Here the primitive Scythians provide a contrast. The ideal condition of chastity which has so sadly vanished in Rome is present in their life.³¹ The picture of Roman marital and sexual life which Horace shows us in III, 24—not directly but by implication and contrast—is bound to remind us of that drawn in another "Roman Ode," III, 6, which includes a fuller and more eloquent and straightforward description of contemporary Roman decadence in matters of sexual morality.³² Evidently *licentia* in the sphere of sex and *cupido* in the sphere of material gain are the two cardinal ills from which Rome suffers. As Augustus sought to curb extravagance in private building as well as the decline of family life,³³ so Horace in *Ode* III, 24

interests of the Roman state to bear on the question whether preference should be given to Epicureanism or to Stoicism; see e.g. *De Fin.*, II, 60 ff.; 76; *Ad Fam.*, VII, 12; *Pro Sest.* 23.

³⁰ Cf. R. M. Henry, "The Roman Tradition" in *Proc. Class. Ass.* (London, 1937), pp. 7-28. Henry suggests that the so-called Roman Tradition came into existence at about the middle of the second century and that it was shaped by Middle Stoicism. I cannot subscribe to his extreme views. A study of Ennius is perhaps the most effective antidote to the idea that the Roman Tradition is wholly the product of Greek philosophy. But to some extent it certainly is and if the necessary qualifications are made Henry's theory should prove helpful and stimulating.

³¹ Lines 17-24. Horace uses the *rómos* of the Scythians to show that chastity is practised where wealth is unknown.

³² III, 6, 17-32.

³³ See especially Suetonius, *Aug.* 89. On the subject of legislation cf. A. D. Winspear and L. K. Geweke, *Augustus and the Reconstruction of*

castigates these two alarming trends and indicates how Rome may be cured of the diseases which are undermining the nation's life and health.

It seems clear then, that *Ode* III, 24 may help us considerably towards understanding the growth and gradual maturing of important ideas that were to be embodied in the "Roman Odes."³⁴ Being still relatively close to the impressions of the civil war and reflecting, like some epodes and a few other odes, the poet's awareness of *scelera*, *vitium*, *culpa*³⁵—it yet points forward to a more constructive approach and includes a demand, if not a program, of reform. We seem to be half-way between some of the epodes in which the consciousness of a curse was uppermost in the poet's mind and the "Roman Odes" which embody his response to a new and better order of things. In III, 24 two lines of social criticism—the one aimed at excessive greed and luxury, and the other directed against sexual demoralization—emerge and take shape against the background of the civil war and its *scelera*. The two lines which have their point of origin in common will later branch out and separate; in "Roman Odes" 1 and 6 the original connection between the themes of social criticism is severed, with the result that each of them is now set forth in a separate poem. If Horace had suppressed III, 24 we should not know that they were to his mind complementary themes.

A few, though perhaps minor, items in this poem should still be noted since they have a bearing upon our problem. *Necessitas* with her *clavi* appears also in the ode on Fortuna (I, 35, 18) but only in III, 24 and III, 1 does *Necessitas* represent the necessity

Roman Government and Society (Univ. of Wisc. Stud. in Soc. Sc. and Hist., XXIV [1935]), pp. 172 ff.

³⁴ Cf. Warde Fowler, *op. cit.* (note 7), p. 227, who credits Wickham with the suggestion that *Odes*, III, 24 "supplied some at least of the subjects of these first six odes" (of Book III). So far as I can see Wickham never said exactly this but the suggestion, whether Wickham's or not, seems indeed correct although I prefer to think not in terms of "subjects supplied" by one ode to others but rather of a development—a fashioning and refashioning—of poetic conceptions and symbols.

³⁵ See especially lines 25 ff.; 33 ff. (34 *culpa*); 45 ff. (50 *scelera*); cf. *Epodes* 7 and 16; *Odes*, I, 2 (line 23 *vitium*, 29 *scelus*, 47 *vitia*); I, 35 (lines 33 ff.); III, 6. On the curse motif cf. Wilkinson, *op. cit.* (note 10), p. 66.

of death.³⁶ In III, 24 even the highest are unable to escape her decision; in III, 1 the high and the low are equally subject to her *lex* (lines 13 ff.). This equality characterizes the coming of Death in several other odes: *aequo pede*, I, 4, 13; *aequa tellus*, II, 18, 32. Yet the *Necessitas* of III, 24 holds a twofold threat for the extravagant spendthrift; if she does not bring death she brings fear (*metus*) from which he can no more "extricate his heart."³⁷ As in III, 1 (lines 32-40), this fear grips the man whose buildings cover "land as well as the public sea."

We may deal more briefly with two other poems which castigate manifestations of contemporary Roman luxury. The ode II, 15 (*iam pauca aratro iugera regiae moles relinquent*) takes in its second part a definite turn towards the political sphere, pointing out how different the relation between private and public expenditure was in the good old days of Romulus and Cato;³⁸ the energetic *Non ita* with which this section begins offers a stylistic parallel to the equally abrupt and emphatic *Non his iuventas orta parentibus* with which Horace in the sixth "Roman Ode" turns from contemporary demoralization to the stern morality of earlier generations.³⁹ Ode II, 18 has already been mentioned⁴⁰ as embodying a reference to the habit of extending palatial mansions into the lakes; it also includes—like III, 1—a contrast between Horace's happy life on his Sabine farm and the luxurious buildings which are fashionable with the wealthy.⁴¹ If we ask whether this poem too views contemporary luxury from the social or political aspect the following passage (lines 23 ff.) would seem to be crucial:

³⁶ At I, 3, 32 Horace specifies the *Necessitas* by adding the genitive *leti*. The commentators are justified in complaining about the obscurity of III, 24, 5 f.; however a *summus vertex* is probably the same as a *late conspicuus vertex* (III, 16, 19) and from the conception of *Necessitas* as carrying *clavi* in her hand it is hardly a far cry to her driving them home. On this interpretation *summis verticibus* may be construed as a dative of reference rather than as an ablative.

³⁷ III, 24, 7 ff.

³⁸ Lines 10 ff.

³⁹ II, 15, 10; III, 6, 33.

⁴⁰ See above, p. 343. The arguments for an early date of II, 18 are well summarized by Heinze in his Introduction to the ode (*op. cit.* [see note 20], p. 249).

⁴¹ II, 18, 1-14 (lines 5-9 present some other illustrations of wealth and high position); III, 1, 45-48.

Quid quod usque proximos
 revellis agri terminos et ultra
 limites clientium
 salis avarus? Pellitur paternos
 in sinu ferens deos
 et uxor et vir sordidosque natos.

One can easily imagine that the wretched people thus deprived of their small holdings would swell the numbers of the destitute proletariat in the city and it is tempting to think that at the time of a movement "back-to-the-country"—in ideology at least, if not in fact—such acts as Horace here pillories would be considered not only as anti-social but even as downright unpatriotic.⁴² However, all this is "interpretation"; Horace himself does not stigmatize the rich man's actions as a crime against the nation but emphasizes the absurdity of indulging in such acts of *avaritia* while one may be at the threshold of death (*sub ipsum funus*).⁴³

We return now to III, 1, bringing back as the result of our excursion into other poems the realization that it was definitely within the range of Horace's poetic imagination and capacity to describe greed and luxury as a blight on the political life of the nation and as running counter to the best traditions of Roman history.⁴⁴ What is more, he could use the very motifs and the poetical material that have gone into the making of III, 1 to drive home his political message. It is of course all the more remarkable that in III, 1 Horace never touches on the political aspects or implications of his theme. Did he feel that his mes-

⁴² Cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1926), p. 65. Rostovtzeff would evidently favor the "political" interpretation of the passage under discussion: "To judge by many poems of Horace which echoed no doubt the talk at the table of Maecenas and Augustus, the subject of the disappearance of the peasants was a common topic of discussion. . . . Public opinion voiced by patriotic and loyal Romans appealed to Augustus to save the peasants." Cf. also Winspear and Geweke, *op. cit.* (see note 33), p. 20.

⁴³ These words at the beginning of our passage (line 18) form a brief prelude to the much fuller and more elaborate treatment of the *rapax Orcus* which we read after the description of the excesses committed by the rich man (lines 29 ff.). The connection between lines 29 ff. and what precedes them is very close; cf. Heinze, *ad loc.*, who nevertheless insists on setting off 29-40 as a separate part of the poem.

⁴⁴ For a further reference to the *paupertas* of the old days see *Odes*, I, 12, 41-44. See also *Sat.*, II, 7, 23.

sage would be more impressive if the poem as such lacked explicit references to the political problems of Rome? Perhaps, in fact probably he did so. Yet, it should be possible to formulate a somewhat more specific answer to our question.

If it is true that the six *carmina non prius audita* were conceived and meant to be accepted as a unit it stands to reason that what we miss in the content of *Ode* III, 1 is largely made up by its place as one of these *carmina*. The reference to Rome's salvation which our poem lacks is amply supplied by those which follow.⁴⁵ True, what particular salutary effect contentment with little would have on Rome's political condition remains unsaid but it could indeed remain so. In III, 24 Horace gives vigorous expression to his belief that the unrestrained desire for riches and sexual immorality are a cancer on the Roman body politic. In the "Roman Odes" he makes this point only in connection with the latter subject, in III, 6, but the conclusion of III, 6 is at the same time the conclusion of this whole set of poems and if we know that the old Romans were very different from the contemporaries whose excesses Horace denounces in III, 6 we know also that they were different from the people whose type of life he repudiates in III, 1. Thus it becomes unnecessary to make this contrast as explicit as it is made in II, 15.

We have seen that the first stanza of III, 1 fixes its place at the head of the series but there are also other and more specific links between the individual poems of this series which should not go unnoticed. If III, 1 lacks references to the political order it does not ignore the divine order and the gods. *Regum timendorum in proprios greges, reges in ipsos imperium est Jovis* is a suitable beginning for a *Musarum sacerdos*. Other "Roman

⁴⁵ Cf. III, 2, 1 ff.; III, 3 *passim*, especially 49 ff., 57 ff.; III, 5, 13 ff.; III, 6, 1 ff. It might be argued that the second "Roman Ode" which begins *Angustam amice pauperiem pati* takes up the theme of the first and develops it in a manner which shows the military and political value of *paupertas*. To me *pauperies* seems a stronger word than the moderation—the *desiderare quod satis est*—which Horace recommends in III, 1. To be sure at II, 18, 10 he calls himself *pauper* but the *pauperies* of III, 29, 56 is somewhat hypothetical. Cf. also III, 16, 37. IV, 9, 46 ff. is unique. On the whole I should say that the relation between the two poems is best expressed in the words which Horace uses at III, 24, 51-54. It is difficult to agree with Pasquali's views (*op. cit.* [see above, note 5], pp. 651 f.) on this subject; the first ode is less "Epicurean" than he thinks, the second Roman rather than "Stoic" in its outlook.

Odes" too give us intimations of the world order, of the *imperium Jovis*, of the divine *lex*, and of the *Giganteus triumphus*; in fact this *triumphus* of which in our ode we find merely a brief but emphatic mention is celebrated at great length in III, 4.⁴⁶ Horace is clearly anxious to bring out links and correspondences between the right political order in Rome and the divine order of the Universe.⁴⁷ He has related the theme of III, 1 to the divine world government which in turn forms the background to his idealized picture of the Roman state.

Although we have already touched on the style of the ode III, 1 it must be emphasized once more that among the poems recommending Moderation III, 1 is unique owing to its severe dignity and a certain stern remoteness. This remoteness gives it something impersonal; actually there are no forms of the second person and apart from the very first and the very last stanzas in which they have special justification and produce special effects no forms of the first person either.⁴⁸ Moreover, while the first and second stanzas contain each a complete and rounded off thought, everywhere else a thought fills exactly two stanzas. To be sure within these units of two stanzas there is *variatio* in the relation between sentence and stanza,⁴⁹ yet the five times repeated

⁴⁶ III, 2, 29 ff.; 3, 17 ff. (*Fata* and *lex*: lines 57, 58); 4, 42 ff. (defeat of the Giants); 5, 1 ff.; 6, 1 ff., 5 ff.

⁴⁷ See also III, 4, 65 with the emphatic distinction between *vis consilii expers* and *vis temperata*. It seems to be Horace's idea that *consilium* which triumphed over the Giants is also thanks to the Muses vouchsafed to human individuals (see lines 37-42) like Augustus and that consequently Rome too is ruled by *consilium* and *vis temperata*. Rutilius Namatianus says of Rome *Nec tibi nascenti plures animaeque manusque / Sed plus consilii iudicisque fuit* (*De Red. Suo*, 87 f.). In general cf. Theiler, *op. cit.* (see above, note 7), especially pp. 264 ff. and 273 (the *consilium* motif), 268 (Hellenistic background to the parallel between the earthly ruler and the *regnum* of Jupiter; for this Hellenistic tradition see E. R. Goodenough, *Yale Classical Studies*, I [1928], pp. 55 ff.).

⁴⁸ II, 18 and III, 24 which we have compared with III, 1 make use of the second person even though they lack addressees.

⁴⁹ At lines 21 and 37 a new sentence begins in the second of the two stanzas after the caesura of the first line; at lines 13 and 34 the first sentence continues into the second line of the second stanza; at line 46 its end coincides with the end of this line. At lines 25-32 one sentence, in no way broken, fills the two stanzas. It clearly also makes a good deal of difference whether a sentence continues into the next stanza by "enjambement" (21, 37), by anaphora (if this term can be applied to

scheme of bringing an idea to its conclusion within the compass of exactly two stanzas gives the structure of the ode a certain rigidity which adds to its solemn and lofty quality. This solemnity is reinforced by a remarkable brevity of expression; not only has Horace denied himself excursions and does not linger over any specific picture or illustrative symbol but he enumerates repeatedly in quick succession various alternative instances of a particular condition of affairs⁵⁰ giving each of them little space and usually compressing the last illustration into fewer words or syllables than the preceding.⁵¹ The piling up of such illustrations conveys an impression of finality precluding as it were further argument about the matter. *Parum locuples continente ripa* (II, 18, 22) says much in little but *dominusque terrae fastidiosus* goes it one better. Words of five syllables (and corresponding weight) like *elaborabunt*, *desiderantem*, *tumultuosum*, *fastidiosus*, *Achaemeniumque*, fill a good part of their respective lines⁵² and a remarkable proportion of lines—especially third and fourth lines—are made up of only three words,⁵³ a technique which is especially noticeable at the beginning, while at the end of the whole poem we have a line made up of only two.⁵⁴ We could comment on many other features if

line 29), or in the fashion for which lines 41-48 provide a good example; here the conditional clause fills one stanza, the apodosis the next. Such matters have been studied by Karl Buchner, *op. cit.* (see note 20).

⁵⁰ Cf. lines 9 f., 18 f., 22 f., 25 f., 30 f., 38 f., 41 f. There is again a high degree of *variatio* in the structure and the wording of these enumerations.

⁵¹ At lines 22-24 the second *non* clause is shorter; so is the second alternative in lines 27 f., the third *nunc* clause at 32 in comparison with the second, and the second *cur* clause in the last stanza. Again the clause (12 f.) beginning with *illi* has fewer syllables than the immediately preceding *hic* clause and line 15 fewer than 13 f. which expresses the same thought.

⁵² Lines 19, 25, 26, 37.

⁵³ I count nine lines of three or two words in the twelve stanzas, whereas III, 29 has seven such lines in sixteen Alcaic stanzas. However, a glance at I, 9 and I, 27 will teach that this criterion of grandeur and *δευότης* can be used effectively only if the results are checked and interpreted in the light of other considerations.

⁵⁴ *Divitias operosiores* (line 48). Cf. *progeniem vitiosiore* at the end of the last "Roman Ode" (6, 48). Of 37 poems in which Horace uses the Alcaic strophe III, 1 and III, 6 are the only two that finish on a line of two words. In fact no other line of the kind is found in Horace's Alcaics.

there were space to go through the poem section by section. Notice for instance how the enumeration of various claims to distinction in the third and fourth stanzas moves on with a certain air of triumph and firmness for more than five lines until it is checked by a much briefer but in its brevity inexorable statement of Necessity's eternal law before which this imposing procession of human pride comes to a halt and is left disarmed and impotent.⁵⁵ There is no warmth or intimacy in this ode. Horace is this time not speaking as friend. He speaks as authority and the authoritative tone indicates that more is involved than the right approach to matters that are of purely personal concern.

All these considerations help us to understand how a poem like *Ode* III, 1 may have a political bearing even though this bearing has not been made explicit. Every student of Horace may judge for himself whether this poem which by its place and tone is raised above the level of a private exhortation is more felicitous or III, 24 with its frank denunciation of greed and immorality as the prime political ills and its almost clamorous demand for a savior and *pater patriae*. By contrast to III, 24 and II, 15 our ode, which keeps aloof not only from the contemporary and ephemeral but also from the national and historical and *spernit humum fugiente penna*, states what it has to state in the form of eternal verities. Yet these verities are the same as had always been Horace's personal and most intimate preoccupation.

However difficult it may be to relate the subject of III, 3 or III, 5—perhaps also of III, 2—to his individuality the poem that opens the cycle of political odes and sets the tone for the whole group proclaims in effect that the moral recovery of Rome is predicated on the same approach to life through which the poet has found his own individual happiness and which he has so frequently expounded in relation to his private existence. The universality which Horace has given his theme is not impaired by references to political actualities and yet the ode is (as we have seen) an organic and essential part of his grand message to the nation.

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⁵⁵ III, 1, 13-15.

SYRIA AND CILICIA.

A Greek inscription from Naples records the distinctions of a famous athlete, T. Flavius Artemidorus, victor in the pan-cratiun at the first Capitoline games in A. D. 86.¹ Among other prizes, Artemidorus was twice victorious at the "common games of Syria Phoenicia Cilicia in Antioch."² This statement poses a problem the solution of which will be of interest not only to historians of the Roman Empire but, as we shall see, to students of Scripture as well.

"Common games" (κοινὸι ἀγῶνες) were organized by a Greek "commonwealth" (κοινόν). These federations were mostly traditional ethnic or religious groupings which gave special homage to a sanctuary or a festival.³ Such was, for instance, the "Koinon of the Hellenes," which down to the second century A. D. continued to celebrate the Eleutheria instituted at Plataea after the victory over the Persians.⁴ The other type of the *koinon* was a confederation of the Greek cities in a Roman province, formed (or reorganized) by Augustus and his successors, to secure the loyalty of the subjects to the emperor. Such a *koinon* also had some political functions as the representative body of the province; its primary responsibility, however, was the maintenance of the provincial cult of the emperor and of festivals and games in his honor. Since Cilicia never really constituted one with Syria, except as a temporary expedient of the administration,⁵ the victory of Artemidorus in the "common

¹ I. G., XIV, 746 = I. G. R., I, 445. Artemidorus is mentioned by Martial, VI, 77: *cum sis . . . tam fortis quam nec cum vinceret Artemidorus*. But I am not convinced by L. Friedlaender's argument *ad loc.* that Martial's epigram implies the loss of his championship by Artemidorus.

² νεικήσας . . . κοινόν Συρίας Κιλικίας Φοινίκης ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ β' ἀνδρῶν πανκράτιον.

³ See now J. A. O. Larsen, *C. P.*, XL (1945), p. 65.

⁴ L. Robert, *R. E. A.*, 1929, p. 16.

⁵ For instance, under Alexander the Great there was an intendant of Syria and Phoenicia and Cilicia (Arrian, II, 16, 9). Q. Sosius governed Syria and Cilicia in 38-36 B. C. (Dio Cassius, XLIX, 22, 3), and both countries were probably united under Caesar and Antonius. See R. Syme in *Anatolian Studies Presented to W. H. Buckler* (1939), p. 329,

games of Syria Phoenicia Cilicia in Antioch" shows that at some time between Augustus and Domitian the imperial government attached Cilicia to the province of Syria.

Five literary data confirm this inference. Tacitus records that in A. D. 35, Artabanus, king of Parthia, claimed the treasure left by Vonones, a Parthian exile, in *Syria Ciliciaque*.⁶ A year before he was murdered, Vonones had been removed by Germanicus to Soli, in Cilicia (A. D. 18).⁷ Tacitus' statement shows that in 35 this city belonged to the province Syria-Cilicia. Writing in the reign of Claudius, Columella says that he has seen the sesame sown in June and July *Ciliciae Syriaeque regionibus*.⁸ He served in Syria about A. D. 36. In Galatians, Paul the Apostle says that after his first visit to Jerusalem he went "to the regions of Syria and Cilicia."⁹ Since he sailed from Caesarea to Tarsus,¹⁰ his wording suggests that at this time (about A. D. 35-40) Cilicia was joined with Syria. Some years later, about A. D. 50, the Christian community in Jerusalem sent a message to the brethren "in Antioch and Syria and

and note the usage of *Bell. Alex.*, I, 1; 25, 1; 26, 1: *Syria Ciliciaque*. Cf. Sallust, *Or. Cottae*, 7: *exercitus in Asia Ciliciaque ob nimias opes Mithridatis aluntur*. The passage refers to Lucullus' joint governorship of Asia and Cilicia in 74 B. C.

⁶ Tacitus, *Ann.*, VI, 31: *missis qui gazam a Vonone relictam in Syria Ciliciaque reposcerent*.

⁷ Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 58 and 68. Cf. Suetonius, *Tib.*, 49.

⁸ Columella, II, 10, 18: *sed hoc idem semen Ciliciae Syriaeque regionibus vidi mense Iunio Iulioque conseri*. Cf. on the other hand Columella, XI, 2, 56: *quibusdam regionibus sicut in Cilicia et Pamphilia*. The word *regio* had no administrative significance but meant "country." Cf. T. R. S. Broughton, in *Quantulacumque: Studies Presented to Kirsopp Lake* (1937), p. 134.

⁹ Gal. 1, 21: τὰ κλίματα τῆς Συρίας καὶ Κιλικίας according to the reading of Codex Sinaiticus. The other uncials place a second article before the word Κιλικίας. Cf. W. M. Ramsay, *Histor. Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (1902), p. 277. Cf. Act. Ap. 15, 41: Paul διήρχετο δὲ τὴν Συρίαν καὶ Κιλικίαν and 27, 5: τό τε πέλαγος τὸ κατὰ τὴν Κιλικίαν καὶ Παμφυλίαν. This sea belongs to both countries together. Cf. Mela, II, 102: the gulf inter *Ciliciam Syriasque porrigitur*. On the other hand, the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia, although adjacent, are distinguished in the New Testament (Rom. 15, 26; II Cor. 9, 2). They are spoken of together in Act. Ap. 19, 21 since Paul going to Jerusalem passes "through Macedonia and Achaia."

¹⁰ Act. Ap. 9, 30.

Cilicia.”¹¹ This address implies that Antioch, the capital of Syria, was at this time also that of Cilicia. In the so-called Fourth Book of Maccabees, the Seleucid strategos of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia is styled strategos of “Syria Phoenicia and Cilicia.”¹² This formulation is exactly the same as the one in the inscription at Naples.¹³

The literary evidence cited, as far as a date can be established, refers to the end of the reign of Tiberius and to that of Claudius. This contrasts with the view generally held¹⁴ that Cilicia was united with the province of Syria between the reign of Augustus and Vespasian. This view is based on two misunderstandings.

Augustus entrusted native rulers with the government of the so-called Cilicia Aspera, that is of the region of rugged mountains in the interior and western part of Cilicia, inhabited by barbarian tribes. This territory, which also included some cities, e. g. Elaeussa or Anemurium on the coast, remained outside of the Roman provincial government until A. D. 72 when it was annexed by Vespasian.¹⁵ The rich plain of coastal Cilicia was organized, on the other hand, as a group of city states, which already in the reign of Augustus formed a “koinon of Cilicia,” headed by Tarsus.¹⁶ Only this Cilician *koinon* could have been included in the province of Syria before A. D. 72.

¹¹ Act. Ap. 15, 23: τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἀρτιοχείαν καὶ Συρίαν καὶ Κιλικίαν ἀδελφοῖς.

¹² IV Macc. 4, 2: ἤκων πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Συρίας καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ Κιλικίας στρατηγόν.

¹³ The official Roman name of the province was “Syria,” but in usage the name was often expanded to indicate the countries included in the province. Thus, the latter is sometimes styled “Syria and Phoenicia” or, under Trajan, “Syria Phoenicia Commagene.” Cf. my paper “La Coelé-Syrie” in *Rev. Bibl.*, 1947, p. 256. For example, A. Iulius Quadratus is styled governor of “Syria” or of “Syria, Phoenicia, Commagene” or of “Syria, Phoenicia, Commagene, Tyrus.” See now A. v. Premerstein, *Sitzb. Bayer. Akad.*, 1934, no. 3, p. 63.

¹⁴ See, e. g., J. G. C. Anderson, *C. A. H.*, X, p. 279 and J. Keil, *ibid.*, XI, p. 602.

¹⁵ See now A. H. M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (1937), p. 203; R. Syme in *Anatolian Studies Presented to W. H. Buckler* (1939), p. 325.

¹⁶ See *B. M. C. Lycania* (1900), p. xci. Mionnet, *Supplem.*, VII, p. 407. Tarsus is styled *metropolis* on its coins struck under Augustus and Tiberius: Mionnet, *Description*, III, p. 624; E. Babelon, *Inventaire de la Collect. Waddington* (1897); no. 4622. Cf. Strabo, XIV, 674.

The hypothesis which put the union of Cilicia with Syria under Augustus was suggested by Baronius in his *Annales Ecclesiastici* (1588)¹⁷ and advanced again by Mommsen in 1850.¹⁸ The authority of the latter determined the view of later historians. Both great scholars had recourse to this hypothesis to explain the career of P. Sulpicius Quirinius, whose "prior" Syrian governorship is mentioned in the Gospel of Luke (2, 1) and to whose expedition *per Ciliciam* against the Homonades¹⁹ Tacitus refers. We need not enter into debate about Quirinius.²⁰ As a matter of fact, his action against the Homonades as well as all other cases of military intervention by the Syrian governors in Cilicia (recorded A. D. 19 and 36 and 52)²¹ took place in the client states of Cilicia Aspera and, consequently, have no bearing on our subject.²² As to Cilicia Campestris, its administrative status under Augustus is nowhere indicated.²³ But Strabo and

¹⁷ Baronius' suggestion was opposed by Is. Casaubon, *De Rebus Sacris* (ed. 1655), p. 125.

¹⁸ See Th. Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (2nd ed., 1883), p. 173.

¹⁹ Tacitus, *Ann.*, III, 48; H. Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 918.

²⁰ See now Lily R. Taylor, *A. J. P.*, LIV (1933), p. 120; R. Syme, *Klio*, 1934, p. 134; J. G. C. Anderson, *C. A. H.*, X, p. 877; A. G. Roos, *Mnemos.*, 1941, p. 306; S. Accami, *Riv. di Fil.*, 1944-5, p. 138.

²¹ Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 78 and 80; VI, 41; XII, 55.

²² For the same reason we do not need to comment on the inscription of Hierapolis-Castabala honoring L. Calpurnius Piso, consul B. C. 15, as "legatus and propraetor" (*Ann. Epigr.*, 1920, 71). Cf. Syme, *loc. cit.*, p. 127, and E. Groag and A. Stein, *Prosop. Imper. Romani* (2nd ed.), II, p. 63.

²³ Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.*, I, 11-12 is of no help. The Roman governor who held a *conventus* in Tarsus A. D. 17 may have been a deputy of the *legatus* of Syria. A coin of Aegeae under Tiberius is inscribed: *ἐπὶ Κουλεῶνος. Ἀγμαν*. The name is regarded as that of a legate, Q. Terentius Culleo, who was *cos. suff.* in 40 A. D. Since there is no place for Culleo in the list of *legati* of Syria, the coin seems to offer additional evidence for the view that Cilicia was not united with Syria. But Culleo may have been a deputy of the nominal governor, L. Aelius Laemia, who was retained at Rome by Tiberius. Cf. Imhoof-Blumer, *Kleinasiat. Münzen*, II (1902), p. 427. S. J. de Laet, *De Samenstelling van den Romeinschen Senaat gedurende de eerste eeuw van het Principaat* (1941), p. 244, lists a governor of Cilicia under Claudius on the authority of the obsolete restitution of an inscription from Olympia (*Eph. Epigr.*, IV, p. 80). But, p. 48, he quotes the same inscription, according to a new edition (*C. I. L.*, III, 12278) as referring to A. Didius Gallus, governor of Moesia.

Pliny's lists of Cilician cities, drawn up under Augustus,²⁴ as well as the existence of the Cilician *koinon* with Tarsus as *metropolis*,²⁵ seem to imply that Cilicia was still distinct from Syria in the beginning of the empire. In any case, Tacitus shows that it was not incorporated into Syria in A. D. 18. At this date the king of Parthia protested against the stay of the above mentioned Vonones in Antioch. Germanicus removed him to Soli, *civitatem Ciliciae . . . ne Vonones in Syria haberetur*. Tacitus adds that the transfer was meant as an affront to Piso, governor of Syria.²⁶ Thus, Soli, and, consequently, Cilicia, were outside of the jurisdiction of the governor of Syria. Accordingly, A. D. 18 is the *terminus post quem* for the formation of the double province. The *terminus ante quem* is, as we have seen, A. D. 35. I am unable to narrow the margin between these two limits.

The assumption that Cilicia remained a part of Syria until A. D. 72 is based on another misunderstanding. In 72 Vespasian put Cilicia Aspera under provincial control²⁷ and, joining the new territory with Cilicia Campestris (Pedias), formed a separate province of Cilicia.²⁸ But this reorganization does not

²⁴ Pliny, *N. H.*, V, 90. Cf. A. Klotz, *Klio*, 1931, p. 429; Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 496.

²⁵ *Supra*, n. 16.

²⁶ Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 58: *petere interim ne Vonones in Syria haberetur . . . Vonones Pompeiopolim Ciliciae maritimam urbem amotus est. Datum id non modo precibus Artabani sed contumeliae Pisonis*. The passage is explained by Lily R. Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 125.

²⁷ Suetonius, *Vesp.*, 8; Josephus, *B. J.*, VII, 243, gives the date of the annexation as the fourth year of Vespasian (July 1, 72-73). The era of Commagene, from 72, places the reorganization in 72. Jerome's date, 73-74, is faulty. G. A. Harrer (*Studies in the History of the Roman Province of Syria* [Diss., Princeton, 1915], p. 75), put the formation of the province Cilicia after 72, while in 72 Paetus, the governor of Syria, arrested at Tarsus the deposed king Antiochus of Commagene (Josephus, *B. J.*, VII, 238). But Paetus was commander-in-chief of the theatre of war and as such had the authority for intervention in an independent province. See Th. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht* (3d ed.), II, 1, p. 256.

²⁸ The *provincia Cilicia* is expressly mentioned for the first time in the cursus of Ti. Iulius Celsus Polemaeanus (H. Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 8971), who governed the province ca. 90 A. D. See G. A. Harrer, *op. cit.*, p. 74 and E. Groag, *R.-E.*, X, col. 547. The next governor was Q. Gellius Longinus (A. D. 92-3; *Ann. Epigr.*, 1920, 72), about 98 M. Pompeius

warrant the assumption that Campestris had hitherto belonged to Syria and not, for example, to Cappadocia. In fact, two texts show that Cilicia had already been separated from Syria under Nero. First, there is a Latin inscription of a procurator of Nero *provinciae Cappadociae et Ciliciae*.²⁹ Since an imperial procurator could supervise several provinces, the inscription does not point to the incorporation of Cilicia with Cappadocia. But since there was also an imperial procurator of Syria, the record is sufficient to prove that at this date Cilicia was no more a unit with Syria.³⁰ Secondly, a passage in Tacitus places the separation before 55.³¹ In the spring of this year, Q. Ummidius Quadratus, the legatus of Syria, was ordered to hand over two of his legions to Corbulo, charged with a command in Armenia. Fearing a loss of prestige if the transfer were made in Syria, Quadratus met Corbulo at Aegae, in Cilicia, lest Corbulo, should he enter Syria, draw attention to himself.³² To conduct the Armenian

Macrinus governed Cilicia (*Ann. Épigr.*, 1913, 168). But as Harrer, p. 74, has pointed out, an inscription of 77-78, from Seleucia on the Calycadnus, refers to L. Octavius Memor, legate and propraetor, designated consul (*I. G. R.*, III, 840; now *M. A. M. A.*, III, p. 6). Since Seleucia politically belonged to Cilicia Campestris (as is shown by Strabo, XIV, 670 and the absence of the royal coinage), Memor's province doubtless included Cilicia Campestris. But Memor could not be a governor of Syria or of Cappadocia or of Pamphylia because these three legati in 77 are already known. They were, respectively, M. Ulpius Trajanus, the father of the future Emperor (see now H. Seyrig, *Syria*, 1941, p. 174), M. Neratius Pansa (*E. Groag, R.-E.*, XVI, col. 2546), and S. Marcius Priscus (*Fluss, R.-E.*, XIV, col. 1580). Thus, Memor could have been a governor only of Cilicia.

²⁹ Calder, *J. R. S.*, II (1912), p. 99 = *Ann. Épigr.*, 1914, 128: *proc. Nero[nis Cl]audi Ca[esaris] Aug[usti] Germa[nici pro]vinciae [Cappadociae et Ciliciae]*.

³⁰ As a separate province Cilicia had its own procurator. See *Ann. Épigr.*, 1924, 83; H. Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 9013. Note that in 102 Postumius Acilianus (*I. G. R.*, III, 928) was procurator of Syria and not of Cilicia. See *Ann. Épigr.*, 1939, 178.

³¹ I do not make use of the trial of Cossutianus Capito, accused by the Cilicians in 57 (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIII, 33), since Capito may have been a legatus of the governor of Syria.

³² Tacitus, *Ann.*, XIII, 8: *Corbulo apud Aegeas civitatem Ciliciae obvium Quadratum habuit, illuc progressum, ne, si ad accipiendas copias Syriam intravisset Corbulo, omnium ora in se verteret*. The importance of this passage for our problem has been stressed by W. E. Gwatkin,

war, Corbulo received the command in Cappadocia and Galatia. But the most important land roads from the Aegean to Cappadocia ran from Cilician ports.³³ Thus, the suggestion may be made that Cilicia, too, was placed under his authority as a base of military operations, at the end of A. D. 54.

It would follow from these data that Cilicia, *Campestris* was added to Syria sometime between A. D. 18 and 35 and separated from the latter before the spring of 55, probably at the end of 54. This chronological result gives us the date of composition of Fourth Maccabees.³⁴ This book, assigned on general grounds to almost every generation from that of Pompey to that of Trajan, was written, as the mention of the government of Syria Phoenicia and Cilicia shows, under Tiberius or Claudius. The same chronological conclusion may be drawn with regard to the so-called "Apostolic Decree," that is, the already quoted letter of the Christian leaders in Jerusalem to the brethren "in Antioch and Syria and Cilicia."

The authenticity of this record is often challenged. Critics observe that the Acts imply the general validity of the decree, and the local address of the letter does not seem to fit with the universality of the message, which was delivered for observance, for example, in the cities of Lycaonia as well.³⁵ For this reason the so-called "Western" text of the Acts already interpolates Act. Ap. 15, 41. Some modern exegetes are astonished that the superscription of the letter does not mention Derba or Lystra,³⁶ where the apostolic commandments were delivered by Paul and Timothy. Radical critics blame the phantastic geography of the sacred writer.³⁷ As a matter of fact these critics are not well versed in the practice of ancient chancelleries. When the latter had to forward the same text to several addressees, they

Cappadocia as Roman Province (University of Missouri Studies, V, No. 4 [1930]), p. 51.

³³ Cf. T. R. S. Broughton, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, IV, p. 861; R. Syme (*loc. cit.*, *supra*, n. 5), p. 303.

³⁴ See my paper "The Date of Fourth Maccabees" in *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume* (1945), p. 105.

³⁵ Act. Ap. 16, 4; 21, 25. See, e. g., J. R. Porter, *Journ. Theol. Stud.*, 1946, p. 169.

³⁶ See, e. g., E. Jacquier, *Les Actes des Apôtres* (1926), *ad loc.*

³⁷ See, e. g., A. Loisy, *Les Actes des Apôtres* (1921), p. 598. Cf. H. J. Cadbury, *The Making of Luke-Acts* (1941), p. 191.

often simply added the appropriate heading to each identical copy of the message.³⁸ Thus, in the case of the apostolic letter, there was an exemplar addressed to Lystra, another for Cyprus, and so on. One duplicate was addressed to the brethren "in Antioch and Syria and Cilicia." The fact that the author of the Acts quotes this heading proves only that he had at his disposition a copy of the exemplar forwarded to Antioch.

On the other hand, the authenticity of the letter is often doubted on general grounds of content and by reason of the disagreement between the document and the narrative in Galatians. I do not feel competent to enter into a debate on this point. But I must emphasize the fact that the superscription of the letter places its composition before A. D. 55. A later forger would hardly have knowledge of the temporary union between Syria and Cilicia and would in any case have no inclination to use this knowledge, even if he did have it, for his own falsification. We expect from a forger the observation of historical minutiae. The ancient reader who did not possess our printed encyclopaedias would be rather suspicious if confronted with an unusual formula. In any case, he did not care for antiquated terminology. For this reason, Josephus generally simplifies or rejuvenates the old-fashioned formulas in the documents he quotes. Thus, the heading of the Apostolic Decrees proves that the document was really composed in the Apostolic Age.

It remains to be seen whether the statement given in the inscription of Artemidorus will fit the literary evidence. At first view the disagreement seems complete. It is obvious that Artemidorus, conqueror in the Capitoline games in 86, could not already have been a victorious athlete before 55. But let us examine his career. Since Cilicia was formed as a separate province in 72, we have to place, it seems, two victories of Artemidorus in the quinquennial "common" games of Syria and Cilicia in Antioch not later than 68 and 72.³⁹ But that

³⁸ See *Rev. Hist. Relig.*, CXV (1937), p. 193; P. Collomp, *Actes du IV Congrès de Papyrologie* (1936), p. 202. See, e.g., two identical letters of C. Norbanus Flaccus sent to Ephesus (Philo, *Leg. ad Caium*, 40) and Sardes (Josephus, *A. J.*, XVI, 6, 6).

³⁹ We do not know the date of the contests. A. Dieudonné, *Rev. Numism.*, 1927, p. 49, interprets a coin of Antioch of 66-67 as referring

would extend his victorious course to eighteen years, at least, and thus make him win in 86 at the age of forty. Since the pancratium was the most violent contest, a combination of wrestling and boxing, and since, on the other hand, the Capitoline victory was the most coveted prize, it is obvious that the "world's champion" of 86 could not have been older than thirty at this date.⁴⁰ In fact, he was probably not 28 years old in 86.⁴¹ Thus, he could not have won in the "common" games of Syria Phoenicia and Cilicia before 77. The calculation shows that, as Mommsen has already suggested,⁴² the "common" games continued even after Cilicia had been separated from Syria, at least until about A. D. 80. Although Cilicia preserved its own *koinon*, the confederation might have wished in 55, for some local or accidental reasons, to continue the partnership with the Syrian *koinon*. The Roman government did not encourage the formation of interprovincial bodies but did not necessarily dissolve a partnership once formed around the imperial altar. There were *Tres Galliae*, but they continued to have the common altar of Augustus near Lugudunum. If the Cilicians, at the

to the games, but this explication is contested by H. Gaebler, *Zeitschr. f. Num.*, 1929, p. 310. That the games were quinquennial follows from the inscription of Artemidorus which sums up the number of victories won in the pentaeteric games. I do not know whether or not the contest was identical with the "Olympia" of Antioch.

⁴⁰ On the age of athletes cf. L. Robert, *Rev. de Phil.*, 1930, p. 29. T. Flavius Archibius was about 22 years old when, in 98, he won in the pancratium at the Capitoline games in the class of men. He conquered at Olympia in 101 and 105, but finished only second in the Capitoline contests of 102 and 106. See *I.G.R.*, I, 446.

⁴¹ Artemidorus won twice at Olympia, certainly in 81 and 85. Although he won fifty times in the quinquennial games, he was never more than twice victor in the same festival, except the "common games" of Asia in Smyrna where he won first in the class of ἀγέμετοι and then twice in the class of men. Obviously, in 86, he was more than eight and less than twelve years a competitor within the class of "men" in the games. Since one entered this class after 20, Artemidorus was in 86 about 25 to 28 years old. Note that, although he won five times at Sardes, four times at Tralles and so on, that does not mean that he was in the ring sixteen or twenty years. Each city had many quinquennial games. See e.g. for Tralles, L. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* (1937), p. 421.

⁴² Mommsen (*op. cit.*, *supra*, n. 18), p. 173, n. 1. Previously (see the paper quoted in n. 34, *supra*) I suggested that the festival has preserved an antiquated name. Louis Robert, however, has pointed out, in a private communication, that this hypothesis is very improbable.

accession of Nero, in 55, wished to worship not only at Tarsus but at Antioch as well "the Emperor whom the world expected and hoped for,"⁴³ the government could not help but accede to this devout demand. The precedent once set, the festival at Antioch remained common for Cilicia and Syria for some twenty-five years at least. But the festal union was dissolved before Trajan or at the beginning of his reign. A coin of Antioch, minted between 100 and 102, bears the legend: *Kouvov Συρίας*,⁴⁴ and so indicates the definitive secession of Cilicia from the Antiochene organization.

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⁴³ I quote an Egyptian announcement of Nero's accession *ap. A. S. Hunt, C. C. Edgar, Select Papyri*, II, 235.

⁴⁴ A. Dieudonné, *Rev. Numism.*, 1927, p. 8. Under Hadrian an athlete won at the Cilician games at Tarsus and at the Syrian festival at Antioch (*C. I. G.*, II, 2810).

ARISTOTLE'S FOUR SPECIES OF TRAGEDY
(*POETICS* 18) AND THEIR IMPORTANCE
FOR DRAMATIC CRITICISM.

The four classes of tragedy mentioned in *Poetics* 18 have been studied chiefly because they offer a textual problem. Is it possible that they are of importance for Aristotle's theory? The fourth class, not named in our present texts, is sometimes said to be the spectacular, sometimes the simple. The *Poetics* lists the other three as the complex, the pathetic, and that dependent on character. This group of four is said to depend on a group of four constituent parts of tragedy already mentioned, which, however, it is now "impossible to find in the earlier chapters."¹ The one group that seems pertinent is of six: plot, character, thought, language, music, spectacle (6, 50 a 7-15; 12, 52 b 14). Yet the only exact correspondence between the two groups is that of character. Plot, from the earlier group, is represented among the four by the complex, and also by the pathetic, for *pathos*, defined as "destructive or painful action, such as death on the stage, bodily agony, wounds and the like," is said by Aristotle to be part of the plot (11, 52 b 10).² This breaking up of plot suggests that the lost group of four was formed on a principle not stated in the present text of the *Poetics*. Yet since three of its elements are known, the fourth should be discoverable.

1. The Species in the *Poetics*.

In the *Poetics* as it stands, the plot is the constituent most thoroughly treated. A tragedy cannot exist without a plot as its soul. This plot or action—in Aristotle's opinion—is a unit from which nothing can be removed without damage to the whole. At its clearest, it shows a single change of fortune, from good to bad or the reverse. These are basic requirements for all plots. But plots of this simple form do not in themselves produce the most

¹ Ingram Bywater, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* (Oxford, 1909), note on 18, 55 b 32.

² Butcher's translation. The active sense of *pathos*, at least to the extent of meaning display of emotion, is kept in 19, 56 b 1, where the *pathe* are said to be pity, fear, anger, and the like.

evident effect. For that the author must select or devise a story that has not only the elements of the simple action but also additional ones, namely recognition and reversal. The drama formed on such a narrative is classed as complex. Most tragedies, including all those assigned primarily to the three other classes, have simple plots.

If, then, there be a class of tragedies called simple because their plots are simple, their classification is negative. A simple plot—though it can be excellent—has nothing distinctive; it merely lacks some of the components of the complex plot.³ It is convenient to say that one pathetic tragedy is complex and another simple, but that is different from making simplicity the reason for an independent class. The complex tragedy has its recognitions and reversals, the pathetic its scenes of suffering, the tragedy of character its striking persons, but the simple tragedy as such has nothing but the possibility of adding to itself material belonging to one of the other classes. The emendation meaning *simple*, as has long been recognized,⁴ rests on chapter 24, where the *Iliad* is said to be simple and pathetic, the *Odyssey* complex and concerned with character.

But is it necessary to suppose that in chapter 24 Aristotle is dealing with the four species of chapter 18? The first words of that chapter run thus: *ἐτι δὲ τὰ εἶδη ταῦτα δεῖ ἔχειν τὴν ἐποποιίαν τῇ παραφύσῃ, ἣ γὰρ ἀπλὴν ἢ πεπλεγμένην ἢ ἥθικὴν ἢ παθητικὴν*. To those who accept the reading *simple* in chapter 18, this passage must appear to give precisely the four classes there discussed. Those, however, who prefer the reading *spectacular* evidently do not take the four classes named in the quotation as equivalent to those of chapter 18, nor can they be so taken by those who look on simplicity as a negative quality unable to dominate a play. For justification, such readers may have recourse to the paragraph as a whole, rather than merely to its first words or to its statement that the *Iliad* is simple and pathetic, the *Odyssey* complex and admirable in the use of character. When Aristotle says

³ "The principle of division being positive, according to the actual source of the effect, we must not look for a species of tragedy called 'uninvolved'" [i. e., simple] (Lane Cooper, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry* [Boston, 1913], p. 62).

⁴ See, for example, the comment of Vincentius Madius (Venice, 1550), p. 194. Gudeman reaffirms it in his note on 24, 59 b 8. Cf. also his notes on 18, 55 b 32; 10, 52 a 11; 11, 52 b 9.

that epic is like tragedy in being simple or complex or full of character or pathetic, is his list to be taken as one, two, three, four, or do simple or complex, expressive of character or pathetic, form pairs of opposing units?"⁵ The first two form such a pair, and the statement about *Iliad* and *Odyssey* hints at a second pair. A tragedy or an epic can be simple and characteristic, but can it be characteristic and pathetic? Not unless the poet had gone far toward making all his parts superior, as Aristotle's contemporaries demanded;⁶ yet the opposition of pathos and character is not absolute, as is that of simple and complex. Moreover, in the first ten lines of chapter 24 Aristotle speaks three times of elements determining the three undisputed species of chapter 18, namely (1) reversals, and recognitions (a unit causing complexity), and (2) scenes of suffering (causing pathos). He also twice mentions components from his list of six; these are (1) thought, (2) language, and (3) character. Plot and character, then, are represented in the list of four and the list of six. Such importance for character is to be expected, since Aristotle places it second only to plot in his discussion of the six components of tragedy (6, 50 a 39). With thought, it is one of the causes of dramatic action (6, 50 a 1-2), and character, rather than spectacle, is said to be the proper cause of the solution of tragic action (15, 54 a 37).⁷ In addition Aristotle brings into this passage in chapter 24 the elements of thought and diction from his list of six, while excluding music and spectacle. Thus two further members of the list of six come into relation with the three qualities that determine species. Thought, as one of the three things imitated by tragedy, is worthy to be ranked with character, while language or diction is ranked with music (6, 49 b 38-50 a 11), as having a lower place than thought in its relation to the art of poetry.⁸ It seems possible that this paragraph in chapter 24—part of the discussion of epic in relation to tragedy—has as its primary purpose to characterize the *Iliad* and

⁵ Is this faintly suggested in Bywater's translation: "either simple or complex, a story of character or one of suffering"?

⁶ 18, 56 a 2-7. See p. 370, below.

⁷ Rostagni and Gudeman agree on a reading so. to be translated. The older text makes the solution result from plot.

⁸ *Poetics* 19, 56 b 19. Diction can be most striking where thought and character are not apparent (24, 60 b 5), yet it is also mentioned in close association with thought (19, 56 a 34).

the *Odyssey* according to a formula suitable for the drama. The *Odyssey* is complex and presents character; the *Iliad* is pathetic and, in contrast with the other poem, simple; both poems are better than any others in thought and diction, though not characterized by either quality. Reference to these characteristics carries with it a reminder about the six parts and the four species. There is one puzzling omission. After the assertion that there must be peripeties and recognitions and scenes of suffering, comes the statement that thought and diction should be well handled. Why is there no reference to character, named both before and after? It seems, then, that this paragraph is not so clear as to justify an otherwise unsupported belief that the simple tragedy is the fourth kind intended in chapter 18.

Those who do not allow the simple as the fourth class commonly make it the spectacular. This belief rests on three letters in the manuscripts taken to form part of the word for spectacle.⁹ Spectacle is first mentioned in the *Poetics* immediately after the definition of tragedy. That definition lays stress on the acting of tragedy—a subject of importance in the preceding chapters. Having given the definition, the text continues: ἐπεὶ δὲ πρῶτοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τι μῦθον τραγωδίας ὁ τῆς ὀψέως κόσμος (6, 49 b 31-3). Spectacle is put first as the first thing that strikes the person who enters the theatre; as Bywater says: "Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers."¹⁰ The remainder of the six parts are then noted: music, diction, plot, character, and thought. There are several later mentions of spectacle. As one of the advantages of acted drama over epic poetry, it is the source of a great deal of pleasure,¹¹ and can do something toward producing the proper

⁹ In the manuscripts the three letters *σης* (given by editors as *ος*) follow the word *τέταρον*. The three letters have been thought to be part of the word *ὄψις*, both by those who make the fourth class the spectacular, and by Butcher, who does not (see note 15, below). See note 40, below.

¹⁰ On 6, 49 b 31. Gudeman also comments: "Handelnde verlangen einen örtlichen Schauplatz für ihre Betätigung, im Drama also die Bühne, auf der die Handlung für den Zuschauer versinnbildlicht wird" (on 6, 49 b 32).

¹¹ 26, 62 a 16-17. I accept Gudeman's text; the usual text excludes spectacle as a special source of pleasure, though making it, with music, important.

tragic emotions of pity and fear, though it is better that these feelings be aroused by the combination of events in the action (6, 50 b 17; 14, 53 b 1); moreover, there is a danger that the feelings aroused by the spectacle will not be suited to tragedy; stage-effects will be stared at with wonder but will not rouse fear (14, 53 b 1). With music, spectacle is to be put in a lower class than plot, character, thought, and diction, four parts that manifest their quality when a tragedy is merely read (6, 50 b 18-19; 26, 62 a 12 and 16). Spectacle, indeed, is rather the art of the stage-designer than of the poet, for, though it can take one's breath away, it requires the least tragic ability and is the least bound up with the art of poetry of all the components (6, 50 b 17-20; 14, 53 b 7-8). Aristotle's tragic poet writes with the stage in view (15, 54 b 16; 17, 55 a 22-32), but his concern is with the stage effects that are inseparable from the written text. In the sixth chapter itself, though he begins with spectacle as the first thing observed in a stage presentation, he soon abandons this *ἀτεχνότατον* part of tragedy and turns to those that come home to the poet himself. He then discusses the parts in the order of their importance as (1) plot, (2) character, (3) thought, (4) diction, (5) music, (6) spectacle, with the warning that mastery over the last belongs more to the art of scene-designing than to that of poetry.¹² From this point on, his interest is in the art of the poet.¹³ Indeed Bywater goes so far as to say that "throughout the Poetics Aristotle resolutely ignores" costume and stage-management "as outside the art of poetry proper."¹⁴

¹² In spite of the space given to diction in chapters 19-22, it seems not quite on the basis of the other parts. Aristotle passes over enquiry into one aspect of it as not belonging to the art of poetry (19, 56 b 18). Music is in a lower group than any of the others, being one of the *ἡδύσματα* or pleasurable accessories of tragedy (6, 50 b 16). Gudeman comments on 6, 49 b 32: "Wenn Aristoteles die *ὄψις* als einen *κόσμος* bezeichnet, so geht daraus zunächst hervor, dass er sie ebenso wie die gleich darauf genannten *μελοποιία* (= *μέλος*) und *λέξις* (hier als *τῶν μέτρων σύστασις* definiert) zu den *ἡδύσματα* zählt. *τι* enthält, wie üblich, eine Einschränkung und deutet darauf hin, dass *ὄψις* von einem anderen Gesichtspunkt aus betrachtet doch nur bedingtermassen ein Teil der Tragödie ist, weil sie unter den sechs *μέρη* allein *ἀτεχνος* und überhaupt nicht Sache des Dichters, sondern des *σκευοποιός* ist." He has in mind *ἡδυσμένον* (6, 49 b 25, 28) and *ἡδύσματα* (6, 50 b 16), with his comment on those passages.

¹³ In chapter 26, however, Aristotle returns to tragedy on the stage.

¹⁴ On 15, 54 b 15, Castelvetro speaks of the things that pertain "alla

In giving his four species and four parts in chapter 18, then, Aristotle is dealing with what pertains to poetic art rather than that of the scene-designer. It is probable also that the lost earlier passage in which he dealt with the four parts considered them as pertaining to the poet's craft. If so, the fourth part of chapter 18 cannot be the spectacular.¹⁵

Thought, however, comes in the third place of importance, after character, and diction comes in the fourth (6, 50 a 39, b 4). Either of these has a better claim to a position in Aristotle's group of four than has spectacle. Thought, in fact, is said by the Philosopher to have a function close to the feelings indispensable to tragedy, for it may prepare the essential *πάθη*, such as pity, or fear, or anger (19, 56 a 38). Moreover, thought, along with character, is one of the two causes for dramatic action (6, 50 a 1-2).

But whatever the fourth part is, these parts are to be used in determining the species of tragedy, since a tragedy is classified according to that one of the four most prominent in it. Suffering, character, and thought appear in some measure in all tragedies whether simple or complex, and complexity, when present, adds to interest. Yet the tragic effect, though derived from all elements, will depend mainly on the constituent most prominent.¹⁶ Aristotle says, then, immediately following his account of the four species and four corresponding parts or constituents: *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰ μέγιστα καὶ πλείονα* (18, 56 a 2-4). The passage, especially the word *ἅπαντα*, has been variously translated, with some tendency to avoid an exact equivalent. Bywater writes: "The poet's aim, then, should be to combine every element of interest." Butcher: "The poet

vista, & all'harmonia" as "non necessarie, ne principali della tragedia." He makes "teatro, palco, maschere, . . . canti, suoni" merely "seguaci della poetica" though "compagne" of tragedy as acted (p. 344). Rostagni speaks of spectacle as extraneous (*La Poetica di Aristotele* [Torino, 1934], p. lix).

¹⁵ Butcher, translating chapter 18, adds to the passage on the fourth species the bracketed sentence: "We here exclude the purely spectacular element." This is a device for being true to Aristotle's thought and yet placating those who see in three unintelligible letters in the manuscripts part of the word meaning spectacle.

¹⁶ "Where the course of the drama is 'uninvolved' [i.e., simple] . . . any tragic effect a play may have is likely to arise from some element other than plot" (Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 62).

should endeavor, if possible, to combine all poetic merits." Susemihl's translation makes *ἅπαντα* refer to the species, and Gudeman explains that it means "die vier eben besprochenen *εἶδη*," that is, the species.¹⁷ Rostagni, however, says that we should understand *ἅπαντα τὰ μέρη*, or all the parts, "cioè 'tutte' le quattro *parti*, menzionate in rapporto alle diverse specie di Tragedia."¹⁸ Such a belief is supported by the occurrence of *μέρος* in the next sentence (18, 56 a 6). Moreover, Bywater and Gudeman quote, as depending on the passage now in question, Polybius, XVI, 20, 2: *δεῖ [τοὺς συγγραφεῖς] μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι πάντων κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς ἱστορίας μερῶν· καλὸν γάρ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο δυνατόν, τῶν ἀναγκασιωτάτων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτῇ πλείστην ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν*. If Polybius is taken as an interpreter, *ἅπαντα* obviously refers to *τὰ μέρη*, the four parts.¹⁹ This seems likely, because, as the translations of Butcher and Bywater indicate, Aristotle is advising a poet to attempt to do as well as he can with as many as possible of the normal components of tragedy. There seems, on the other hand, no reason why the Philosopher should advise a poet to attempt to do well in as many as possible of the various species. This advice to make all the parts as good as possible is given because critics have censured the poets improperly.

This censure is explained in a further clause, difficult partly because of its brevity: *γεγονότων γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον μέρος ἀγαθῶν ποιητῶν, ἕκαστον τοῦ ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἀξιοῦσι τὸν ἕνα ὑπερβάλλειν*. Bywater renders it: "Just because there have been poets before him strong in the several species of tragedy, the critics now expect the one man to surpass that which was the strong point of each one of his predecessors." Epps does not thus pass over the word *μέρος* or *part* but renders: "Just because there have

¹⁷ I now regret that I followed him in my own translation of the *Poetics* (*Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden* [New York, 1940], p. 96).

¹⁸ Rostagni goes still further in holding that Aristotle had earlier said pretty much the same thing, namely that one or more of the six parts (plot, character, thought, language, music, and spectacle) may be unimportant in a particular tragedy (6, 50 a 13-15).

¹⁹ Giovan Giorgio Trissino writes: "Essendo buoni Poeti in ciascuna di queste parti, vorrebbono che parimente in tutte le altre fussero eccellenti" (*Poetica* [Venice, 1563], p. 15v). And Pazzi: "Ad taxandos poetas haec aetas in tantum prona est, ut quos in omnibus his partibus probandos noverit, in singulis etiam mirum in modum excellere aequum censeat" (From Madius, *In Aristotelis Librum de Poeticis Communes Explanationes* [Venice, 1550], sect. 93).

been poets who were, each of them, good in the use of some one of these essential elements [i. e., parts], people now think that one man should surpass all the individual excellencies of previous poets."²⁰ But if the explanation in the preceding paragraph is correct, this entire clause continues the discussion of the parts. It is unlikely, then, that while the first section of this clause carries on the reference to those parts, the last turns to excellencies in general. There is, therefore, presumably a reference to the four parts in the last part of the clause, especially since it concludes the discussion of the topic. If so, Aristotle's meaning, when his compressed statement is expanded, is as follows: "The critics misrepresent the poets, for it is true that there have been poets good at using in a play one, and only one, of these four parts, but critics now expect any poet to do as well, in a single play, with all four parts as an earlier poet has done with the one part he was most skilful in." Aristotle did wish the poet to do as well as he could with the largest possible number of parts. Yet he saw that the critics were asking for an excellence impossible to tragedy. His own classification of tragedies according to one leading element, based on wide observation of tragedy, showed what the poets up to his time had attained, and led him to think that no more could be asked. No tragic author could be expected to do strikingly well with more than one of the four elements in a single play.²¹ If the classification into four species according to the one dominating part of each tragedy is not generally applicable it is useless.

2. A Pathetic Tragedy: *Ajax*.

To make his four species clearer, Aristotle has given examples of three of them. Though none are named for the complex tragedy, various references point to the *Oedipus King*, where much of the interest is in the concatenation of events, as the hero is enmeshed tighter and tighter. That tragedy "is concerned chiefly with the detection of a crime, but differs from a modern detective story in that the audience knows from the start

²⁰ Preston H. Epps, *The Poetics of Aristotle* (Chapel Hill, 1942), p. 36.

²¹ In exceptional cases he might have allowed that two of the elements were evenly balanced. In chapter 24 he speaks of the *Odyssey* as complex and concerned with character. Even if this be allowed as a parallel, an example from epic is not decisive for the more limited form of tragedy.

who committed the crime, though the criminal does not; still more significantly, it arouses not only our curiosity but our deep emotions."²² *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, in which the reader asks: Will Orestes escape? is also in this class. The tragedy of character is illustrated by *The Phthiotides* and *Peleus*, of which very little is known (18, 56 a 1-2).

The pathetic tragedy, says Aristotle, is represented by the *Ajaxes* and the *Ixions*. Our only survivor is the *Ajax* of Sophocles. The plot of this play has been censured as not unified, but has been so defended that little more need be said.²³ The strife over the burial is in truth an essential part of the story of suicide; the play could not have been complete if it had ended with the death of the hero. In the latter part, "the pathos and insistent claims of the dead body are reinforced by the child Eurysaces and Tecmessa, who kneel in silence by it and suggest that the dead man is waiting to be justified and restored to honour. Those who complain that the play falls into two separate parts tend to forget the presence of the body. It shows that the problem of Ajax is not yet solved, and explains why he is still a centre of fierce controversy."²⁴ Even the intervention of Odysseus, which approaches the *deus ex machina*, is prepared for when in an early line he expresses pity (121). Aristotle, then, need not have rejected the plot.

But is *Ajax* ruled by pathos—a quality mentioned in the quotation just above, though with no evident thought of Aristotle?²⁵ It appears early in the tragedy, when the mad Ajax, having slain and tortured sheep and cattle, exults as though he had found revenge on his foes. His enemy Odysseus pities him

²² William Chase Greene, *Moirai* (Cambridge, 1944), p. 154. Though recognizing that plot is first, he does not forget that the work is a tragedy.

²³ Jebb, *The Ajax* (Cambridge, 1896), pp. xxviii-xxxix; Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Die dramatische Technik des Sophocles* (Berlin, 1917), pp. 51-2, 67-8; C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford, 1944), p. 18; Thomas D. Goodell, *Athenian Tragedy* (New Haven, 1920), p. 220. William Chase Greene writes: "Doubtless an Attic audience was conscious of no slackening of dramatic interest even though the hero falls on his sword when the play is not much more than half over" (*op. cit.*, p. 148).

²⁴ Bowra, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

²⁵ In such criticism of *Ajax* as I have seen, there is no mention of Aristotle's remark in the *Poetics*.

in his misery, for he reflects that he too might have the same lot. Then come the chorus, pierced to the heart by rumors of their leader's strange conduct, yet forced to admit it:

ἦκοι γὰρ ἂν θεία νόσος (186).

Tecmessa confirms their worst fears for their leader, bringing to themselves—dependent on Ajax—fear of death by stoning. Ajax's recovery of his sanity, which the Chorus hail as a blessing, is but a double sorrow; Tecmessa not only grieves for her husband but with him, as he realizes what he has done. Ajax himself sits among the beasts he has slaughtered. He can see nothing before him but death, bringing delight to his enemies. Tecmessa exhorts him by the sufferings he will bring on herself, by the grief of his father and mother. He is unmoved, leaving his son in the charge of his followers and of Teucer. With ironical words he departs alone, bearing the sword of Hector. Then, too late, the messenger arrives with a charge that might have saved the hero's life, and Tecmessa realizes that Ajax has deceived her into thinking the danger past. In the next scene, the hero, having lamented the possibility—terrible to a Greek—that his enemies may cast his body to the dogs and birds, carries through his suicide—one of those deaths *ἐν τῷ φανερόν* that Aristotle marked as especially pathetic (11, 52 b 12). His body is found by Tecmessa, who with the chorus laments his and their own fate, helpless before the sons of Atreus. Teucer, from whom they hope for support, expresses equal weakness. Menelaus enters to embody their fears, declaring that Ajax shall not have burial. Teucer in his devotion makes the scene darker as he appeals the chorus by his insults to the leader. When Agamemnon appears, the grief of Teucer carries him still farther, and all hope seems gone. But Odysseus with cool rationality averts the wrath of the king and secures burial for the dead man. In pathetic persistence, Teucer, still mindful in his gratitude that Odysseus was an enemy to the dead, rejects further aid.

The action of this tragedy is evidently simple. On recovering from his madness, Ajax moves straight on to his death. Teucer returns only when, in the normal course of events, he has finished his expedition. Menelaus and then his brother come on the spur of the moment, with no design other than the immediate one of forbidding burial. Yet there is no unexpectedness in their coming, for they have been often mentioned throughout the

play. Odysseus, also named several times, carries out the spirit of the early speeches caused by his view of the mad Ajax. He comes, then, as not wholly unexpected, though without special reason. Moreover, he achieves no spectacular success but wins by argument a grudging assent from Agamemnon, even himself admitting that he works in his own interest; he departs without display when his further aid is rejected. The action is toned down to the utmost to give opportunity for the direct expression of the foreboding, grief, and anger of all the characters, without diverting any attention to involved actions or striking, unexpected accidents.

The characters, such as Teucer in his devotion to Ajax, living and dead, are admirably represented, but they are controlled by the pathos of the play. What their qualities may be in a more general way is not suggested. To pathos, too, are subdued most of the statements of general truths, in which the element of thought appears:

ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν
εἶδωλ', ὅσοι περ ζῶμεν, ἣ κούφην σκιάν (125-6).

ἐν τῷ θεῷ πᾶς καὶ γελᾷ κωδύρεται (383).

τοῖς θανοῦσί τοι
φιλοῦσι πάντες κειμένοις ἐπεγγελαῖν (988-9).

πρὶν ἰδεῖν δ' οὐδεὶς μάντις
τῶν μελλόντων, ὃ τι πράξει (1419-20).

Thought on a pathetic subject, directly applied to the fears of the speakers, appears in the discussion of Tecmessa and the Chorus whether one in distress would prefer happy friends, or whether it is better for all to feel woe (265-77). The intellectual element comes chiefly in the speeches of Menelaus, Agamemnon, and Odysseus. But thought, though fairly important, is subdued to pathos. No one would think of the play as dealing with the self-restraint proper to the ruler. Even artful diction is not lacking, as

πόνος πόνῳ πόνον φέρει (866).

But for all its richness, *Ajax* is dominated by the element of suffering. The Philosopher rightly chose it as a tragedy of pathos.

3. A Tragedy of Thought: *Prometheus Bound*.

Aristotle's illustrations for the fourth class of tragedy are difficult for us. First is *The Phorcides*. This seemingly was a satyric drama. Gudeman, as though feeling something strange in an illustration from a drama not purely tragic, comments: "Die Möglichkeit, dass eins von diesen Stücken gemeint ist, [die] kann nicht bestritten werden, stutzig macht nur die Tatsache, dass A. sonst in der Poetik das Satyrdrama nie eingehend berücksichtigt oder als solches zitiert."²⁶ But much more than that, it seems impossible that Aristotle exemplified one of his types of tragedy by naming a play that does not belong to that class.²⁷ There must have been on the subject a tragic drama now unknown to us.

The second example is given by some editors in the singular number, by others as plural, yet either permits reference to the *Prometheus* of Aeschylus.²⁸ Aristotle's mention of scenes in the lower world is not now helpful.²⁹ My discussion depends on the belief that Aristotle intended *Prometheus Bound* as one of his

²⁶ Note on 18, 56 a 2. He mentions as possible exceptions *Odysseus the False Messenger* (16, 55 a 14) and *Sisyphus* (18, 56 a 22). The first relates to a recognition, which might be illustrated from any sort of narrative. The second is possibly a reference merely to the story of *Sisyphus*. Gudeman remarks (note on 18, 56 a 22) that no situation such as Aristotle seems to have in mind can be discovered. Bywater, making no attempt to explain *Sisyphus*, assumes that the examples were from actual tragedies (note on 18, 56 a 21). His assumption is supported by the context, which deals with what is especially tragic.

²⁷ Even though satyr-plays have been referred to as tragedies (Seymour M. Pitcher, "The 'Anthus' of Agathon," *A. J. P.*, LX [1939], p. 155), it seems that Aristotle would not without warning have set up a class of tragedy to be exemplified only by them. If he could not find a tragedy of pure type to illustrate a species, would he have allowed the species to stand?

²⁸ So Rostagni and Gudeman. Bywater mentions only a satiric drama, in spite of his assumption in commenting on *Sisyphus* (see the preceding note). Fyfe, with a reference to satyr-plays, asserts that the *Prometheus* here mentioned "is certainly not . . . *Prometheus Bound*" (*Aristotle's Art of Poetry* [Oxford, 1940], p. 51, note). Whether *Prometheus Bound* is by Aeschylus or not is not important for my purpose.

²⁹ Rostagni says that these "dovevano costituire quasi un genere particolare" (*ad loc.*). Trissino makes the fourth species "quella degli inferi" (*op. cit.* [note 19], p. 16—*quinta divisione*).

examples. The plot of this play, like that of *Ajax*, has been much attacked. The tenor of criticism may be represented by Fontenelle's remarks:

On ne sait ce que c'est que le *Prométhée d'Eschile*. Il n'y a ni sujet ni dessein, mais des emportemens fort poétiques & fort hardis. Je crois qu'*Eschile* étoit une maniere de fou qui avoit l'imagination très-vive & pas trop réglée (*Oeuvres* [Paris, 1761], IX, p. 415).

The simple plot is indeed far from the complex one of *Oedipus King*. There is not even much progression within the mind of the hero, who seems about the same at the end as at the beginning. His visitors give him a chance to discourse on his state but hardly to change it. Io exhibits to the Titan another aspect of tyranny but does not modify his view of the spirit of Zeus. Yet the action at the beginning is striking, and the play is active throughout, more than in the coming of the interlocutors, for the spirit of the hero is dynamic, and demands the spectacular final scene. The chief sign of external movement is that connected with the secrets known to Prometheus, that of Io, which she desires to know, that of Prometheus' own deliverance, which excites the curiosity of the Oceanides, and above all that of the overthrow of Zeus, linked with the other two, which Prometheus refuses to Io and the nymphs, and which Hermes attempts to drag out of the Titan.

Turning away from plot, one observes that the dialogue, except for such portions as the narrative of Io's wandering, is marked by wise sayings:

τὸ ξυγγενές τοι δεινὸν ἢ θ' ὁμιλία (39).

κέρδιστον εὖ φρονούντα μὴ δοκεῖν φρονεῖν (387).

αὐθαδία γὰρ τῷ φρονούντι μὴ καλῶς

αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς μείζον σθένει (1012-13).

One is used to point the discussion of marriage:

τὸ κηδεῦσαι καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀριστεύει μακρῷ (890).

A topic developed at length is man's advance from primitive to civilized life. But the chief subject is that of the tyrant, presented as in Aristotle's *Politics* and elsewhere, "for in *Prometheus Bound*, Zeus is a modern tyrant as seen by the

contemporaries of Harmodius and Aristogeiton."³⁰ The importance of this topic has been developed as follows:

The ministers of Zeus, appointed by him to escort Prometheus to his place of confinement, are Might and Violence, the son and daughter of Styx. The one signifies his power, the other the methods by which he uses it. He is described as harsh (202, 340: *τραχύς*), as irresponsible (340: *οὐδ' ὑπεύθυνος*), as unconstitutional, acknowledging no laws but his own, a law to himself (159: *Ζεὺς ἀθέτως κρατύνει*, 419: *ἰδίους νόμοις κρατύνων*, 202-3: *παρ' ἐαντῷ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων*). Further, he is suspicious of his friends—a trait which is expressly declared to be characteristic of the tyrant (240-1: *ἐνεστί γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι / νόσημα, τοῖς φίλοισι μὴ πεποιθέναι*),—implacable and impervious to persuasion (34: *Διὸς γὰρ δυσπαραίτητοι φρένες*, 199-201: *ἀκίχγητα γὰρ ἦθεα καὶ κέαρ / ἀπαράμυθον ἔχει Κρόνου παῖς*, 349: *πάντως γὰρ οὐ πείσεις νιν· οὐ γὰρ εὐπιθής*). Above all, in his treatment of Io, he reveals his violence. The brutality of this episode is not, as in the *Supplices*, veiled in lyric poetry: on the contrary, the poet seems to be at pains to fill the audience, like his own Oceanids, with abhorrence. Zeus tried first persuasion, and then threats, to bend the unhappy girl to his will. This is the method Prometheus expected of him (185-7), and it is typical of the tyrant. Hence the climax, when, breaking off his prediction of Io's future agonies, Prometheus turns to the Oceanids and cries (761-3):

ἄρ' ὑμῖν δοκεῖ
ὁ τῶν θεῶν τύραννος ἐς τὰ πάνθ' ὁμῶς
βίαιος εἶναι;³¹

To this theme are devoted further wise sayings or sentences:

ἅπας δὲ τραχύς ὅστις ἂν νέον κρατῇ (35).

οὐ κατ' ἰσχὺν οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸ καρτερόν
χρεῖη, δόλῳ δὲ τοὺς ὑπερσχόντας κρατεῖν (214-15).

τραχύς μόναρχος οὐδ' ὑπεύθυνος κρατεῖ (326).

ὅσον τό τ' ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ δουλεύειν δίχα (927).

³⁰ Werner Jaeger, *Paideia* (New York, 1939), I, p. 250. "The character of Zeus in the *Prometheus Bound* is above all political" (Greene, *op. cit.*, p. 122).

³¹ *Prometheus Bound*, ed. and trans. by George Thomson (Cambridge, 1932), p. 9; the line numbers are those of his translation. It well illustrates the neglect into which Aristotle's analysis of the Greek drama has fallen that Thomson writes this paragraph under the heading of characterization rather than of thought or *dianoia*. The same may be said of part of Richter's discussion (*Zur Dramaturgie des Aeschylus* [Leipzig, 1892], pp. 65-7).

With the subject are connected other sentences on human prudence and the tyranny of the gods.³² As many discussions of the tragedy show, it is easy to carry its idea even as far as that of Christian martyrdom.³³ The structure of the play is suited to concrete presentation of tyranny. In the first scene Prometheus, fastened to the rock, is the victim of despotism, and as he speaks, held by his chains, the horror of injustice is ever before the spectator. The Titan's vivid recital of his devotion to the good of man is the opposite of the tyrant's attitude to his subjects. Oceanus is the ordinary man who will adapt himself to any government rather than undergo danger. Io is the victim of the monarch's lust and his wife's jealousy.³⁴ Hermes is the ruler's slave, truckling to his master, haughty to others. Prometheus at the end suffers increased violence from the oppressor's rage. If with such a plan the play is a great tragedy, the best work by its author save *Agamemnon*,³⁵ presenting the finest character in Aeschylus, its construction is at least good enough to enable the tragedy to produce a powerful effect. Is it too much to ask whether the author did not design an action admirably suited to carry out his purpose?³⁶

³² As in lines 17, 28, 43-4, 49-50, 103-5, 109-11, 150-1, 188-9, 252, 265-7, 306-8, 311-12, 324-5, 331, 337-8, 380, 473-5, 514, 536-8, 547-52, 624, 638-40, 685-6, 750-1, 901-2, 981, 1034-5, 1039. There are other sayings so well wrought into the dialogue that they are hardly to be classed as distinct sentences, as 629, 1072-3. The line numbers are from *Aeschyli Tragœdiæ*, edited by Sidgwick (Oxford, 1902).

³³ Richter, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 78; Herbert W. Smyth, *Aeschylean Tragedy* (Berkeley, 1924), pp. 92-7; Greene, *op. cit.*, p. 117; Jaeger, *op. cit.*, I, p. 261.

³⁴ Lines 590, 703, 899. For a reference to the tyrant's wife, see Aristotle, *Politics* 1314 b 13.

³⁵ Richter, *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 54, 64-5, 271, 280. William Chase Greene calls it "one of the most impressive and moving dramas ever composed" (*op. cit.*, p. 117). Werner Jaeger writes: "Poets and philosophers of all nations have for centuries loved *Prometheus Bound* far more than any other Greek drama, and they will always love it, as long as a spark of Prometheus' fire still burns in the human soul (*op. cit.*, I, p. 261). In one of the choral songs (553) "the chorus raises itself above emotion to pure contemplation, and so reaches the highest aim of all tragedy" (*ibid.*, p. 263).

³⁶ This is hinted at by Smyth (*op. cit.*, p. 100), though still in language derived from the conception of an abstract good plot: "Art has been forced to yield to necessity, or rather, it cooperates with necessity." Maurice Croiset acknowledges that the action suits "la condition

When the play is so considered, it gives a high place to the third element among the six making up a tragedy—namely thought or *dianoia*.³⁷ Thought appears in those passages “in which the characters show something by argument or utter a sententious saying” (6, 50 a 6); or in those in which characters “show something as it is or as it is not or present a general idea” (6, 50 b 11); “thought is shown in everything that the characters bring about by means of speech; the subdivisions are proof, refutation, arousing of emotion—pity, fear, anger, and the like—and the feeling that things are important or trivial” (19, 56 a 36-62). To this intellectual element the action of *Prometheus* is adapted; no other plot would so well carry the tragic pity and fear aroused by the speeches presenting the evil of tyranny.

This tragedy has other elements too. It has been said that its chorus “is nothing but pity and terror,”³⁸ and indeed they twice use Aristotle’s word *φρίττειν* (*Poetics* 14, 53 b 5) for the horror produced by tragedy (540, 695), and once his word *ἐλεειν* (*ibid.*) for pity (248). Io is a pitiable figure. Above all, Prometheus suffers, yet his stubborn courage is not subdued; he is not an Ajax. Suffering, however great, does not dominate the play.³⁹ The character of Prometheus won the admiration

acceptée par le poète”: “Il avait à inventer une action dont le principal acteur se trouvait condamné à demeurer toujours présent et à peu près immobile” (*Eschyle* [Paris, 1928], p. 141).

³⁷ Note such expressions as “Prometheus, the hero of the intellectual world”; “in the core of [Prometheus’] character . . . there is and always was a philosophical element”; “the audience goes through the same experience as the chorus, and is meant to feel and learn the same things” (Jaeger, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 260, 261, 263). See also note 35 above.

“In the Prometheus trilogy, Aeschylus returns to the theme of strife and reconciliation, and develops it on a cosmic scale. Hardly shall we find elsewhere in Greek literature, or even in the Bible, so daring a conception, spanning aeons of time and the vastness of space, of material power at first in conflict with moral ideals and then at last interpenetrated by them; but throughout the process the various members of the natural order vibrate with human sympathy for the suffering Titan” (Greene, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-17). In this quotation the author points to the primacy of thought in the tragedy but recognizes also the element of pathos or suffering.

³⁸ Jaeger, *op. cit.*, I, p. 263.

³⁹ Gudeman, however, in Aristotelian language calls *Prometheus Bound* ἀπλή και παθητική (note on *Poetics* 18, 56 a 2).

of Shelley, but there is no general exposition of mental traits; the courage of the hero is devoted to the one purpose of resisting the tyranny of Zeus. There is spectacle too; Oceanus comes on his sea-horse, but not to cause feelings of terror. More immediately tragic is the storm at the end, yet the last words of the stubborn Prometheus express not horror at the confusion of sky and sea, which cannot bring him death, but protest against injustice:

ἔκδικα πάσχω.

Prometheus Bound, then, asserts that tyranny is not final. Shelley is right in basing on it the concept of freedom expressed in his *Prometheus Unbound*, true sequel to the older play, though transformed as the passing of the ages requires:

To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;
To love, and bear; to Hope till Hope creates
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free;
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory.

If we can trust the evidence of *Prometheus Bound*, Aristotle's fourth species is the tragedy of thought.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Perhaps some of diction enters too, for, as has been remarked above, Aristotle sometimes connects that element closely with thought.

Trissino makes the first three species of tragedy *la complicata, la passionale, la morale*. Of the fourth he says that in it "le parole denno havere il luoco precipuo" (*op. cit.*, p. 15v—*quinta divisione*). Franz Susemihl speaks of the "vier eigentlich-poetischen qualitativen [Theile] Fabel, Charaktere, Reflexion und sprachlicher Ausdruck" (*Aristoteles über die Dichtkunst* [Leipzig, 1865], p. 187). Margoliouth in his translation makes the fourth class "the Tragedy of appropriate expression." In his note he says that *Prometheus* "has little of a plot, is more philosophical than psychological, and the characters are too far removed from us to arouse much sympathy; the success of the poet lies, then, in this—that he has made them speak in language worthy of the gods and the like."

There is perhaps some textual support for making the fourth species that of thought. Ralph Nash suggests that in 18, 56 a 2 the letters *ons* may be part of the word *νόσις*. This does not occur in the present

4. The Consequences for Dramatic Criticism.

The preceding development of the species of tragedy is important for the interpretation of the *Poetics*, in that it modifies the usual conception of the Aristotelian plot. One must still hold that Aristotle recommends a clear and well-wrought action for all plays, that he makes the complex plot—when skilfully used—the most effective, and even that, as a counsel of perfection, he exhorts the dramatist to be admirable in as many as possible of the four constituent parts of tragedy (to wit, complexity, pathos, character, and—as I believe—thought). But yet he accompanies this exhortation with a disapproving reference to critics who make the improper demand that a poet should show all the parts at their best in a single play. As has been said,⁴¹ this implies that Aristotle's observation had convinced him that a poet could not be expected to distinguish himself in the use of more than one of the four components in any single play. Hence, when he says that any one of the four can dominate a class of tragedy, he thereby relaxes all that is excessive in his demands for the plot abstractly best. Indeed, since the structure of such of his examples as we know has required defense, he is allowing or even recommending such plots as some of his followers have thought non-Aristotelian. He did not hold an absolute and rigid conception of structure, but asked what sort

Poetics, though used by Aristotle in his other writings. Though not a synonym of *διάροια*, as Plato (*Rep.* 511 D 25-E 28) explains, it is but one remove from it. If Aristotle were explaining that the fourth class was dominated by the mind at work, he might well have used *νόησις*. This is used by Plato (*Rep.* 529 B) in contrast with *ἡμῶσι*, and by Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* 1170 a 17; *De Inc. Animal.* 701 a 36; *Metaphysics* 1036 a 6) as well as Plato (*Tim.* 28 A) in contrast to *αἰσθησις*. This latter word Aristotle twice uses in the *Poetics* with reference to the spectacle. In the first (7, 51 a 7) it is opposed to *τέχνη*, the poet's art. In the second (15, 54 b 16), it has long been understood to refer to matters relating to stage production (Gudeman lists various early expositors; Castelvetro, p. 344, may be added). If Aristotle's fourth class depends on the intellect, he may have chosen for it a word opposed to the visual part of presented tragedy. If in a lost passage on the four parts, preceding chapter 15, he emphasized the intellectual element germane to poetic art, he perhaps wrote the passage in chapter 15 to remind his audience that even the poet in his study should not forget that his tragedy is to be acted.

⁴¹ P. 370, above.

would best serve to carry out the dominant quality in a tragedy. An action not abstractly the best may be best suited to the nature of a given play. In so far, however, as a playwright can develop the other elements by means of a complex plot, his work will be so much the more effective. But the action is an organic member, not something apart from the other elements. The Philosopher, then, is better than most of his followers.

When Aristotle has had restored to him his power to observe the varying types of tragedy and to appreciate organic subordination even of plot, his methods again become possible models. Our newspaper critics, if they wish to do more than indicate to tired businessmen that a play is amusing, can learn something from Greek procedure. Criticism at present tends to retain, without enthusiasm, the abstract view of plot traditionally held by Aristotelians and as a result by most men. Hence critics now rarely deal specifically with a play as an organic unit; they turn rather to observations on character or to exposition of the social views of the author. Such matters must be noted, but to treat them in isolation, though it is to study dramatic material, is not to be a critic. If a drama of social protest, for example, is to be analyzed as something other than a pamphlet or a speech from the soap box, its author must be tested as a playwright. He is not a good one unless his social ideas, or whatever dominates his work, are expressed through a suitable plot controlled by them. If the artist elects to use a plot that does not give scope to all his ideas, he must drop some of them. The writer of a good play can, if his plot is fixed, go only so far as it lets him, and no further, just as Milton could assert eternal Providence only to the height of his great argument, that is, so far as his story allowed him to do it. If exposition is an author's desire, he should turn to a form of writing that does not have action as its soul. The dramatic critic, then, when he follows the sensible and truly scientific method so briefly outlined by the Master of Those Who Know, will observe the relation of the components in the play before him and will ask to what extent they are united in an organism fitted to the stage. He will observe the individual piece from within, rather than bring to it a set of rules.

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GNAEUS ALLEIUS NIGIDIUS MAIUS OF POMPEII.

In a recent issue of *A. J. P.* (LXVIII [1947], p. 19) mention was made of a proposal for the revision of the current chronological treatment of the painted notices on the walls of Pompeian edifices; and, as a corollary to this, a new interpretation of two familiar monuments of that city, the reconstructed stage setting of the great theater and the altar with marble reliefs in the forecourt of the temple "of Vespasian." The traditional hospitality of *A. J. P.* now permits the submitting of the evidence and the presentation of the line of reasoning which have appeared to justify a fresh approach to matters regarding which it might have been assumed—at least by those not familiar with the course of such studies—that the last word had long since been uttered.

As a preliminary step, it is necessary to clarify one's ideas regarding the wall-inscriptions of Pompeii, and in particular the electoral propaganda and the notices of games.

No one who has enjoyed the good fortune of visiting the more recently excavated quarters of Pompeii, and especially has passed along the streets situated immediately to the north of the great Palestra, or else, in the second decennium of the present century, had visited the "New Excavations" of the Strada dell' Abbonanza, in the fresh state in which they had been revealed by the excavators—no one of these fortunate visitors will soon forget the impression produced by the number of notices, painted in bright colors and in the most perfect calligraphic technique upon the stucco surfaces of the walls of houses and shops. There is no need of detailed and learned argument to convince these eye-witnesses that such inscriptions, so fresh in appearance and so obviously forming an essential element in the life of the city during the period immediately preceding the final catastrophe of the year 79 of our era, are to be dated, in general, within the comparatively restricted limits thus indicated.

This impression, moreover, conforms with the general picture of local conditions which has been established with severely scientific method by Maiuri, in his recent work, *L'ultima fase*

edilizia di Pompei,¹ in which Pompeii appears as a city recovering from extensive damage caused by earthquake.

The notices in question consist chiefly of electoral propaganda; while a relatively small minority, including, however, the examples which are most conspicuous by reason of the occasional use of decorative, extra-large letters, and also of their greater length, give notice of various celebrations to be held in the city, whether at the amphitheater or elsewhere. The two categories of inscriptions are in a sense interrelated: in some instances the same individual appears in inscriptions of both classes, first as candidate for local office and then as giver of games; and in at least one clearly defined group (see below), examples of both classes of notice are signed by the same *dealbator*.

Certain historical considerations also tend to restrict the limits of time available in this connection. As a consequence of the disastrous fight between Pompeians and Nucerines in the year 59, reported by Tacitus,² the Pompeians were forbidden for the space of ten years to hold such spectacles; and although a learned colleague³ has thought that an abrogation of this sentence is implied by certain graffiti, still it must be admitted, given the form in which the statement of Tacitus is couched, that for a period of some duration, beginning in the year 59, gladiatorial exhibitions were not held in the colony. The *munera* announced upon the walls cannot be assigned to the period antedating the famous fight of the year 59, for the reason above presented: the twenty years that lapsed between that year and the final catastrophe of 79 would have brought with them the deterioration or obliteration of the notices from that period, even without the effects of the disastrous earthquake of the year 62.⁴ The notices in question are to be assigned, at least in general, to the final decade of the life of Pompeii, i. e. to the years 69-79, always with the possibility that the above-mentioned prohibition may have been removed, through the personal intervention of Nero, before

¹ E. g., p. 162.

² *Ann.*, XIV, 17.

³ Magaldi, *Rivista di Studi Pompeiani*, II (1936), pp. 82-100, using especially *C. I. L.*, IV, 1074, 1190, 1745, 2993 y, 3525.

⁴ This dating is to be preferred to A. D. 63, since the text of Seneca, *N. Q.*, VI, 1, 1-2, was open to interpolation, whereas Tacitus, *Ann.*, XV, 22, is imbedded firmly in an account of events of A. D. 62—in a group of sinister happenings assembled before passing on to the following year. See S. Chabert, in *Mélanges Boissier* (1903), pp. 115-19.

the year 68, and in consequence, that some of the notices may have been painted towards the close of that prince's reign: in fact, there are several allusions among the painted inscriptions to his benefactions and his popularity.⁵

A second consideration, restricting the time available, derives from the severe earthquake of the year 62, which has already been mentioned together with Maiuri's demonstration of the extent and nature of the damage which it caused. The fresh appearance of whole quarters of the city, when newly excavated, is largely due to the thorough reconstruction, re-stuccoing and repainting, necessitated by that disaster. Inscriptions painted on exposed stucco-faced walls antedating A. D. 62 had a poor chance of surviving intact; a still poorer chance, when, as was usual, the surface to receive them had been prepared by *dealbatio*, for this painted field itself would flake.

If these obvious criteria have not yet become a matter of common acceptance among Pompeian students, this has lain inherent in the slow progress of Pompeian studies in general, during the two centuries and more which have elapsed since the beginning of systematic excavations at that spot: just as was the case with the structures of the house-walls and the painted decorations of their interiors, so for the painted inscriptions the patient labor of successive generations of investigators has been required in order to establish precise standards of judgment and to accustom the eye of the observer to distinguish between styles and periods.

It is necessary, however, to use discretion and to judge each individual case on its own merits. It is true that a certain number of painted inscriptions survived in conditions of legibility on the walls of the houses at Pompeii even from the time of the Roman Republic; and the well-known group of "EITUNS inscriptions" are dated in the period of the Social Wars; but such inscriptions belong, technically, in a category distinct from those with which we are here concerned: they were painted, not on a surface of stucco, but directly upon the stone, or at most, on a painted surface of the stone; then, at least in certain cases, they were in turn covered by other layers either of paint or of stucco: the conditions governing their possibility of preservation

⁵ Magaldi, *loc. cit.*

and survival were fundamentally different from those of the later *programmata*.⁶

Another source of error lay in the assumption that the use of a magisterial or priestly title was confined to the actual period of holding of the office or function in question—the failure to realize that a former holder could continue to avail himself of the title after his actual term of office had expired, at least in certain circumstances—as in the inscription of Agrippa on the Pantheon in Rome—and in particular in the case of a priestly office qualified as “perpetual.” Of this matter, more anon.

But it almost seems as if a malignant star had presided over these studies: for the whole discussion has been prejudiced from a source which should have been above reproach or suspicion, namely *C. I. L.*

On *C. I. L.*, IV, 3884, Mau had made the faulty deduction from the title of D. Lucretius Satrius Valens, *flamen Neronis Caesaris Aug. filii perpetuus*: “Programma igitur scriptum est inter annos p. Chr. 50 et 54”; and his general conclusions on the dating of such inscriptions were presented in *C. I. L.*, IV, Suppl. ii, p. 468: “Multum abest ut candidatorum programmata secundum tempora in ordinem redigi possint.—Nonnullos tamen candidatos—antiquiores esse affirmare licet.—Hi igitur omnes anno certe 63 anteriores sunt.”⁷ Here most of his conclusions depend upon the dating of the flamine of D. Lucretius Satrius Valens, with which is bound up the dating of the activity of the

⁶ E.g., *C. I. L.*, IV, 152, “on the great and antique stones” of the Casa del Naviglio: MARIVM AED. The force of these considerations is not essentially weakened by the circumstance that some notices painted on stucco were protected through being situated in roofed and sheltered places.

⁷ Here the *C. I. L.*’s list of references bristles with errors due to incomplete revision: for 3460 thrice read 3461; for 3816 read 3820; for 3879 read 3884; for 3462 read 3463; for 3592 read 3594; for 3593 read 3595; for 3772 read 3775; for 3571 read 3572; for 3561 read 3562; for 3533 read 3534.

For D. Lucretius Satrius Valens, see e.g. *C. I. L.*, IV, 1185; 3884 = *I. L. S.*, 5145 = Diehl, 242; Diehl², 979 a; *N. S.*, 1936, pp. 318-319, no. 97; p. 327, no. 161 (defective); Magaldi, *loc. cit.*, pp. 89-91, 134-35; *C. I. L.*, IV, 1084 (corrected, p. 202). This last inscription is, of course, to be read:—*munifico August(ali) et liberis* (i.e. to Satrius and his sons): the notice was misunderstood by Magaldi, *ibid.*, pp. 202-203 and by Diehl, no. 83.

dealbator Publius Aemilius Celer, who signed not only this notice but several others in a characteristic technique.

Both Della Corte⁸ and Magaldi⁹ have demonstrated the wealth of allusions to Publius Aemilius Celer among the wall-inscriptions, both painted and incised: but, perhaps because still under the influence of the conclusions set forth magisterially by Mau, they did not draw the obvious deduction regarding the late period of the *dealbator's* activities. He left sufficient evidence of his occupancy of a certain establishment to prove that they centred about the latest period of the life of the community. And yet Magaldi¹⁰ had hovered on the verge of the solution, when he recognized the true character of a perpetual flamine: "può essere ormai un titolo onorifico derivante dalla carica ricoperta per il passato, non deve necessariamente indicare un ufficio tenuto attualmente."

Another painted inscription, *C. I. L.*, IV, 3572 = *I. L. S.*, 6400, of the candidate L. Rusticelius Celer, should now be reconsidered in the light of Maiuri's interpretation of the successive phases of the structure of the House of the Vettii:¹¹ it may well have been executed after the earthquake but earlier than the final restoration of that house.

To return to the nature of a perpetual flamine: the priesthood was annual but the title was perpetual. This has long been known to specialists. Toutain¹² had said: "Nous pensons avec Mommsen que de telles expressions désignent la permanence du titre plutôt que celle de la fonction sacerdotale elle-même.—Les *flamines perpetui* étaient dans chaque ville les prêtres honoraires du culte impérial." And, at least with regard to the African inscriptions, this has been demonstrated with an approach to certainty by F. Geiger:¹³ "Flamines perpetui et flaminicae perpetuae ad cultum vivi principis domusque eius spectantes sunt sacerdotes annui. Sed dignitatem eique adhaerentia insignia in

⁸ *Case e Abitanti*, no. 218.

⁹ *Accad. Nap., Atti*, N. S., XI (1928), parte ii, pp. 55-60.

¹⁰ *Riv. Stud. Pomp.*, II (1936), p. 95.

¹¹ *L'ultima fase*, pp. 105-112; also Van Buren, *M. A. A. R.*, X (1932), p. 27, pl. 5, fig. 2.

¹² *Les cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, prém. partie, I, p. 155.

¹³ *De sacerdotibus Augustorum municipalibus* (*Diss. Philol. Halenses*, XXIII), pp. 45-56, especially p. 50.

perpetuum eos possedissee itaque perpetuos nominatos esse verisimillimum est."

Nor can it be asserted that the memory of Nero was so offensive at Pompeii as to preclude such use of his name after the accession of the Flavii. The above-cited inscriptions (note 3) were motivated by some act of generosity on his part or attest his popularity in general; and the official policy of denigration of his memory was not actively pursued in the earlier years of the Flavians.

Further confusion has been caused by the unwarranted deduction that games announced in the *programmata* can be associated with the magistracies held by signatories to the documents of L. Caecilius Jucundus. Here there are three sources of possible error: the magisterial title may refer to an office previously held, a magistracy, especially the highly-prized five-year ones, might be assumed for the second time, and a prosperous and generously-minded citizen might be disposed to offer games or other benefactions even when out of office and not appearing as a candidate.¹⁴

The above will perhaps suffice as the prelude to an attempt to arrange in chronological order the evidence relating to Gnaeus Alleius Nigidius Maius, to reconstruct his career within the limits consented by the evidence, and to determine the nature of two of his benefactions.

The presence in duplicate of the name *Cn. Alleius* in a graffito¹⁵ affords no positive information for our purpose.

A painted notice—painted directly on a pilaster, without the use of stucco, and hence capable of longer preservation¹⁶—*Maium aed. ovf.*, reveals him at an early stage of his career, as candidate for the local aedileship.

¹⁴ As will be shown below, this renders intelligible the number of different games offered by Gnaeus Alleius Nigidius Maius; also his popularity attested by *C. I. L.*, IV, 1177: *Maius / principi coloniae / feliciter*; *N. S.*, 1939, p. 309, fig. 22; p. 311, no. 423: *Celer lorarius Maius delibat. / Maius principi coloniae felic(iter)*; and *N. S.*, 1936, pp. 340-1, no. 219: *Cn. Alleio Maius / principi munerarior(um) / feliciter*. The fact is so obvious that it has escaped the attention of both Zangemeister, *C. I. L.*, IV, p. 71, and Tenney Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, V, pp. 100-101.

¹⁵ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1483.

¹⁶ *C. I. L.*, IV, 512.

Another¹⁷ shows him aiming for a more exalted rank in the quattuorvirate: [*Cn. Alle*]ium Maium d. v. i. d. / *Aurelius civem bonum fac(it)*).

The electoral campaign which was to result in a still higher position is revealed by the notice, transmitted to us in a faulty copy:¹⁸ M. ALVIVM (*leg.* CN. ALLEIVM) D. V. I. D. / Q. O. V. F. / —S. ONOMASTVS. ROGAT.

So far, no fixed dates: but one is now furnished by certain *tabulae ceratae* of L. Caecilius Jucundus—*apochae*—dated in A. D. 55/6, in which our magistrate appears once as d. v. i. d. *quinq.* of that year; once as creditor; a third *apocha*, lacking date, mentions him as witness.¹⁹ His *duumviratus quinq.* then occurred in that year, A. D. 55/6.²⁰

On the other hand, the well-known renting notice²¹ implies a date not far from the great catastrophe of Vesuvius: for the reason that such a notice would not have been left intact after it had once served its purpose, on the outside wall of a dignified residence or of a series of shops. Besides, four *tabernae* forming part of the house in question, "entirely reconstructed after the earthquake" of the year 62, were not "yet fitted out for rental and for commercial use at the moment of the eruption."²² For these reasons, this renting notice appears to attest the survival of Gnaeus Alleius Nigidius Maius down to the last years of Pompeii, some twenty-four years after he had attained the *duumviratus quinquennalis*: if he was, e. g., forty years old when he held that office, he need not have passed sixty-four at the time of the catastrophe.

It is to this latest period of his life that his well-known *edicta*

¹⁷ *C. I. L.*, IV, 499: on a pilaster: some of the others were painted "in lateribus dealbatis." This helps to explain their preservation.

¹⁸ *C. I. L.*, IV, 504: on a pilaster.

¹⁹ *C. I. L.*, IV, suppl. i, nos. CXLVIII, 4-5, 15-16; XVI, 1-2, 15, 19; LXXVII, 5.

²⁰ He could have retained the title after the expiration of his term of office or between two terms of office; but in the tablet first cited his magistracy serves for dating.

²¹ *C. I. L.*, IV, 138 = *I. L. S.*, 6035 = Diehl, 437: *insula Arriana / Polliana* [*Cn. Al[le]i Nigidi Mai* / *locantur ex* [?] *Iulis primis tabernae / cum pergulis suis et c[e]nacula / equestris et domus. conductor / convento Primum* [*Cn. Al[le]i / Nigidi Mai ser(vum)*]. Here he appears as a speculative holder of real estate.

²² Maiuri, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

munerum edendorum are to be assigned, for reasons already set forth in treating of such notices in general; and it is to these exceptional documents that our attention must now be directed. No less than four sets of *ludi* are attested by the notices of this generous personage: itself a strong confirmation of the view, expressed above, that such exhibitions were not necessarily limited to those imposed by the requirements of office or the necessities of electoral campaigning.

One notice ²³ mentions thirty pairs of gladiators, and the name of the *dator* is followed by the qualification of *quinquennalis* and then the acclamation: *Maio quinq. feliciter!*

He appears again with the title of *quinquennalis* in a notice found on the Strada dell' Abbondanza: ²⁴—*sine impensa publica gladii. pur. XX el eorum supp(ositicii) pugn. Pompeis.*

Greater importance, however, is assumed by a third notice of games, which requires more detailed attention, especially in view of its defective state as transmitted to us: ²⁵

Pro salute—Caesaris Augu[sti] li[b]e[ro]rumqu[e]—dedicationem arae [fam. gladiat.] Cn. [Al]ei Nigidi Mai flami—Caesaris Augusti pugn. Pompeis sine ulla dilatione IIII non. Iul. venatio [sparsiones] vela erunt.

Here the reference is without doubt to the Flavian house: a parallel is supplied by the well known stone from the Roman Forum: ²⁶ *Paci aeternae / domus / imp. Vespasiani / Caesaris Aug. / liberorumq. eius / sacrum—*. In our opinion the notice not only may but must be restored as follows:

PRO. SALVTE

[imp. Vespasiani] CAESARIS. AVGV[sti] LI[b]E[ro]RUM-
QV[e]

[eius ob] DEDICATIONEM. ARAE [fam. gladiat.] CN.

[Al]EI. NIGIDI. MAI

FLAMI[nis] CAESARIS. AVGVSTI. PVGN. POMPEIS, etc.

The *flamen Caesaris Augusti*, naturally, was the flamen of the ruling emperor, in this case Vespasian. ²⁷ The construction [ob]

²³ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1179 = *I. L. S.*, 5143 = Diehl, 243.

²⁴ *N. S.*, 1913, 479 = Diehl², 980.

²⁵ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1180; add. pp. 462, 790 = Diehl, 245.

²⁶ *I. L. S.*, 6049.

²⁷ *Pace* of previous scholars: e.g. Magaldi, *Riv. Stud. Pomp.*, II (1936), pp. 187-88, 202, refers it to the period of Claudius. It is tempting to group with this the "eco abbreviata" *pro sal. / gladiatorum paria XX / pugnab.*, *N. S.*, 1946, p. 95, no. 78 bis.

dedicationem suggests that the *ludi* were presented not before the altar but presumably in the amphitheater.

The *ara*, the dedication of which was to be celebrated by means of these gladiatorial exhibitions, could hardly have been other than the well-preserved altar with marble veneering, the abundant sculptured decoration of which includes not only a scene of sacrifice but the sacerdotal insignia, *corona civica* and laurel branches, which occur on coins of Vespasian: the altar familiar to all visitors to Pompeii, which stands in the forecourt of the temple which, on the basis of this inscription, may now with perfect confidence keep the name of "the temple of Vespasian."²⁸

As has already been mentioned, and as has been clearly revealed and documented in Maiuri's *Ultima fase* cited above, with the tremendous earthquake of A. D. 62 a new period in the life of Pompeii began, characterized by a feverish activity in the restoration or fresh construction of, first private buildings of a commercial nature, then residential quarters for the poorer classes, and finally some of the public buildings. The last-named class includes the temple and altar of Vespasian, as we have just seen: and here too seems to belong another structure which is mentioned in a painted announcement discovered on the north side of the Strada dell' Abbondanza:²⁹

DEDICATIONE

OPERIS. TABVLARVM. GN. ALLEI. MAI. POMPEIS.

IDIBVS. IVNIS

POMPA. VENATIO. ATHLETAE [sparsiones] VELA.

ERVNT

(We omit the names *Ocella* and *Nigra va(le)*, as non-essential to our purpose.)

No fewer than three, and possibly four, certain or probable variants of the same notice of games—incomplete however—have

²⁸ Maiuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-48; Bowerman, *Roman Sacrificial Altars*, pp. 75, 90; Brendel, *Rom. Mitt.*, XLV (1930), pp. 200-1, pl. 68; N. Degrassi, *Bull. Com.*, LXVII (1939), p. 73. Not the altar of the "Sacellum Larum Publicorum," the dedication of which would have been combined with that of the building in the center of which it stood: Fiorelli, *Descr.*, p. 263; *C. I. L.*, IV, p. 462; Maiuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-53.

²⁹ *N. S.*, 1914, pp. 106-7; *I. L. S.*, add. p. clxxxiv, no. 5144; Diehl², 981.

come to light in various quarters of Pompeii;³⁰ in the first of these, there is preserved the word *sparsiones*, which is not legible in the copy reproduced above, presumably because it was executed in a special color which has not resisted the action of atmospheric agencies.

Here, the personal name used in the genitive, Cn. Allei Nigidi Mai, seems to depend on all three words preceding, *dedicatione operis tabularum*; although it might be taken as referring simply to *operis tabularum*.

It appears necessary to reject the interpretation of *opus tabularum* as = *tabularium*, "record-office," and still more the identification with the building at the south end of the Forum currently known as *curia*:³¹ *opus tabularum* is a periphrasis for *tabulae*,³² and for its interpretation it will suffice to cite the Elder Pliny's description³³ of the famous theater of Scaurus in Rome: *ima pars scaenae e marmore fuit, media e vitro,—summa e tabulis inauratis—reliquus apparatus tantus Attalica veste, tabulis pictis, cetero choragio fuit.*

The *tabulae*, then, whether gilded or painted or otherwise treated, formed the decorative background of the stage, or its details, decorative, subsidiary, or technical. Or else they may have been the platforms which served as sounding-boards: Vitruvius, V, 5, attests a preoccupation with acoustics, but the *tabulationes* of wooden theaters there mentioned are not apposite in the present connection.

The structural remains of the great theater of Pompeii show that the decorative portion of the *scena* was undergoing modernisation during the latest period of the life of the colony:³⁴ it is to this adornment that the notice of games is to be referred.

As regards the details of these games mentioned in the notice: *pompa*, *sparsiones*, and *vela* require no comment; they fit in

³⁰ *C. I. L.*, IV, 1177 = *I. L. S.*, 5144 = Diehl, 244; 1178; 3883; *N. S.*, 1913, p. 85, no. 11.

³¹ Della Corte, *loc. cit.* in *N. S.*, 1914; Maiuri, *op. cit.*, p. 37; *N. S.*, 1942, pp. 284-85. For *tabularium*: Vergil, *Georg.*, II, 502; *I. L. S.*, III, pp. 901-2; Diehl, *Altlat. Inschr.*³, nos. 379-380.

³² Cf. *R.-E.*, s. v. "opus"; *I. L. S.*, 9362, *opus bibliothecae*.

³³ *N. H.*, XXXVI, 114-115. Theatrical scenery was treated by A. M. Friend, Jr., in *Art Studies*, VII (1929), pp. 9-22; *pinakes* = *tabulae* in one sense, p. 20.

³⁴ Maiuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

naturally with any exhibition in an open-air theater. The mention however of *athletae*, and still more *venatio*, seems to us at first sight to be more suitable for an amphitheater than for a theater; there are, however, precedents: Cicero, in his famous Letter to Marius,³⁵ and Plutarch, in his *Life of Pompey*,³⁶ describe the gymnastic exhibitions and the wild-beast shows which were offered by Pompey on the occasion of the inauguration of his theater in Rome.

This notice, therefore, transmitted in four or possibly five copies, forms a document of prime importance for the history of the great open-air theater of Pompeii: an edifice, the stage structure of which was being embellished during the last years of the colony's existence,³⁷ and the re-dedication of which—even assuming that the projected reconstruction had not been brought to completion—would have afforded adequate occasion for spectacles such as the notice indicates.

As all know, the history of the *scena* of this theater in its successive phases is far from simple, and the opinions of learned colleagues have been by no means in agreement.³⁸ Maiuri, however, concludes that during that final period, that is to say after the great earthquake, the structure of the *scena* had been entirely remade in brickwork, with an architectural composition approaching the broken architectures of the Neronian and early Flavian time, but that not even the architectural decoration of the *scena* was entirely completed at the moment of the eruption of 79, since there is lacking every trace of columns, trabeation, and sculpture. This would not have prevented an "inauguration" in the unfinished state, to satisfy the demands of an impatient public which expected not only bread but games.

In the well-known account of the final catastrophe presented by Dio Cassius³⁹ we read that the eruption occurred "while the people of the city were seated in the theater." Some have seen in this statement a reference to the amphitheater. Now, however, on the basis of the above considerations, Dio's statement may be accepted literally: the theater was at that time capable of accommodating at least a certain number of spectators, and of functioning at least to some extent.

³⁵ *Ad Fam.*, VII, 1.

³⁶ LII, 4.

³⁷ Maiuri, *loc. cit.*

³⁸ M. Bieber, *The History of the Greek and Roman Theater*, pp. 336-38.

³⁹ LXVI, 23, 3.

At the time that the structural remains in question were discovered, "vi si sono rinvenuti più frammenti delle aste che sostenevano il sipario."⁴⁰ If so, how is it possible that no remains were observed of such a structure or structural details in wood as have been envisaged in the present discussion?

The answer is not difficult: in the first place, the excavations in question took place in the years 1764-65 and 1791-96, that is to say in an age when the excavators did not give such attention as would now be usual to the vestiges of elements which, for them, seemed to possess only a secondary interest. Moreover, as in the case of the bronze statues which once formed the adornment and the distinction of the Forum and also of the so-called Foro Triangolare, we are here following in the track of the *curatores restituendae Campaniae* mentioned by Suetonius:⁴¹ it would have been a special function of that commission to recover valuable and usable objects, especially those in public places, for the purpose of re-use elsewhere. And one of the very first of the public edifices to which these functionaries would have directed their attention would have been the great theater: its huge dimensions, together with the characteristic semi-circular outline of the *cavea*, situated as it was on the slope of the hillside, made its identification extremely easy. In fact, given the considerable elevation reached by such *scaenarum frontes*, it is certain that even after the rain of *lapilli* and *cineres*, the upper portions of the *opus tabularum* projected conspicuously above the level of the ground: to have left in place the *opus tabularum* of Gnaeus Alleius Nigidius Maius would have constituted an act of culpable negligence on the part of the *curatores restituendae Campaniae*.

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⁴⁰ Fiorelli, *Pomp. Ant. Hist.*, I, ii, p. 51.

⁴¹ *Titus*, 8, 4.

CATULLUS' ATTIS.

Though most students of Catullus and of Latin poetry in general speak of the *Attis* in superlative terms, few have seriously attempted to treat this poem as original poetry.¹ Its fate too often has been: *laudatur et alget*. Possibly this neglect has arisen from the backing which Wilamowitz gave to the unsupportable suggestion that in this work Catullus was translating or closely imitating an imaginary Alexandrian prototype.² At all events, in evaluations of Catullus' imaginative powers and of his formal creative talents,³ the poem is usually passed by with a few stock compliments, and most of the comments on it are confined to matters of text, grammar, or the Cybele-Attis cult.⁴

¹ Two notable exceptions are G. Allen, *The Attis of Caius Valerius Catullus* (London, 1892), and W. Y. Sellar, *The Roman Poets of the Republic* (3rd ed., 1905), pp. 461-62. Considerable help, too, in this line may be had from G. Friedrich, *Catulli Veronensis Liber* (Teubner, 1908), pp. 295-314.

² Wilamowitz, "Die Galliamben des Kallimachos und Catullus," *Hermes*, XIV (1879), pp. 194-99, conjectured that in his *Attis* Catullus was translating a poem by Callimachus of which two lines, he claimed (following the suggestion of O. Schneider, *Callimachea*, II [Teubner, 1873], p. 698), are still preserved by Hephaestion. In his "*Attis*," *Hellenistische Dichtung* (Berlin, 1924), pp. 291-95, Wilamowitz modified his earlier view to allow as Catullian the middle of the poem. The evidence, if it may be called that, is this: Hephaestion, 12 (ed. M. Consbruch [Teubner, 1905], p. 38), describing the development of the galliambic metre from Ionic tetrameter catalectic, remarks that the metre is also called *μητρωνάκον* because the "newer" poets had used it when writing of the Great Mother. To illustrate the metre, he cites without mention of author two "famous" galliambic lines, neither of which mentions Attis. The scholiast on this passage (Consbruch, *op. cit.*, p. 246) says that "Callimachus also used this metre." Any attempt to link the poem to other possible Alexandrian models is equally unsupportable.

³ It is regrettable that A. L. Wheeler in his excellent *Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry* (Berkeley, 1934) omitted a study of this poem. Little help is to be found in G. Lafaye, *Catulle et ses Modèles* (Paris, 1894), pp. 82-89 since he followed Wilamowitz so closely.

⁴ It should be noted that Catullus is much more interested in this poem in the rites of the cult than in the forms of the myth. On myth and cult, see H. Hepding, *Attis, seine Mythen und sein Kult* (Giessen, 1903); H. Graillot, *Le Culte de Cybèle* (Paris, 1912), especially pp.

Such points surely merit the most careful study. Yet the work possesses many of the qualities which are commonly associated with great poetry; it is an exact and intense expression of a significant and moving theme, put in a form of high technical excellence. A study of the ideas and construction of the poem, therefore, would certainly appear to be merited.

This paper is directed toward such a study, and aims to suggest answers to three of the basic questions which should be asked about the poem. What idea or concept was the poet seeking to express in the work? Why did such an idea appeal to him? And with what technical and formal devices did he seek to express that idea? In such a subjective field, it need hardly be said, one cannot pretend to any dogmatism.

First, what was Catullus' aim in this poem? As I interpret the work, it is the dramatization of a mental state or, to put it another way, the sympathetic delineation of a mind undergoing a psychological experience of a most powerful sort. And Catullus' Attis, in my opinion, is not the original Attis of the myth but an ordinary man who by emasculation becomes a priest of Cybele. The poem presents a study of two moods of such a man. The first is one of wild and dominant fanaticism which culminates in a terrible self-sacrifice; the second is one of awakening and bleak despair when Attis realizes what he has done, what he now is, and recalls the world to which he may never now return. In brief, it is a study of fanatic devotion and subsequent disillusionment.

Why did such a study appeal to Catullus? I should say at once that I share Professor Havelock's distaste⁵ for the school of literary criticism which, relying on those weary handmaids, history and psychology, believes that a poet's verses are best understood against a factual background of biography. Not only may such a "literal" approach inhibit our critical appreciation of the poet's imaginative powers and of the extent to which his own virtuosity is dictator, but, in many cases, the biographical "facts" are not facts at all, but simply conjectural cobwebs.⁶

101-3; F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le Paganisme romain* (Paris, 1929), pp. 43-68. I am indebted to Mrs. Milton Ryberg for much suggestive information on this cult.

⁵ E. A. Havelock, *The Lyric Genius of Catullus* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 79-85.

⁶ Thus, if one were to suggest that both Attis and Catullus through

Thus in the case of the *Attis* we can safely enough assume that Catullus had witnessed the rites of Attis in Bithynia (in 57-56?) and probably marvelled at a power which moved the frenzied worshippers *Veneris nimio odio* to such limits. Emasculation is obviously a subject full of attraction and horror for all human beings.⁷ Certainly, too, like many educated Romans of his day Catullus must have watched with keen interest the worship of the Great Mother in Rome itself,⁸ though, like Lucretius, Caeilius, Varro, or Maecenas, he could safely express this interest only in a literary way. Such personal observation may well explain the poet's original curiosity about this strange and bizarre cult and account for his knowledge of its rites. It is quite another matter, however, to explain why he chose to picture with such vivid contrast the high enthusiasm and the deep disillusionment of a human being who entered into this inhuman practice. The sympathetic reconstruction of poetic impulses is ticklish business; fortunately, it may not be a business of any great moment. But one element in the composition of the *Attis* we should not overlook—the poet's desire to indulge his own virtuosity. Surely the poet who could often express the most passionate thoughts in the calmness of high art was fully aware of the opportunities which such a subject offered his artistic talents. The chances for such a display in such a work undoubtedly attracted him to the theme. One cannot successfully probe too deeply into the distinction of form from content, but some aspects of formal excellence, in their subtle union with content, merit attention. In the *Attis* this is particularly true of those formal devices by which the poet created the effect of wild orgiastic speed and those by which he helps to convey the unforgettable picture of Attis' two states of mind. To a study of these technical devices we shall now turn.

To account for the speed and orgiastic abandon which stamp

an unworthy form of devotion had unfitted themselves for any other love, and that consequently this theme appealed to Catullus, not only may he actually be underrating the poet's artistic imagination by such a "literal" circumscription, but he has arbitrarily dated the composition of the poem on no evidence at all.

⁷ Cf. S. Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (transl. W. Sprott, New York, 1933), pp. 122-3 and 170.

⁸ See Graillot, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-107.

the poem, one should first turn to the metre itself.⁹ The preponderant number of short syllables, especially in the last half of the line, lends to the poem the air of swiftness which matches the quick enthusiasm of the worshippers, while the imperious caesura, preceded with striking contrast by the insistent long syllables, furnishes the fateful and heavy regularity of the tympana themselves. This orgiastic effect is heightened by the careful use of alliteration¹⁰ and assonance, as in the line

typanum, tubam Cybelles, tua, mater, initia (9)

or in

dea, magna dea, Cybelle, dea, domina Dindimei (91).

The atmosphere of wild speed is also built up in other ways. The short cola and asyndeton are effective; so, too, are the great number of verbs of motion. The same purpose seems to have governed the poet's choice of adjectives. One is reminded of Southey's assonant participles in his description of the fall of the water at Lodore. Most of Catullus' adjectives either depict haste, like *celer*, *citatus*, and *rapidus*, or else frenzy, like *vagus*,¹¹ *rabidus*, and *furibundus*.

When we pass to an examination of the technical ways by which the poet helped convey his impressive picture of Attis' two moods, a number of points need attention. First, the struc-

⁹ We do not know whether the galliambic metre was an Alexandrian invention, though most scholars assume that it was; cf., however, R. Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus* (2nd ed., 1889), p. 252, n. 1. The only ancient galliambics known, beside those quoted by Hephaestion (see note 2) are: four fragments by Varro (E. Bosisani, *Varrone Menippeo* [Padova, 1936], frags. 80, 142, 143, 288), two by Maecenas (W. Morel, *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum* [Teubner, 1927], p. 102), and one by an unknown author (Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 174). On the metre itself, see G. Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-54; R. Tyrrell, "Grant Allen on the Attis of Catullus," *C. R.*, VII (1893), pp. 44-5; E. Thompson and G. Dunn, "The Galliambic Metre," *C. R.*, VII (1893), pp. 145-8; E. Thomas, "Attin annotavit illustravit, anglie reddidit Grant Allen," *Rev. Crit.* (nouvelle série), XXXV (1893), pp. 284-6; T. Goodell, "Word-accent in Catullus's Galliambics," *T. A. P. A.*, XXXIV (1903), pp. 27-32.

¹⁰ For some interesting views on the effect of recurrent sounds, see J. L. Lowes, *Convention and Revolt in Poetry* (Boston, 1919), pp. 243 ff., and D. A. Stauffer, *The Nature of Poetry* (New York, 1946), pp. 88-9.

¹¹ *Vagus* in line 4 depicts frenzy; in lines 13, 25, 31, 86, motion.

ture of the poem is noteworthy. Narrative is kept to a minimum. The sudden opening reminds one of the *Shield of Heracles* or of some of Theocritus' shorter idylls or epyllia¹² or of Callimachus' *Hecale* or *Bath of Pallas*. Description, used with great economy and usually for dramatic purposes, is confined to such key elements as the savage sea over which the "mad crew were borne," the furious enthusiasm of the devotees as they ascend Mount Ida, the frozen wastes of Cybele's dark realm, and the golden beauty of the sunrise that restores consciousness to the worshippers. The description of Attis himself, as he was and as he became, serves but to emphasize the dramatic contrast. For once he was "the flower of the gymnasium, the glory of the wrestler's ring, whose threshold was warmed with many visitors, whose home was garlanded with fair wreaths."¹³ This general picture, thoroughly Greek, was enough; no individualization was wanted here, for this is the picture of any man become Attis. Then we see the new Attis, the now *notha mulier*, sketched with the fewest of strokes—*niveis manibus, teneris digitis, roseis labellis, tenerum Attin*. As for his companions, abruptly introduced in Hellenistic fashion in line 11 and forgotten before the poem's close, they merit no description at all. So, too, similes are few and functional. Of the three, *velut exules* (line 14) bears an ironical reference to lines 59 and 60; the other two, in lines 33 and 51, imply eventual mastery and enslavement under Cybele. From the structural point of view, the chief emphasis is given to the speeches, so that against the lightly drawn background described above we may focus all our attention upon Attis' own feelings and moods. And the two speeches, reflecting the two moods of devotion and of despair, are thrown into a sharp contrast by the sudden and delicate beauty of the verses on the sunrise:

sed ubi oris aurci Sol radiantibus oculis
lustravit aethera album, sola dura, mare ferum,
pepulitque noctis umbras vegetis sonipedibus (39 ff.).

This is a contrast which not only intensifies each separate mood but also fuses them into a total picture of great power. Such

¹² Nos. 6, 8, 24, 25.

¹³ Lines 64-6.

an equation of night with frenzy and of dawn with sanity is reminiscent of passages in the *Iliad* and in the *Ajax*.¹⁴

One of the poet's most interesting devices for showing us the tortured agony of the awakened Attis is the variation in the gender of Attis after the emasculation. Usually, of course, he is feminine. But now and then, in significant spots, he emerges masculine. Thus in line 45 when, freed momentarily from his madness with the coming of dawn, he reviews his own acts, he is *ipse*.¹⁵ But a few lines later, when he addresses in his hopelessness his fatherland in Roman style, the word is *allocuta*. The masculine points back to his previous state; the feminine realistically depicts his present state. So in the speech itself he describes himself as masculine when he left his homeland (*quam miser relinquens*, line 51), but he acknowledges his present state elsewhere by applying feminine adjectives to himself. So, too, the goddess subtly recognizes the revolt in Attis' own mind by calling him masculine when she bids the lion drive him back into submission: *face ut hunc furor agitet* (line 78) . . . *qui fugere imperia cupit* (line 80). And in our last picture of Attis, *ille demens fugit in nemora fera* (line 89), we are left with a hint of that inner struggle which he is destined in occasional periods of sanity to feel for the rest of his life.

In his metrical variations, too, Catullus has shown great sensitivity to content. Consider, for example, lines 22 and 23 in Attis' first speech of enthusiasm:

tibicen ubi canit Phryx curvo grave calamo,
ubi capita Maenades vi iaciunt hederigeræ.

In the first, one hears the slow music of the curved reed; in the second, one feels the orgiastic abandon of the Maenads.¹⁶ Or note the utter weariness of the devotees in the close of this line:

itaque, ut domum Cybelles tetigere lassulæ (35)

¹⁴ Cf. *Iliad*, XXIII, 212-32, and *Ajax*, 21, 217, 258, 660, 672.

¹⁵ I have followed the Oxford text of R. Ellis, *Catulli Carmina*. Friedrich, and Kroll (*C. Valerius Catullus* [Teubner, 1929]), have adopted the emendation *ipsa*, which here quite misses the point.

¹⁶ Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 303, notes that the first half of lines 21-23 closes with a monosyllabic word, which thus heightens the mood of frenzy.

or the wavering, feminine, fluctuation of Attis expressed in the short syllables of:

ego mulier, ego adolescens, ego ephebus, ego puer (63).

On the whole, the first speech contains more short syllables than the second, which is what one would expect from a contrast of the thought of each. The second speech closes with a line memorable for its long syllables, by which the poet emphasizes the culmination of the emotional crisis:

iam iam dolet quod egi, iam iamque paenitet (73).

One of the most marked features of the poem is the extensive use of repetitions, a feature common, though to a less degree, to many other of Catullus' poems.¹⁷ The eye has certainly largely displaced the ear in our modern literary communication, despite the radio.¹⁸ But not so in Catullus' time, and we must not miss the force of pictures for the ear in a poetry written for recitation. In lines 62-71 of Attis' second speech, *ego* occurs thirteen times, an iterative device here used to reinforce the highly personal character of the speech. But more striking is

¹⁷ E.g. Catullus uses the irregularly recurring refrain in several poems: In no. 61, *Virginem, o Hymenaeae Hymen, / Hymen o Hymenaeae* 4 times (with the first word wisely varied); and *Te volente. quis huic deo / comparier ausit* 3 times; and *Prodeas nova nupta* (with *abit dies* preceding in 3 cases; cf. also line 192) 5 times; and *Io Hymen Hymenaeae io, / io Hymen Hymenaeae* 11 times. In no. 62: *Hymen o Hymenaeae, Hymen ades o Hymenaeae!* 8 times. In no. 64: *currite ducentes subtegmina, currite, fusi* 13 times. In three short poems he commences and closes with the same line (nos. 16, 36, 57). Or he often suggests a theme by repeating words from another poem; cf. 2, 1 with 3, 4; 8, 5 with 37, 12; 21, 2-3 with 24, 2-3 (cf. 49, 2-3); 23, 1 with 24, 5; 41, 4 with 43, 5. And the device of repeating one or two words within the same poem in the same metrical position is surprisingly common in both his short and long works; cf. *obdura* in 8, 11 and 19 (cf. also line 12); *venisti* in 9, 3 and 5; *sive* in 11, 2 and 5 and 7 and 9; *cenabis bene* in 13, 1 and 7; *eone nomine* in 29, 11 and 23; *Sirmio* in 31, 1 and 12; *pueri integri* in 34, 2 and 3; *renidet ille* in 39, 4 and 6; *omnium* in 49, 5-7; *concupine* in 61, 125 and 128 and 130 and 133; variations of *tum Thetidis* in 64, 19-21; *-ore Theseu* in 64, 69 and 133; *-ore Theseus* in 64, 73 and 110; *Gallus* in 78, 1 and 3 and 5; *quid carius est oculis* in 82, 2 and 4; *formosa est* in 86, 1 and 5; *quid facit is* in 88, 1 and 3; cf. *niveis . . . artus* with *niveos . . . artus* in 64, 303 and 364.

¹⁸ Cf. Stauffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 13 ff.

the repetition of words in the *same* metrical position.¹⁹ Now this is a device not at all common in earlier writers. Naturally there is some correspondence of sounds in the strophes and antistrophes of Greek choral odes;²⁰ now and then one finds such repetitions by the same character within a few lines in the three tragedians,²¹ and some instances of repetitions in the *same* metrical position may be found in the poems of Solon,²² Theocritus,²³ and Bion.²⁴ Several examples occur in Euripides' ode to the Great Mother in his *Helen*²⁵ and in the *Hymn to the Idaean Dactyls*.²⁶ Callimachus appears to be the poet most fond of this practice.²⁷ Still, the device is rarely found and, though one may argue that the exigencies of the galliambic metre, which is certainly contrary to the genius of the Latin language, may explain some of this repetition, the amount of it in the *Attis* is so large that it would appear to be consciously done. And this iteration in the *same* metrical position involves key words: *Attis*, *Cybele*, *citatus*, *animus*, and *nemora*. This sort of repetition is not used here for liturgical purposes, for the *Attis* is anything but a hymn, nor is the repetition mere ornamentation. Rather, its function

¹⁹ As pointed out in my "The Art of Catullus' *Attis*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXI (1940), pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. My suggestions there made on epyllion and hymnal elements in this poem now seem to me largely unsupportable. J. W. Mackail, *Latin Literature* (Scribners, 1895), p. 57, noting the repetition of *identidem* in the same metrical position in 11, 19 and 51, 3 calls it "a stroke of subtle and daring art."

²⁰ E. g. *Antigone* 585 and 596, and 614 and 625.

²¹ Cf. F. Schroeder, "De iteratis apud tragicos graecos," *Diss. Philol. Argentoratenses*, VI (1882), pp. 84-5 and 123-4.

²² Cf. forms of ἄλλος in Solon, 13 (no. 1 in E. Diehl, *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca* [1936], pp. 23-29), lines 17, 29, 39, 47, 49, 51, 53, 57, 67.

²³ Cf. forms of Διώνυσος closing the verse in no. 26, lines 6, 9, 27, 37; Περθεύς opens lines 10, 16, 18; χαλποί opens lines 33, 35.

²⁴ Cf. δαίβιος ἦν in no. 8, lines 2, 4, 7.

²⁵ Cf. μάτηρ in lines 1301 and 1320, and ματρός in lines 1340 and 1356.

²⁶ *I. G.*, XII, 9, no. 259; lines 8 and 23, and 25 and 30 as edited by J. Powell, *Collectanea ALEXANDRINA* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 171-3.

²⁷ E. g. Ζεῦ σὲ in Hymn 1, lines 6, 7, and 45; Ἀπόλλων in Hymn 2, lines 34, 42, 51, 61, 68, and 93; forms of Φοῖβος in Hymn 2, lines 44, 47, 55, and 65; forms of Ἀηρώ in Hymn 4, lines 39, 60, 68, 204, 246, and 326; Ἀστερίη in Hymn 4, lines 37, 197, 224, 225, 244, 300, and 316; Ἀθανάτα in Hymn 5, lines 5, 16, 33, 43, 55, 57, 69, 88, 96, 99, 133, and 137; forms of Ἐρυσίχθων in Hymn 6, lines 32, 65, 81, and 85; forms of ἐλαλή in Iambi, lines 224, 233, 262, 266, 271, 276, and 280.

in this poem is to help convey the picture of a unique and morbid state of mind, by returning the reader forcefully and frequently to key themes.²⁸ The following cases merit attention:

super alta vectus <i>Attis</i> celeri rate maria	(1)
simul haec comitibus <i>Attis</i> cecinit notha mulier	(27)
comitata tympano <i>Attis</i> per opaca nemora dux	(32)
ibi Somnus excitum <i>Attin</i> fugiens citus abiit	(42)
simul ipse pectore <i>Attis</i> sua facta recoluit	(45)
tenerumque vidit <i>Attin</i> prope marmora pelagei	(88)
tympanum, tubam <i>Cybelles</i> , tua, mater, initia	(9)
Phrygiam ad domum <i>Cybelles</i> , Phrygia ad nemora deae	(20)
itaque, ut domum <i>Cybelles</i> tetigere lassulae	(35)
ait haec minax <i>Cybelle</i> religatque iuga manu	(84)
dea, magna dea, <i>Cybelle</i> , dea, domina Dindime	(91)
Phrygium ut nemus citato cupide pede tetigit ²⁹	(2)
hilarate aere citatis erroribus animum	(18)
quo nos decet citatis celerare tripudiis	(26)
ibi Somnus excitum <i>Attin</i> fugiens citus abiit	(42)
alios age incitatos, alios age rabidos	(93)
agite ite ad alta, Gallae, Cybeles nemora simul	(12)
famuli solent, ad Idaee tetuli nemora pedem	(52)
egone a mea remota haec ferar in nemora domo	(58)
ubi cerva silvicultrix, ubi aper nemorivagus	(72)
face uti furoris ictu reditum in nemora ferat	(79)
facit impetum: ille demens fugit in nemora fera	(89)
stimulatus ibi furenti rabie, vagus animis	(4)
hilarate aere citatis erroribus animum	(18)

²⁸ *Attis*, *animus*, *nemora*, *redimita*, *itaque ut* and *citus abiit* could stand metrically in several other positions. Words forming a bacchius, however, like *Cybelle*, *citato* and *acuto* must stand, I admit, just before the caesura. But Catullus could have avoided this in the case of *Cybelle* by using the form *Cybele* (as he did in lines 12, 68, and 76, where it stands each time in the same metrical position). The recurrences of *Attis* were noticed by T. Means, "Catullus LXIII," *C. P.*, XXII (1927), pp. 101-2, who suggests that "The word 'Attis' (or 'Attin') finds itself in that position in the line which is as neutral as possible" to show that he was neither masculine nor feminine.

²⁹ Note that forms of *citatus* suggest also the sound *Attis*.

abit in quiete molli rabidus furor <i>animi</i>	(38)
miser a miser, querendum est etiam atque etiam, <i>anime</i>	(61)
ferus ipse sese adhortans rapidum incitat <i>animo</i>	(85)
devolvit ile <i>acuto</i> sibi pondere silicis	(5)
sectam meam <i>exsecutae</i> duce me mihi comites	(15)
ubi sacra sancta <i>acutis</i> ululatibus agitant	(24)
adiitque opaca silvis <i>redimita</i> loca deae ³⁰	(3)
mihi floridis corollis <i>redimita</i> domus erat	(66)
<i>itaque</i> ut relictæ sensit sibi membra sine viro	(6)
<i>itaque</i> , ut domum Cybelles tetigere lassulæ	(35)
ibi Somnus excitum Attin fugiens <i>citus abiit</i>	(42)
roseis ut huic labellis sonitus <i>citus abiit</i>	(74)
sed ubi oris aurei Sol <i>radiantibus oculis</i>	(39)
ibi maria vasta visens <i>lacrimantibus oculis</i>	(48)
abit in <i>quiete molli rabidus furor animi</i>	(38)
ita de <i>quiete molli rapida</i> sine rabie	(44)

This study has emerged from a belief that, perhaps because of Wilamowitz's support of the view that Catullus was translating Callimachus in this poem, the work as original, creative poetry has been too much neglected. Too frequently in estimates of the poet's imagination and artistic powers, the *Attis* has counted for little. Yet it deserves a better fate, and so in this paper suggestions have been advanced as to what idea, moulded from Catullus' own poetic fancy and discipline, and reflecting his personal interest, may have drawn him to this subject. Such conjectures about the psychology and art of an ancient poet, being at best chiefly subjective, are always open to criticism and correction. But the examination of the technical devices, the "tricks" of poetry, lies in a surer field, and it is to be hoped that this study of noteworthy formal elements in the *Attis* may attract the reader's attention in the case of Catullus' other poems to those devices which enabled this poet so often to recreate his feelings and experiences "in the tranquillity of a perfect art."

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³⁰ Note the contrast in meaning in the two verses.

ARISTOTLE'S PRESUPPOSITIONS ABOUT CHANGE.*

A study of certain of Aristotle's presuppositions will reveal a basic conflict in what might be called his "protophilosophy."¹ That conflict lies in the existence of two orders, one of which contains material objects, change, chance, perversions, accidents, and is known only by observation, which Aristotle is unwilling to call "knowledge"; the other of which is an orderly arrangement of classes, is permanent, controlled by logical necessity, and can be known by logical insight or presumably the *nous*. Whether these two realms are existentially separate from each other is not a question which need concern us here, since the very meaning of "existentially separate" would require a detailed analysis which would be out of place. We shall call the first of these realms, the world of chance, the second the world of order, though Aristotle himself is not consistent in giving them either these names or others. Change occurs only in the former of these two realms, as does evil, and it is our purpose here to try to discover what Aristotle thought change to be.

1. *The Empedoclean analysis of change.*

In *Metaphysics* A, 3, 4, Aristotle assumes that in all change there can be found an agent and a patient, which are two different beings. Nothing would change "of its own accord," an axiom which continues through Renaissance science, and a problem arises only when change occurs, not when something persists "in its own nature."

We have an analogy to this in Galilean physics, when a change in direction requires explaining, the persistence of a direction requiring none. In the case of locomotion, no special difficulties arise, for it was always possible to find two distinct physical objects which came into contact with each other. In the case of

* The paper which follows is a section from a larger study of the presuppositions of Aristotle, portions of which have already appeared in the *American Journal of Philology* at various dates. Its intentions are purely historical.

¹ Cf. "A Basic Conflict in Aristotle's Philosophy," *A.J.P.*, LXIV (1943), pp. 172-193.

living beings, it was not so easy to find an agent, and, as is well known, the efficient cause sometimes dwindled to a mere metaphor, the final cause taking its place. In the final analysis, the Prime Mover becomes a universal agent, and Matter a universal patient, a development which is inevitable if the analysis is universally applied.

It will be noticed that this conception of change goes back at least to Empedocles who also felt the necessity of positing agents to introduce change into the material substratum of the world.

2. *The identification of genesis with separation and combination* (*Met.* 988 b 32).

The Empedoclean analysis of change left open the question of what the agent actually does. Historically the two most important questions asked about its task are: (1) does the agent *create*, (2) does he simply rearrange elements already pre-existing? It would look as if Aristotle believed that real creation was impossible, for in the passage of the *Metaphysics* in which this axiom appears, he is criticizing the weakness of his predecessors in positing one element as the *arché*. If the elements are really simple, he argues, no one of them could arise out of the others. In the *De Generatione et Corruptione* (329 a 24) we see clearly that he believes the traditional elements to be compounds of the opposites *in potentia*, heat and coldness, moistness and dryness. Of these the cold and the wet are privations, so that the fundamental properties are dryness and heat, which are replaced in the transmutation of elements by their respective opposites or privations.²

This notion of qualitative change is pervasive of the corpus. All qualitative change is the passage of what might be called "floating qualities"—not unlike the qualitative atoms of Anaxagoras—from one substance into another. Thus in discussing spontaneous production (*Met.* Z, 9) Aristotle says that the heat in the movement of the masseur's hand makes heat in the body of the patient (*Met.* 1034 a 26), and in discussing the opinions of the Heracliteans he maintains that they are right in saying that the changing "when it is changing" does not exist. "For

² *Earth* is cold and dry and yet is matter in relation to *Fire* which is hot and dry.

that which is losing a quality has something of that which is being lost, and of that which is coming to be, something must already be" (*Met.* 1010 a 17). The invention of the concept of potentiality was probably made to take care of this. The thing-coming-to-be was already present in *potentia*, so that its development was simply the uncovering of the pre-existent.

Since the opposites are atomic qualities at the very least, they are elementary and indestructible. This logically led Aristotle to assert (*Met.* 1000 b 25) that to perish is to be resolved into the things from which a thing came into being. Consequently an absolutely simple thing would be eternal and, conversely, the easiest way to explain the eternality of anything was to assert its simplicity (*Met.* 1088 b 14). This is the logical reason why later thinkers who wish to prove the immortality of the soul also try, as Plato did (*Phaedo* 78), to prove its simplicity.

It is clear that Aristotle is arguing here as if he believed in the dictum *ex nihilo nihil* and indeed in *De Caelo* (302 a 3) he states definitely that though it is possible for one body to be generated out of another, it is impossible for a body to be generated "from no other pre-existing quantity." Aristotle's conception of corporeal quantity is none too clear, but Stocks translated the Greek equivalent "mass." The principle which Aristotle would be invoking is the conservation of mass, but that is anachronistic. In fact, no very clear idea of corporeal quantity obtained in physics until the time of Lavoisier. In the *Physics* (255 b 23) Aristotle speaks of the quantitative as spreading out, as if volume were the distinguishing mark of corporeal quantity, whereas in the *De Caelo* (273 a 24) weight is directly correlated with it, in the argument that an infinite body would have infinite weight. This may not be an inconsistency, inasmuch as he may mean by an infinite body a body of infinite extent. In the *Physics* (201 a 6) when he is applying the categories to the kinds of change, he indicates that the two poles of quantitative change are the complete (*teleion*) and the incomplete (*ateles*). This would seem to mean that each thing has a quantity assigned to it by "nature," and that it will increase normally until its "natural" quantity has been reached. But just what its natural quantity would be is not revealed. The principle *ex nihilo nihil*, then, cannot be said to be equivalent in Aristotle to the conservation of mass. In fact, if we may take *De Generatione et Corrup-*

tione (322 a 16 ff.) as typical of Aristotle's thought, "mass" would be an indefinable, just as it was in classical physics, for there he speaks of "quantity-in-general" as a basic concept referring to something which no more comes into being than "animal-in-general." "Quantity-in-general" is of course one of the categories and presumably Aristotle thought that its meaning was clear enough to require no definition.³

In any event, the characteristics of matter must be of such a nature that they cannot be observed. Matter serves a purely systematic function in the Aristotelian doctrine; it is the universal patient. We observe its qualities or properties, not itself. These qualities come together and separate and this type of behavior is what we call qualitative change. There are probably two basic metaphors at play here: (1) the metaphor of the grammatical subject with its attributes asserted in the predicate, (2) the metaphor of the receptacle, which contains things and which is unmodified by their presence or absence. The acuteness of the analysis lies in its applicability to observed fact: one can perceive the properties which come together and break apart, whether one can see the matter or not. If now Aristotle had added to his basic theory of genesis a technique for measuring observed synthesis and its reverse, he would have established a technique for empirical science. But in that event he would have had to give up the following axiom, which, while simplifying the order of nature, renders empirical science impossible.

3. *The polarity of change* (*Physics* 224 b 28; *De Gen.* 324 a 3; *Physics* A, 5, especially 188 a 31 ff.; 188 b 25; *De Anima* 416 a 33).

The best formulation of this principle occurs in *Physics* 224 b 28: "Non-accidental change is not in all things, but only in the opposites and in contradiction."

³ It goes without saying that the discussion of "quantity" in *Met.* Δ, 13, the "Philosophical Lexicon," throws no light on this matter. In the same work (K, 6), discussing Protagoras, he speaks of "quantity" as "indeterminate" in nature. Ross in his commentary on this passage says, "The size of things is not definite and unchangeable as some of their qualities are." As a matter of fact, one could make out a good case for the theory that Matter as such in Aristotle amounts to little more than his system of absolute space with fixed positions; quantity thus becomes extent and is weight only in bits of matter.

This is fundamental to Aristotle's thought and is used to prove among other things that where there is no opposition, there is no change (*Physics* 225 a 10). But opposition always occurs within a given genus, so that only certain changes are possible, once the subject of the change is known, and all change is predictable. It is on this basis that one can reason out the generation of the elements from the primary qualities, which provides the logical structure of the *Meteorology*.

There is, however, one exception to this rule: locomotion. Locomotion (*Physics* 261 a 30) may be, but is not always, continuous and eternal. "Every other motion and change is from an opposite to an opposite: thus for the processes of becoming and perishing the limits are the existent and the non-existent, for alteration the various pairs of contrary affections, and for increase and decrease either greatness and smallness or perfection and imperfection of magnitude; and changes to the respective contraries are contrary changes." As Aristotle's argument develops, it turns out, as is well known, that only circular motion can be continuous and eternal (*Physics* ②, 8), for any rectilinear motion must come to an end, there being no infinite extent in space which it might traverse, and, if it turned back, it would, according to Aristotle, have to come to rest at the point at which it turned back. The only motion of this eternal type is that of the planets. Sublunary locomotion is never continuous and eternal and consequently it too, like other forms of change, occurs only between opposites.

In his extended analysis of change in the opening of the fifth book of the *Physics*, we find the following factors involved in any change:

1. agent
2. patient
3. time
4. *terminus a quo*
5. *terminus ad quem*⁴

It is the two termini which (*Physics* 224 a 34) are the poles, the opposites, the examples given by Aristotle being the hot and the cold. This means that all change except superlunary motion moves between termini which are opposites, that is, termini of

⁴In *Physics* 236 b 2, the number of factors is reduced to three, the patient, the time, the *terminus ad quem*.

which one is the privation of the other. Aristotle believed that there are four kinds of change: local motion (change of direction), increase and diminution (change of quantity), genesis and destruction (change of form), alteration (change of quality). But they are all forms of motion, as he says following his famous definition of motion: "the fulfillment of what exists potentially in so far as it exists, is motion" (*Physics* 201 a 10).⁵ And motion of course takes time—in fact the definition of time implicates it within the category of motion. If Aristotle is consistent, even alteration would take time and in one place at least (*Physics* 249 a 29), he indicates that the speed of some processes of alteration is greater than that of others. Yet alteration is always the appearance and disappearance of a floating quality and like all change can occur only between opposites. Consequently alteration must be instantaneous. For the qualities are eternal and come and go as atomic blocks. In fact, when Aristotle argues against Melissus (*Physics* 186 a 15), he definitely asserts the possibility of sudden change. Genesis and destruction, being combination and separation, should also be instantaneous, for what is separated or combined can be only the atomic floating qualities in the last analysis. Increase and diminution, being change of quantity, might be expected to take time, but matter is not atomic in Aristotle, and hence cannot be supposed to grow by imperceptible amounts added one to the other over a period of time, each amount being added instantaneously. Primary matter cannot be added to or subtracted from anything. Secondary matter, the elements, can move in blocks from point to point and thus can increase and diminish the amount of matter in any given position. But there must be a minimum amount which is added in the case of increase and subtracted in the case of decrease, which would occupy the same position in Aristotle's physics as the atoms did in the physics of Democritus. These fundamental amounts would have to appear and disappear instantaneously. Now since the elements can move only in

⁵ In *Physics* 236 b 19, he flatly asserts that all change (*to metaballon*) takes place in time, making no distinction between kinesis and other forms of change. In *Physics* 243 a 6, he makes alteration a species of motion. See also his argument against Melissus (*ibid.*, 214 a 26) in which the plenum is said to be capable of kinesis since it is capable of alteration.

predetermined directions, the appearance of a bit of, for instance, Water, on the level of Earth, could be attributable only to (1) force, some unnatural dislocation of it, or (2) its having been previously drawn down from its natural location to the earth and its present effort to regain its natural position. The former case is scientifically inexplicable, being a random event, unnatural, observable, but not knowable. The second is the realization of the bit of matter's potentiality: its coldness and wetness. Both of these qualities are unfortunately privations and privation is supposed to be unnatural. Be that as it may, what happens when some Water appears on the surface of the earth is the appearance of two floating qualities in a position in fixed space. We are back at the kind of thing that happens in alteration. Finally, the same remarks can be made about sublunary motion, all of which is realization of potentiality—the realization of the hot and dry, the hot and wet, the cold and wet, the cold and dry.

The outcome of this is that we have to recognize two physical systems in Aristotle: (1) that of fixed position, the cosmic map, so to speak, in which everything is located where it "ought" to be; (2) that of movement, in the observable world where change exists but is fundamentally inexplicable.

4. *The finitude of change.*

"No change is endless but there is an end to all," *Met.* 999 b 10.

The end to a process of change is the achievement of the final cause or essence. The seed grows into a tree, fire reaches the outermost sublunary sphere, the marble attains the form incorporated into it by the sculptor. Accidents may happen so that (1) the process is deflected from its "natural" goal or (2) it is stopped short of the goal. But on the whole the world of change is orderly and repetitive.

This assumption is linked with the conception of nature as a system of classes in which the general characters are the final cause of the members. No technique is anywhere indicated by Aristotle for telling what the natural classes are, but we do not have to linger over this difficulty. Whatever the technique, it will be logical rather than empirical.

Aristotle's great problem, as we have said, is the fitting of the world of observation into what we have called elsewhere the "order of nature." This becomes a problem because time does

not exist in the latter, though it is an integral part of the former, wherefore individual things may be other than they really are, due to chance, corruption, perversion, etc. If Aristotle had assumed that things were really processes, of which the end term was what he called the form, and the essence were the peculiar characteristics of the whole process, then he would have made a longitudinal analysis of the world instead of a lateral. Having made a lateral analysis, he had the following difficulty on his hands: some things, like minerals, seem to be whatever they are at all times; they do not show any process of development; they are dead.⁶ Others, like living beings, grow into their final cause. The model for his logical universe is the former group of things and through the concept of potentiality he thought that he was able to accommodate one to the other. The result was that the world of living beings became a world of processes which were cyclical; that is, when an individual reached maturity, it passed its form over to its descendants to be realized in them once again, and so on world without end. This corresponds to the circular movement of the heavens, only in the heavens it is the same individuals which repeat their course. Since different individuals arise in the world of living beings, one must answer the question of what happens to their matter. It takes on, of course, new forms, but there can be no knowable law which will determine or describe what form it will take on. The investigator will reply to this question that he as, for instance, a biologist, will have done his duty when he has described the life-cycle of the species in which he is interested. But as a philosopher he cannot rest at that point. For he sees only too clearly that the sciences are marked off from one another by the termination of realizations as well as by intra-generic differences. And the possibility remains that after a form has been realized, new questions may arise about the new forms which are bound to appear in the matter of the old ones.

The history of science shows us that new sciences arise often when such questions are asked. Thus alchemy logically—though not historically—has its origin in the question, Do material substances occur only in fixed species? Genetics may be said to answer the question, Are the characters of offspring exclusively

⁶ But not in Plotinus. See *Enn.*, IV, iv, 27, 9.

determined by those of the parents—that is, does the *form* of the species alone determine the characters of particular members of the species? Darwin assumed as part of his theory that the variations within a species were not merely accidental but, in peripatetic language, were modifications of the specific form.

Once the assumption of fixed species and the accompanying assumption of the finitude of change are dropped, two results of major importance are found. (1) Every individual may be said to have its own form, and the class-characteristics are nothing but resemblances which determine certain generalizations but do not prevent the study of individual traits. The study of individual traits may give rise to new generalizations which will locate the individual in a new class. The statement, X is *really* a member of the class Alpha, becomes a convention established by the interests of the investigator. The question of what are the interests of a science is fundamental to a clarification of this issue. In Aristotle they consisted first, in classification; second, in the establishment of the form and the matter, not only in the genus but also in the species and subspecies. In modern science the subject matters are in part determined historically; in part, by analysis of existing subjects. Such an analysis may be made in several ways but in general it effectuates a substitution of the material and efficient cause for the final and formal cause. Matter is assumed to be heterogeneous and to have laws of its own, and, equally important, the efficient cause is assumed not to work primarily for ends. Thus the denials of fixed species and of teleology go hand in hand.

The second major result will be the substitution of the historical or genetic method for the strictly causal, and the rise of events in place of things. This will happen when the question is asked, Can *direction* be explained or is it basic?

5. *The necessity of a substratum in generation from opposites* (see especially, *Met.* 1087 a 36).

Generation from opposites is qualitative change or alteration. But, as we have suggested above, alteration proceeds by the appearance or disappearance of floating qualities. Qualities must qualify something. The something which they qualify is the substratum. Therefore the first principle cannot be a quality.

Aristotle is thus able to refute those of his predecessors who treat the contraries as first principles.

The strength of this assumption lies in its apparent grammatical justification. It is clear that the word "quality" and its derivatives, in Greek as well as in English, are adjectival and unless one retains a sharply critical sense, one is led into believing that grammatical usage is indicative of metaphysical fact. As has been already suggested, primary matter, the substratum, is, as used by Aristotle, nothing more than the spatial matrix and the appearance of floating qualities is always located naturally in some region of this matrix. But otherwise the assumption has very little power. It is something which helps build metaphors, being itself little more than a pervasive metaphor.

6. *The denial of action at a distance.*

"It is not right to say that such things as do not touch one another can act upon or be acted upon by one another," *De Generatione et Corruptione* 322 b 23.

To discuss all the implications of this presupposition, its use and neglect in Aristotle, the difficulties which it causes for him would require a paper double the space available. I shall therefore merely mention it to conclude this paper and suggest that its use can be literal only in cases of local motion below the moon; elsewhere it will be figurative. The main difficulty it causes concerns the Prime Mover who if he touches that which he moves may be in danger of being touched by it.

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THE ETYMOLOGY OF BOTARGO.

In the etymological part of its article on the somewhat uncommon English word "botargo," the *Oxford English Dictionary* derives it as follows:

A[dopted from] It. *botargo*, *botarga* (now *buttarga*), ad[aptation of] Arab. بطرخة *butarkhah* 'preserved mullet-roe,' in Makrizi A.D. 1400 (in pl. بطارخ *butārikh*, whence It. var. *bottarica*), ad[aptation of] Coptic *outarakhon*, which the Arab. word renders in a glossary published by Kircher; f[rom] Coptic *ou-* indef. art. + Gr. *ταρίχιον* pickle. See Quatremère in *Journal des Savants*, Jan. 1848. (Fr. form *boutargue*, occas. found in Eng.)

To the critical philologist this etymology is neither final nor satisfying so far as it does go. The word and the food are a little out of the ordinary in English-speaking countries, but to those familiar with the rôle botargo has played (and still plays) in the Mediterranean, it would seem intrinsically unlikely that the ultimate origin of its name should be a hybrid of Greek and Coptic, forged in Egypt or Ethiopia, when for centuries the two sources of the botargo of the Mediterranean world have been the lakes of Tunis and the Black Sea. Nor, if *outarakhon* is the original, does this etymology explain whence came the B which is so prominent a feature of the English, Italian and Arabic borrowings.¹ The *Oxford English Dictionary* has, it would seem, rather uncritically adopted without independent investigation the

¹ Walter W. Skeat (see his *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, s. v. "botargo") apparently read Quatremère's Coptic as *bulurakhon*, which explains why so skilled an etymologist as Skeat could be satisfied with the derivation; not being an Orientalist, he trusted Quatremère as to the Coptic article being *bu*. There is, however, no question that *outarakhon* was the form quoted by Kircher, *Lingua Aegyptiaca Restituta* (Rome, 1643), p. 200 (not 290, as the index states), "ΟΥΤΑΡΑΧΟΝ *bottarga* بطارخ." This word is not found in standard Coptic dictionaries (Tattam, Parthy, Veysierre la Croze, Spiegelberg, Crum), but ΤΑΡΙΧΙΟΝ, ΤΑΡΙΧΕ are met with—probably as transliterations of Greek—as equivalents of the native term *χιπ* (W. E. Crum, *Coptic Dictionary* [Oxford, 1929-1939], pp. 780-781). The *ou-* here may be the Coptic indefinite article; but see *infra*, note 14.

etymology off-handedly suggested by the Orientalist Étienne Quatremère.²

Now the ultimate origin of the word "botargo" must certainly be the Greek phrase *ᾠὰ τάριχα*, meaning "eggs [of fish] preserved by salting"—a far more exact description of the substance in question than *ταρίχιον* "pickle." We meet foreshadowings of this phrase already in ancient literature,³ and by the fifteenth century it appears as a standard, international commercial term.⁴

² Quatremère's article (*Journal des Savants*, January, 1848, pp. 37-49) is a review of A. P. Pihan's *Glossaire des mots français tirés de l'arabe, du persan et du turc* (Paris, 1847). After discussing a few words from Pihan's book, Quatremère mentions some others that could have been included, among them *boutargue* (which he regards as Provençal, not French), which he discusses on pp. 44-45. He suggested that *outarakhon* was a copyist's error for *outarikhon*, or better *outarikhion*: not being primarily a classicist (the whole case illustrates the dangers of specialization) he apparently did not know either *αὐγοτάραχον* or *ᾠὰ τάριχα* (see *infra*), and naturally based all his reasoning on the Arabic of Egypt and North Africa. He mentions also that the Egyptian Arabs use *butarkhah* not only for "botargo" but for "mullet"—the fish from which it is made. But *bouri* is—at least nowadays—a commoner name for the fish: see L. Keimer, "La Boutargue dans l'Égypte ancienne," *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte*, XXI (1938/39), p. 215.

³ τὰ . . . τῶν τὰρίχων ᾠὰ, in Diphilus of Siphnos, as quoted by Athenaeus, III, 121 C; and *ᾠὰ ἰχθύων τεταρίχεύμενα*, in Eustathius (12 cent.), *De emendanda vita monachica*, 66 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, 135, col. 785). Eustathius' phrase certainly, and that of Diphilus possibly, cover caviar as well as botargo. Caviar is the salted roe of any fish (but chiefly sturgeon and salmon) from which the membranes or egg-follicles of the original lobes have been removed. Botargo is salted, dried and sold in the original lobes—often preserved with a coating of beeswax—and is a compact, reddish-black, nutritious mass in which the original eggs have lost their identity.

⁴ In the earliest printed cookbook—Platina's *De Honesta Voluptate* (undated ed. pub. at Rome, probably ca. 1474; first dated edition pub. at Venice, 1475)—botargo is referred to in the Latin text as *ova tarycha* (see, in the 1475 ed., fol. 86v, also fol. 4v where it is misprinted). The *De Honesta Voluptate* was a Latin version of the recipes left by Martino of Como, cook to the chamberlain and patriarch of Aquileia: and in an undated early Italian MS closely paralleling Platina's text which is in the Bitting Collection in the Rare Book Room of the Library of Congress, and would seem on palaeographic grounds to be shortly subsequent to the earliest printed editions of Platina, *botarghe* corresponds to Platina's *ova tarycha*. Evidently *ova tarycha* was the international expression corresponding to the peculiar Italian word, which the Italians them-

This, however, has already been suspected.⁵ Its final establishment is a corollary to the solution of the other main problem of the case—to establish definitively the actual route by which *ῥά τῥιχα* came into English, and show where and how along this route it became corrupted into *botargo*. We believe we have discovered the final answer to this problem in the dialects of modern Greek.

The ancient classical Greek word *ῥόν* was replaced, first by *ῥόν* in Hellenistic Greek, and then in the standard modern idiom by the form (whose own history is not uninteresting) *ἄγόν*. Consequently *ῥά τῥιχα* became in the popular language—with a shift from plural to singular—*ἄγδ τῥιχο*, and—coalescing into one word—*ἄγοτῥαχον* (in which latter a popular etymology from *ταπάσσειν* has further disguised the penultimate syllable).⁶

But although *ἄγόν* became the word for “egg” in standard modern Greek, and is the one found in the lexica, a variety of other forms—no doubt to some extent persisting from ancient times—are used in the dialects.⁷ If we search among these, the missing links in the history of “botargo” can soon be supplied. The Pontic dialect has *ῥβόν*;⁸ the dialect of *Ἀχό* (in central Asia

selves doubtless did not know came from that very phrase. It is not Latin, but a simple transliteration of *ῥβά τῥιχα*—*ῥβά* being, as we shall show (see *infra*, note 8), a local dialect form for *ῥά*.

⁵ Cf. A. P. Pihan, *Dictionnaire étymologique des mots de la langue française dérivés de l'arabe, du persan et du turc* (Paris, 1866), p. 75. He points out that the *B*' is not an accidental part of the word; summarizes Quatremère's remarks (the theory adopted by the *O. E. D.*); and asks, “Ne serait-ce pas plutôt une altération des mots grecs *ῥά τῥιχα*, oeufs salés?” But he has no suggestion as to the precise nature and history of this “altération.”

⁶ Du Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae graecitatis* (Lyons, 1688), I, col. 151: “*ἄγδ τῥιχο*, ova piscis condita, in *Thurogrf. Ciusij*, apud Hieron. Germanum, *ἄγοτῥαχον* (leg. *τῥιχον*) exponitur ovum piscis. Italis *botarga*.” The second *a* was not, as several writers supposed, a mere copyist's error, for it became standard in modern Greek. The dropping of final *ν* is of course familiar in the colloquial modern idiom.

⁷ See Richard M. Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge University Press, 1916), p. 663.

⁸ Demosthenes E. Oeconomides, *Lautelehre des Pontischen* (Leipzig, 1908), p. 75. For a bibliography of glossaries, vocabularies, and other works on modern Greek dialects, see Gustav Meyer, “Neugriechische Studien,” *Wien. Sitzb.*, CXXX (1894), Abh. 4.

Minor) has $\delta\beta\acute{o}$, and those of Ferték and Sílata have $\beta\acute{o}$.⁹ In these dialects, consequently, $\alpha\gamma\delta\acute{\tau}\alpha\rho\iota\chi\omicron$ or $\alpha\gamma\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\chi\omicron$ would be $\omega\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\chi\omicron$, $\delta\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omicron$, $\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omicron$ (ν).¹⁰

It can readily be seen that such forms as these fully account for the Arabic *buṭarkhah*. To be sure, the Greek β has been sounded as [v] for centuries; but as Arabic has no V; B was not only the natural substitute but the most probable one.¹¹ We believe that the hitherto unknown early history of "botargo" is as follows. The whole story began in Pontus and its "Laz colonies"¹²—since this region was the center of the manufacture of caviar and botargo—with $\omega\beta\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\alpha$, the local dialectic equivalent of the classical Greek world's phrase $\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\alpha$, $\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omega\nu$, $\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\tau\alpha\rho\iota\chi\acute{\epsilon}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$. The shift to singular which took place as the modern idiom began to develop made this $\omega\beta\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omicron$ (later $\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\chi\omicron$). Now, for $\omega\beta\acute{o}$ each Greek locality no doubt substituted its own form of the word for "egg"; and the Arabs borrowed the expression from Greeks who said $\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omicron$. (Though many Greek words came into Arabic through Coptic, this cannot have been the case here since the Coptic borrowing from $\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\alpha$ knew no B.) Arabic, of course, regarded the word as B-T-R-KH, and varied the vowels in accordance with its own usages.¹³

We may assert, then, that the Arabs borrowed *buṭarkhah* from the Greeks, whom they found eating, making, and selling it; as to the date of the borrowing, it should perhaps be noted that Quatremère's mention of Makrizi was quite casual—merely as

⁹ Dawkins, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰ For $\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omicron\nu$ see Heinrich Fleischer, *De glossis Habichtianis* (Leipzig, 1836), p. 70 (and, for the source of the gloss, p. 6). We have heard $\omega\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\chi\omicron$ in the speech of natives of Kerasun on the Pontic coast. For this latter and for $\delta\beta\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\chi\omicron$ we have not so far been able to find occurrences in published material, but both are perfectly regular formations and completely analogous to the first.

¹¹ The representation of V by B is particularly likely when the V is bilabial, as Greek β undoubtedly was at first (cf. note 15 *infra*). An exact parallel is English *buokaroo* from Spanish *vaguero*.

¹² See R. M. Dawkins, *J. H. S.*, XXX (1910), p. 110.

¹³ For the forms used in Arabic, see R. P. A. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes* (2d ed., Paris, 1927), I, p. 94, col. 1; and Pihan, *loc. cit.* Keimer (*loc. cit.*, p. 237) indicates that only the plural form (which he writes *baṭāriḥ*) is current in present-day Egypt. The only singular he knows is *baṭrab*, which, however, he seems never to have heard in actual usage, as he thinks it may be theoretical.

the first illustration which came to his mind—and the date of the first occurrence of *butarkhah* in Arabic is still to be scientifically determined. The Italians of course took the word from the Arabs: again we have not the *terminus ante quem*, but we are certain that it was well established by 1500 (cf. note 4). (The fact that the Italians transliterated the Greek phrase when writing Latin, but had a word of their own when writing Italian, may indicate that they knew botargo through the Arabs before they themselves came into contact with the Greek fisheries of the Black Sea.) The English probably took "botargo" from the Italians in the sixteenth century. And we venture to suggest that the Coptic *outarakhon* is an independent borrowing—in fact not a genuine Coptic word at all, but a mere transliteration—from the Greek, in which the *ou-* is not the Coptic article, but somehow represents the syllable $\omega\beta o$.¹⁴

Finally, it might be remarked that the Pontic form $\omega\beta\acute{o}\nu$ —of which some of the other dialect forms are evidently derivatives—has an ancient and honorable lineage in Greek, being merely the prehistoric $\omega\beta\acute{o}\nu$ —the ancestor of the classical (Attic) word $\phi\acute{o}\nu$ —with the digamma, expressing the sound [w], converted into a voiced labiodental spirant [v], through an intermediate bilabial spirant [β].¹⁵ A form $\omega\beta\epsilon\alpha$ (plural) is mentioned by Hesychius (approximately fourth century A. D.).¹⁶

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¹⁴ A gloss exists which cites a Greek form $\omicron\upsilon\acute{\rho}\alpha\rho\iota\chi\omicron\nu$ (Fleischer, *loc. cit.*). Kircher's Coptic form would then be a mere transliteration of this, or rather of an alternative $\omicron\upsilon\acute{\rho}\alpha\rho\alpha\chi\omicron\nu$; and the $\omicron\upsilon$ - (which may have been pronounced $\omega\beta$ -) must be, not the Coptic article, but some version of $\phi\acute{o}\nu$ or $\omega\beta\acute{o}\nu$.

¹⁵ Cf. Eduard Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Abt. 11, Teil 1, Bd. 1 [Munich, 1939])*, pp. 224-25, No. 3. (The word $\omega\beta\acute{\alpha}$ mentioned in this paragraph is a Laconian form meaning "a tribal division," and is not to be identified with the plural of the Pontic $\omega\beta\acute{o}\nu$.)

¹⁶ $\omega\beta\epsilon\alpha$. τὰ ὠά. Ἀργεῖοι. *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, post Ioannem Albertum recensuit Mauricius Schmidt (Jena, 1858-1862), IV, p. 317. Liddell and Scott inferred that the singular was $\omega\beta\epsilon\omicron\nu$; but the word may have been heteroclitic, with alternative plurals. Or there may well have been a slight difference between the Argive and the Pontic dialect forms.

REVIEWS.

PAUL SHANER DUNKIN. *Post-Aristophanic Comedy. Studies in the Social Outlook of Middle and New Comedy at both Athens and Rome.* Urbana, The Univ. of Illinois Press, 1946. Pp. 192. \$2.50. (*Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, XXXI, Nos. 3-4.)

To the already enormous literature on the plays of Menander, Plautus, and Terence, the author has contributed a work which not only utilizes and adds to the conclusions of earlier scholars but which also has the merit of presenting a rather new and radical approach to the subject of Greek and Roman comedy. The reviewer would like to say at the outset that he has found the book one of the most interesting and at the same time most controversial works he has read on the subject in recent years. Dunkin is a writer with definite views; Plautus is his hero and, as he admits,¹ he finds it necessary to say harsh things about Menander and Terence. But he is not interested in the plays primarily as drama; his purpose is "to sketch certain phases of the social outlook of the writers of Middle and New Comedy" (1).

In one sense, Dunkin's book is a continuation of Ehrenberg's recent works on Aristophanes, but Ehrenberg used Old Comedy as a source for a detailed description of the Athenian people, and he stated his belief that New Comedy could not be so used, because the persons of Menander, in spite of their realism and psychological truth, "stand, so to speak, in a world outside time and space. . . . Life in New Comedy apes life, but was shut off from reality" (Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*, pp. 29 f.; cf. also n. 29 on p. 270). Dunkin, although interested chiefly in the social outlook of the dramatists, believes that Menander's work was "a mirror of life"; in a long, interesting, and important footnote on the reality of Menander's world (131, n. 56), he discusses the views of Ehrenberg, Gomme, Tarn, and others who deny that New Comedy gives a true picture of Athenian life in the Hellenistic Age. Dunkin considers their views far too severe, and argues that the popularity of New Comedy in Greece can be explained only if much in the comedies was true to the life the spectators knew. This does not necessarily follow; certainly the plots and characters of Plautine Comedy did not give a true picture of Roman society at the end of the third century B. C., but there is no question about the popularity of the plays. Dunkin does not mention Plautus in this connection, but says that "Terence's splendid versions . . . achieved no such outstanding success in lands

¹ Cf. paragraph 20. Since the work is arranged by paragraphs conveniently numbered for reference, I shall follow the author's practice and cite paragraphs rather than pages. Dunkin writes in an effective, but occasionally choppy style, and some of his "paragraphs" are very short, e.g., "The boom was on" (35): "He lives too abundantly" (284); "Dependence for ideas was inevitable" (288).

where the plays were unquestionably *not* an expression of everyday life." Cf., however, 138 f., where he speaks of the close analogy between second-century Rome and fourth-century Greece. Actually, the success or failure of Terence's plays depended on many other factors, not merely on the extent to which they reflected everyday life. Furthermore, if, as Dunkin implies, Menander's plays lack universality because they do not portray the life of people who have to earn a living, how can he maintain that they are true to Athenian life? Dunkin modifies his view somewhat when he closes his footnote by quoting with apparent approval the words of Rostovtzeff that the pictures drawn by Menander and others "are not, and were not intended by them to be, complete representations of the life of the *bourgeois* class as a whole or even of individual members of it."

Dunkin's method is to analyze the lives and works of all the ancient comic playwrights after Aristophanes in an endeavor to discover two things: the attitude of the writer toward his environment, and the heredity and environment which produced that attitude; these are the two phases of what Dunkin terms "social outlook" (2, cf. 14). The conclusions to be drawn from a study of the playwrights represented only by fragments (Antiphanes, Alexis, Diphilus, Philemon, etc.) are admittedly hypothetical and are placed in a final chapter, which Dunkin considers an appendix (19). The major portion of the book consists of three long chapters on Menander, Plautus, and Terence, each chapter divided into sections: Background, Life, Characters, Attitudes, Conclusion.² The bibliography of over four pages and the index of ten pages give ample evidence of the author's thorough and scholarly approach to his material. He is fully aware of the difficulties of his task, as he states in his Introduction (3 ff.); among these difficulties are the fragmentary nature of Middle and New Comedy in Greece, the attempted reconstruction of New Comedy from Latin adaptations (a procedure both uncertain and misleading), the false idea that Greek Comedy was perfect and that all flaws (real or imagined) are to be attributed to Plautus or Terence, the danger of excessive ingenuity in the reconstruction of Greek plots.³ Another difficulty (cf. 22) is that any such work as this is necessarily conditioned by the author's own "social outlook," and Dunkin frankly states his own attitude: a belief in the socially useful man, the "man whose activities tend to promote the welfare of human society as a whole" (23); this "socially useful man" is obviously the working man, as opposed to the business man, the man of property. Dunkin's attitude doubtless accounts in part for his dislike of New Comedy philosophy and his disapproval of what he believes to be the social outlook of Menander and Terence; it doubt-

² The chapter on Terence has no section on Background. In all three chapters the sections on Background and Life are very short, those on Characters and Attitudes very full and detailed. The concluding section of each chapter does little more than repeat (sometimes unnecessarily) the already summarized results of the preceding sections; cf. 63 and 89 with 133; 188 with 279; 339 with 370.

³ Kuiper, whose ingenuity is mentioned by Dunkin, also illustrates the pro-Greek point of view held by Drexler, Jachmann, Norwood, and others; cf. my remarks on Kuiper in *Class. Phil.*, XXXV (1940), pp. 86 ff., 201 ff.; *C. W.*, XXXIV (1940-41), pp. 260 f.

less accounts also for many comments he makes in passing; e.g., "the man of property must have sentimentality, plenty of it, if he is thoroughly to enjoy his play" (96); "moderation: the one virtue possible to weak and little men" (352; for other attacks on moderation, which Dunkin considers a characteristically Hellenistic and Menandrian doctrine, cf. 128, 135, 343, 371); "only the man of wealth has the leisure in which to develop a system of philosophy anyway" (384, n. 1; cf. 353). In his Acknowledgment, Dunkin expresses his indebtedness and gratitude to the late Professor W. A. Oldfather for suggesting the work, for encouragement and criticism, and also "for a social outlook in certain respects not altogether uninspired by him." The influence of Professor Oldfather is seen throughout the notes, which quote copiously from his published works and from unpublished comments on the book under review;⁴ it is evident that Oldfather shared Dunkin's dislike of the social class portrayed by Menander (cf. 131, n. 56).

Lest, in criticizing Dunkin's arguments, I give an unfair impression of the work as a whole, I wish first to quote his major conclusions. I shall limit myself here to the three playwrights whose works have survived. On Menander we read the following: "The Rich Man in Menander is, first of all, the hero of the play" (39): he is the hero "because maintaining the honor of men of property supplies the motivation for the plot" (63); "Philosophy of the man of property, this curious farrago of stylishly affected gloom, fatalism, human fellowship through suffering, imagined human woes, compensation, the whole thoroughly seasoned with conventional maxims, saturates Menander's every play . . . Menander's friends were wealthy and philosophical gentlemen, and naturally he wrote pleasant character sketches to be presented to comfortable and cultured audiences" (121): Menander "was a matchless artist. Honestly, delicately, vividly, he portrayed the life he was familiar with, the life of the well to do. Menander's comedy marks the triumph of the man of property on the stage" (131). Dunkin describes the Rich Man in Plautus as follows: "smug and sly Ancient Gallant; slinking, whining, sensual Spineless Young Man; grasping Banker; filthy Procurer; silly, long-winded Soldier. Stupid, trivial creatures, all of them" (188); in Plautus "the most significant feature is the exaltation of a new hero: the Poor Man" (189, cf. 245), but the Poor Man is summarized as "Slave; Parasite, Courtesan: a sorry bunch of rascals" (237); Plautus' characters are "one great rogues' gallery of common folks forced into meanness by their economic position: . . . (Plautus) was a poor man, and in his work may be seen the instinctive reaction of a vigorous poor man to an oppressive capitalistic system" (282). With Terence the situation is quite different: "Slavery had given Terence the habit of dependence on rich men for freedom, wealth, and social prestige"

⁴ See Index under Oldfather; the fact that Dunkin includes so many unpublished comments by Oldfather on Greek and Roman Comedy makes the book unusually interesting and valuable; cf., e.g., the long footnote (38, n. 3), in which Oldfather discusses the Menander-Glycera tradition and the age at which girls become courtesans in different countries—a most amazing and delightful bit of erudition indeed!

(287); "Terence's six plays were art-for-art's-sake pictures of the well-to-do as the pillars of society, the setters of pace and precedent" (289); "in the plays of Terence money is the motivating factor because it is the standard of respectability" (295); the old men of the plays are "rich, solemn, honorable, quietly playing their little games and contriving their little schemes to preserve the methodical little patterns in this neat little world which they own!" (302); "the good Rich Man is the hero, and he dominates the plays in such a manner as to preserve his conventional morality" (313); the slaves and the parasites are the rascals, because "in the world of property, rascals must of necessity be men without property" (314, cf. 339); Terence's plays are "philosophical studies of wealthy men" (364, cf. 373). Dunkin's conclusions on Plautus and Terence are expressed without reserve: "Plautus is alternately inferior and superior to his original; Terence is consistently inferior" (376); "Plautus probably distrusted imperialism; Terence found his friends among the leaders of imperialism. Plautus ridiculed the Rich Man of his original in cruel caricatures; Terence exalted the Rich Man with many a flattering touch" (377); "The issue is clear-cut. The Man of Property is in the saddle and Terence is his poet; Plautus voices the Poor Man's complaint against ruthless exploitation" (381).

The statements quoted above present in broad outline the author's main contentions, but do not do justice to the wealth of illustrative material which he introduces to support his conclusions. The subtitle of the book might well be "Rich Man vs. Poor Man." Many of these conclusions, it will be noted, run counter to generally accepted views on Menander and Terence, and give a rather new picture of Plautus and his work. If Dunkin's arguments are sound, our ideas about Greek and Roman Comedy need to undergo considerable revision. But I do not believe that the arguments are sound, for several reasons. In the first place, Dunkin occasionally commits the very errors he mentions in his Introduction, i. e. unwarranted deductions from fragmentary material (e. g., 40 ff., 56, 60) or confusion between Greek and Roman elements; he states that, for the purpose of this study, Plautus and Terence must be held responsible for the contents of their plays, and it does not matter whether certain passages were in the Greek originals or not (203, cf. 20). However, it seems unwise to argue that the *Cistellaria*, one of the most Menandrian of Plautus' comedies, perhaps is "typical of Plautus' attitude toward this phase of seamy life" (232; cf. Dunkin's next statement, which is a tacit admission that the *Cistellaria* is not typical of Plautus: "In it is little if any humor; everything is in sober earnest. No slave appears except Lampadillo, and he is but a weak shadow of a Plautine Slave"), or that the *Amphitruo* "is given over to the ridicule of conventional Greek religion" and that this ridicule is indicative of Plautus' attitude toward religion (281; cf. 270, where Dunkin says that "Amphitruon is the foolish Old Man, Jupiter the dashing Young Man"; what then becomes of the supposed resemblance between Jupiter and Amphitruon?).

Second, although Dunkin states that he is interested only in social outlook and makes no pretense to literary criticism (29), he appears to forget that the plays were comedies and were produced as such;

he realizes that it is "difficult to know if the playwright is expressing his individual attitude or merely writing 'in character'" (3), and yet from the speech of almost every character, rich man and slave alike, he draws conclusions concerning the social outlook of the dramatist. The plot and its intrigue, the characters with their serious or humorous problems, the moralizing which he finds so tedious, may well have dramatic and comic purposes entirely unrelated to the poet's attitude; e. g. does the slave in Menander play only a minor part "because the center of the stage is already taken by the Rich Man" (75), or because the type of plot favored by Menander did not need the slave in an active role? Is it true that in Plautus "the Slave's trickery is the natural result of his position: a man driven to cunning by ill treatment" (221), or is it the result of Plautus' understanding of broad farce and the tastes of the Roman spectators? Is it so probable that Sosia as a protatic character was introduced into the *Andria* "merely as a means whereby the young freedman-author might express his devotion and gratitude to his own former master" (354)? If the vices of the young men in the *Dis Eupaton* "merely served a dramatic purpose" (55), why cannot the same allowance be made for young men in Plautus?

A third and more serious criticism of Dunkin's method is that his classifications are far too arbitrary and evidence is often neglected or twisted to support his theories. The constant emphasis on Rich Man and Poor Man gives a wrong impression of the characters of the comedies, especially when the "grasping Banker, filthy Procurer, silly, long-winded Soldier" (188, cf. 279) are included among the Rich Men, and the Poor Man proves to be a Slave, Parasite, or Courtesan. Actually, the Rich Man of comedy is usually not a rich man at all but a middle-class land-owner or business man (as Dunkin admits, 63, n. 18). He maintains that the Courtesan in Menander is respectable and in love (98 ff.), and hardened, sensual Courtesans are exceptions, but are introduced to point a moral or make a psychological study of the Rich Man (100); in Plautus, however, the Courtesan ("pretty sorry stuff," 280) has usually been forced into business by economic pressure (cf. 230, 232); Dunkin fails here to do justice to women like Philematium (*Most.*) and Palaestra (*Rud.*). In his treatment of Plautine characters in general, he stresses first the most villainous or most stupid of each class and passes over or explains away those who do not fit into the scheme. For example, the discussion of the Rich Old Man (143 ff.) begins with *senes* like Demipho (*Merc.*) and Lysidamus (*Cas.*); that of the Rich Young Man (160) with the three suitors of Phronesium (*Truc.*); Phronesium is undoubtedly "a disgusting creature" (231), but she is not representative of the average Plautine courtesan. It is hardly accurate to say that "the Rich Man's predominant role is that of the lover" (143), even when he includes young men with the old. He admits that there are good Old Men in Plautus (151), but condemns them as stupid moralizers and later (e. g., 279) ignores them entirely. Callicles in the *Trinummus*, for instance, receives far less than his due, and Dunkin has nothing but scorn for "Honesty is the best policy"; he calls this "the Rich Man's Golden Rule" (152). One gains a decidedly false impression of the nature and variety of

Plautus' plots from the statement that "the plot proper hinges on the rascally Slave's countless and intricate maneuvers against this same Old Man and his strong box" (190); in the first place, almost half of Plautus' comedies are not of this type (*Amph.*, *Aul.*, *Capt.*, *Cist.*, *Men.*, *Rud.*, *Stich.*, *Trin.*, *Truc.*); furthermore, in most plays of trickery the deception is directed primarily against a *leno* or a *miles* (cf. *Curc.*, *Mil. Gl.*, *Pers.*, *Poen.*, *Pseud.*) and is successful; when the *senex* is deceived, the trickery usually does not succeed (*Epid.*, *Most.*); the fact that Plautus makes this distinction shows also the inadvisability of putting *senex*, *leno*, and *miles* in the same category. Another type of Rich Man in Plautus is the Spineless Young Man who "is made to appear even more spineless by the vivid contrast with the Slave's self-reliance and common sense" (198); this both ignores the many occasions when the Plautine slave, for purposes of comedy and suspense, is portrayed as helpless and at a loss (e.g., *Epid.* 81 ff., *Most.* 348 ff., 536 ff., *Pseud.* 422 ff., 1024 ff.), and makes an unwarranted distinction between the Young Man in Plautus ("pretty sorry stuff," 160) and the Young Man in Terence (good and respectable, cf. 306). Many *adulescentes* of Terence (e.g., Antipho in the *Phormio*, Ctesipho in the *Adelphi*) are as spineless as the average Plautine youth (cf. 305, n. 8). To return to the Old Man, who, according to Dunkin, is Terence's hero and therefore a thoroughgoing gentleman (290), it is interesting to note the author's method of dealing with characters who do not fit into his classifications; e.g., Chremes (*Phormio*) is "a thorough scamp," but "he is allowed to cut so sorry a figure because he has actually lost his own money. . . . Hence, the class of Good Rich Man is not disgraced, because Chremes is no longer rich" (299, n. 4); if, on the contrary, a Poor Man is a decent fellow, he obviously can't be poor, so he becomes what Dunkin calls the Stage-Poor Man, a person not really poor, but merely less rich than his neighbors (cf. 70), e.g., Hegio and Sostrata in the *Adelphi* (337). It is perhaps worth pointing out that Hegio is not only called *pauper* (*Ad.* 948), but is considered sufficiently impoverished to share in Micio's reluctant generosity. But Dunkin would be as unwilling to admit that a poor man in Terence could have nobility of character as he would be to find a spark of decency in a rich man in Plautus.

Dunkin makes many other statements and comments that are open to criticism. I mention the following as among the more significant: (1) The relationship between old men and young men in Menander and Terence can be only "that of sincere trust and affection" (56, cf. 309); for Menander, how can we be so sure? For Terence, what of Ctesipho in the *Adelphi* (cf. especially *Ad.* 518 ff.)? (2) How can we know that the original of the *Bacchides* "was a philosophical study of the reaction of the Rich Man to luxury" (81, cf. 49, 127)? But Dunkin's conception of Menander makes no allowance for a slave-controlled play of deception, and so the *Dis Exapaton* can bear but little resemblance to the *Bacchides*.⁵ We have too little of

⁵ But Dunkin thinks (127) that the *Dis Exapaton*, like the *Heauton* and the *Adelphi B*, probably had two old men and two young men; this suggests that the dual plot, which Norwood (*The Art of Terence*

Menander preserved to assert that the slave is "shoved into the background so that the Rich Man may steal the show" (89). (3) It may be questioned whether "Roman Comedy took Middle and New Comedy (rather than Aristophanes) for its model, perhaps, not alone for simple reasons of approximate contemporaneity, but also because second-century Rome was in a stage of development roughly analogous to that of fourth-century Greece" (138). But Roman Comedy began in the third century, before the influx of slave labor and the resultant bankruptcy of the small farmer. The Romans did not go back to Aristophanes primarily because his plays were too difficult to adapt and too filled with references to local personages and contemporary events to appeal to a Roman audience. New Comedy dealt with more universal themes and had plots and characters readily intelligible to the Romans, as Dunkin implies (131, n. 56), when he quotes Kocerte to the effect that the people of Menander, interested only in property and pleasure, have been "easily understood in all ages and by all nations." (4) Most students of ancient comedy look upon the parasite as a comic character, who is funniest when his desire for food is thwarted (e.g., Peniculus in the *Menaechmi*, Gelasimus in the *Stichus*); Dunkin considers the parasite "a pathetic figure which none but a social order so selfish as to be utterly hard-hearted, could possibly regard as amusing" (222), and he finds Hegio (in the *Captivi*) an unsympathetic figure because he has the heart "to trifle cruelly with the Parasite's craving for food" (153). (5) The numerous metaphors in Plautus drawn from warfare (250 ff.) provide humor from the incongruity of slaves talking like victorious generals; Dunkin considers these passages "devastating ridicule against war" (259), which reveal Plautus' instinctive "reaction against war." (6) The Plautine slave is perhaps less a rascal than Dunkin believes; cf. 190, n. 34, where Dunkin rightly admits that "the Slave is loyal enough to his young master" and questions the correctness of the term "rascal"; later, he ignores the slaves' loyalty and speaks of them as "forced into meanness by their economic position" (282); cf. 317: "The Plautine Poor Man is driven by want to vice. But in Terence we meet . . . the Poor Man engaging in wanton and unscrupulous trickery, quite voluntarily and deliberately because, forsooth, the knave positively enjoys it." But what could be more misleading? Does Dunkin really think that slaves like Chrysalus, Epidicus, Palaestrio, Tranio, and Pseudolus enjoy trickery less than their Terentian counterparts, whom he considers clumsy bunglers (cf. 323). (7) In 367 ff., Dunkin discusses the problem of the Terentian prologue and suspense, and suggests that Terence may have dropped the old type of prologue, fearing that "the audience would lose interest because they already knew what was going to happen." Frank's theory that there was no suspense before Terence and the oft-quoted statement that the pre-Terentian prologue told what was going to happen, are both unsupported by an examination of the prologues of Plautus. The prologue often gives information which facilitates dramatic irony

[Oxford, 1923], p. 127) calls Terence's "greatest achievement in construction," was favored originally by Menander, however much Terence developed the method.

(cf. Harsh, quoted by Dunkin, 369, n. 42) and occasionally foretells the recognition, but almost never gives an outline of the plot. Perhaps the most striking exception is the prologue of the *Miles* (79-155), spoken by Palaestrio; this summarizes the deception of Sceledrus (which is subordinate to the main action of the comedy). References to a final recognition or happy ending (e. g., *Aul.* 30 ff., *Capt.* 40 ff., *Men.* 70 ff., *Poen.* 120 ff.) neither outline the plot of the play, nor destroy the spectator's interest in the action to come. Almost half of Plautus' plays either are without prologues (*Cure.*, *Epid.*, *Most.*, *Pers.*, *Stich.*) or have prologues which give no foreknowledge (*Asin.*, *Merc.*, *Pseud.*, *Trin.*). But the erroneous idea that "the broad outlines of Plautus' plots are generally clear from the beginning" (360, n. 40) appears to have an amazing, if undeserved, vitality.

The reviewer of a book such as this is in a difficult position. If Dunkin's conclusions are in part the result of his own social outlook (as I believe to be the case), the same may be said of the unfavorable criticisms of a reviewer (cf. 22). Furthermore, Dunkin points out that the teacher "naturally tends to identify his interests with those of the 'middle class'" (63, n. 18), i. e. the Rich Man. But unfavorable criticism of Dunkin's theories need not imply a lack of sympathy for the common man, helpless victim of an unjust economic condition; it might rather imply that the evidence from the comedies does not support the conclusions of this book. There is undoubtedly far more caricature and gross exaggeration in Plautus than in Terence, but I am still not convinced that Plautus distrusted imperialism and ridiculed rich men as such, or that Terence favored imperialism and exalted rich men. Dunkin's book is a valuable storehouse of interesting material on Greek and Roman comedy, but it must be used with extreme care; in it are many pitfalls for the unwary. It is not basically a cheerful book; cf. 136: "The tragedy of the Greek man of property is much the tragedy of that creature which our myopic egotism calls 'modern man'; . . . in his very victory he had protected his children from the need to fight, and from the strength which fighting brings. And in this strange new world of his own creation he sees them grow soft and philosophic and find life futile."

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EDWARD T. NEWELL. *The Byzantine Hoard of Lagbe*. New York, The American Numismatic Society, 1945. Pp. 22; 7 pls. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, No. 105.)

In the spring of 1920 heavy rains washed from the earth at Ali Fachreddin Koi a hundred and two pieces of Imperial Byzantine gold of the eighth and ninth centuries. From the hands of their peasant finders they passed into those of an Italian nobleman and ended five in the Museo delle Terme, ninety-seven in the amazing collection of Edward T. Newell. They are now published, skillfully and accurately, from a manuscript written by the owner of the ninety-seven some years before his death in 1941.

Newell was a brilliant collector. He aimed not only to secure great rarities (which he did) or pieces beautiful in themselves (which he possessed in numbers) but also as thoroughly as possible to document in his own cabinet the coinages of states whose issues were his particular study. And Newell was among the best of the scholar-numismatists of his time. From his first serious work on the Alexander coinage in 1911 to his last great book on the early Seleucid coinages in 1941 the problems of classification and attribution constantly concerned him. His writing is precise in the record of evidence, careful in arguing its significance. These are qualities which Newell so valued that his charity sometimes failed him when he found them lacking in others,—as when he wrote of an unfortunate scholar's "almost uncanny ability to misinterpret Greek coin types and to make impossible attributions," or of another's argument to prove certain coins forgeries: "Now this is exactly like arbitrarily dating the Olympia temple at, say, 400 B. C. and then arguing that since the Parthenon in stylistic development surely comes after Olympia but is as obviously earlier than the year 400 B. C., *ergo* the Parthenon must be a modern forgery!" It is rare to find in Newell's writings such censure—not that he lacked reason, but he was an amiable man and his own appointed tasks were (I suppose) so demanding that they left him little time to scold the witlessness of his fellows.

Much of what he knew, or could divine, he has published. He has put order into a disordered mass of coinages, and so done very much to prepare a large body of evidence on the financial history of the states of those extravagant days of Alexander and the Successors when men—without nuclear fission—seem still to have been quite mad. Newell's contemporaries will return to his works for knowledge, and for a long time to come scholars will not neglect him.

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(The items in this bibliography supplied by Sawyer McA. Mosser I have marked with his initials. Between us we have compiled a bibliography somewhat more complete than that published on pp. 268-269 of *The Numismatist* for April, 1941.)

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DAG NÖRBERG. *L'Olympionique, le Poète, et leur Renom éternel.* Contribution à l'étude de l'ode I, 1 d'Horace. Uppsala, A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz, 1945. Pp. 42. (*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift*, 1945, No. 6.)

This pamphlet seeks to prove that Horace's Ode, I, 1, instead of being "plane ridicula" as Hermann said, or ironical (K. Fulda,

Heinze and Risberg), imitates Pindar in asserting that an Olympian victor and a lyric poet pursue the two greatest careers possible to a mortal, who is thus raised to the level of the gods. Such is the kernel embedded in an intricate mass at least six times too large; and the title-page seems to imply that this is what we are expected to enunciate—though even here lies confusion, eternal fame being not the same as equality with gods.

To make this contention good, the three following points, and these alone, need proof.

(i) That vv. 3-5 (*sunt quos curriculo . . . nobilis*) do not describe an example parallel with those next enumerated—the politician, merchant, etc.—but a man analogous only to Horace himself as described in the last two stanzas (*me doctarum hederæ . . . feriam sidera vertice*).

(ii) That the *olympionique* and the poet are raised by their achievements to Heaven and association with the gods.

(iii) That the above two ideas are borrowed from Pindar.

To prove (i), we must take v. 6, *terrarum dominos evehit ad deos*, only with the *olympionique* just mentioned, not with the following politician, etc.; and Norberg rightly does so.¹ We have then to discover a syntax for *hunc* and *illum* (vv. 7-10). In note 79 he correctly understands *iuvat* from v. 4 with both accusatives, but with *hunc* understands also *evehit ad deos*, gratuitously ruining this part of his case. If, however, we ignore that inexplicable lapse, we can recognize two descriptions,² analogous to one another but quite different from the intervening types: the *olympionique* whom his victory *evehit ad deos*, and Horace whom his garlands *dis miscent superis*, etc.

To prove (ii) seems to Norberg no task at all. He takes the phrases just quoted as meant literally, writing, e.g., on p. 25, "il dit que . . . la palme de la victoire et la couronne de lierre conduisent l'olympionique et le poète aux Dieux . . . La mise en parallèle de l'olympionique et du poète et les rapports de ces deux idéals avec les Dieux, sont deux éléments essentiels du poème d'Horace."

The present reviewer, though determined not to beg this question (or any other), cannot but express his conviction that we must not take these phrases literally: first, because Horace cannot have believed that he would really strike the stars with his head, however muscular an assistant Maecenas may have been; second, because this kind of language is fairly common in Latin,³ as it could not be if meant literally. Surely Heinze (quoted on p. 30) is right in calling *sublimi feriam sidera vertice* the "stärkster Ausdruck freudigen Stolzes" and paraphrasing with "so fühle ich mich überglücklich."

To prove (iii) is flatly impossible. Norberg's contention is set forth on p. 25 (see above). After saying that the bracketing of

¹ His identification of *terrarum dominos* with *deos* is, however, highly doubtful (despite, e.g., Orelli-Baiter-Hirschfelder *ad loc.*). Why insert a lumbering and otiose description of the gods? Birt's explanation (*Horaz' Lieder*, p. 111, quoted by Norberg, p. 32) is immensely better: that Horace, of course with Pindar in mind, points at men like Thero and Hiero.

² But descriptions of what? See below, on (ii).

³ Cf. for instance Cicero's use of *divinus*, *divinitus*, etc.

olympionique and poet, and the relations of these with the Gods, are essential elements in Horace's poem, he proceeds: "Ces deux éléments, nous prétendons qu'il les a trouvés dans Pindare."

The parallelism of *olympionique* and poet in Pindar is a figment. True, he often sets himself beside the victor; but not at all, so far as anywhere appears, because he sees a fundamental likeness; the reason is that his complete works deal with Olympian, and closely similar, victors. The juxtaposition, though not inevitable, is extremely obvious. What Norberg needs, and cannot adduce, is evidence from the fragments, by no means scanty, of non-epinician poems.

The opposition between *olympionique* and lyric poet on the one side, and soldier, politician, etc., on the other is nowhere to be found. Pindar does give lists of occupations not unlike that in our Horatian ode:

Pyth. I, 41 f.:

ἐκ θεῶν γὰρ μαχαναὶ πᾶσαι βροτέαις ἀρεταῖς,
καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ χερσὶ βιαταὶ περίγλωσ-
σοὶ τ' ἔφυν.

Isth. I, 47 f.:

μισθὸς γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλλος ἐπ' ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώποις γλυκὺς,
μηλοβότα τ' ἄρότα τ' ὄρ-
νιχολόχῳ τε καὶ ὄν πόντος τράφει.

Fr. 208 (Bowra), 221 (Schroeder):

ἀελλοπόδων μὲν τιν' εὐφραίνουσιν ἵππων
τίμα καὶ στέφανοι, τοὺς δ' ἐν πολυχρύ-
σοις θαλάμοις βιοτά·
τέρπεται δὲ καὶ τις ἐπ' οἴδμ' ἄλιον
ναὶ θοῶ σῶς διαμείβων.

But we have no reason at all to suppose that any of these even hints at the Horatian comparison.

Finally, the case for deification or quasi-deification by Pindar of these two human types is if possible weaker still. It would be absurd to enumerate the passages in which he urges kings, athletic victors, and indeed everyone within earshot to remember their mortal estate, and not seek to transcend it. Perhaps the most impressive is the first strophe of *Nem.* VI, which, since Norberg (p. 27) quotes it as supporting him, it may be well to quote in full.

Ἐν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν θεῶν γένος· ἐκ μῆος δὲ πνέομεν
ματρὸς ἀμφοτέρου· διείργει δὲ πᾶσα κεκριμένα
δύναμις, ὡς τὸ μὲν οὐδέν, ὃ δὲ χάλκεος ἀσφαλὲς αἰὲν ἔδος
μένει οὐρανός. ἀλλὰ τι προσφέρομεν ἔμπαν ἢ μέγαν
νόον ἥτοι φύσιν ἀθανάτοις,
καίπερ ἐφαμερίαν οὐκ εἰδότες οὐδὲ μετὰ νύκτας ἄμμε πότμος
οἶαν τιν' ἔγραψε δραμεῖν ποτὶ στάθμαν.

Surely it is plain that Pindar here not only asserts our kinship with the gods, but also insists on the vast difference that nevertheless separates us from them. The words ἀλλὰ τι προσφέρομεν . . . ἀθανάτοις are arresting, indeed, but do not destroy the meaning of

the whole passage. Norberg, however, finds the hardihood to claim them as endorsing his main thesis: "Lorsqu'il écrivit ces mots, Pindare faisait allusion aux poètes et aux athlètes, les deux idéals qu'il plaçait par-dessus tous les autres. Comme, en effet, l'adjectif μέγαν le montre, ce n'était pas tous les hommes qui ressemblaient aux Dieux, mais seulement quelques élus." That is θέσιν διαφυλάττειν with a vengeance.

Had Norberg been content with Pindar's frequent allusions to "immortality" of *renown* for both victor and poet (as on his title-page), no one could have complained. But this would not have helped his theory that Horace's deification-idea comes from Pindar.

The confusion is increased by the presence of topics irrelevant to his thesis. On pp. 6 ff., we find discussion of the four βίοι (Plato, *Rep.* 581 C, Aristotle, *Ethics*, and popular philosophy) which leads nowhere. Norberg astonishingly reports (p. 25) that the βίος φιλόσοφος is dear to Pindar's heart, and that he loves to talk of it. Indeed, most of his statements about Pindar are incorrect: for example (pp. 27 f.) fr. 133 (Bowra 127), which says that βασιλῆες ἀγανοί and others ἥρως ἀγνοί πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλέονται, is interpreted as meaning that they "sont admis parmi les Dieux." The constant assertion that for Pindar the *olympionique* (together with the poet) stands at the head of human beings, is contradicted—in an epinician, be it noted—by the statement (*Ol.* I, 113 f.):

ἐν ἄλλοισι δ' ἄλλοι μεγάλοι· τὸ δ' ἔσχατον κορυφούται
 βασιλεύσι.

The paragraph on pp. 28 f. about Ajax and Odysseus, though quite irrelevant, is brief; but on pp. 13-26 occurs a long, interesting, yet utterly obtrusive account of the "trionphateur romain" whom Horace (we are told) substitutes—not in our Ode, of course—for the Olympian victor. Finally, the long account (pp. 16-23) of the changes which came over Horace's conception of his own function as poet has little if anything to do with the subject. It is, however, by far the best thing in the pamphlet.

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SISTER M. MONICA WAGNER. *Rufinus, the Translator: A Study of his Theory and his Practice as illustrated in his Version of the Apologetica of St. Gregory Nazianzen.* Washington, D. C., The Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1945. Pp. xiii + 100.

This doctoral dissertation written at the Catholic University of America is divided roughly into two parts. Sister Monica offers first a general discussion of Rufinus' aims and methods as a translator and then, in order to test his application of his theories, gives a detailed analysis of his methods in the translation of St. Gregory Nazianzen's *Apologetica*. The general discussion includes a review of criticism of Rufinus and a study of St. Jerome's theory and practice in translation as well as the testimony of Rufinus himself

upon the subject. The analysis of the *Apologetica*, which comprises about two-thirds of the whole, is presented under three heads: Adaptation Procedures, Some Structural Modifications, and Biblical Citations. The analysis is thorough, but I question whether the point involved justifies so long and elaborate a presentation. Certainly it is the first part of this book, with its discussion of theories of translation in the age of St. Jerome that will interest and challenge most readers.

Sister Monica defends with vigor the thesis that "it would be a perverse critic indeed who would set about judging the Latin versions of Rufinus according to a criterion of verbal fidelity" (p. 29). There have of course been several such perverse critics, but I believe most students will concede the justice of the author's protest. It was no doubt the privilege of Rufinus as well as of Jerome, "whose methods in translation he claimed to imitate" (p. viii), to set up his own standards of translation. After a translator has made it perfectly clear in his prefaces that he is not attempting a version *verbum de verbo* and that he intends not merely to translate for his readers but also to edify them, there can be no purpose in pointing out that there are indeed omissions, additions, and other changes. In making alterations the translator has done precisely what he set out to do. Sister Monica safely establishes that Rufinus had his own theory, according to which he defined translation as adaptation, and that in translating the *Apologetica* he carried out theory in practice.

The author is not so successful, however, when she attempts to establish also in behalf of Rufinus the translator the "positive value" of his "translation procedures" (pp. 63-64, 98). That the translations follow the theory prescribed for them by the translator does not mean that they are good translations. That Rufinus wished to edify and consequently characterized "the translator's art as a re-working of old materials" and "the original text as a foundation upon which his versions were constructed" does not make such characterizations acceptable even "on the part of a fourth-century translator who openly and repeatedly announces these methods to his readers as required for his purpose and who justly appeals to precedent in support thereof" (p. 98). Neither do Rufinus' diligence and his belief that his course of adaptation was more difficult than verbal fidelity bear upon the quality of his work as translation. The charge to be made against Rufinus as a translator is neither that he was careless and hasty nor that he followed the sense rather than the words. His fault is rather that his purpose was not simply to translate from one language to another but to write a commentary, to be an ethical teacher, and to popularize. Jerome was quite justified in his accusation that because of his stated aims Rufinus assumed the responsibility of an author rather than that of a translator (*Apol. adv. Ruf.*, I, 7, quoted p. 21, n. 129).

Fundamentally the question involved here, and it is an important one, is what the duties and rights of a translator are. Do they go beyond fidelity combined with clarity? In my opinion they do not. I should agree with Sister Monica that Rufinus' "free handling of his original" does not make him *ipso facto* "a careless and dishonest worker and unequal to his task" (p. vii). The author does not seem

to be aware, however, that it is not Rufinus' free treatment of his original that is to be criticized but rather his judgment and sometimes his intention. He went astray in not letting us know simply and clearly what his authors said without altering their text—and he could have done this in a free as well as in a literal translation. The objection to be made to Rufinus as a translator then is not just that he "did not see fit to include the textual critic as a beneficiary of his labors" (p. 98) but that he sometimes tampered with the text so ruthlessly as to make his work unreliable. Where the original is missing such interference may be costly, and not to the textual critic alone but also to the historian and the theologian. In the translation of Origen's *De principiis* Rufinus' error in this respect is sufficiently serious to have brought the charge of forgery upon him.¹ Sister Monica does not acknowledge this grave fault. She is, I should say, too eager to overlook Rufinus' shortcomings as a translator because of his contributions as a commentator.

I hope this book will be followed by other studies of the early medieval theory and practice of translation, more broadly conceived. A short but extremely interesting step in this direction is taken by W. Schwarz in his article, "The Meaning of *Fidus Interpres* in Medieval Translation," *The Journal of Theological Studies*, XLV (1944), pp. 73-78. This essay, restricted in scope because of war conditions, centers about Boethius' conception of translation. A work which considered at once the aims and methods of Jerome, Rufinus, Marius Mercator, Boethius, and Dionysius Exiguus would not be out of place. This might be only the first of a series of inquiries into the theory and practice of translation in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, and for that matter in more recent times too. Much value might be derived, for example, from the study of translations of scientific texts in the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Comparisons of Patristic and Renaissance versions of, say, the Greek Fathers might also prove useful.

It is clear that translation may mean many things: one may

¹ Gustave Bardy is cited by the author (pp. 3-5) as having a relatively favorable impression of Rufinus as a translator, particularly in his *Recherches sur l'histoire du texte et des versions latines du De principiis d'Origène* (Paris and Lille, 1923). I note, however, that in an article (not mentioned by Sister Monica) published some years after the *Recherches* Bardy expresses an adverse opinion, referring in the course of his discussion to an appropriate section of the *Recherches*. In "Faux et fraudes littéraires dans l'antiquité chrétienne, II," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, XXXII (1936), p. 283, Bardy remarks, after quoting Rufinus on the subject of interpolations in the *De principiis*: "Nous avons perdu le texte grec de ce grand ouvrage, si bien qu'il ne nous est pas possible de vérifier jusqu'à quel point l'argumentation de Rufin était fondée. Nous avons par contre la traduction latine que Rufin lui-même a donnée du *De principiis*, et nous sommes assurés que cette version est loin d'être toujours fidèle: additions, suppressions, explications y abondent [there is a reference to the *Recherches*, pp. 89-153 here], non seulement comme veut bien l'avouer l'interprète, dans les passages où le dogme trinitaire n'était pas exposé en des termes assez précis, mais ailleurs encore, si bien que nous pouvons, sans trop d'injustice, ranger l'honnête Rufin parmi les faussaires qu'il condamne avec si belle ardeur."

translate freely or word for word, as an orator or as an expositor and in all cases still be called a translator. Sister Monica is correct in maintaining that Rufinus does what he said he would do. The question remains whether his practice of injecting exposition into his translations does not seriously diminish his value as a translator.

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NAUM JASNY. *The Wheats of Classical Antiquity*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. Pp. 176; 2 pls. (*The Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series LXII, No. 3.)

The author is well qualified for the above study. He is an authority upon food grains, having published in 1940, for the Food Research Institute of Stanford University, an exhaustive study of present day grains.¹ Also, his familiarity with the Russian language makes accessible to him much of the most important research in recent years upon the origin of cultivated plants, grains especially,—the research of the Russian botanists Vavilov and Fliaksberger.

The purposes of the book are several. One is to bring the views of modern botanists to the attention of historians (p. 11). Another is the reinterpretation of classical references to grains with particular emphasis upon the adaptability and use of the several kinds of wheat, as for porridge and bread (p. 12). This is important. The ancients did not describe and distinguish plant types so much by morphological characteristics, e. g., flower structure, as we do. Instead, they tended to distinguish plants by their food or medicinal value, judging them by their uses, often on the criteria of flavor and odor. Thus many ancient references to specific grains describe their suitability for grits (porridge) or for flour (bread). And since certain types of wheats are definitely superior for this or that use, these references are valuable aids toward identification of the varieties of ancient wheats.

Whereas barley probably ranked first in the production of grains in Mediterranean lands around 500 B. C., it had generally yielded the first place to wheat by 500 A. D. (p. 14). Since 1918 the kinds of wheat have been classified scientifically by their chromosome number, one-kernelled wheat or einkorn having 14 chromosomes, emmer wheats having 28, and spelt types having 42 (pp. 18 f.). A commonly employed classification distinguishes wheats by the presence or absence of hulls. All einkorn has hulls, but, whereas there is a hulled form of emmer, there are also three hull-less or naked types, chief of which is durum. Likewise there are two forms of the spelt group of wheats. The hulled form is spelt proper; the naked form embraces three types, chief of which is common wheat.

¹ *Competition Among Grains*, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, California. Stanford University Press, 1940 (no. 2 in Grain Economic Series).

Jasny prefaces his study with a consideration of the present distribution of these kinds of wheat (pp. 22 ff.). Einkorn is the least grown and is now found in Asia Minor, in Spain, and occasionally throughout the Mediterranean and Black Sea areas as a weed in wheat fields. The type of emmer which has hulls is found in slight quantities in many Mediterranean countries, but the naked types, particularly durum, occur throughout the Mediterranean area. Durum predominates in the hotter climates, especially in Sicily and Egypt. Spelt proper has hulls and is grown only in a limited area of S. W. Germany and the adjacent portions of Switzerland, whereas the naked form of the spelt group, principally common wheat, is by far the dominant wheat grown in the world today.

Jasny outlines his thesis on pages 26-28. The present distribution of wheat types in the Mediterranean area is an indication, he believes, of the wheat types grown in antiquity. The emmer group then dominated "almost to the exclusion of the other two groups" (p. 27). The use of einkorn declined during antiquity; spelt proper did not appear till toward the end of the period and the naked forms of the spelt group made no advance over the naked forms of the emmer group until after classical times.

The remainder of the book is a compilation of data, references to modern authorities, chiefly botanists, and to ancient authors, arrayed to support Jasny's contentions. The arguments are not always easy to follow. The seeming contradiction of some of the ancient statements (especially those of Pliny, p. 38) and the difficulty of the interpretation of the many Greek and Roman names of wheats cannot easily be solved. Yet Jasny makes a good case for his thesis. *Τίφη* (*ξεία ἀπλή*), Latin *tīphe*, was einkorn (pp. 109 ff.), well suited for use as porridge but too scanty in yield to compete successfully with other wheats (p. 152). *Ζεία*, *ὄλυρα* (pp. 112 ff.), and *σμιδαλίτης* (pp. 89 ff.), Latin *ador*, *far*, and *tritium*, were emmers (both hulled and naked), also well suited for porridge, good in yield, and particularly well adapted to the Mediterranean climate. This is especially true of durum, which predominated in the warmer lands (Sicily and Egypt) in classical antiquity, as it does even today (p. 91). Though ill adapted for bread, durum is sweet and best for porridge. It also yields excellent paste and has been extensively used for macaroni since the invention of that food form soon after the close of classical times.

Jasny effectively disposes of spelt proper, which was long thought to be the hulled wheat of the ancients (pp. 120 ff.). He believes the *spelta* named in the Edict of Diocletian was emmer (pp. 134 ff.). *Σιτανίας* (p. 105), Latin *siligo* (especially spring sown varieties), made the best flour and the finest bread, according to ancient authors (pp. 66 ff.). This was a naked form of the spelt group, chiefly common wheat. It was sown in the spring (mostly in Italy, p. 68) and was therefore much less widely grown in antiquity than the emmers, for these wheats, being sown in the fall, adapted themselves better to the Mediterranean climate, starting their growth in the moist winters before the droughts of spring and summer.

Jasny consistently names the Loeb translator of Theophrastus' *Enquiry into Plants* as Horst (pp. 12 and 167). The correct name

is Hort. Jasny's manner of referring to Pliny's *Natural History* is confusing at times because of inconsistencies, as, for example, in notes 54 and 55 on page 102. In note 55 the complete reference is given including both the section numbers used in the Bohn translation and the number of the smaller section used in the Teubner (Mayhoff) text. In note 54, however, only the Teubner section number is given. Also, Jasny's references to Russian authors are often misleading since when translating the titles of their works, he frequently fails to indicate that the titles are merely his own translations. Actually the works do not exist in English. These are minor criticisms, however. The book is an able treatment of the subject and is valuable both for presenting the views of modern botanists and for the new approach stressing the qualities and uses of ancient wheats.

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BLAUMA I. TRELL. *The Temple of Artemis at Ephesos*. New York, American Numismatic Society, 1945. Pp. x + 71; 1 + 28 pls. \$2.00. (*Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, No. 107.)

When the Abbé Montfaucon published his *Antiquité Expliquée* in 1719 and 1724, long before travelers had returned from the Eastern Mediterranean with accurate delineations of Greek monuments, it was to representations on coins that he wisely limited the illustration of Greek architecture, instead of adopting the fantastic restorations of his contemporary Fischer d'Erlach. Since that time the comprehensive study of coin types as illustrative of ancient architecture has been undertaken only once, by T. L. Donaldson in his *Architectura Numismatica* published in 1859, until the last few years when, under the same general title, Donald F. Brown and Mrs. Trell wrote their unpublished dissertations on, respectively, *I, The Temples of Rome*, and *II, Temples in Asia Minor*. Both writers have published portions of their dissertations in *Numismatic Notes and Monographs*, No. 90 (1940) and No. 107 (1945). It is with the latter of these that we are here concerned.

From a study of 1800 coins of 250 types, of Roman date, representing thirty-eight temples of Asia Minor (Aphrodisias, Colophon, Ephesus [6], Erythrae, Magnesia [2], Metropolis, Miletus [2], Mylasa [2], Pergamum [4], Samos, Sardis [6], Smyrna [6], Teos [2], Tralles [2], and an unknown Asia Minor temple on coins of C. Fannius, governor in 49-48 B. C.), and from comparison with whatever is known of the actual architecture of these examples, Mrs. Trell draws valuable conclusions as to the veracity of the die-engravers. She finds that the representations are fundamentally faithful, subject to a code of abbreviation in the reduction in number, or omission, of details, and in stylization. Thus the engraver may show the proper number of columns on a façade, or fewer, but never more; an octastyle façade may be represented with any even number from two to eight, a hexastyle with any even number from two to

six, etc. The same applies to the number of steps in the platform below a colonnade. She rightly points out the fallacy of deducing facts as to restoration or even identification of a temple from one or two coins alone, since those first available might happen to be the most abbreviated ones; only by following the illustration of a temple through an entire series can one draw safe conclusions as to its basic form. She discovers, by comparison with the architectural evidence, that the die-engraver was faithful (within the limits of abbreviation) to the architectural "order" of the temple, never using the wrong types of capitals except on multiple-type coins whereon capitals might be shown as uniform on all the buildings in spite of differences in actuality. She even decides—though this is harder to prove—that the die-engraver's faithfulness was such that he never "invented" details, and that, in consequence, the spirally fluted columns shown in some illustrations of the temple of Hera at Samos, and the arcuated lintels shown over the central intervals of nine temples (including Aphrodisias, Metropolis, Samos, Sardis, and Tralles), reproduce what actually existed in late imperial times. More plausible are the pediment windows represented in five of her listed temples (Ephesus [4] and Magnesia, as well as, outside her series, Baalbek, Emesa, and Laodicea, and in actual architectural remains at Antioch in Pisidia, Baalbek [another], and Mylasa).

The reviewer believes that another element should be added to the code, that is, if not "invention," at least "transposition" or "transference." This alone, in his opinion, could explain the representation of dentils under the raking cornice at Ephesus, where they would have no place in fourth-century design, and the antefixes on top of the raking sima normal to the slope, an illogical usage recurring in a barbaric provincial temple at Ciro in South Italy. These, it would seem, were transferred by die-engravers not too familiar with the strict laws of architecture, respectively, from below the horizontal cornice and from the top of the flank sima. By analogy, therefore, we might explain the "arcuated lintels"—which often enframe the heads of cult statues transferred to the façade plane—as the tops of niches or shrines within the respective cellae; and the spirally fluted columns of Samos would fall into the same category. In fact, the "arcuated lintel" is of such general use on coins that one might suspect it as a mere numismatic convention for the enframement of cult statues. Certainly it is difficult to believe, in view of the absence of material remains, that so many of the temples of Asia Minor were rebuilt with arcuated lintels in the second and third centuries A. D.

Most of the small volume (pp. 7-32) is devoted to the documentation of the various details of the fifth ("E" or "Alexander") temple of Artemis at Ephesus both as to its known and its unknown architectural details, with reference to the coins issued by twenty emperors from Claudius to Valerian over a period of more than two centuries (A. D. 41 to 258).¹ This portion is illustrated by reproductions of

¹ There are no references to the coins published by Montfaucon (*op. cit.*, II, 1, pl. 15; suppl. II, pl. 4), nor, with one exception (p. 61), to the studies of Donaldson (*op. cit.*, pp. 21-32, 88-90, 150-152); there are certain items, as the sculptured drums and the pediment openings, on which their opinions might have been cited.

thirty-five different coins and by an architectural elevation drawn by Stuart Shaw (frontispiece). P. 32: the great platform is never accurately represented, showing at most seven equal steps, so that even this inadequate maximum must be an abbreviation; it is to be noted that Shaw's restoration with a vertical podium supported on four steps and crowned by only two, though adding up to the number seven, is not substantiated either by the coins or by the architectural remains. Pp. 29-32: the coins, however, apparently give the final answer to the much disputed question of the *columnae caelatae*, whether those on the façade had two superposed tiers with the sculptured drums on top of the pedestals (Fergusson, Murray, Henderson), or merely sculptured pedestals alone (Lethaby), or merely sculptured drums alone (Wood, Butler, Dinsmoor, Krischen), in that only the last conforms to the representation of a single tier of sculptured cylindrical drums. Pp. 28-29: the dentils resting directly on the architrave, forming the friezeless entablature, generally assumed for the last forty years on the analogy of other temples, are now definitely authenticated by the coins; but the author's statement that these appear only in one type (pl. III, 1) is not literally accurate, since it is obvious that the beading above the architrave in many types is a shorthand representation of dentils. Pp. 10-23: three window-like openings in the pediment, represented on the coins but previously interpreted as tables, altars, or a central door with two altars, are now definitely proved to have been three windows by analogy with other coins (e. g., Baalbek, Magnesia) which reproduce the pediment-windows existing in these very temples, thus corroborating a suggestion made long ago by the reviewer (*A. J. A.*, XIV [1910], p. 151, n. 1) that some special precaution, analogous to the hollowed lintels and pediment opening of the Propylaea at Athens, must have been taken above the central intervals of colossal Ionic temples such as Ephesus. This discovery leads the author to a very interesting accumulation of evidence for such pediment windows (summarized above), supplementing the discussion by D. M. Robinson (*Art Bulletin*, IX [1926], p. 17). Pp. 10-11, 23-27: the pediment sculpture, hitherto only fancifully restored, is represented on coins with a maximum number of four figures alternating with three windows, two figures standing and two reclining, which the author tentatively restores as four Amazons recalling those set up in this sanctuary by four great sculptors of the fifth century (Pliny, XXXIV, 53); but in this respect the reviewer is more doubtful, since both on the coins and in the architectural elevation (frontispiece) the composition appears so parsimonious and meagre as to suggest that the die-engravers here abbreviated as in the matter of the steps. Pp. 10-11, 27-28: a convex disk shown on the coins as suspended from the apex of the raking cornice (analogous to the Spartan shield at Olympia?) is interestingly restored as a Gorgoneion like that on a terracotta tablet from Locri Epizephyrii. Another strange detail of the pediment, shown on many coins but not mentioned by the author (except in passing on p. 5), is represented in Shaw's elevation, namely, the series of antefixes normal to the slope on the top of the raking sima, which, as noted above, the reviewer regards as an instance of transference. It is evident that this careful sifting of the

numismatic evidence has greatly increased our knowledge of one of the seven wonders of the ancient world.

As further demonstration of the usefulness of coins in the identification and restoration of temples, the author shows (pp. 33-35) that the temple appearing on coins of Samos is the actual Ionic Heraeum rather than a Doric peripteral structure erected before it in the imperial period as Schleif assumed; also (pp. 36-39) that four temples combined on coins of Sardis are four different temples rather than four aspects of the single temple of Artemis as Butler had assumed, and (pp. 39-40) that the temple of Asclepius Soter on coins of Pergamum was too large to be identified with the Hellenistic or the Roman structures already excavated, as proposed, respectively, by Deubner and Wiegand. Apparently, moreover, the so-called Serapeum or temple of Claudius at Ephesus was in reality a temple erected for the cult of the emperors in the time of Hadrian (pp. 50-59). By such instances the importance of a comprehensive survey of the numismatic evidence by the architectural investigator is simply vindicated.

A few typographical errors, such as variant spellings of Mme. Paola Zancani-Montuoro's name (pp. 28, 70), the omission of the "o" in Leukophryene (p. 70) or of the "e" in Arkadiane (pl. xxvi), are of minor importance. The twenty-nine plates, more than half displaying coins, are very clearly and adequately reproduced, permitting the reader to test, and in most cases to corroborate, the author's conclusions.

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GUDMUND BJÖREK. *Apsyrtus, Julius Africanus et l'Hippiatrique Grecque*. Uppsala and Leipzig, 1944. Pp. 70. (*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift*, 1944, No. 4.)

With this book, Björck continues his earlier studies of the *Corpus Hippiatricum* which have contributed so much toward a better understanding of its content and historical significance. His main concerns in his new investigation are chronological and literary problems (chs. I-II), as well as text and tradition of the collection (chs. III-IV).

To start with the latter part of the treatise, Björck shows that the number of Greek manuscripts used by Hoppe and Oder in their authoritative edition can be enlarged; he also surveys Latin and Italian renderings which ought to be considered (pp. 42 ff.). Moreover, he emphasizes the importance of the Arabic tradition. Theonnestus' book, lost in the original, seems to have been known to Hunain ibn Ishak who apparently promoted its translation. A re-examination of the Arabic sources should yield interesting results (pp. 36 ff.). It follows that the text as given by Hoppe and Oder cannot be considered final, a fact especially noteworthy in regard to the appreciation of the linguistic and syntactic data which the Hippiatric writings contain (e.g. pp. 52 ff.). Björck himself is fair enough, however, to point out that his findings, including a revaluation of the

history of the collection and of the grouping of its various chapters (pp. 26 ff.), are not likely to invalidate the basic presuppositions of the work done by the last editors of the *Corpus Hippiatricum* (pp. 50 f.).

As regards the chronological questions discussed by Björck (ch. 1), he proposes that Apsyrtus cannot have written after the Danubian campaign of 332-334 A. D., that he must have lived between 150 and 250 A. D., rather than under Constantine the Great, as has been generally assumed on the authority of Suidas (p. 12). The new dating seems to square well with the circumstances that Apsyrtus' language is free of "Byzantine" influences, that none of the official titles of the fourth century occur in his writings, and that the addressees of his letters are not Christians (pp. 11 f.). The new dating would also make it understandable that Theomnestus, who certainly wrote between 313 and 324 A. D. (p. 8), could quote the book of Apsyrtus. Theomnestus' reference to Apsyrtus is indeed the stumbling block for those who follow Suidas. Yet Björck's thesis is acceptable only with the provision that the data furnished by Suidas are not derived from good and independent sources. To me, this seems a rather hazardous assumption, as things stand in the present case, even granted that Suidas' reliability is not beyond doubt. Björck maintains (p. 9) that Suidas has copied the statement concerning Apsyrtus' military service from the beginning of the latter's own book. This may well be true. But where did he find that Apsyrtus was born in Prusa or Nicomedia? According to Björck (p. 9, n. 1), Suidas has culled the names from letters now lost or from incipits now changed, or from the subscription of Apsyrtus' book given in an earlier *Corpus*. The probability of such a hypothesis is not enhanced by the fact that, in the preserved documents, Apsyrtus is introduced as a citizen of Clazomenae (II, p. 96, 23, Oder and Hoppe). Again, one may surmise that Suidas misinterpreted a dedication of Apsyrtus' work, or of a whole *Corpus*, to one of the later Constantines as indicating that Apsyrtus lived under Constantine the Great. It is equally possible that in both instances he simply transcribed a source which used reliable external information. While Apsyrtus' style and vocabulary do not place him in the fourth century, they do not speak against his writing during that period either. And since additions to the text of the *Corpus Hippiatricum* could easily be made and were actually inserted by later compilers, it would be safer, I think, to take Theomnestus' mention of Apsyrtus for an interpolation. For this much has been proved by Björck, that one must either make this assumption or give up the dating based on the article of Suidas. To reconcile both statements, as has recently been tried again by Hoppe (*R.-E.*, Supplement VII, s. v. "Theomnestus"), is an impossible procedure.

Finally, Björck suggests (ch. II) that the *Kestoi* of Julius Africanus are "un pastiche ou bien un véritable travestissement" (p. 25), and although he admittedly feels uncertain whether this characterization should cover the book in its entirety (p. 24), he does not hesitate to compare Julius Africanus with Lucian (p. 23). It is certainly true that some of the passages of the *Kestoi* are not meant to be taken quite seriously (pp. 20 ff.). That this is so, however, hardly

implies that the author intended to parody superstition in general, as did Lucian. Julius Africanus, his good sense and critical judgment notwithstanding, adhered to "superstitious" beliefs, he relished "sacred" books which dealt with mysteries, he enjoyed relating "secret histories" (cf. Kroll, *R.-E.*, s. v., X, cols. 117 f., 120 ff.). The stories on which Björck puts so much emphasis record some of the well known *παλγυα*, that is, practical jokes which are so often referred to in the ancient literature on magic (cf. M. Wellmann, *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., IV [1921], pp. 31 ff.; Björck, p. 56), and in my opinion it would be a mistake to draw any conclusions from Julius Africanus' mention of these facetious descriptions as to the tenor of the work itself or as to the author's attitude toward superstition. I cannot help expressing the hope that Björck, who has himself written so lucidly on magic in the *Corpus Hippiatricum* (ch. VII, pp. 55 ff.), will reconsider his verdict on Julius Africanus and allow him to be "sensible" and "superstitious" at the same time. Many of Julius' contemporaries were of like hue.

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R. P. FESTUGIÈRE, O. P. *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, I: L'Astrologie et les Sciences Occultes.* Paris, J. Gabalda & Co., 1944. Pp. xii + 424.

There has come down to us a collection of theological treatises, known as *Corpus Hermeticum* (or *Poimandres*) and purporting to contain teachings of Hermes Trismegistus, god of wisdom. There are extant, too, many disparate writings attributed to the same divine authorship, which concern astrology and other occult arts. This "hermetic" literature has not yet been treated as a whole. W. Scott in his *Hermetica* purposely ignored "the masses of rubbish" and limited his investigations to the theological writings. Father Festugière's work will cover the whole subject. In the present, first, volume he treats the Hermetic writings on astrology and cognate matters. Since, as he states himself (pp. 82 and 355), the name of Hermes was a mere label, arbitrarily and without discrimination attached to disparate works which might have circulated as well under another name, there is no unity of subject in his book. But that is the sole objection (if any) which the reader may be tempted to advance. For Festugière's book is written according to the best traditions of French scholarship. He is exact without pedantry and presents in a lucid and well-ordered form an astonishing array of detailed and difficult materials. Twenty pages of indices help the reader. Appendices give the Greek text of an alchemist treatise (by Zosimus), the dossier bearing on Cyprian the magician (with the translation of a Coptic version of *Confessio* by Mr. Malinine), and, last but not least, an admirable account of Hermetic literature in Arabic by the master hand of Louis Massignon.

In the middle section of his book, Festugière successively examines

Hermetic writings of astrology (pp. 106-122), those bearing on the relations of herbs and stones to the planets (pp. 160-187), as well as the surviving fragments of alchemist treatises (pp. 240-283), and the texts concerning the magic arts (pp. 287-303). A chapter deals with the so-called "Kiranides," a group of works on magical, particularly medical, efficacy and properties of animals. Composed before 100 A. D., these works widely influenced the bestiaries of the Middle Ages. By translating more important passages, Festugière greatly facilitates the understanding of these abstruse and arid remains of Greek pseudo-science. Nevertheless, I am afraid that even a recipe as to how to pluck sunflowers so as to enable the adept to see at a glance the treasures hidden under the earth (p. 154) will hardly attract the reader. As a matter of fact, all these aberrations are only interesting as testimonies of a historical situation or, as Festugière says (p. 362), as records of "human nature as it was" under the Caesars, or as texts which manifest "the real reasons of life and behaviour" of a period. For this reason, Festugière diligently marks the place of each Hermetic writing in the current of occult thought which carried off the Ancient World under the Roman Empire. For the same reason, he deals with the literary form of the revelation (pp. 309-355), an important contribution to the morphology of religion. He successively treats the revelation in dream, by the word of god, and by other types of direct inspiration; then he studies two forms of conveyance of revelation: admonitions addressed to a king and the instruction given by a father to his son. He stresses the fact (pp. 336, 346, 348, 353) that the idea of the tradition of secret knowledge from father to son (and not from teacher to disciple) is of Oriental, particularly Egyptian, origin. I may add that the moulding of this tradition in epistolary form is Hellenistic (and Greek). As to the revelations by a sage directed to a king, it is hardly necessary to cite here the belief in the divinity of princes (p. 324); in this case the king would be the inspired author himself (cf. p. 325). This type rather follows the Egyptian patterns of didactic works, which are regularly destined for a prince (*Sayings of Ipu-wer, Instructions for Merikere, etc.*).

In the Introduction (pp. 1-89) Festugière deals with the decline of Greek rationalism and the rise of mysticism. He discusses the predilection of late paganism for Oriental revelation and the quest to see the deity face to face, and, coming to Hermetic literature, speaks of its origins and stresses that both classes of Hermetic texts, theological as well as occult, belong to the same milieu and the same spiritual situation.

These are important and difficult questions, and there is room for disagreement. To come to one fundamental point of difference,—for Festugière the success of occult arts and sciences under the Roman Empire is a "perversion of piety." Giving up the rational study of Nature, man asks the deity to grant him as a personal revelation the knowledge he formerly sought to obtain by the force of his intellect (p. 5). To explain this regression toward barbarism, Festugière speaks of the life-blood drained off the wounded body of Hellenism (p. 7) and particularly stresses the fact that the Greek

scientific work lacked experimentation and that Greek rationalism exhausted itself in logomachy (p. 8). But wordy disputations occupied the Greek scientist because the central object of his investigations always remained Man, and not Nature. Like the great French seeker for truth (Malebranche), Greek scholars thought that the most necessary and the most worthy knowledge is that concerning ourselves. As to the weakening of Greek spiritual energy, I venture to think that the emergence of a new (although misleading) way of research can hardly be regarded as a proof of deficiency. Let us imagine ourselves at the beginning of our era and cast our eyes over the results of some five centuries of rational investigation of Nature. The practical result of this investigation is almost nil. The sword of the legionary has conquered the world, but its excellence, stressed by Polybius (VI, 23, 6), owes nothing to Hellenistic science, but much to the art of Spanish blacksmiths. Augustus and not Antony reigns over the world because the small and swift "Liburnae" of the former, constructed after the manner of the barbarian Illyrians, scored at Actium in comparison with Egyptian ships built according to Hellenistic technic. The same sterility of science appears everywhere. Metals were in great demand in the Hellenistic world, but there was hardly any progress in technical devices after Themistocles (M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, II, p. 1219). As to medicine, some Latin author of the first century (I quote from memory, unable to identify the passage), assures us that there is no further possibility of inventing a new drug. Nevertheless, men continued scientific investigations. At the same time that Nigidius Figulus was helping to spread in Italy the occult arts, Philodemus discussed the principles of empirical method (see P. H. DeLacy and E. A. DeLacy, *Philodemus, On Methods of Inference* [1941]). When the false prophet Alexander of Abonutichos was exercising his tricks, Galen performed vivisections in public to show the function of the brain and spinal cord in the nervous system, while the great Ptolemy discussed refraction and the relation between the eye and light. A contemporary of Apollonius of Tyana, Menelaos of Alexandria, published the first work on spherical trigonometry, while others at the same time were enthusiastic about geographical discoveries. *O quantum terrae, quantum cognoscere caeli permissum est. Pelagus quantos aperimus in usum* (Valerius Flaccus, *Argon.*, I, 168).

But the empirical and positivistic approach led at best to a rather uncertain probability, as Philodemus states. Mathematics alone offered reliable and certain knowledge and accordingly was extended in an unbroken tradition until the time of Newton. The weakness of ancient experimental science, which suffered most severely from the lack of continuance in research (see O. Neugebauer, *Journ. Near East. Stud.*, 1945, p. 19), had as its background the poverty of the ancient world. There was no keen competition or over-production in agriculture or industry, no need for mass production, but a plentiful supply of cheap labor,—all the factors which excluded want of and demand for technical improvements (Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, II, p. 1237). Thus, tired of the inefficiency of official science, men turned to the occult arts. They hoped to find here a

"short-cut" to practical results (so in astrology, alchemy, etc.), since here the researcher came in contact with the cause of things, the divinity, and since, according to Greek (Platonic) principle, the arts which rest on empirical observation are of little value. True science is based on knowledge of causes.

Pestugière (p. 316) places on the same level the search for truth and the Oriental revelation in ecstatic trance. But in the latter case man is passive, while an adept of the Hermetics worked to acquire the knowledge. As Seneca says (*De Ben.*, IV, 8, 1), the universal deity is called Mercurius (Hermes), *quia ratio penes illum est numerusque et ordo et scientia*. Accordingly, Hermes Trismegistus prescribes for his adepts the forcing of the knowledge: "think that for you nothing is impossible . . . bid your soul fly heavenward." That is the Greek idea of climbing up by one's own endeavour. Aristophanes had earlier ridiculed the dithyrambic souls who floated in air looking for odes (Aristophanes, *Pax*, 828). Misdirected as they were, the paths trodden by the Greek occultists aimed at the conquest of Nature. For this reason, these efforts were regarded with misgiving by pious souls (cf. L. Delatte, *L'Ant. Class.*, 1935, p. 309).

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ÉCOLE LIBRE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES, NEW YORK.

ERIK VANDVIK. National Admixture in Medieval Latin. Reprinted from *Symbolae Osloenses*, XXIII (1944), pp. 81-101.

This is a useful survey of Old Norwegian (sometimes German) loanwords, loan-translations, and loan idioms that are to be found in Latin writings of Old Norwegian authors.

After a short introduction the author first takes up "Proper Names and Technical Terms," that being the most conspicuous category, then "Some substrata of the Common Vocabulary," then "Vernacular Features in the Syntax," and finally "The Substrata and the Writers' Nationality."

A few notes are here in order. On pp. 82-83 the author compares *insula pertinet ad regem Norwegie, ita quod non habet ibi aliquis nisi solus rex Norwegie* with *Innþræendr hqfðu fjqlmennt á Mærinni*, but the cases are not quite comparable; *hafa* in the sense of "possess" always seems to need an object, except in the phrase *hafa í seli* "keep (animals) at the shieling."

On p. 85 it is noted that a bishop of the Faroes added "a curious termination to the national stem" of *rúnar*. The word is *Malrunen* (*málrúnar*) and the termination seems to be German. There are more instances of German elements in these Latin writings.

On p. 89 the author discusses *norici* in the sense "inhabitants of the North of Norway" (the usual sense of *norici* being: "Northmen, Norwegians"). To prove his point—which cannot be disputed—he says that *norðmenn* was used in Iceland about the inhabitants of North Iceland. Now this term is actually found once—in a verse

from 1231—while the usual terms for that sense are *norðlendingr* or *norðanmaðr* ("Northlander," "man from the North"). I am inclined to think that *norðmenn* was formed *ad hoc* to fit the verse line.

On the origin of *lingua materna* (p. 94) Professor Spitzer has other ideas (*Monatshefte für Deutschen Unterricht*, XXXVI, pp. 113 ff.), but it occurs apparently first in the *Historia de antiquitate regum Norwagensium* by Theodricus monachus.

On p. 96 though the author prints *consulimus* (pro *suadimus*!) he does not expressly point out the Old Norse verb substratum *ráða*, which he has in mind.

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